PREFACE

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HRAF-37 N. Y. U. -2 ..... *Burma (3 Vols.)*

PREFACE

121 This is one of five monographs prepared by the staff of the China Project at Stanford University in fulfillment of a twelve-month subcontract with the Human Relations Area Files, Incorporated, New Haven, Connecticut.

The main purpose of this monograph is to present insofar as possible a concise account of the social, economic, and political conditions and problems of the North China Region, which is comprised of the provinces of Hopei and Shansi. Although primary emphasis is placed on developments since the Chinese Communists assumed the reins of government in the latter part of 1949, whenever necessary the region's past is touched upon.

121
114 It may be helpful to point out to readers unfamiliar with the Chinese source material used for the preparation of this monograph that, generally official publications published before 1949 in Nanking or Chungking were of Nationalist origin, whereas those dated from 1949, unless their place of publication is Taipei, Hong Kong, or some other non-Communist area, are Communist sources. Moreover, two sources, the Survey of China Mainland Press and Current Background, although prepared by the American Consulate General in Hong Kong,

121 are compilations of translations from Chinese
114 Communist publications; unless the citations contained therein are specifically attributed to American editors, they refer to translations from Communist newspapers and magazines and neither represent nor reflect the views of the United States Government. The critical use of Communist and pro-Communist sources has been the principal means of analyzing developments in Soviet Russia. Scholars of China are now obliged by circumstances to employ similar sources in their study of contemporary China.

121 The regional approach embodied in this monograph represents an attempt to conform with the suggestion of our Prime Contractor. Although certain topics which cannot be properly treated on a regional basis have been discussed in more general terms, the bulk of this monograp is comprised of regional information. Since Communist China is undergoing many rapid chang the studies contained in this monograph should be brought up to date at frequent intervals.

This monograph is to be regarded as a cooperative project, and no attempt will be made to identify the authors of the individual studies included. It is enough to mention the members of our staff.

121 Sociological -- Shau Wing Chan, Lienche T. Fang, Susan Han, Kai-yü Hsü, John E. Manning, Arthur F. Wright

Economic -- Hsien-chang Ling, Yüeh-ch'iung Pu Tung, Yüan-li Wu

Political -- Carsun Chang, Yü-nan Chang, Franklin W. Houn, Robert C. North, Mary C. Wright

000 We are also grateful to our consultants who have rendered us invaluable assistance: Professor T'ung-ho Tung of the Academia Sinica, Dr. Kia-ngau Chang, Loyola University of Los Angeles, Dr. Shun-hsin Chow, now of the College of William and Mary, Dr. Ch'i-yün Chang and Dr. Yün-t'ien Chiang of Formosa, and Dr. Shann Yau Wang of Hong Kong. We are also grateful to Professor Joseph E. Williams, executive head of the Department of Geography, Stanford University, for his supervision of our cartographic work. We should like to express our sincere appreciation to the staff of the Hoover Library, Stanford University, for their patient co-operation, and particularly to Dr. Mary C. Wright, curator of Chinese Collections, for her unfailing support.

000 The views and opinions expressed in this monograph are those of the staff of the China Project and are not necessarily those of Stanford University.

Shau Wing Chan, Director

March 26, 1956
Stanford University
Stanford, California

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* See pocket in back cover

Annex "A," Subparagraph la',
Sociological Background

GEOGRAPHICAL SETTING

131 101 Immediately before the Peking regime abolished regional administrative organs in the summer of 1954, the North China Region consisted of two provinces -- Hopei and Shansi. Wedged between the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and the northeastern provinces to the north and Shantung and Honan provinces to the south, this region spans six degrees of latitude (36°-42°N), and nine degrees of longitude (110°-119°E). To the west, it borders on Shensi Province, and to the east, the Gulf of Pohai provides it with access to the sea. The area is approximately 332,000 square kilometers (129,000 sq. mi.) only 3.3 per cent of China's total land territory, with a population of over fifty-five million (9.6 per cent of the total Chinese populace).

161 The population density of North China as a whole is about 167 persons per square kilometer (439 per sq. mi.). But in areas like the Hai River estuary, including Tientsin, Peking, and its vicinity, the various population concentrations at the center of the famous North China Plain, and the Taiyuan high basin on the Shansi plateau, there are over five-hundred persons to each square kilometer (1,316 per sq. mi.) of land. On the other hand, there are less than twenty people per square mile in Northwest Shansi.[1]

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[1] Chou Sung-k'ang, Shan-hsi [Shansi], Shanghai, Chung-hua shu-chü, 1939, p. 70.

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
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REGIONAL BOUNDARY

[Facing p. 1--A]


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Precipitation
Scale in Miles
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PROVINCES
A-Shansi
B-Hopei

[Facing p. 1 -- B]


NORTH CHINA
Mean Annual Temperature
Scale in Miles
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PROVINCES
A-Shansi
B-Hopei

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
3000
D2
5000
40
36
112
116
0
Sang-chien River
Yung-ting
Hu-to River
Tzu-ya
Nan
Fen River
Ch'in-shui River

NORTH CHINA TOPOGRAPHIC

[facing page 1]

-D1-

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

GULF OF CHIHLI
River
River
River
40
36
116
0
100
200
E. Conaghan

OGRAPHIC

[facing page 1]
-D2-

101 The term "North China" has been used to refer to a region in the northern part of China which has been varyingly defined at different times. Before the Communist ascent to power, North China was most commonly understood to comprise five provinces, these of Hopei, Shantung, Shansi, Suiyuan, and Chahar. Between 1949 and 1952 the Peking regime continued to employ the term "North China" to describe the five northern provinces which, however, excluded Shantung and in its place included a new province called P'ing-yüan created out of parts of Shantung, Hopei, and Honan provinces. During 1952-54, Chahar, Suiyuan, and P'ing-yüan provinces were abolished and their territories divided. Suiyuan and a large portion of Chahar were incorporated in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. The remainder of Chahar went to Hopei. P'ing-yüan Province underwent a three-way split; each of the three parts was restored to the province from which the part had been carved. As a result, the North China Region after January 1954 included only two provinces, Hopei and Shansi, with their boundaries roughly in agreement with the pre-Communist provincial lines of demarcation. The northeastern boundary of the region is an exception. There, a sizable area has been gained from the former provinces of Chahar and Jehol. Thus Hopei Province today is considerably larger than it was in the 1930's.

A resolution to abolish Jehol Province and divide its territory among the Mogolia Autonomous

101 Region, Liaoning Province, and Hopei Province was passed during the closing sessions of the People's Congress in Peking toward the end of July, 1955. The references to North China in this chapter, however, are based on the 1954 information because the details of the latest change are still unavailable.[2]

TOPOGRAPHY

133 This region is composed of an impressive tableland in the west and a huge alluvial plain in the east. The difference in elevation between the two halves amounts to about 2,000 meters (6,500 ft.).

1. Mountains: The mountains on the northern border of this region are an extension of the great Yin Shan Range that forms a natural line of demarcation which used to separate the Chinese from the Mongols. These mountains are, from west to east, the Ta-hai-t'o, the Chün-tu, and the Yen-shan, each about 1,000 meters (3,280 ft.) in height and all having steep southern approaches. Rising an average of 2,000 meters (6,560 ft.) in the middle and extending throughout the region is the T'ai-hang Range which marks the end of the Northwest China highland. At the northern tip of

133
778
788

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[2] For details of political subdivisions as of 1954, see the chapter on Structure of Government.

133 this range stand two noted summits, the Heng-
778 shan, traditionally known as Pei-yüeh (one of the
788 five sacred mountains), and the Wu-t'ai-shan, or
Five-Table Mountain, so-called because of its
summit having five flat peaks. The historic religious buildings on the Wu-t'ai-shan have been
destinations of uninterrupted Buddhistic pilgrim-
133 age through the centuries. These two mountains
measure 2,200 meters (7,216 ft.) in height respectively. To the west of the T'ai-hang in the southern half of Shansi Province is Huo-shan Mountain (2,200 m. or 7,216 ft.). To the northwest rises the Yün-chung Range. The Lü-liang Range, with peaks of 2,000 to 2,500 (6,580-8,200 ft.) lies along the western border of the region.

The entire province of Shansi is a plateau with an average elevation of 1,000 meters (3,280 ft.). To the people on the Hopei plain, the T'ai-hang Mountains are towering escarpments; but to dwellers on the Shansi Plateau, the same mountains seem relatively small.

Of course, there are also scattered lower gullies and basins in Shansi Province, and these are generally found along the rivers that have gnawed their way through the mountains to spill off the tableland.

2. Rivers:[3] In the northeastern corner of the region is the Lwan (Luan) River. It flows out

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[3] Ch'en Shih-chien, Chung kuo Ti Ho-liu [The Rivers of China], Peking, San-lien ch'u-pan-she, 1950, p. 32.

133 of the Yen-shan Mountains southeastward into the
Gulf of Po-hai. As a waterway the Lwan River
133 can carry sampan traffic only about 524 kilometers
506 (325 mi.) from its estuary. Farther west is the
503 Hai River (Ku River) which irrigates most parts
of northern and western Hopei Province. It receives water from four major tributaries, the Ch'ao-pai from the north, the Yung-ting from the west, the Tzu-ya from the southwest, and the Nan-yün-ho (South Canal) from the south. On these tributaries, some sampan traffic is possible most of the year. Their combined water fills the Hai River sufficiently to bring vessels inland from the Tangku New Harbor to dock at Tientsin. The recently-completed (Spring 1954) reservoir system on the Yung-ting River further improved control of the flow in that river, and, according to the Peking government, eliminates once and for all the flood hazards in the central north area of Hopei Province.

133 The South Canal, a man-made waterway which
503 connects the Hwai and the Yellow rivers in the
East China Region with the Hai River, is an important waterway system in its own right.

133 Issuing from the T'ai-hang Range are a few minor rivers: the Sang-ch'ien River (also known as Sang-kan, the upper reaches of the Yung-ting) in the north along which is the high Sang-ch'ien basin; the Hu-t'o River (upper reaches of the Tzu-ya) a short distance to the south, and several other small rivers which flow eastward to join the Hai River system. Between the T'ai-hang and the Huo-shan mountain ranges the Ch'in-shui River runs

133 southwesterly to join the might Yellow River outside the region. The Ch'in-shui is not a large river and the valley along it is narrow. The largest river in Shansi is the Fen River. This 133 river flows through the Hsin-hsien, Taiyuan, and 505 Lin-fen basins. The last basin is the lowest in the province, only 450 meters (1, 476 ft.) above sea level. In high water seasons, wooden junks can sail from the river's juncture with the Yellow River upstream to the city of Hsin-chiang.[4]

A section of the Yellow River forms the western boundary of North China. This is one of the worst sections of the river, completely unnavigable; the current, locked between two mountain ranges, is far too swift and the course too rocky for passage. A waterfall 9 meters (29ft.) high cuts the river at Hu-k'ou where the span of the river also narrows from over 100 meters to 52 meters (328-170 ft.). Southward from Hu-k'ou down to Lung-men, the river resembles the famous gorges of the upper Yangtze River. Overhanging cliffs rise hundreds of feet on both sides of the river. Below Lung-men, (the dragon gate), the river receives the Fen River and widens to provide safe sailing for small river boats all the way around the sharp south-to-east bend of the river to Shan-hsien on the southern border of this region. East of Shan-hsien the river again narrows and flows through mountain gulches and cuts three channels at San-men-hsia.

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[4] Ibid., pp. 40-49.

133 505 The three channels are traditionally named the God, the Ghost, and the Man. From these names it can be readily seen that boatmen have been finding safe passage only through the last channel. As the river flows farther eastward to reach the edge of the region at Yüan-ch'ü, the current eases somewhat to a more hospitable flow.[5]

133 504 3. Coastline: This region's limited coastline opens to the Gulf of Po-hai. Because it is on the fringe of an alluvial plain, its potentiality for seaports is limited unless extensive dredging is done. Chinwangtao was formerly the only natural port, but it was handicapped by its position which required a long overland haul for cargoes passing through this port. However, the fact that it is almost completely ice-free adds to its value.[6] The completion ofthe Tangku New Harbor (October 17, 1952) improves considerably the position of Tientsin as the most important port in this region. Described a major man-made harbor, the New Harbor encompasses a 20-square-kilometer (7.7 sq. mi.) body of water, complete with two breakwaters, 20 kilometers (18.6 mi.) long altogether, designed to accommodate vessels up to 10,000 tons.[7]

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[5] Ibid.

[6] George B. Cressey, China's Geographic Foundations, New York, McGrow-Hill, 1934, p. 177; Ch'u Shao-t'ang, Hsin Chung-kuo Ti-li [The Geography of New China], Shanghai, Ta Chung-kuo t'u-shu-chü, 1953, p. 61.

[7] Atlas of the People's Republic of China by Province, Shanghai, T'i-t'u ch'u-pan-she, 1953.

CLIMATE

132 This region has a wide range of temperatures through the seasons. During the four-month long winter the temperature sometimes reaches -18°C (0°F).

Dust storms added to the intense cold make outdoor life virtually impossible. The rivers freeze by the middle of October and often remain frozen until the following March. In summer, the relentless sun beating down from a cloudless sky for days in succession often builds up the temperature to over 30°C (86°F) and even 38°C (100°F) is not a rarity. This climate is shared by both the western half of the region, which is of the "cold steppe dry winter" type and the eastern half which falls within the "cool, dry winter" category.[8]

In good years, rain brings to this region an average of 500 millimeters (20 in.) of precipitation per year, usually falling in July and August, which constitute the local planting season. The southern portion, in comparison, gets a little
132 more rain. Often, however, rainfall either ex-
[illegible] ceeds or fails to reach this level; the result has
731 been frequent years of drought or flood. The
fluctuation is so great that it causes the farmers to trust their fate to heaven which they traditionally placate by erecting numerous little temples.

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[8] Ch'u Shao-t'ang, op. cit., p. 37; Cressey, op. cit., p. 162.

192 The frequent floods, caused by the untimely rain-
731 storms and poor drainage on the flatlands, also contribute an uncommon feature to the landscape -- wooden junks perched here and there on parched dry land without a drop of water for miles around. The boats lie in readiness for use when the next rainstorm submerges the land under a shallow expanse of water.[9] There may be fewer and fewer of these stranded boats now -- according to Peking claims -- as flood control is continued and reforestation is initiated in certain areas.[10]

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[9] Ibid., pp. 168-70.

[10] The forestation project in the Yung-ting River area, for instance, has planted a belt of forests along the Ta-hsing, Ku-an, Yung-ch'ing and An-tz'u line, totaling some 3,100 kilometers. Ch'u Shao-t'ang, op. cit., p. 42.

Table 1. Climate at Selected Localities */

Locality	Mean Temperature				Rainfall		
	January		July		Annual Average		Rainy Season
	C.	F.	C.	F.	MM.	Inches	
Chinwangtao (northeast Hopei)	-6.1	21	23.8	75	673	26	July-August
Peking (central-north Hopei)	-4.5	25	25	78	500	20	July-August
Taiyuan (central-Shansi)	-5.1	23	27.9	82	351	14	July
Ta-t'ung (northern Shansi)	-5.8	22	32	89	371	14.5	July
Ch'ang-chih (southeastern Shansi)	-3	28	25	78	497	19.5	July

*/ Based on Cressey, op. cit.; Atlas of the People's Republic of China by Province.

132.
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SOIL AND VEGETATION

134 The North China Plain is covered with a layer of alluvial soil. In colors ranging from light yellow to dark brown, the soil varies from saline to calcareous. Some parts of the plain are sandy. Along the coast of Hopei Province, the soil has a distinct saline character. The extreme northeastern and the western parts of Hopei lie under deep layers of black and dark brown soil which are calciferous in nature. Light and dark brown calciferous soil cover most of the eastern portion of Shansi Province. The upper layer of this type of soil is usually lighter in color because of the loss of its calciferous content through erosion. It has a low humus content. In western Shansi, loess, a fine silt, spreads over the land, with a depth of 150 feet at many places. Loess is yellow-brown in color and calcareous in character. In the river valleys in Shansi Province, the yellow soil is predominantly alluvial.

137 241 Extensive cultivation in the North China Plain leaves very little land for natural vegetation. Kaoliang and wheat occupy most of the flat acreage, and orchards of pears, apples and dates which grow well in cool climate are planted on the surrounding hills. Semi-desert plants are found in northern Shansi Province. Trees of the mulberry family and hardy, slow-growing types cover central Shansi. Vegetable and fruit cultivation prevails in the river valleys.

COMMUNICATION LINES AND CENTERS[11]

489 Communications are quite well developed in
this region, especially in Hopei Province where
roads can be easily built because of the extensive
plain In northern Hopei Province the highways
and railways converge on two main centers, Peking
361 and Tientsin. Peking, the capital of the
[162] People's Republic of China, has a population of
over 2,000,000. Since the establishment of the
Communist government, this historic metropolis
has been undergoing extensive reconstruction.
Around the Academy of Sciences (Academia
Sinica) in the northwestern suburb of the city
there is being developed a "cultural town" which
upon completion will cover an area one-third
larger than the old city itself. Among the dozens
[543] of new construction projects in Peking, the Russian
Exhibition Hall, opened in September 1954,
is the most pretentious and most impressive. It
is located outside Hsi-chih Gate in the northwest
sector of the old city. The eastern and southern
parts of Peking are sites of industrial plants.

496 From Peking one can travel northward to Inner
489 Mongolia via the Peking-Pao-t'ou Railway which
passes through Kalgan. The latter is located on
one of the historic routes traveled over the cen-

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[11] Ch'eng Kuang-yü, Chung-kuo Tu-shih [The Cities of China], Taipei, Chung-hua wen-hua ch'u-pan shih-yeh wei-yüan-hui, 1953.

496 turies by the Han Chinese and Mongols. South-
489 ward from Peking, the Peking Hankow Railway provides ready access to a number of key cities in Hopei and other provinces in central China. These key cities include Paoting, which was the site of the Hopei provincial capital until it was moved to Shihchiachuang in 1954, to the south on the same rail line. Shihchiachuang is a communication center with railways and highways that reach most of the region. Both Han-tan and Hsinhsiang are important cities on the Peking-Hankow Railway; the latter is more and more frequently mentioned in the press because of the growing industrial center at the nearby city of Chiao-tso.

489 Tientsin as a treaty port has a history dating
504 back to 1860. The extensive inland waterway
496 system that connects Tientsin with many areas in northern Hopei Province adds to the city's commercial value. Completion of the New Harbor at Tangku on October 17, 1952 further enhanced the position of Tientsin by bringing sea-going vessels up to 3,000 tons directly to Tientsin.[12] The Tientsin-Pukow (P'u-k'ou) Railway is the artery of transportation in eastern Hopei Province. On this railway are located such key cities as Te-hsien (or Te-chou) and Ts'ang-hsien. There is also a railway connecting Tientsin with Shanhaikuan to the north. Just before reaching Shan-

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[12] Wang Kuang, Chung-kuo Hai-chiang Chih [The Bays and Harbors of China], Taipei, Chung-hua wen-hua ch'u-pan shih-yeh wei-yüan-hui, 1954, p. 58.

489 haikuan the railway passes through Chingwangtao,
504 an ice-free port which has been the main outlet
496 for coal extracted from the Kailan Mine at Tangshan. Shanhaikuan is the eastern terminal of the Great Wall. Between the Wall and the seashore there is an opening of only about five miles. Through this gateway once passed expeditionary troops to the northeastern territories and invasion armies from without.

489 In Shansi Province all roads lead to the provin-
496 cial capital of Taiyuan. A short distance to the south of Taiyuan, the Shihchiachuang-Taiyuan Railway from the east connects with the Ta-t'ung --P'u-ch'eng Railway which runs vertically through the province and passes Taiyuan. The Fen River on the west side of Taiyuan is not navigable on this stretch. In the city of Taiyuan there are relatively well-developed iron, steel, and chemical industries.

Ta-t'ung is the northernmost communication center in Shansi Province. It has convenient acess to the key points in Hopei Province via the Peking--Pao-t'ou Railway, and it also has direct railway connection with Inner Mongolia.

From Taiyuan southward one can travel on the main railway in Shansi Province to reach the important cities located in the Fen River Valley, the southernmost of which is Feng-ling-tu. Feng-ling-tu guards the southwestern approach to the region. Across the Yellow River it faces the famous city of T'ung-kuan in Shensi Province. If

489 the ferry facilities are improved, Feng-ling-tu
490 will become even more important as a strategic city because the occupation of both Feng-ling-tu and T'ung-kuan gives control of central and west China. At present there are no facilities to ferry the trains at Feng-ling-tu, and ferrying automobiles across the river still remains a trying task. One can also follow the highway due south of Taiyuan and reach the industrial center of Ch'ang-chih in southeastern Shansi Province. Yang-ch'üan to the east of Taiyuan is another coal production center which is served by the Shihchiachuang-Taiyuan Railway.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 1b,
Sociological Background

HISTORICAL SETTING

I. INTRODUCTION

631 The North China Region had a more checquered existence than any of the short-lived regions formed by the Communist regime. When the system of regional administrations was established in November 1949, the North China Region was marked off as a geographic unit but its administration was handled by the central government. The territory under the direct control of Peking at that time included the old Chinese provinces of Hopei and Shansi, the Inner Mongolian provinces of Chahar and Suiyuan, and the newly created province of P'ing-yüan, carved out of Honan, Shantung, and Hopei. This was approximately the same territory amalgamated in August 1948 from various "old liberated areas," with their post-World War II extensions, and administered as the North China People's Government.

That government was dissolved within a month of the inauguration of the Central People's Government and was not replaced by any new over-all regional political body until the Department of North China Affairs was formed within the central government in

631 September 1950. The department was finally succeeded at the end of 1951 by a North China Administrative Committee.[1] It was the first to be dissolved in 1954 when the whole regional administrative system was abandoned. At that time, the North China Region consisted of only Shansi and Hopei. (On the boundary changes of these provinces and of the North China Region, see the chapter on Geographic Setting.)

101 Historically and culturally Hopei and Shansi constitute the core of what Chinese for centuries have thought of as "North China." The designation embraces these two provinces and the provinces which border on them to the west, south, and east -- respectively, Shensi, Honan, and Shantung. In this sense, "North China" is more than a geographical distinction: It marks out the cradle of Chinese civilization and an area of common historical development during most of three thousand years.

631 However, Shansi's topography makes it an integral unit strong in natural defenses;

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[1] See the comment by the American editors of Current Background, Hong Kong. American Consulate General, 161, pp. 1-2.

63/ though lacking in agricultural self-sufficiency. The province has frequently been an independent entity when China has been disunited or its ruler weak. But in periods when strong centralized rule had been established on the North China Plain, Shansi has been too close to the central domain to resist absorption into it.[2]

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II. HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

A. The Beginnings of Chinese Civilization

The southern parts of Shansi and Hopei were approximately the northern center of an east-west belt of interacting neolithic cultures out of which emerged the mainstream of Chinese civilization. The first organized state in China of which we have concrete evidence -- the Shang (c. 1520 to c. 1030 B.C.) -- was centered on what is today the border of Hopei and Honan and included the southern area of modern Shansi. From this area, Chinese culture spread in all directions, integrating elements of other cultures with which it came in contact, to the limits of

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[2] Chi Ch'ao-ting, Key Economic Areas in Chinese History, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1936, p. 32.

175 arable land and topographical barriers.[3]

The expansion of Chinese civilization and its integration of alien cultures in the North

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[3] On Chinese pre-history and the development of the Shang state see H. G. Creel, The Birth of China, London, Jonathan Cape, 1936; Wolfram Eberhard, A History of China, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1950, pp. 3-21. Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, Vol. I, Cambridge, England, The University Press, 1954, pp. 72-99, summarizes both the foregoing presentations and other modern scholarship on China's early development. On the extent of the original Shang state and its lines of expansion, see maps in Albert Herrmann, Historical and Commercial Atlas of China, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1935, pp. 7-8, 9.

175 was accelerated after the ruling house of the succeeding Chou Dynasty (c. 1030 to 221 B.C.) declined in 771 B.C. and its territories fragmented into petty kingdoms.[4] Until the middle of the fifth century B.C., the greatest advance was made by the state of Chin. Originally occupying what is today southern Shansi, Chin expanded northward beyond the limits of the province's modern borders. In the process, the state absorbed less advanced people or drove them to the steppes of present-day Inner-Mongolia, where the soil and climate favored the creation of a competitive specialized civilization based on nomad herding. A similar development occurred to the east and west of Chin as the respective states of Yen and Ch'in pushed their borders to the limits of agricultural land and beyond.[5]

When the three Chou states reached and passed the limits of terrain favorable to Chinese civilization, the competing nomad civilization began to have a counter-affect on

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4. On the Chou state and its fragmentation see Eberhard, op. cit., pp. 25-68; Needham, op. cit., pp. 90-98; and Kenneth S. Latourette, The Chinese: Their History and Culture, 2nd ed., revised. (two volumes in one), Vol. I, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1934, pp. 42-83.

5. Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (American Geographical Society Research Series No. 21), 2nd ed., Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y., Capitol Publishing Co., Inc., 1951, pp. 382-90, 412-19

175 them. In advancing into what is now northern Shansi, where the land is marginal to agriculture and herding, and into present-day Inner Mongolia, where the land is not suited to farming at all, the people of China were quickly forced to adopt elements of the nomad culture. The Chin pioneers in these areas soon broke their old political ties and formed a separate state of Chao.

The new state almost immediately engaged in simultaneously repelling the counterattack of nomad tribes and in contending for survival and supremacy with the old Chou states and new ones formed during the expansion of Chinese civilization. Chao's neighboring state of Ch'in, occupying what is today Shensi, proved more able in handling the new techniques of warfare borrowed from the nomads and the modified form of Chinese political organization. By 221 B.C., Ch'in had overcome all opposition and established the first unified Chinese empire.

B. The Great Wall and Its Function

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712
131 An undertaking for which China's first emperor Ch'in Shih Huang Ti (221 to 210 B.C.) is still known throughout the country was his reconstruction and extension of the northern walls of his original domain and of the former

175 Chao and Yen kingdoms. The line of the first
712 Great Wall of China, built by hundreds of
131 thousands of conscripted laborers, included
more of the steppe region of Inner Mongolia and
southwestern Manchuria than the last Great Wall
constructed under the Ming Dynasty (1368
to 1644). This last frontier barrier in its
eastern extensions largely coincided with the
northern boundaries of Shansi and Hopei before
the Japanese invasion of China in 1937. Other
dynastic rulers of China up to the end of the
imperial period (1912) have rebuilt and maintained the Great Wall along or between its
175 original and final extensions.[6] For all the
131 emperors, the reason for the existence of the
184 wall was the same: It was an attempt to
563 establish and maintain a line of demarcation
between the settled Chinese peoples and the
nomadic "barbarians."

563 The line of demarcation was never
311 definitely settled. Judging by the changes in
the borders of the North China Region, the
problem of establishing a true boundary between
the "Han Chinese" and what are now called
ethnic minorities still has not been solved.
The continued existence of the problem arises

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[6] See map in Lattimore, op. cit., p. 336.

563 311 from the fact that arable land suited to the Chinese type of agriculture only gradually shades off into steppe land not suitable for farming.

195 131 563 184 The northern portions of Shansi (above Taiyuan) and of Hopei (above Peking) are part of this marginal zone. Unstable politically and culturally, this area and its inhabitants were drawn toward the tribal culture of the steppes when it was on the rise or toward the imperial system of China proper when it was strong and united. The area was also a primary training ground in the Chinese way of life for nomads drawn, pushed, or invited into China as well as a Chinese staging area for campaigns of conquest in the steppe regions of Central and northern Asia. So marginal and politically unstable is northern Shansi that its upper and lower borders have at different times been included in the main line of the Great Wall, resulting in the encompassment of northern Shansi by remains of the frontier barrier. The frontier struggle began with the establishment of the first stable Chinese empire under the Han Dynasty (221 B.C. to A.D. 220) and lasted until at least the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937.[7]

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[7] Lattimore, op. cit., develops the thesis of the origin, nature, and consequences of the frontier conflict.

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C. The T'ang Dynasty

175 The T'ang Dynasty (A.D. 618 to 906), which promoted the highest flowering of Chinese culture, was established by a family having a strong nomadic strain and using subsidized "barbarian" troops.[8] The dynasty's first emperor, Li Yüan (Kao Tsu), was of aristocratic North Chinese lineage on his father's side and of nomadic ancestry on his mother's side. His original domain coincided with the extent of the ancient kingdom of Chao in northern Shansi. This area provided a favorable environment both for cultivating the scholarly and artistic accomplishments of the Chinese civilization and for mastering the nomad art of swift warfare and control of tribal auxiliaries.

The second ruler of the dynasty, Li Shih-min (T'ai Tsung), was proficient in both the Chinese and nomadic skills. His was the initiative and direction of a revolt against the Sui Dynasty (581 to 618). In seven years of warfare, he conquered the country and placed his father on the throne of a united China.

As emperor, Li Shih-ming was equally

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[8] Latourette, op. cit. p. 189 ff.; Lattimore, op. cit., p. 414.

175 remarkable and earned for himself a place with posterity second to none among China's many rulers. He dispelled the menace of the Turks on the northern frontier, pushed Chinese hegemony into Central Asia, and reorganized the empire and its administration. His work initiated an era of unsurpassed excellence in Chinese art and literature and of cultural and commercial contact with the rest of the world.

D. Nomad Occupation of North China

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184 For most of the fourth through sixth centuries and the tenth through thirteenth centuries, Hopei and Shansi were under nomad dominance while the South was experiencing great cultural advances under Chinese rulers.[9]

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[9] The best accounts of the nomadic conquest and rule of North China are: Eberhard, op. cit., pp. 110-77, 207-39; Wolfram Eberhard, Conquerors and Rulers, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1952, pp. 64-120; and Karl A. Wittfogel, Feng Chia-sheng, et al, History of Chinese Society: Liao (907-1125), issued as Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, n.s. 36, 1946, Philadelphia, The American Philosophical Society, 1949.

175 The periods of division have led to some
563 differences between North and South in dress,
184 spoken language, and habits of daily life. Also, the long centures of partition have developed a consciousness within North and South of their separate identities and some antagonism between the two regions which has never been eradicated.

These differences should not be too much stressed, however. Sufficient numbers of the old families stayed in the North to fill most of the administrative jobs under the alien rule and instill Chinese values and forms of organization in the conquerors. By intermarriage and cultural conformity, the nomad peoples have been so thoroughly assimilated by the conquered Chinese that today there is no trace of the separate strains of Tiebtan, Manchu, Hun, Turkish or Mongol invaders who overran North China and settled there.

E. The Alien Dynasties

175 Only twice have the nomad invaders of North China extended their dominance over the whole country. The Mongols who had conquered North China by 1260 ruled all China as the Yüan Dynasty from 1279 to 1368. The Manchus, entering by way of Peking, dominated all China as the Ch'ing Dynasty from 1644 to 1912.

The entry into North China of the Mongols under Genghis Khan at the beginning of the thirteenth century was the climax of four centuries of nomad invasion and rule in North China. Shansi and Hopei had been under the rule of the Nüchen (Juchen) Tartars (Chin or Kin Kingdom) for about a century when the Mongols carried their attack into those provinces and took Peking in 1215. Not until 1279 was the rest of China subdued and the first alien mastery of all China established.[10]

Like the Mongols, the Manchu conquerors had assimilated much of the Chinese culture of the North before attempting the conquest of China. Well organized at the beginning of the seventeenth century, they maintained themselves outside the Great Wall, made occasional raids into North China, and even adopted the dynastic title of Ch'ing before penetrating the frontier barrier in force.[11]

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[10] On the Mongols in China see Eberhard, A History of China, pp. 243-57; Latourette, op. cit., pp. 243-49, 277-98.

[11] On the Manchus see Franz Michael, The Origin of Manchu Rule in China: Frontier and Bureaucracy as Interacting Forces in the Chinese Empire, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1942; Lattimore, op. cit., 308-11, 327-427.

175 The Manchu's entry into North China followed an old pattern. The last decades of the Ming Dynasty, as with every previous regime in China, was marked by the decline in vigor of the ruling house, abuse of power by the dynasty and its officials, and the growth of disorder and rebellion among the people. In the North, a commoner named Li Tzu-ch'eng had instituted a rebellion which by 1644 had enabled him to gain ascendency over all North China, seize Peking, and proclaim the founding of a new dynasty. He made no attempt to attract the sympathy of the gentry and officials or to reassure them that the system they represented would be preserved and staffed by them under his rule. One of these officials, Wu San-kuei, was the commander of the Ming forces defending the frontier. He did what many of his predecessors had done in a like dilemma -- invited inside the Great Wall the nomad forces he was holding off at the frontier. After the combined armies of the Manchus and Wu San-kuei had retaken Peking, he and other army and civilian officials of the Ming joined the new Ch'ing Dynasty in conquering the rest of China. It did not entirely succumb until 1683, when a counter-rebellion launched by Wu San-kuei against his new masters was finally put down.

Several factors merit attention regarding the affect on North China of alien rule

175 over the whole country coming after centuries of nomad dominance in the area between the Great Wall and the Yellow River.

For the first time in Chinese history, the capital of China was located outside the area around the great southeast bend of the Yellow River when the Yüan Dynasty established its capital at Peking in 1279. That city has continued to be the site of China's capital to the present day, except for the first forty-one years of the Ming Dynasty and the period of the Nationalist Government from 1928 to 1937 when the capital was at Nanking.

Under both alien dynasties, the territory ruled from Peking was more extensive than that controlled by any native dynasty and permitted the establishment of a single political control over the agricultural, marginal, and nomad regions above the Yellow River. Already controlling Manchuria before entering China, the Ch'ing rulers brought an end to nomad and agricultural conflict in the border region by conquering the steppes of Mongolia and subverting the war potential of its inhabitants into pacific trading and religious activities. Early in the process, the Manchus also halted Russian expansion in Siberia at the Amur River.

A further factor that should be noted in China's dominance by alien rulers is that

175 the North was far more amenable to their continued rule than was the South. The Yüan and Ch'ing dynasties were both eliminated by revolutionary forces centered on or below the Yangtze River. As the northern provinces had been least resistant to the Manchu conquest, they were more trusted by the Ch'ing than were the southern provinces. Although the grain-tax wealth of the empire was largely derived from the South, Ch'ing revenues were most heavily lavished on Peking and the surrounding areas. For these and other reasons, including perhaps the fact that the northerners were more used to getting along with alien rulers, neither Shansi nor Hopei contributed significantly to the revolutionary movements that attempted from the end of the nineteenth century to overthrow Manchu rule and finally achieved success in 1912.

F. Transition in North China's Economic and Political Position

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433 Shansi has never been rich agriculturally, but the Fan River portion of the province was able to satisfy a large part of the relatively limited grain demands of China's early civilization through the end of the Former Han Dynasty (206 B.C. to A.D. 9). In the latter Han Dynasty (23 to 220), the key economic area of the empire shifted from the loess

433 highlands to the North China Plain, which
175 included southern Hopei.[12] At the end of the third century and the beginning of the fourth centur Shansi became sparsely populated and Hopei's population was greatly reduced by the mass emigration of Han Chinese fleeing from nomad invasion, drought, and famine above the Yellow River.[13]

433 The building of the Grand Canal by the
175 Sui and the resulting realization of the agri-
312 cultural potential of the lower Yangtze basin under the T'ang Dynasty, reduced the North China Plain to a secondary economic position. However, although the Yangtze area contributed an overwhelming share of the empire's tax-grain revenues under the T'ang, the ruling house attempted to improve the productive possibilities of the home province of Shansi by undertaking numerous irrigation projects there as well as in Shensi to the west.[14]

631 After the location of the capital at
175 Peking near the second economic area of China
433 and the rebuilding of the Grand Canal by the Mongol rulers to bring to the political center

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[12] Chi, op. cit., pp. 83-92.

[13] Harold Wiens, China's March Toward the Tropics, Hamden, Conn., Shoe String Press, 1954, pp. 175-79.

[14] Chi, op. cit., p. 42.

631 the resources of the primary economic area,
175 China did not again experience a protracted
433 period of disunity until the Taiping Rebellion
in the mid-nineteenth century. Though free from the risks and losses of ocean transport and less vulnerable to pirate raids along the coast, the inland waterway was increasingly costly to operate and maintain. This fact and the military danger of over-reliance of the capital on the South for grain induced the Yüan, Ming, and Ch'ing dynasties to attempt development of the Hui River area near Peking by the construction of additional irrigation systems. The productive results of the projects never came up to expectations, however, because the climate and soil of the area were unfavorable.[15]

441 During the same period in Shansi,
175 individual initiative developed numerous similar
[312] hydraulic works in the province. Such private
[471] activity was uncommon in China and seems to
[565] have been an outgrowth of the relatively high
[438] degree of commercial development in Shansi.[16]
The rise of a merchant class in the province began with the Shansi people's participation in trade with the Mongol nomads at state-regulated markets, established on the frontier

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15. Ibid., p. 144.
16. Ibid., p. 144.

441
175 by the Ming Dynasty and maintained by the Ch'ing rulers.

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453 The business group in Shansi increasingly gained experience in credit transactions, and by the nineteenth century had achieved a dominant position in the economy of Inner Mongolia and a leading role in the banking business of China.[17] Among the prominant banking figures from Shansi in Modern China have been such men as H. H. Kung (K'ung Hsiang-hsi), former finance minister of the Nationalist Government and president of the Bank of China; Po I-po, one-time guerrilla leader and later minister of Finance of the People's Republic; and Chi Ch'ao-ting, director of economic research at the Central Bank of China under the Nationalist Government, and under the Communist regime secretary-general of the Committee for the Promotion of International Trade and a director and assistant general manager of the Bank of China.

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III. THE MODERN PERIOD

A. The Invasion of the West

After the middle of the nineteenth

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[17] Eberhard, A History of China, p. 278; Lattimore, op. cit., pp. 92-95.

177 century, the North China Region was subject to the intrusion of western military, material, and economic forces. They carried with them new secular and religious ideas incompatible with the traditional cosmological, social, political, and economic views of China. These forces for change coincided with a phenomenon which had been repeated many times over the centuries in China -- the decline of the ruling dynasty with an accompanying abuse of power and growth of disorder.[18]

The North China Region felt the impact of the West later and was less profoundly

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[18] The course and affect of Imperial China's interaction with the West are described from different points of view in H.B. Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, 3 volumes, London, Longman, Green, and Co., 1910-1918; and John K. Fairbank and Teng Ssu-yü, China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1954. Unless otherwise noted, the material used in the following pages is taken from these sources.

177 influenced by it than the Central-South and East China regions. The imperial government not only resisted the Western intrusion, but also reacted against attempts at internal political and economic reform initiated outside the North China Region. Most of the imperial officials and educated elite from Shansi and Hopei remained committed to the old tradition and the ruling dynasty. Some of these men saw the need of adopting the technical knowledge and advances of the West to preserve China and the throne, but they rejected fundamental changes in the traditional political, social, and economic system that would have permitted China to establish the basis necessary for supporting and managing a technical civilization.

In the post-imperial period up to World War II, material and ideological change made little headway in the North China Region. Shansi and Hopei were ruled by strong men who had retained the loyalty of personal armies built up in the service of the Manchu Dynasty. The continuance of warlord rule in Shansi and Hopei after the establishment of the Nationalist Government and the inroads of Japan into the provinces after 1933 barred wide dissemination of the Kuomintang program. Only in the foreign concessions and in Chinese educational institutions at Peking and Tientsin was there any wide awareness of the new ideas in the country.

B. The North and Political Reaction

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648 Although the West, particularly England, had been pressing the Ch'ing Dynasty from the late eighteenth century for the establishment of diplomatic and commercial relations on a basis of equality and fought a war with China in 1840-42 in an attempt to institute such relations, Western military force did not penetrate the North China Region until 1858. Anglo-French armies, accompanied by American and Russian diplomatic representatives, occupied Tientsin in that year as part of a renewed effort to obtain the old objectives. When Peking continued to procrastinate, the French and English forces thrust into Peking in 1860. The Manchu court having fled north to south-western Manchuria, the armies of both nations sacked the Summer Palace in retaliation for mistreatment of some captured Western soldiers. The Ch'ing Dynasty was not only forced to establish diplomatic and commercial relations with the West, but had to do so with China as an inferior partner.

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178 The real power of the Manchu throne from 1856 to 1908 was concentrated in the hands of the Empress Dowager Tz'u Hsi (or the "Old Buddha," as she was commonly called). A strong-willed and capable woman, she was largely ignorant and unmindful of China's

643 weakness, strongly anti-foreign, resistant to
178 reform, and more intent on seeking satisfaction for her own desires and whims than in promoting the nation's welfare. One example of her tendencies was the diverting of millions of dollars appropriated for the modernization of China's navy into the rebuilding of the Summer Palace at Peking, including, ironically, a marble ship. Surrounded by corruption and grasping, idle courtiers as ignorant and reactionary as herself, Tz'u Hsi was responsible in great part for the failure of such reform and modernization as was attempted while she held power.

178 One of the most reform-minded and influential of the scholar-officials from Hopei who served the Ch'ing Dynasty was Chang Chih-tung (1837-1909). The essence of his ideas was expressed in the slogan he made famous in 1898, summing up the approach to change of the generation that preceded and followed him -- Chung-hsüeh wei t'i, Hsi-hsüeh wei yung ("Chinese study for the fundamental principles, Western learning for practical application"). In word and deed, he promoted industrialization as a means of saving China. On the other hand, in his widely read book, Ch'üan-shueh-p'ien [Exhortation to Study], he stoutly supported the Manchu Dynasty as the defender of the Chinese race, insisted on

178 Confucianism as the basis of the nation, and scorned the adoption of such western institutions as constitutional monarchy, democracy, and personal liberty.

These ideas published in 1898 represented social and political reaction following China's defeat by Japan. More forward leaders from the South were then demanding rapid political and social reform on a grand scale, including the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. Under their inspiration, an attempt was made by the young emperor to institute rapid reform in 1898, but within three months the efforts ended in his deposition by Tz'u Hsi. She hounded out of Peking and the country such of his southern ministers as she could not arrest and execute. Chang Chih-tung continued to serve the dynasty while it gave way, too little and too late, to the rising demand for reform and constitutional monarchy.

C. Anti-Foreignism

177 The Westerner encountered violence wherever China was forced to permit him residence in the country, but the worst outbursts of anti-foreignism occurred in Hopei and Shansi. Provincial and local officials in the two provinces were not only within reach and influence of the Manchu court, but were also largely sympathetic to its reactionary

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177 and anti-foreign attitude. In addition, they were discouraged from close contact with Westerners and saw little of Western military and economic power. Such contacts in the East China and Central-South regions often deterred officials from showing open and futile hostility toward the West, even when encouraged or ordered to do so by the throne.

177 The focus of anti-foreignism through-
797 out China was the Christian missionary. His faith and practices were subversive of Chinese beliefs, customs, and cohesion as well as misunderstood and misinterpreted by the uninitiated. As an overt symbol of foreign inroads into China supported by military might, the missionary was an object of hatred for the scholar-official group.

177 A decade of violence against Christian
797 missionaries throughout China reached a
648 climax in what is known to the West as the Tientsin Massacre of 1870. Directed primarily against French diplomats and Catholic missionaries, the outbreak arose from Chinese suspicion and resentment toward the foreigner and from French inattention to the feelings of the Chinese people. Unmindful of the respect which the Chinese had for their own religion and emperor, the French at Tientsin established a consulate in an imperial palace and constructed a church on the site of an

177 imperial temple. At the same time, the
797 eagerness with which the newly founded Sisters
648 of Mercy orphanage and hospital sought sick
and even dying children for care encouraged the
Chinese in the belief that the youngsters were
wanted dead or alive for the practice of weird
and horrible rites.

When the high death rate at the hospital was climaxed by the death of over thirty children in a mid-1870 epidemic, Chinese popular suspicion turned into active hostility. While local officials encouraged public demonstrations and demands for revenge, the imperial commissioner in charge of international affairs in Tientsin did all he could to quiet mass outbursts and disprove the baseless charges of the demonstrators. He apparently had the affair in hand when the rash and provocative actions of the French consul precipitated his own death at the hands of a crowd, the plunder and destruction of the cathederal and orphanage, and the killing of their custodians. In all, twenty foreigners and more than thirty Chinese workers at the cathederal and orphanage met their death.

648 The incident brought France and China close to war. Conflict was averted by French preoccupation with Prussia in Europe. Finally, the French accepted as sufficient

648 redress for the incident the Chinese government's execution of sixteen Chinese and the banishment of over thirty others, including two local officials who had been lax in maintaining peace and order.

D. The Boxer Rebellion

648 A more violent and bloody manifestation
471 of anti-foreignism occurred in 1900 after
177 Germany, England, Russia, and France had wrung from the dynasty leases of territory and privileges of exploitation on Chinese soil. This display of imperial weakness in 1898, preceded a few months earlier by Tz'u Hsi's deposition of the emperor and the crushing of the reform movement, aroused as much sentiment against the Manchus as against the West. In the North, however, the dynasty was able to turn the expression of resentment almost wholly against the foreigners, particularly Christians and Chinese converts.

171 Anti-foreign hatred and violence
579 initially reached greatest intensity in Shantung and coalesced in the I Ho T'uan (Righteous Harmony Corps), also called the I Ho Ch'üan (The Fists of Righteous Harmony). Known to the West as the Boxers, the membership of the movement not only had gentry leadership, but also were encouraged by the Manchu governor of Shantung, Yü-hsien. His dismissal

177 under foreign pressure at the end of 1899 led
577 to the rapid decline of I Ho T'uan activities in Shantung but the sect immediately shifted its scene of operations to Hopei. By spring of 1900, the Boxers had killed scores of foreign and native Christians in the province and were receiving open support from the imperial family. When an order for the expulsion of the foreigner was issued from the capital on June 20, the Boxers laid siege to the foreign communities in Peking and Tientsin.

The sect made its appearance about the same time in Shansi, where Yü-hsien had become governor after being relieved from his post at Shantung. He personally assisted in the execution of a Catholic bishop and generally encouraged violence against foreigners and Christian converts. Outside of Shansi and Hopei, the I Ho T'uan was active on a large scale only in Manchuria and Mongolia. In all, more than two hundred Westerners, mostly missionaries, and several thousand Chinese converts were killed in the anti-foreign movement. Provincial governors elsewhere in China ignored the orders from Peking and generally maintained order among the people.

177 The movement fell apart almost
577 immediately after a coalition of Western and
728 Japanese forces relieved the siege at Peking
648 on August 16, 1900. As in 1860, the court

177 fled the capital before its fall, and the Western
579 soldiers plundered and looted the city far more
728 devastatingly than they had forty years earlier.
648 Tientsin had suffered a like visitation a month
earlier. The further cost to China of the Boxer Rebellion included the payment of an indemnity to the offended nations -- the United States' share being later converted into a scholarship fund for Chinese students to study in America -- and the stationing of foreign troops in Peking with the right to police the area from the capital to the sea. Foreign garrisons continued to exercise these rights until forced out of the capital by the Chinese Communists.

E. Government by Military Force

642 The example of Japan's defeat of Russia
669 following on China's humiliation as a consequence of the Boxer Rebellion swelled reform sentiment throughout the nation. By 1911, a national assembly was sitting in Peking. Although constituted by the throne to assure the conservative nature of the advisory body, it was proving more progressive minded than the dynasty and more demanding than advisory. Before the real intentions of the dynasty were put to the test, revolution broke out along the Yangtze River and immediately spread to the South. Very little sympathetic response came

642 669 from Hopei and Shansi.[19]

The most powerful and modern military force in China at the time, the Pei-yang Army, remained loyal to the throne. The staff officers of the army were even more loyal to Yüan Shih-k'ai, who had organized and trained the force while governor of Hopei. Called out of enforced retirement to save the Manchu Dynasty, he used the Pei-yang Army to contain the revolutionary forces. At the same time, Yüan advanced his own ambitions as negotiator for the ruling house with the revolutionaries. An agreement was finally 642 reached in February 1912 by which the Manchus abdicated the throne and transferred the central governing power to Yüan. He was able to win the approval of the republican leader, Sun Yat-sen, who persuaded the provisional assembly convened at Nanking to elect Yüan president of the Republic of China with its capital at Nanking.

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[19] On the nature and progress of the 1911 Revolution see Fairbank and Teng, *op. cit.*, pp. 193-229 and *passim*; and H. F. MacNair, *China in Revolution: An Analysis of Politics and Militarism under the Republic*, Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1931, pp. 1-45.

642 Yüan refused to budge from his base of power in Peking. The provisional assembly, intent on exercising the real power in the government, reluctantly moved to Peking to limit the actions of the new and distrusted president. At his own base of power, however, Yüan was invulnerable. When the parliament refused to bend to his will, he brought about the dissolution of the body in 1913 and its permanent suspension at the beginning of 1914.

Thereafter, he restored Confucianism and the worship of heaven as state cults, established peace and order by strong-arm methods, and consolidated his personal power. Having become president for life in 1914, he attempted to make himself emperor. This move led to the defection of six provinces south of the Yangtze River and their organization of a rival government. Yüan was in the midst of trying to undo his folly when he died in June 1916.

F. Warlord Rule

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681 With Yüan's death, his staff officers in North China and military leaders elsewhere made a bid for dominance over all or parts of China. Motivated largely by the desire for power and wealth, none attracted a popular following or was able to restore unity and centralized government to China.[20]

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[20] On the warlords see MacNair, op. cit., pp. 46-64 and passim.

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631 Peking was a primary attraction to these military despots. It was still the national capital of the Republic and carried on the fiction of governing China. Through control of the phantom government at Peking, various warlords were able to enrich themselves by arranging loans from Japan in return for favors that sacrificed China's interests.

Most notorious of the warlord rulers of Peking was Tuan Ch'i-jui. A former staff officer of the Pei-yang Army and premier under Yüan, he retained the latter position after Yüan's death and controlled the central government through leadership of a military faction called the Anfu Clique (an for Anhwei and peace, fu for Fukien and good fortune). His dominance of the government was alternately shared with or disputed by two other similar groups: the Chihli (Hopei) Clique headed by Ts'ao K'un, later by Wu P'ei-fu; and the Fengtien (South Manchuria) Clique led by Chang Tso-lin, after 1928 by his son Chang Hsüeh-liang. From 1923, Feng Yü-hsiang, until then the chief lieutenant of Wu P'ei-fu, become an independent and additional element in the dominance of Peking. In consort, the warlords ousted from Peking the 1911 parliamentary rule.

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668 While Hopei and the capital were experiencing almost constant warfare and

642 701 631 668 changes in governing personnel, Shansi was held firmly by Yen Hsi-shan. A native of the province, he had controlled it since becoming military governor under Yüan Shih-k'ai. After the Kuomintang armies embarked on the Northern Expedition to unite all China, Yen temporarily cast in his lot with the movement. His seizure of Peking in June 1928 under the revolutionary banner marked the last step in the Kuomintang's nominal unification of China. On June 21, the name of the capital of China for almost 650 years was changed from Peking to Peiping (actually from Pei-ching or Northern Capital to Pei-p'ing or Northern Peace), and Nanking (Nan-ching or Southern Capital) was made the political center of China.

642 701 631 The nominal unification of the country did not bring an end to turmoil in the northern provinces nor their subservience to the Nanking Government. Yen retained his control over Shansi and made a bid for dominance of Hopei as well. In ephemeral alliances with or against Feng Yü-hsiang, Chang Hsüeh-liang, and the Kuomintang, he continued the struggle until Chang committed himself to the Nationalist Government in 1930. The Fengtien leader eliminated his rivals from Hopei with the help of Nanking and was given command of the area between the Great Wall and the Yellow River as well as the task of bringing his domain in Manchuria into closer alignment with the

642 central government. Real power in Shansi,
701 however, remained in the hands of Yen Hsi-shan,
631 and he was eliminated from the province only after World War II by the Communist armies.

G. North China and Japan

167 Toward the end of the second decade
631 of the twentieth century, a significant change
648 occurred in the frontier region north and northeast of Shansi and Hopei. The opening of modern rail and road systems stimulated mass migrations from the North China Region (and Shantung) into Inner Mongolia and, on a far larger scale, into Manchuria. As soon as the Nationalist Government was established in October 1928, it created the provinces of Suiyuan, Chahar, and Jehol out of Inner Mongolia and made them part of the Chinese administrative system. Soon afterward, the Nanking regime made strenuous efforts to establish economic dominance in the new provinces and Manchuria.[21]

648 These moves threatened Japan's whole position in East Asia. Japan had been

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[21] See Lattimore, op. cit., pp. 13-18, H.B. Morse and H.F. MacNair, Far Eastern International Relations, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1931, pp. 727, 758-60; and George H. Blakeslees and Harold S. Quigley, The Far East, An International Survey, Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1938, pp. 8-122.

648 established in southern Manchuria since 1905. and had looked on Inner Mongolia as a Japanese sphere of influence since 1915. When the Chinese Government began contending for supremacy in these areas, the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria took counter-measures to protect Japan's primary source of raw materials.

Chang Tso-lin had been a subservient tool of the Japanese, but his son, Chang Hsüeh-liang, defied Japan and worked with the Nanking regime. Japan forced him out of Manchuria and set up the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932. Japanese armies added Jehol to their Manchurian kingdom the following year. Attempts were also made to extend control over Chahar and Suiyuan by force and by exploiting Mongolian resentment at Chinese immigration and political control.

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221 As none of these moves had encountered firm Chinese resistance, the Japanese military regime in Manchuria invaded Hopei in 1933. Fighting was halted by the Tanku truce of May 25, 1933, by which China agreed to de-militarize the area of Hopei north of a line running roughly just above Peiping and Tientsin. Two years later, the Nationalist Government agreed to withdraw its influence and political organizations from the area. At the same time, Japan forced

648 Nanking to permit the establishment of the East
721 Hopei Autonomous Council and the Hopei-Chahar
Political Council. Although the personnel of these governments was named by Nanking, their creation undermined the Nationalist Government's sovereignty and control while increasing Japan's military, political, and economic dominance of North China. This was the situation in July 1937 when Japanese troops in the Peiping-Tientsin area clashed with Chinese troops in Lu-kou-ch'iao outside Peiping and precipitated the war of resistance against Japan.[22]

Although China had considerable armed strength in the North when Japan launched a full-scale attack, no determined resistance took place in Hopei and Shansi as developed around Shanghai in the early months of the war.
648 By the end of 1937, the main campaign in the
642 two provinces and Inner Mongolia was completed.[23]
727 The Provisional Government of the Republic of
China was established as a puppet regime at Peking in December 1937 with jurisdiction over

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[22] T.A. Bisson, Japan in China, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1938, pp. 1-153, 290-316.

[23] Ibid.

648 Suiyuan, Chahar, Hopei, Shansi, and Shantung.
642 When the Reformed Government was established
727 at Nanking in March 1940 under Japanese tutelage, as the political authority for all China, the Provisional Government was sublimated into the North China Political Council to maintain semi-autonomy in the North China Region. In actuality, neither political unit had any real power, attracted no important Chinese leaders to their standards -- other than Wang Ching-wei, head of the Nanking puppet regime -- and derived no real support or recognition from the Chinese people.[24]

648 Japan, content with dominance in the
729 large cities and along communication lines, did not attempt to control all of Shansi and Hopei. In the areas under their command, the Japanese promoted a revised form of Confucianism that had been worked out in Manchukuo and was calculated to both make the conquered people more subservient and given them a sense of continuity with the past. A New People's Association (Hsin-min-hui) was also set up with the intention of regimenting the populace and

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[24] George E. Taylor, The Struggle for North China, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, pp. 20-26, 31-32, 64-65, 151-56, 176, and passim; and Paul M. Linebarger, The China of Chiang K'ai-shek [sic] : A Political Study, Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1941, pp. 183-210.

648 leading them into new activities beneficial to
729 Japanese control and economic exploitation. Whatever chance Japan had for gaining the sympathy of the people of North China was precluded by the occupying army's indiscriminate looting and destruction of property and inhuman treatment of the conquered people.[25]

H. The Role of the Universities

185 Alghouth Shansi and Hopei remained the stronghold of political reaction up to the Japanese invasion of China in 1937, the voice of New China occasionally burst forth from the North to electrify the whole nation. After the establishment of the Chinese Republic in 1912, a need arose to define the goals and values of the new society. In order to do so, a number of intellectuals began re-examination of China's past and of existing Western ideologies. The dissemination of the new goals and values thus formed began about 1915 and resulted in what is known as the New Culture Movement. Although the movement was nationwide, its

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25. See references preceding footnote; Bisson, op. cit., pp. 293, 301; and Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder out of China, New York, William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1946, pp. 63-66.

185 most famous leaders were the chancellor of the Peking University, Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei, and the faculty he had gathered around him. The original emphasis of these men was on China's need for individualism, science, and democracy. After the Bolshevik victory in Russia, some of these intellectual leaders like Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao turned toward Communism as the answer to China's needs. Other leaders at Peking such as Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei and Hu Shih continued to espouse individualism, science, and democracy.[26]

668 Li Ta-chao, a native of Hopei, is now honored by the Communists as the leading figure in the formation of the Chinese Communist Party, although Ch'en Tu-hsiu was a far more influential figure in the early Communist movement and headed the party from its founding in 1921 until made the scapegoat for the Communist failure to achieve power in 1927. However, Li Ta-chao was one of the first prominent Chinese to embrace Marxism, one of the founders of the Communist Party in China, and a dedicated worker in spreading its influence. He gave the penniless Mao Tse-tung a job on the latter's arrival at Peking in 1918 and was instrumental in developing Mao's trend toward Marxism.

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26. On the New Culture Movement and its leaders see Fairbank and Teng, op. cit., pp. 231-258. On the Communist phase of the movement see ibid.; and Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 1951, pp. 7-27.

668 Ch'en Tu-hsiu played a secondary role in this regard, according to Mao.[27] In 1927, Li was arrested and executed for his radical activities by Chang Tso-lin.

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668 The culmination of the New Culture Movement was the May Fourth Movement of 1919. It began as a series of demonstrations by the students of Peking University in protest against the Versailles Treaty provision validating Japanese control of Shantung. The students launched demonstrations and propaganda campaigns that grew into a national movement and anti-Japanese boycott joined by bankers, merchants, and other articulate sections of the country. It forced the resignation of the warlord government of Tuan Ch'i-jui, moved the Chinese delegation to refuse to sign the Versailles Treaty, instigated a rising tide of nationalism at home, and turned China away from trust and hope in the Western powers and toward a search for salvation through the aid of the Soviet Union and the use of Communist organization and methods. From the May Fourth Movement can also

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[27] See Mao's autobiography as recorded by Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, New York, Random House, 1938, pp. 134, 140-41.

185 be traced the injection of strength and substance 668 into the Kuomintang and the birth of the Communist Party. The Communist regime recognizes a debt to the May Fourth Movement and views it as the source of the revolutionary stream which carried the Communists to victory.[28]

Another nationwide movement was inspired by the Peking University students at the end of 1935 when North China was coming under increasing Japanese control. Protesting against Nanking's appeasement of Japan, the students in Peking demanded an immediate cessation of civil war between the Nationalist Government and the Communists, the resistance of a united China against Japanese inroads in

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[28] The student role in the May Fourth Movement and subsequent events is described in Kiang (Chiang) Wen-han, The Chinese Student Movement, New York, Kings Crown Press, 1948, pp. 75-102. On the reorientation of the Kuomintang, the rise of the Chinese Communist Party, and Russia's role in both, see MacNair, op. cit., pp. 65-227, Schwartz, op. cit.; T'ang Leang (Liang) -li, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution, London, G. Routledge and Sons, 1930; Harold Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, rev. ed., Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1953; Robert C. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1953.

185 North China, the institution of democracy
668 and individual rights, and the participation in the government of non-Kuomintang groups, including representatives of the Communist Party. The program was denounced by the Nanking Government, which continued to insist that national unification through the military defeat of the Communists must precede resistance against Japan and the inauguration of democracy in China.

Because the program favored the Communists at a time when the "United Front" policy of the Comintern was in force, they endorsed the student proposals. But so did the non-Communist middle-class and professional groups throughout China. Following the student lead, National Salvation Association units were organized everywhere in the country, and the informal membership of the movement in 1936 grew to third party proportions. Despite the jailing of its adult and student leaders by the government, the association continued to insist that Chiang Kai-shek was the only possible leader of a united China. The movement's activities in educating large segments of the population to an awareness of the nation's peril, was in large part responsible for the enthusiasm, spontaneity, and scope of the public response that greeted Chiang's decision in 1937 to resist Japan.[29]

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[29] Kiang (Chiang), op. cit., pp. 101-33; Linebarger, op. cit., pp. 175-78; and Bisson, op. cit., pp. 135-47.

IV. THE RISE AND VICTORY OF COMMUNISM

A. The Beginning of Communism in Peking

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668 The possibilities of Communism as a solution for China's ills was first entertained by some of the leaders of the New Culture Movement at Peking University. In 1918, Li Ta-chao formed at the university a Society for the Study of Marxism which included Mao Tse-tung among its membership. Ch'en Tu-hsiu approved of the group's activities, although he took no part in them. In May 1919, an entire issue of the New Culture Movement's leading journal, Hsin Ch'ing-nien (New Youth or La jeunesse), was devoted to the outcome of the study group's investigations. The articles, including one by Li Ta-chao, were on the whole critical and analytical rather than partisan. Yet within a year, both the organizer of the study group and Ch'en Tu-hsiu were in the Marxist camp.[30]

668 While Ch'en left Peking for Shanghai, Li stayed in the capital and organized a labor group. The lack of Communist sympathizers

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[30] Schwartz, op. cit., pp. 7-36; North, op. cit., pp. 53-71.

668 in Peking at the time is evident from the composition of the group, which included only two Communists and six anarchists. The shift in Li's and Ch'en's flirtation with Communism to complete acceptance of it seems to have been influenced by the Soviet Union's offer to cancel its privileges in China, by the student-inspired May Fourth Movement with its overtones of hostility toward the West, and by the arrival of the Communist agent Voitinsky
668 in China. He saw Li at Peking in 1920 and
665 was referred by him to Ch'en in Shanghai. The same year at Shanghai, Ch'en was present at the meeting of some eight intellectuals who discussed the formation of a Communist Party in China. At the time, a Communist group existed at Peking as well as at several other centers. In 1921, Li Ta-chao was one of the organizers of the Chinese Communist Party at Peking.

668 With the formal inauguration of the Chinese Communist Party, its direction by the Comintern, and co-operation with the Kuomintang, Communist activities in China were centered in Canton and Shanghai. Communist influence was minor in Shansi and Hopei thereafter until just prior to the Japanese invasion of China. In concert with Communist parties everywhere, the Chinese Communists announced an anti-fascist (anti-Japan) "United Front" policy in late 1935. This program and the Nationalist

668 Government's inaction gained sympathy for the Communists among the patriotic elements in North China. A large part of the student group, always to the left of the Kuomintang ideologically, was particularly drawn toward the Communists in their "United Front" phase, and many young people from the universities streamed to the Communist center at Yenan before and after the outbreak of hostilities with Japan.

B. Communism in the Resistance War against Japan

668
721 The first large-scale entry of the Communists into the North China Region occurred during the resistance war against Japan. Their Eighth Route Army moved from Shensi into neighboring Shansi in 1937 to fight the Japanese forces entering the passes along the Great Wall. As the Japanese armies swept south to Taiyuan, the Communist forces remained in northeast Shansi to engage in guerrilla warfare. In January 1938, representatives of the Communist Party, the Kuomintang, Yen Hsi-shan's provincial administration, and other groups established the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region with central government approval to continue the fight against Japan. While the forces of Yen Hsi-shan and the Nationalist Government faced the enemy in southern Shansi, the Eighth Route

668 Army carried guerrilla warfare into the rural
721 areas of Shansi, Hopei, Chahar, and Jehol,
and central and northern Shansi.[31]

668
701 Functioning as a collection of separate armed bands rather than as a group, the Eighth Route Army maintained scattered rural bases isolated from one another by Japanese forces concentrated in the cities and along communication routes. Local peasants and former students and professors from Peking and Tientsin were drawn into the army or trained as an irregular militia guarding the villages. Because the Communist army existed behind enemy lines and lacked independent finances, it was forced to cultivate the good will of the local Chinese populace. Political cadres operating with the army established local governments, encouraged a high degree of local participation in them, lowered the taxes of the poorer peasants,

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[31] On the Eighth Route Army and the Communist areas see Gunther Stein, The Challenge of Red China, New York, Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1945, pp. 324, 328-30, and map facing p. 458; White and Jacoby, op. cit., pp. 199-213; Linebarger, op. cit., pp. 116-23, 159-75; and U.S. Office of Strategic Services, The Guerrilla Front in North China, Washington, D.C. 1943.

668 suspended rents due absentee landlords who
70 had gone over to the Japanese, and organized
production co-operatives for the benefit of
the army and the local people.

For the people of North China, it was a new experience to encounter a government which did not exploit them and an army which did not pillage, rape, and kill civilians. The grasping administrators and rapacious armies of the provincial governments had been followed by the even more predatory army and administration of the Japanese. Almost wholly lacking in political and social consciousness before the arrival of the Eighth Route Army, the rural people of North China began to hear from the army commissars and from the refugee students and professors the radical and liberal ideas with which other areas of China had been concerned for a quarter of a century. The reaction of the North China people to the change-over from the expedient and necessarily liberal, democratic policy of wartime Communism to the ruthless, regimented policy of the present-day Communist regime is impossible to determine, but it is likely these people now feel the Communist wartime program was a lulling interlude to encourage their acceptance and promotion of a government more disciplined but no less exploitive than its predecessors.

C. Victory of the Communist Party

701 At the end of the war, Communist forces
668 were scattered throughout the North China Region.
631 With few exceptions, the Communists were in
command wherever the authority of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region Government
reached. Other border region governments
unrecognized by Chungking had been established
by the Communists at the juncture of Shansi-Suiyuan, Hopei-Jehol-Liaoning, Shansi-Hopei-Honan, and Hopei-Shantung-Honan. The
countryside surrounding these bases was
largely under the supervision of roving
guerrilla units of the Eighth Route Army.

668 After the surrender of Japan, the
669 Communists' design to solidify their control
over the entire North China Region by
accepting the surrender of Japanese troops in
the major cities was thwarted by the Kuomintang.
Yen Hsi-shan seized Taiyuan, and American
air and naval transport facilities ferried
National Government forces to the major cities
of North China before the Communists reached
them on foot. The only important city in the
North occupied and held by the Communists
for a time was Kalgan (Chang-chia-k'o[illegible]) along
the Great Wall in northern Hopei. Through
this key rail junction the Communists were
able to funnel troops into Manchuria, where
Soviet Union occupation enabled them to take

668 Japanese arms and ammunition and occupy
669 most of the region.[32]

In the civil war that almost immediately followed the defeat of Japan, the Communists in North China concentrated on holding actions and the disruption of rail communications. These tactics not only handicapped the Nationalist Government in supplying its troops in Manchuria, where the main struggle in the civil war was being fought, but also helped to cripple the national economy south of the Yellow River.

After Manchuria had been won by the Communist forces in early November 1938, they were regrouped as the Fourth Field Army and funnelled into Hopei by way of the coastal pass at Shan-hai-kuan. Reinforced by troops from North China, the Fourth Field Army launched a full-scale offensive in the Peking-Tientsin-Kalgan triangle in December. Tientsin fell on January 15, 1949. The Nationalist army in

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[32] The names, dates, and campaigns, connected with the Communist victory are largely taken from a Communist source, which is accurate in regard to these facts in so far as can be determined by checking other, scattered sources: Liao Kai-lung, From Yenan to Peking, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1954, pp. 36-38, 50-54, 60-64, 89-92, 104-105.

668 Peking under the command of Fu Tso-i
669 accepted Communist surrender terms and withdrew from the city on January 22, permitting the Red Army to enter the capital in a triumphal march on January 31, 1949. The capture of these cities and Communist campaigns in the area between the Yellow and Yangtze rivers caused a general withdrawal of Nationalist forces to the south bank of the Yangtze.

The Communists paused to regroup their troops, while talking peace with the Kuomintang, before resuming the offensive in late April. Taiyuan was taken on April 24, and the remaining cities held by the Nationalists in Shansi fell by early May, placing all North China within the Great Wall in Communist hands. North of the frontier barrier, western Suiyuan held out until September, when anti-Communist forces laid down their arms.

668 During the course of the North China campaign, popular opinion was increasingly hostile to the Kuomintang, when not sympathetic to the Communists. Red Army control of the countryside and disruption of communication routes prevented the Nationalist Government from solving the food and inflation crises in the cities. Its use of troops that had served the Japanese during the war, reinstatement of pre-war officials, and inability to control the reversion of soldiers and administrators to

66 their prewar tendencies undermined popular allegiance to Nanking. Kuomintang graft and corruption further lowered the loyalty and morale of the people and the Nationalist armies.

Meanwhile the Communists were continuing to stress their wartime democratic policy in the countryside and to promise to the articulate element a Communist rule on the moderate lines drawn by Mao Tse-tung in his New Democracy. Sick of fighting, the population longed for any regime which would restore peace and stability. For the peasants out of reach of Communist influence, the struggle for power in China was none of their business. They stood aside, waiting for the winner to emerge, and accepted the victory of the Red Army as the beginning of a new dynasty which had inherited the "mandate of heaven" from the discredited Kuomintang.[33]

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[33] For an account by a trained observer of the initial reaction of the people of Peking to the Communist victory in the North see Derk Bodde, Peking Diary: A Year of Revolution, New York, Schuman, 1950.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 1c,
Sociological Background

POPULATION

I. DISTRIBUTION AND GROWTH

A. Total Figures

161 Based on the 1953 census carried out under the 659 auspices of the Peking regime, the total population of North China amounts to 55,761,109.[1] The accuracy of this figure is open to question on the basis of one or both of the following facts: (1) The 1953 census-taking was not thorough and in certain areas where direct counting was not possible, undefined "indirect" methods (possibly estimates) were employed. (2) Before the results of the census were announced, responsible Communist quarters had begun a campaign to "correct the undesirable habit of filing false reports," and even the Bureau of Statistics had begun to criticize the lack of reliability in the statistical work of various government departments.[2] Until 1952, the estimates on China's population cited by the Communist officials were all under 500 million. Early in 1953, several months before the census figures were completely tabulated, the estimates

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[1] Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily] , Peking, Nov. 1, 1954, p. 1.

[2] Editorial, Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily] , Peking, Mar. 31, 1954, p. 1.

1:Stanford U.S-4,5 1956 AF12 North China AF12

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
NORTH CHINA
POPULATION
DISTRIBUTION
Scale in Miles
0
100
200
112
116
120
40
36
32
A
B
PROVINCES
A-Shansi
B-Hopei

[Facing p. 66]

161 were stepped up to around 550 million. Thus
659 there is ground for suspicion that the Peking government might have intentionally exaggerated the figures for propaganda purposes.[3]

However, until evidence is discovered to substantiate charges of fabrication, the figures in Table 1 will stand as the result of the first and only direct nation-wide census. Relative reliability is further strengthened by the following considerations: (1) They generally tally with the figures on the electoral delegates and the voters they represented in the "basic-level election" (see chapter on Structure of Government) for which the census was initiated.[4] (2) Scattered reports on the basic-level elections are available roughly covering all parts of China; this fact should serve to indicate the geographic extent, if not the degree of thoroughness with which the census was carried out. And thoroughness is unprecedented in China. (3) The Communists as far back as 1949 had begun their study on population, and it appears possible that the Peking regime had done some checking of the 1953 census against the figures previously released. (4) Only a comparatively small percentage of the 1953 population figures (about 8 million) was derived from the so-called "indirect method of

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[3] *Tsui-chin Ch'i-koyüeh Lai Chung-yao Fei-Ch'ing Tsung-ho Pao-kao* [*Comprehensive Report on Important Developments in Communist China in the Past Seven Months*] ,Taipei, 6th Section, Central Committee, Nationalist Party, 1954, p. 23.

Yuan-li Wu, *An Economy Survey of Communist China*, New York, Bookman Associates, 1956, p. 13.

161 census-taking." (5) The above-cited communique 659 also reported on the review of these figures by the Bureau of Statistics. After rechecking 9 per cent (or 52,950,000) of the total population in a cross-section of many different localities, duplicates amount to only 0.139 per cent and those uncounted in the initial registration only 0.25 per cent.

It should be mentioned that the term "North China" is used here to refer to a region in the northern part of China which has been of varying size at different times, and changes in provincial boundaries have affected the figures representing the population in this region. Considerable discrepancy is to be expected between any previous work on China's and our study, if different regional point of view is followed.[5]

B. Distribution and Density

161 The announcement of the results of the 1953 census gives figures by provinces and municipalities. It is to be noted, however, that the figure for Hopei Province does not include that portion of Jehol Province which was incorporated into Hopei at the end of July 1955.

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[5] See chapter on Geographical Setting.

Table 1. Population of North China[*]

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Hopei Province	35,984,644
Shansi Province	14,314,485
Peking Municipality	2,768,149
Tientsin Municipality	2,693,381
Total	55,761,109

[*] *Enlightenment Daily*, Peking, Nov. 1, 1954, p. 1.

The population in this region stands fourth in size among China's regions. The average density of 167.57 per square kilometer (or 434 per sq. mi.) is second only to that of the East China Region, and this figure is possible because of such centers of concentration as Peking and Tientsin, in Hopei Province, and Taiyuan in Shansi Province. The following table shows population density according to the political subdivisions of this region:

Table 2. Population Density of North China[*]

	Per Sq. Km.	Per Sq. Mi.
Hopei	204.45	529.75
Shansi	91.76	237.65
Peking	3,915.34	10,140.73
Tientsin	48,978.74	126,854.92
Regional Average	167.57	434.00

[*] Based on 1953 figures and area figures in *Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-ho-kuo Fen-sheng Ti-t'u* [*Atlas of the People's Republic of China by Province*], Shanghai, Ti-t'u ch'u-pan-she, 1953.

161 The area and climate conditions of the North China Region may be compared to those of Missouri and Kansas, although the two states do have a higher annual average rainfall. The density of population in the two states according to the 1950 Census, averages only 45.92 per square mile. North China must support almost ten times as many people in an area of similar size.

A less discouraging view of North China's density of population results from a comparison with the situation in India -- a country whose average standard of living furnishes more valid ground for a comparative study of the social conditions of China. India's national average population density of 292.03 per square mile would indicate that the country is half as crowded as North China, but actually, India is almost twice as congested if we compare it with China as a whole.6/

C. Population Growth

Detailed information on the growth of the population in this region, which may have been secured through the 1953 census, is not available. However, statistics on a few localities have been released and, on the basis of these limited studies, a general trend for this region can be seen. Census-taking in the municipality of Tientsin was

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6/ Statistics for the U. S. and India are taken from the World Almanac, 1955, pp. 204, 259.

161 completed as early as March 30, 1954. The results show:

1.	Total Population of Tientsin	2, 693, 831
2.	Children born since 1949	366, 688
3.	Babies under one year old	86, 968

[163] During the year 1953, an average of 240 babies were born daily in Tientsin. According to the Communists, the birth rate of 1953 in Tientsin was 3.2 per cent higher than in 1948.[7]

On the basis of the above-mentioned statistics and the available 1948 population figure of 1, 772, 840 for Tientsin, we can say that the annual rate of increase in Tientsin's population is approximately 87 per thousand, or 8.7 per cent.[8] This, indeed, is an alarming rate. In view of the following facts it is seen that this rate does not represent the North China Region as a whole: (1) The 1948 population figure of 1, 772, 840 for Tientsin announced by the Ministry of the Interior at
161 Nanking has never been checked or verified. (2)
166 The sudden jump of Tientsin's population since
178 1948 is at least partially attributable to the influx

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[7] Enlightenment Daily, Mar. 30, 1954, p. 1.

[8] The 1948 Tientsin figure is taken from Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ung-chi T'i-yao [Statistical Abstract of the Republic of China, 1955] , Taipei, Executive Yuan, 1955, p. 34. Computation of rate of increase is according to Ch'en Ta, Jen-K'ou Wen-t'i [Population] , Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1935, p. 116.

[178] of people resulting from the intensive industriali-
161 zation program that has been pushed in this loca-
166 lity. Immigrants have a dual effect on the total population of Tientsin for they augment the total figure and increase the number of births. Considering these statements, it can be concluded that the rapid increase in Tientsin's population is not sufficient reason to assert that the increase rate for this region deviates in any great measure from the over-all trend of national population increase, which is 2 per cent per annum.

165 Lack of information on the death rate in this region makes it impossible to discuss this subject in any detail. However, the Peking regime has cited a few isolated cases as evidence of its claim that the welfare of the people has been greatly improved since the "liberation". One of the cases cited involves the Ch'ang-chih District in Shansi Province, where in 1949 as many as 57 per cent of the babies born in the district died of apoplectic diseases. To prove how health and sanitation measures have improved, Communist sources cited the population of one village -- Hsia-Ch'uan; for over fifty years the total population had remained about 470 until the census of 1953 raised it to 515.[9] Another case cited concerns the new capital of China, Peking. In November 1950, the death rate in Peking stood at 0.11 per cent. Three years later, after the nation-wide

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[9] Jen-min Shou-ts'e [People's Handbook], Tientsin, Ta-kung pao, 1955, p. 29.

165 census had been compiled, the death rate in Peking dropped to 0.06 per cent.[10] This noticeable drop in the death rate was attributed to the success of Communist regime's selective economic reconstruction program whereby important localities receive immediate attention. Because Peking is the capital, its sanitation system is among the first to be improved. However, the influx of young adult workers with lower specific death rates may account for the lower average death rate.

II. COMPOSITION

162 A. Age Composition

The birth rate and number of children in Tientsin cited in the preceding paragraphs indicate that the average age in Tientsin is somewhat lower than the national average. If this city could be used as an indication of the population composition of the entire region (data on other localities in the region are still unavailable), then the age group of 1-4 is 16.6 per cent of the total, slightly lower than the 15.6 per cent national figure. Apart from these figures, there is no information on the population of this region to contradict the national age group breakdown shown in the People's Daily report (November 1, 1954, p. 3.)

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[10] "Sharp Drop in Death Rate," Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 828, p. 3.

B. Sex Ratio

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The official communique reporting the results of the 1953 census failed to disclose any regional breakdown on the sex ratio of the Chinese population. On this question the latest available information is that which was released by the Ministry of the Interior of the Chinese Nationalist Government in 1948 and which has since been quoted in all official reports.

Table 3. Sex Ratio in North China Population (1948)[*]
(Number of Males per Hundred Females)

Hopei Province	116.25
Shansi Province	121.62
Peking Municipality	125.66
Tientsin Municipality	133.43
Average	118.92

[*] Statistical Abstract of the Republic of China, 1955.

C. Rural and Urban Population

162 The traditionally large percentage of rural popu-
178 lation in China undoubtedly still holds true to a great extent in the North China Region. However, the effect of industrialization on the basically agricultural nature of this region should be mentioned. Since the North China Region is undergoing intensive industrialization, the urban-rural popu-
000 lation ratio may change radically. Although the

162absence of detailed statistics makes it difficult to show a trend toward an increase in urban population, it can be stated that the national average of 86.74 per cent for rural population may not be accurate for this region. Allowance must be made when comparing present reports with the following table which is based on the latest available data of 1948:

Table 4. Rural and Urban Population in North China (1948) */

(Per Cent)

	Rural	Urban
Hopei	84.54	15.46
Shansi	65.74	34.26
Peking	---	100.00
Tientsin	---	100.00
Regional Average ..	72.58	27.42

*/ Chung-hua Nien-chien [The China Year Book], Shanghai, Chung-hua nien-chien she, 1948, p.108.

It should also be noted that the ratio figures in Table 4 appear to conflict with the trend of population movement from rural area to urban centers, in view of the 1953 national average of 86.75 per cent for urual areas. The matter of different definitions of "urbanity" and the expansion of Tientsin into a "municipality" to include a wide suburban area should be considered.

III. INTERNAL MIGRATION

A. Migration toward Industrial Centers

178
168 Apart from the northwestern province of Shensi, the Chinese Communists have had the best opportunity and the greatest time to develop and reorganize the provinces of North China. With the central Communist authority close at hand, all the details of administrative reorganization have been quickly disposed of and the way to industrialization and economic reconstruction has been rapidly prepared. According to China Mainland sources, recovery of industrial productivity in this region has been rapid, and the Communists have carried out a program of expansion for existing factories and the construction of new factories. The much-publicized five-year plan of Peking determines 156 industrial units for expansion and construction; a good number of them are in this region.[11] The government has been making a systematic effort to facilitate the migration of skilled and unskilled laborers and their families to these centers. Most of the immigrants are from the countryside around the industrial centers; others are from outside of this region.

B. Migration toward Large-scale Construction Sites

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166 As in the Central-South Region, in North China large-scale construction projects have been launched. The extensive flood-control projects on the Yung-ting River in Hopei Province and the

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[11] People's Handbook, 1955.

178 Kuan-t'ing Reservoir on the same river, which is 166 reported to have been completed, have caused sizable concentrations of population at the sites of these projects. Hundreds of thousands of people are employed upon a mammoth construction program in Peking, which, when completed, will expand the city to seven times its original size. Some of these migrant workers have settled permanently in the city. This situation has led authorities in Peking to predict that Peking's population will increase to over four million at the end of the expansion program.[12]

C. Emigration from this Region to the Northeast

Mass emigration from south of the Great Wall to the northeast dates from the early 1920's. The majority of the emigrants started their journey from Hopei Province in this region and from Shantung Province in East China. Early statistics have placed the total number of Hopei and Shantung emigrants to the northeast at over five million during 1923-30. Many have adopted the northeast as their home. Between 1927 and 1930 about 1, 500, 000 people had permanently settled in the northeast.[13] 168 The Peking regime encourages this emigration. Large groups of men skilled in technical work have been sent where they are needed. Experienced

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[12] Wang Tzu-ch'iang, Pei-ching [Peking] , Shanghai, Hua-tung jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1954, p. 55.

[13] Hua-pei Wu-sheng Hsin Ti-t'u [New Map of the Five Provinces of North China] , Shanghai, Ya-kuang yü-ti hsüeh-she, 1950.

198 laborers who returned to North China but who could
166 not find enough work in the factories there, are
now employed in the less populated provinces of
Manchuria. At the same time, people have been
encouraged to settle on reclaimed lands. These
population movements are continuing in this
region.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 1d,
Sociological Background

ETHNIC GROUPS

563 Ethnic minorities are hereby defined as groups bound together by common ties of race, nationality, or culture, living together within an alien civilization but remaining culturally distinct. The Chinese-Communists, following the practice of the USSR, have termed the ethnic minorities within the Chinese territory "nationalities" or "national minorities" in juxtaposition to the Han nationality. Therefore, the term "nationality," as it is used in China today, is a designation for an ethnic and geographical community. Owing to the fact that the Hui people, neither racially homogeneous nor concentrated in one area, are also regarded as a separate nationality by the Chinese Communists, the latter's main principle for such a classification seems to be the presence of customary laws and practices peculiar to a group of common origin which have, over a period of time, regulated its standard of behavior and given rise to group consciousness and distinctive characteristics. It is on this same broad principle that we base our classification of the ethnic groups in China. Accordingly, the Han Chinese, though by far the great majority of the Chinese population (94 per cent), are also considered as one of the many ethnic groups in China.

I. INTRODUCTION

142 Compared with the Chinese in the South and the Southwest, the northern Chinese are generally taller, have longer and larger heads, relatively lower foreheads and cheek bones, lighter skins, and less pronounced development of the almond-shaped eyes.[1] Although the northern Chinese are more uniform in appearance than their compatriots in South and Southwest China, they are still a very mixed group ; and the fact that they all speak Northern Mandarin by no means indicates lack of diversity in their ethnic composition. [197]

II. THE HAN CHINESE, MANCHUS, AND MONGOLS

175 The Han Chinese who constitute the great majority of the population in North China were established in the area occupied by the present provinces of Shansi and Hopei toward the end of the third century B.C., and at that time, having assimilated all of the "barbarians," they were the only people residing in that part of the country.[2] The invasions of North China by tribes of Hsiung-nu and Hsien-pei from A.D. 304 to 580, the Ch'i-

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[1] The difference between the northern and southern Chinese was sufficiently great that Marco Polo called North China Cathay and South China Manji. Li Chi, The Formation of the Chinese People, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1928, pp. 165-66.

[2] Ibid., pp. 165-66, 232.

175 tan and NU chen from A.D. 907 to 1235, and the Mongol tribes from A.D. 1280 to 1368 resulted in the ascendency of these tribes in North China and the migration of many Han Chinese across the Yangtze River. The so-called Han Chinese population in North China was in fact a mixture of Han Chinese and the tribal elements mentioned above.[3]

175
553 During the Manchu dynasty (A.D. 1644-1911) there was constant migration into China proper from both North Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia of recruits for garrisons and other kinds of military service inside the Great Wall. There arose Manchu settlements in North China.[4]
563 Today, the majority of Mongols and Manchus live in autonomous regions in Inner Mongolia and the Northeast respectively. Those remaining in Hopei and Shansi are generally scattered among Han Chinese communities. Under Communist leadership, a number of people in Shansi and Hopei have distinguished themselves as prominent citizens of Manchu and Mongol origin, but they are in fact not much different, either culturally or in physical appearance, from the Han Chinese around them. Although the Peking government often speaks of its policy toward non-Han peoples, it has no distinct policy for

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[3] Ibid., pp. 232, 282, 265, 167.

[4] While this process was going on, many Han Chinese, seeking farmland, migrated in just the opposite direction into Manchuria and Inner Mongolia from China proper.

563 Mongols and Manchus in Hopei and Shansi. The Communists do list and publicize the names of people's leaders of such ethnic origin for the sake of propaganda. In contrast, the *Hui* people in Hopei and Shansi seem to be given a good deal of official attention, far exceeding the proportion their numerical strength deserves.

III. THE HUI IN NORTH CHINA [5]

The *Hui* in China trace their descent from Arabian and Iranian soldiers and merchants who moved into China during the seventh and thirteenth centruries and who intermarried with the Chinese and the aborigines, and from Chinese children adopted by *Hui* families.

The *Hui* people intermarry with the *Han* Chinese. However, when a *Han* Chinese desires to marry a *Hui* woman, he must embrace Islam, whereas a *Han* Chinese women who wishes to marry a *Hui* man need not change her own religion. Although ancestral differences set apart the *Hui* from the *Han* Chinese, the lack of racial prejudice on the part of the *Hui* facilitates the assimilation of other groups into the *Hui* community and renders the racial composition of the *Hui* more complex. The *Hui* of North China have

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[5] There are many Moslem peoples in China of which the *Hui* is one. Other Moslem peoples are the Uigurs, Kazaks, Mongolian Moslems, Tibetan Moslems, and others.

543 Chinese blood and are almost indistinguishable from the average Han Chinese in physical appearance. The cohesiveness of Hui people in North China is attributable to factors other than racial and physical similarity. Their religion (Islam, called Hui Chiao or Ch'ing-chen Chiao), language (Chinese supplemented by Iranian and Arabic elements of a religious nature), and customs which stem from religious practices and observances make them cohesive as an ethnic group in spite of outside cultural forces and the fact that in North China the Hui do not have large and contiguous communities.

Most of the Hui people in North China live in big cities. Peking and Tientsin have the largest concentrations of Hui population in North China.[6] Most of the Hui are merchants and hand craftsmen, many are restaurant operators and innkeepers. The present Communist government has been trying to draw the Hui peoples together with other Chinese peoples into the labor force for national construction in large production plants. In doing so, special problems have to be solved to adapt the work schedule and food provisions to Hui customs and religious observnace. Recently, Communist spokesmen declared that the employment of Hui people together with Han Chinese workers were no long-

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6. Jen-min Jih-pao, Peking, June 26, 1952, gives the number of Hui people in Peking as more than 70,000. Survey of China Mainland Press, Hong Kong, No. 923, Nov. 5, 1954, gives the number of Hui in Peking as 78,000. S.D. Gamble, in his Peking, A Social Survey, New

563 er a problem.[7] There have been many instances in which Hui workers are accorded special treatment, especially in their meat ration and in increased freedom to observe religious holidays.[8] These special arrangements are clearly departures from the Communists' stringent practice towards adherents of other religions, notably, the Christians.

In contrast to the Hui people in the Northwest, who have been antagonistic towards the Han Chinese as a result of the oppressive policies of the previous Chinese governments and who tend to isolate themselves, the Hui in North China mingle closely with the Han Chinese in their economic activities. The Kuomintang government seemed to take for granted that the Hui were sufficiently assimilated into Chinese communities and did not merit recognition as a separate ethnic group. In the 1930's the Hui were treated merely as "believers in Islam," and their ethnic difference were minimized. The present Chinese Communist government has reversed the Kuomintang practice. By emphasizing past grievances between the Hui (mainly in Southwest and Northwest China) and the Han Chinese, the ethnic policy of the People's Government is claimed to be the "most enlightened of all times.

York, George Doran Co., 1921, p. 99, says that in Peking, the Han Chinese constitute 70-75% of the total population, the Manchu 20-25%, and the Hui, 3%.

[7] *Survey of China Mainland Press*, July 13, 1954, p. 24.

[8] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, June 26, 1952; June 4, 1954.

53 In North China, in addition, the Communists have tried to build up Hui heroes in connection with Communist enterprises. For example, the late Ma Pen-chai, who commanded the Hui People's Regiment in Central Hopei during the last war against the Japanese, was greatly honored on the tenth anniversary of his death. At the commemoration service held in Peking, not only was Ma's contribution in the Communist guerrilla warfare praised, but because of his Islamic faith, the Hui people's glory was thrust vicariously upon all the Moslem people in China.[9] This is only one of the many acts of the Communists in which the Hui people of North China are made a nucleus of Moslem activities in the expectation that other Moslem peoples in the fringe areas of China may be drawn under the influence of Peking. This practice of praising members of minority groups pleases foreign Moslem visitors. In the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Movement in North China, the Hui people served as representatives for all the Moslem peoples.[10] The Hui Cultural Association at Peking invariably leads the activities of the China Islamic Association. The largest mosque in Peking at Tung Ssu-p'ai-lou and Peking's other 65 mosques, as well as the National Hui People's Academy,[11] have been made into

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[9] Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, February 10, 1954.

[10] Ibid., Nov. 15, 1950.

[11] Li Shu, "The Hui People's Academy," China Reconstructs, May 1955, pp. 12-13.

563 Chinese centers for Moslem activities.

According to a report at a meeting held by the Hui Cultural Association at Peking, ten autonomous hsien and ch'ü have been established for the Hui people in China. However, so far there has not been any news release concerning the establishment of Hui autonomous units in the provinces of Hopei and Shansi, although there are indications that Hui people are among the delegates elected to the governments at all levels.[12]

IV. CONCLUSION

There are actually no ethnic problems involved in the provinces of Hopei and Shansi because unassimilated Mongols and Manchus have been incorporated into autonomous regions outside these provinces.[13] However, the presence of a handful of people of Hui origin in and around the capital of the Communist regime renders it convenient for the Communists to make a showcase of ethnic equality and religious toleration[14] for visitors from others parts of China and abroad.[15] Thus Hui people of North China are accorded preferential treatment, partly because only they can provide some sort of cultural tie between the Chinese government and the Moslems in Northwest China, Sinkiang, Southeastern Asia, and the Near East.

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[12] *People's Daily*, Jan. 29, 1955.

[631] [13] The Communist government has recently abolished the province of Jehol, incorporating northern Jehol into Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and southern Jehol into Hopei. There is no indication that large numbers of unassimilated Mongols and Manchus are now in Hopei consequent to this change. For cultural characteristics of the Mongols, see Handbook on Inner Mongolia; of the Manchus, see the Handbook on Manchuria.

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[14] People's Daily, Jan. 29, 1955.

[15] Feng Chia-sheng, "China and the Arabic World," China Reconstructs, April 1955, pp. 24-5.

~~AF 12~~ AF12

Annex "A," Subparagraph le,
Sociological Background

LANGUAGES

I. NORTHERN MANDARIN DIALECTS

197 The population in Hopei and Shansi provinces, totaling 55,750,000, speak Northern Mandarin dialects which are mutually intelligible and have the following distinguishing features in common:

194 There are two kinds of stop affricative consonants which are not voiced and voiceless as b, d, g, dz, and p, t, k, ts in English, but voiceless unaspirated and voiceless aspirated, commonly expressed in phonetic symbols of the Wade-Giles system of Romanization as p, t, k, ts and p', t', k', ts', respectively. Roughly speaking, p, t, k sound like English p, t, k, in speak, still, and skill; and p', t', k' sound like English p, t, k in peak, till, and kill. Voiced consonants such as b, d, g of English do not exist in Northern Mandarin.

There is a set of retroflex affricatives and fricatives distinguishable from dental affricatives and fricatives. For example:

Chu (pig) : tsu (to rent)
Ch'eng (city wall) : ts'eng (storey, layer)
Shan (hill) : san (three)

The guttural nasal ng does not occur in the initial position of a word as it usually does in other dialect groups.

1:Stanford U.S-4,5 1956 AF12 North China AF12

197


NORTH CHINA
LINGUISTIC
SINO - TIBETAN FAMILY
CHINESE GROUP
N. MANDARIN
E. MANDARIN
ALTIC FAMILY
MONGOLIAN
S. MONGOLIAN
Mary Carmine

[Facing p. 88]

194 A vowel scheme such as the following exists:

	Front Unrounded	Front Rounded	Central	Back Unrounded	Back Rounded
High	i	ü			u
Mid	e		ə	ə̂	o
Low			a		

With an additional symbol for the apical vowel, the above scheme will suffice to indicate all the vowel sounds of these dialects. Ordinarily, e and ə, or ə̂ and o are not distinguishable.

Only two final nasals, n and ng are found, except in Shansi Province, and they are distinguishable regardless of the vowel preceding them.

Lan (indigo)	:	lang (wolf)
Chen (true)	:	cheng (to steam)
Min (people)	:	ming (name)
Sun (grandchild)	:	sung (loose)
Ch'ün (a crowd)	:	ch'iung (poor, impoverished)

There are four tones. The pitch of the first tone is high-level; that of the second, high-rising; that of the third, low-dipping; and that of the fourth, high-falling. Graphically, these four tones may be represented as follows: ˥, ˧˥, ˨˩˦, and ˥˩, respectively. However, the dialects spoken in Shansi and areas adjacent to it have an additional fifth tone, which is always associated with a glottal stop in a final position. Another characteristic of these dialects is that n and ng rarely occur

194 after the vowels a and e.

A few variations from the standard Northern Mandarin are noted in this dialect group as spoken in Hopei Province. The tone values of the words vary from place to place. The following comparison is made on the basis of dialects spoken in Tientsin (northeastern Hopei), Paoting (central Hopei), and P'u-yang (southern Hopei):

Standard Northern Mandarin	Tientsin	Paoting	P'u-yang
High -level	High-falling	High-rising	High-rising
High-rising	Mid high-falling	High-falling	Mid high-falling
Low-dipping	High-rising	Low-dipping	High-level
High-falling	High-falling	High-falling	Low-dipping

194 In scattered areas in Hopei Province, certain standard Northern Mandarin sounds are pronounced differently. For example:

	Standard Northern Mandarin	Hopei Dialects
enter	chin	tsin
near	chin	kin (k pronounced like something between kin and go)
wife	ch'i	ts'i
deceive	ch'i	ki

In some dialects spoken in areas southeast of Peking, initial n is added to the standard Northern Mandarin zero initial preceding a mid or low vowel. Thus standard Northern Mandarin e (hungry), ai (to love) ao (to stew), and en (favor) become ne, nai, nao, and nen, respectively.

Most of the people in Hopei Province pronounce the vowel e in standard Northern Mandarin final ien "opened", thus making it sound like ian. They also pronounce standard Northern Mandarin ing like ieng or iang.

The characteristics of the dialects spoken in Shansi Province and some mountainous areas in western and northwestern Hopei Province are as follows:

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF 12 North China
~~AF 12~~ AF12

194 The ancient "entering" tone, which has been dropped from standard Northern Mandarin, is preserved in Shansi dialects. Consequently these dialects have five tones. All the words with an "entering" tone are pronounced with a final glottal stop.

Retroflexes and sibilants are not differentiated in many Shansi dialects; thus standard Northern Mandarin shu (to comb) becomes su and ch'ung (to rush) becomes ts'ung, etc.

Standard Northern Mandarin medial u, when pronounced with a zero initial, is substituted by v; thus wen (to ask) becomes ven; wa (stockings) becomes va, etc.

Both standard Mandarin ai and ei are pronounced like ei, with e sounding like e in the English word set; thus standard Northern Mandarin k'ai (to open) becomes k'ei.

Standard Northern Mandarin finals n and ng are dropped when they follow vowels a and e; thus pan (half) becomes pa, kang (steel) becomes ka, etc.

Most of the standard Northern Mandarin finals n and ng are pronounced ng uniformly; thus hsin (heart) becomes hsing, sun (grandson) becomes sung, etc.

V. THE NATIONAL LANGUAGE OR KUO-YÜ

197 185 Since there is no standard spoken Chinese, and since the various Chinese dialects in general are sufficiently different to make them mutually unintelligible to various degrees, many difficulties naturally arise. The Chinese themselves have long felt the need for a national language that will help them solve such difficulties. Consequently, as early as 1911, a movement was launched to unify the national language, and a system of thirty-nine phonetic symbols which were later reduced to thirty-seven was devised primarily for the purpose of indicating speech sounds. In the following year the pronunciation of Northern Mandarin as typified by the dialect of Peiping was adopted as the standard for the new national language. With the strong support of the government and educational leaders, the movement soon gained momentum and swept the entire country. Gradually more and more speakers of other dialects began to make an effort to learn the new national language or kuo-yü.

197 During the years of China's war of resistance against Japan, when people speaking various dialects were squeezed into the hinterland, dialectal barriers were gradually broken down. A situation like that proved to be favorable to the further popularization of the national language. Although it may be exaggeration to say that now the national language has replaced the local dialects in the North China Region, it is nevertheless true that kuo-yü is gaining wider acceptance than ever before.

VI. THE CHINESE WRITTEN LANGUAGE

212 Despite the fact that the Chinese people in this region speak difference Chinese dialects, the fact still remains that they use one and the same system of writing. China's written language consists of thousands of uniformly understood logographs or "characters" as they are commonly called. They can be understood only with reference to their ancient forms.

A. Pictographs

Chinese characters are traditionally classified into six main categories, the first of which is pictographs. The characters in this category all originated from simple pictures: jih ⊙ (now written 日) is the character for "the sun"; yüeh ☽ (now written 月) is the character for "the moon," etc. However, they have long lost their function of picturing things and become merely conventionalized visual symbols of spoken words.

B. Ideographs

The second category is that of the ideographs, which are characters indicating in a diagrammatic manner simple ideas, as shang 上 for "up, above," hsia 下 for "down, below," i 一 for "one," erh 二 for "two," san 三 for "three," etc. Pictographs and ideographs, presumably bases of ancient Chinese characters, however, amount to only one-tenth of the entire stock of China's written symbols.

C. Compound Ideographs

212 The third category is that of the compound ideographs or characters whose meanings are determined by the combined meanings of their component parts, as ming 明 , which is a combination of the "sun" and "moon," stands for "bright"; hsin 信 , which is a combination of "man" and "word," hence, the "words of a man" stands for "honesty."

D. Phonetic Loan Characters

The fourth category is that of phonetic loan characters. These characters were all borrowed from existing words homophonous with the new ones for which written symbols had to be coined. For example, when a written symbol had to be created for the new word lai, meaning "to come," instead of resorting to pictographic or ideographic devices for the coining of such a symbol, the old character 來, meaning "barley," also similarly pronounced, was borrowed for that purpose. Often such a borrowed character displaced the original source. Thus, 來 is now used exclusively to mean "to come" rather than "barley." Similarly, ch'i 其 , the third personal pronoun, is now used invariably as such rather than as a symbol for "basket," the meaning of the original word similarly written and similarly pronounced.

E. Phonetic Compounds

Phonetic compounds constitute the fifth and perhaps the most numerous category of Chinese

212 characters. They consist of two portions, a "signific" or meaning portion, and a "phonetic" or pronunciation portion. The former reveals the general meaning while the latter indicates the pronunciation of the compound. Thus, jan 燃 "to burn" has huo 火 "fire" as its signific, and jan 然 "so, thus" as its phonetic. Similarly, t'ang 糖 "sugar" has mi 米 "rice, cereal" as its signific, and t'ang 唐 "bold talk" as its phonetic. It may be pointed out here that the phonetic element of such compounds may or may not have been a "phonetic loan compound," that the pronunciation of the phonetic may or may not be exactly identical with that of the compound even on the basis of ancient Chinese pronunciation, and that the meaning indicated by the signific is at best categorical rather than minutely accurate.

F. Derivative Characters

The last of the six categories consists of what may be called derivative characters, the origin of which is still uncertain. Some scholars think that the characters of the category resulted from graphic inversion, such as lao 老 "aged, old" and k'ao 考 "aged, old'; others think that they resulted from changes brought about by modifications in sounds accompanied by modifications in meanings, such as heng 亨 "propitious" and hsiang 享 "to enjoy." At any rate, this is the smallest category.

VII. CHINESE SCRIPT AND THE HIGH INCIDENCE OF ILLITERACY

It is true that written Chinese is uniformly understood throughout the country and has created

212 no difficulty for literate Chinese in communicating ideas to one another regardless of their dialectal affiliation. But it is also true that although Chinese characters might have been devised for writing the spoken language in ancient times, now the great majority of symbols have become merely conventionalized written equivalents of individual spoken words. Some of the characters for most commonly used words such as 鹽 "salt" and 鐵 "iron," for instance, consist of twenty-four and twenty-one strokes respectively. To say the very least about them, they are time-consuming for the average Chinese to learn and memorize. As there are thousands of characters in everyday use, many of which are comparable in complexity and clumsiness, it should be apparent that it will take an average person many years to become adequately literate. It is entirely possible and highly probable that there is a definite connection between the complicated and clumsy Chinese script and the high incidence of illiteracy in China, although other equally convincing factors, too, must have contributed substantially to that fact.

VIII. LITERARY CHINESE

Besides the many different dialects, many of which have their own written counterparts of varying degrees of completeness, there is yet another language in China known as the literary language, as it is usually called by Western writers. It is the language of China's undying classics and owes its preservation to the inflexible and conservative system of writing of the country. As such, it has no standard pronunciation of its own.

212 In other words, it has as many standard of pronunciation as there are dialects in China. That is to say that if a passage written in literary Chinese is read by a speaker of Northern or Southwestern Mandarin, Kan-Hakka, Cantonese or Southern Min, it will sound like the dialect he speaks. Moreover, in grammar and syntax, literary Chinese is so different from any of the dialects that it is almost a different language, entirely free from the influences of the changes that have taken place in the dialects. Hence, it is possible for a lettered Chinese at the same time to speak his own dialect and write literary Chinese without any strange feeling on his part at all. As a language, literary Chinese is noted for its conciseness, frequently leaving out many things which are ordinarily expressed, thus creating a kind of ambiguous terseness all its own, requiring its readers to fill in the missing elements as they go along. This characteristic accounts for the reason why a passage written in literary Chinese, when read aloud, can seldom be fully understood by a listener even though he may speak the dialect of the person reading.

Despite such a shortcoming, literary Chinese has been exerting a tenacious influence on the Chinese, especially the lettered segment of the population. It is literary Chinese that has kept China's classics alive and perpetuated the many pithy dicta of wisdom unsurpassed in the living language of the Chinese people despite dialectal barriers of any kind. Although the written national language has been gaining wider and wider acceptance, the great majority of government

212 and commercial organizations are still using literary Chinese in the transaction of their routine business.

IX. LANGUAGE REFORMS

212
185 Attempts to introduce language reforms in China began on a nationwide basis with the movement to unify the national language shortly after the establishment of the Chinese Republic in 1911. The movement was followed closely by efforts to reform the written language. Those who advocated such reforms were of the opinion that since the characters were so complicated and time-consuming for the average person to learn, and since literary Chinese was so unrealistic and impractical, something had to be done to make the written language of Chinese more effective, so that it could be within the grasp of the average Chinese citizen in a relatively short period of time.

A. Phonetic Symbols

One type of reform advocated the use of phonetic symbols as an aid to the illiterate to learn to read. However, since the sole function of these symbols is phonetic, they are effective when they are used as a guide to correct pronunciation in accordance with the standard of the national language for the purpose of leveling down dialectal differences in pronunciation. They are helpful only to those who have not yet acquired such a knowledge. They cannot possibly add anything to the attempt to make the Chinese language system simpler or more readily accessible to the illiterate masses.

B. Alphabetization

Another type of reform advocated was the alphabetization of Chinese in order to get away from ideographic writing. As a matter of fact, the use of the Roman alphabet for the transcription of sounds of the Chinese language is no novel suggestion. As early as the beginning of the sixteenth century, Matteo Ricci, a Jesuit missionary to China, began to transcribe the then Mandarin sounds with the Roman alphabet on the basis of the speech sounds of his own native Italian language. Later, other system of romanization were devised by others to meet the needs of those speaking other Western languages. The most widely used system among English-speaking peoples is the so-called Wade-Giles system, originally devised by Sir Thomas Wade, a member of the British legation in China, and later revised by the British sinologist, Herbert A. Giles. Another system in current use in this country is devised by the linguists at Yale University, and is known as the Yale System.

In 1928 the Chinese Ministry of Education adopted a system of romanization known as Gwoyeu Romatzyh or National Language Romanization, devised by a group of Chinese linguists and intellectual leaders such as Dr. Yuen Ren Chao, Dr. Lin Yutang, and others. Its distinguishing feature is that instead of indicating Chinese intonation by means of superior figures or diacritical marks, it spells the different tones of Chinese words with different letters: mai (second tone, Wade-Giles mai^2) "to bury"; mae (third tone, Wade-Giles mai^3) "to buy"; may (fourth tone, Wade-Giles mai^4) "to sell."

Between 1929 and 1931 another system of romanization known as Latinxua was devised mainly by Professor A. A. Dragunov, a linguist of Leningrad, primarily for teaching the Chinese workers in the USSR to read. It has been very popular, for obvious reasons, with the Chinese Communists, who have been doing all they can to promote and popularize it. However, since the system makes no attempt, except in an ad hoc manner, to distinguish tones in Chinese, it is not only inadequate and unsatisfactory, but often misleading.

C. Simplified Characters

Yet another type of proposal advocated the simplification of Chinese characters, especially the more complicated ones in common use, by reducing the number of their strokes. Adocates of this proposal believed that a simplified system of writing would make the whole process of learning to read and write Chinese much easier and less time-consuming. For example, ts'ai 纔 "then" has been reduced to look like 才, and 鐵 t'ieh "iron" to look like 鉄. If a satisfactory principle of simplification that is philologically sound can be worked out, so that the simplified characters, if necessary, can be identified with the original characters, the adoption of such a system may turn out to be a boon to China's millions of illiterate people in their

212 effort to become literate.

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D. Basic Chinese

A fourth type of proposal advocated the reduction of the number of characters to be meant for general use in order to simplify the written language. For example, the series of textbooks for teaching the illiterate compiled by Dr. Yen Yang-ch'u, leader of the Mass Education Movement, who is better known abroad as James Y. C. Yen, represents an effort made in this direction. On the basis of some 1,200 characters chosen by him in terms of their frequency, he compiled texts that he believed would enable China's illiterate people to meet their basic needs in expression. As another effort made more or less in the same direction, we may mention the list of characters chosen by Hung Shen, the famous dramatist. In 1935 he published his Method of Teaching and Using 1,100 Basic Chinese Characters. Instead of basing his choice of characters on frequency and limiting their usefulness and expressiveness to the rudimentary plane, he chose them on the criteria of their flexibility in forming compounds with other characters and their adequacy for general use in everyday situations.

VII. DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE COMMUNISTS

The Chinese Communists have been cautious in their efforts to reform the Chinese language. They frequently quote Stalin as saying that the

212 language of a people cannot be artifically changed
185 and that the evolution of any language has to follow a natural course.[1] However, to combat illiteracy the Communists also see the immediate need of simplifying the Chinese written language. In this regard the government policy is based on Mao Tse-tung's statement in his *On New Democracy* that, "under certain conditions, the written language of China must be reformed."[2] Envisaged as the ultimate goal of language reform is the complete Latinization of the Chinese written language. In other words, the characters will be replaced by the Latin alphabet. Communist promoters of Latinization often cite Lenin's pronouncement that, "Latinization is the great revolution of the East"[3] in order to justify their argument.

192 The Communists are trying to cultivate a politically conscious proletariat in China. China's spoken language, as reflected in songs, plays, and speeches, is becoming more proletarian and drifting away from the set phrases and expressions traditionally used by the intdlectual class. Extensive use of professional jargon and local expressions is the vogue of the day. Political terms and scientific terms, particularly those of Russian origin, are apparently on the lips of every Chinese who has had Communist indoctrination. It must be noted that the Communists, in adopting many new terms heretofore unfamiliar to the average Chinese, are aware of the danger of corrupting the language. The *People's Daily of Peking* (the *Pravda of China*), in an editorial

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[1] See quotation and discussion in Ts'ao Po-han, *Yu-wen Wen-t'i P'ing-lun Chi* [*Critical Essays on the Language Problem*], Shanghai, Tung-fang shu-tien, 1954, p. 95.

[2] [next page]

on June 6, 1951, urged the use of correct Chinese 198 and stressed the need for the study of grammar so that "the Chinese language will not become corrupt and impure."[4]

In the movement to eradicate illiteracy, 212 the current trend is to promote accelerated meth- 185 ods of language teaching and to standardize and formalize many simplified characters already in use by the people in their handwriting. The Peking government is applying little effort, however, to the popularization of Latinized Chinese. One of the most publicized methods to accelerate language learning was introduced in 1948 by Ch'i Chien-hua, a cultural cadre attached to the armed forces. Ch'i champions the use of the "National Phonetic Symbols" (not to be confused with the Gwoyeu Romatzyh discussed in foregoing sections of this chapter) as the "walking stick" for new learners. The phonetic symbols are employed as a pronunciation aid to the students. This method was said to be so successful that the Peking government in May 1952 recognized Ch'i's contribution by inviting him to the capital and awarding him a citation.[5]

Simplification of written characters has been given official blessing. When the Committee on

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2. Mao Tse-tung, Mao Tse-tung Hsüan-chi [Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung], Vol. II, Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1952, p. 680.

3. John de Francis, Nationalism and Language Reform in China, Princeton University Press, 1950, p. 90.

4. Quoted in Jen-min Chiao-yü [People's Education], (Monthly), Peking, March 1955, p.28.

5. [see next page]

the Study of Language Reform under the Ministry of Education compiled 798 such simplified characters and recommended that they be adopted, the recommendation was given immediate attention. On May 1, 1955 the committee announced that 57 simplified characters would be adopted by six national periodicals for experimental purposes.[6] On October 15, 1955, an All-China Conference on Language Reform was called by the committee to revise and enlarge the proposed list of simplified characters.

The Latinization movement, although without much official promotion, is by no means dead. There are publications printed in this new form of Chinese. One ardent supporter of this movement, Ni Hai-shu, claimed that in 1954 there were over 300 such publications with a total circulation of about 500,000 already in the market.[7] In February 1952, magazines published in Peking frequently printed articles promoting the Latinization of Chinese.[8]

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5. [continued from previous page] People's Education, May 1952, p. 4.

[6] Hua-ch'iao Jih-pao [China Daily News], New York, May 2, 1955, p. 1.

[7] Ni Hai-shu Chung-kuo Yü-wen Ti Hsin-sheng [The Rebirth of the Chinese Language], Shanghai, Shih-tai shu-pao ch'u-pan-she, 1949, pp.458-59; also see John de Francis, op. cit., pp. 131-34.

[8] Hsin-wen-tzu Pan-yüeh-k'an [New Language Semimonthly], Shanghai, February 16, 1952, p. 28.

212 185 There are other recent developments in language reform. One of them is the attempt to standardize the use of punctuation marks. On October 5, 1951, the Government Administration Council in Peking issued a directive on the correct use of punctuation marks.[9] Since that time the general trend has been moving toward standardization.

Another recent development is the practice of writing Chinese horizontally and from left to right. Such a practice is not new, but the Peking government is the first regime to sanction it. Following lengthy discussions on such a practice, national publications like the Enlightenment Daily and New China Monthly, since January 1, 1955, have been printing their texts horizontally.

563 212 As to the languages of minority nationality groups, the over-all Communist policy is to help them create their own written scripts. The theory is that these people must be given their own languages, and then it will be easier for them to learn Chinese (Latinized Chinese, most probably Since there is no concentration of any minority nationals in North China, the study and use of languages of minority nationalities, therefore, are confined to such institutions as the Central College for Minority Nationalities and the medical school of Peking University.

XI. SPEAKERS OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES

191 Before 1949, the use of foreign languages,

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[9] Jen-min Shou-ts'e, 1952 [People's Handbook, 1952], Shanghai, Ta-kung pao, 1952, p. 437.

19 mainly English, was found in a few large cities in North China such as Tientsin and Peking. Contact with English-speaking people in such cities and inclusion of English in school curricula accounted for the popularity of English. However, with the exception of a few foreign missionary schools in which English was taught by native speakers, instruction in English in other schools did not amount to much. This was true even of the colleges in the region. Though some college students could manage to read a publication in English with reasonable ease, they could not converse in English without great difficulty. On the average, it may be safely assumed that about one-tenth of the secondary school graduates and possible one-third of college graduates could read English with some difficulty. The over-all percentages of those who could speak it would be even smaller.

The Communist policy is to discourage the use of English or any other Western language except in advanced, specialized studies. But as late as 1953, knowledge of simple English was still required for enrollment in colleges.[10] It appears reasonable to assume that the number of senior middle school and college students able to read or speak English has not been changed a great deal. Foreign language instruction has been eliminated from junior middle school and primary school curricula.[11] Although the study of Russian has been encouraged by the Communists, it is doubtful if much has been achieved during the past five years.

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10 and 11. [See next page.]

191 There is no statistical information on the number of people able to read or speak English in East China, but if the curricula for senior middle schools and colleges are any indication, [12] then there could not possibly be more than 50,000. As to the number of people in this region who can speak or read other Western languages, there is even less information to serve as a basis for conjecture.

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[10] I-chiu-wu-ssu-nien T'ou-k'ao Ta-hsüeh Chih-tao [Guide to Taking College Entrance Examinations in 1954], Hong Kong, Hsüeh-sheng shu-tien, 1954, pp. 98-100.

[11] Wu-nien-lai Ti Kung-fei Chiao-yü Kung-tso [Communist Education in the Past Five Years], Taipei, Sixth Section, Central Committee Nationalist Party, 1955, p. 16.

[12] The total number of senior middle school graduates in China from 1949 to 1953 was 216,000. It is believed that of this number no more than one-fourth could be in this region. People's Handbook, 1955, pp. 571-73.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 1f,
Sociological Background

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

565 The social structure in the North China Region closely resembles that of other regions of China. Because Peking in past centuries was the national capital of China (except for the period of 1927-49) and remains so today under the Communist regime, the social structure of North China is often taken to be more representative of the nation than are other regions which owing to their geographical locations and past histories have unique features of their own.

I. THE TRADITIONAL SOCIAL STRUCTURE

A. Social Classes

The people of traditional China often viewed society as being comprised of four occupational groups: the literati, the farmers, the artisans, and the merchants. Soldiers had no social status and were not members of any group. Although this classification indicates that all members of society recognized the prestige of the literati and the low status of the merchants it fails to account for two things: the wide diversity in wealth, standards of living, and cultural and recreational interests within each occupational group; and the free interchange of occupations among the top

565 layers of the farming, merchant, and governing groups.[1]

In reality, social stratification in Chinese society was not entirely based on occupational lines. Rich merchants and wealthy landlords were often linked by marriage; retail merchants and middle peasants were socially compatible; the social distinction between a craftsman and a

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[1] In some dynasties, sons of merchant families were not allowed to join the governing group. However with the help of economic resources, it was relatively easy for the third generation to come into the governing group. It was quite common for retired bureaucrats to engage in commerce. Toward the end of the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1912) there emerged in coastal provinces a group of gentry-merchants who might have the rank of expectant taotai and operated the official customs banks. Ssu-yü Teng and John K. Fairbank, China's Response to the West, A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923 Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1954, pp. 214-5.

[1] [Errata: pp. 110-119 omitted in pagination. This page follows p. 109 directly. -- Analyst]

556 simple peasant was even more difficult to draw; and bureaucrats were often wealthy landlords as well. Thus, if we employ the term social classes to mean the stratification of society on an economic basis, we will find that class lines cut across the traditionally accepted occupation-status classification.

556 However, members of all the occupational groups regarded the possession of land as the true indication of prestige and security. A landless peasant hoped to possess land, a peasant with some land hoped to acquire more, and the wealthiest landlord wished to do likewise. Artisans who had acquired savings would invest them in land. Merchants invariably put excess capital that might have been used for business expansion into land, although often they did not count on income from it as their principal means of support. Bureaucrats were even more preoccupied with owning land concomitant with their rise in officialdom. This is a common phenomenon in any society where other tangible assets for accumulation are lacking.

Although the possession of land was a criterion for determining prestige and to a large extent the sign of real power, prestige did not always result from wealth and the land-holdings of any one family seldom remained constant for more

556 than two or three generations.[2] These conditions accounted for the lack of a permanent ruling caste in China. There are definite ideals in traditional Chinese culture which conditioned the upward and downward mobility of the people within the social hierarchy.

B. Social Mobility

596 428 55 The Family Ideal. Large families especially of the extended type, were the ideal in China.[3] However, in practice, the ideal was limited by matters of economics. Primogeniture in China had been done away with long before the Manchu Dynasty (1644-1912). Land was divided equally among sons. After successive divisions individual holdings became infinitesimally small. This contributed to the decline of the economic status of even the wealthiest families, particularly when land was the sole source of income.[4]

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[2] Martin Yang, A Chinese Village, New York, 1945, p. 132; Francis Hsu, Under the Ancestor's Shadow, New York, Columbia University Press, 1948, p. 4.

[3] Consult the chapter on The Family.

[4] "In the matter of inheritance, the general pattern observed for poor agriculturalists holds very well for the merchant group. Just as at the death of a farmer, there is a sharing of the property. In the agricultural situation, however, there seems to be greater fragmentation of the legacy, each son working his share more or less independently and with a minimum of combination. In the merchant situation there is somewhat more cohesion among the heirs, who often work the inherited enterprise as partners." Morton H. Fried, Fabric of Chinese Society, New York, 1953 p. 52.

55 On the other hand, because of the existence of
596 extended families and the clan structure, less
423 fortunate members of these groups might be
helped by relatives to gain a living or an education.
A substantial amount of land was usually
allotted to the communal family or clan for
religious, educational, or charitable purposes by
illustrious members of the family or clan. Nepotism
596 was simply a projection of the family ideal
55 of mutual help among the members. Clan nepotism
often accounted for a man's rise on the
social and economic ladder. This practice contributed
to the upward movement of poorer segments
of the population who otherwise might
never have advanced socially and economically
in a relatively short period of time.

555 The Scholar Ideal. Learing was much esteemed,
565 especially when combined with wealth. The
517 prestige of the wealthy was never complete until
their wealth was adorned with culture. Indication
of respect for learning was common in
China, as typified by the saying: "Although your
children may be of low intelligence, you as
parents should make them study the Classics."[5]

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[5] This stress on learning and cultivation of the Chinese was studied by Max Weber. In his Religion of China Weber goes so far as to conclude that this emphasis caused the lack of capital accumulation necessary for the development of modern capitalism in China. While this analysis may be over simple, it indicates how the traditional supremacy of officialdom over the merchant

555 The emphasis on learning was buttressed by the
565 imperial examination system, the means by
577 which official positions were obtained, which, in turn, during peace time was the quickest means to the acquisition of wealth and social prestige in China. The saying, "After I have studied I will take a government position," was indicative of the usual goal of education. Wealthy families as a matter of course and poorer families at great sacrifice educated one or more of their children in the Classics in order to obtain immediate prestige in the eyes of the community and with the hope of eventual success in the examinations, which might lead to an official position and enrichment of the family fortune. Thus, education contributed to the upward movement of the families be they of the landed, merchant, or bureaucrat groups. On the other hand, the allocation of family income to the support of one or more unproductive persons through years of study with no assurance of economic return often dissipated the fortune of the family and led to the loss of economic status. Moreover, the belief that those who used their brains were superior to those who used their brawn contributed to the scholars' contempt for manual skills

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groups may have impeded the rise of a system of negotiable property rights, protected by corporation law instead of official favoritism, and capable of supplying the investment capital needed for industrialization. Teng and Fairbank, op. cit., pp. 274-5.

555 565 517 and commercial activity. Therefore, if a scholar did not pass the examination, or having passed it, failed to obtain official appointment, and if the successive divisions of his family property reduced his own holdings to a small plot, he would find it difficult to improve his economic status. At the same time, his lack of economic means would deprive his children of the opportunity to study. Thus, the scholar ideal also contributed to the downward movement of families in the social hierarchy.

555 565 647 517 The scholars, therefore, are not to be regarded as a separate class or a separate occupational group, except as they relied for their livelihood on the teaching profession or the use of their literary skills in a clerical capacity, but rather as "leisure" members of families of varying degrees of wealth of the bureaucratic, agricultural, artisan, or commercial groups. When recruited by the government to study at the imperial academies, scholars were protégés of the government and were regarded as potential bureaucrats even if they were engaged only in the compilation of historical documents of no current import. Certainly the majority of those who devoted their full time to study considered themselves potential bureaucrats. To those who did not cherish the dream of becoming bureaucrats and who had other economic means, education was only an additional sign of their prestige.

555 565 517 701 The road to status and wealth through education and government service was often bypassed in time of chaos; military skills would enable individuals to obtain high positions in the bureaucracy. But military men seldom won social esteem until they had become cultivated, and such esteem generally accrued to their children, who were given the opportunity by reason of their parents' wealth to acquire learning under the tutelage of well-known scholars.

C. Social Organizations

575 579 Social organizations which had no basis in kinship were not recognized as approved parts of the social hierarchy or as approved means for gaining social prominence. However, they helped to supplement relationships otherwise neglected by the social order. Most of the traditional non-kin social organizations had an economic motivation. The success of such organizations, however, served as a disintegrating influence on the existing social system.

In rural areas organizations such as the Red Spear Society (Hung-ch'iang Hui) and the Mutual Protection Society (Lien-ya Hui) existed for the protection of its members against roving bandits. These voluntary associations arose in areas where the government failed to maintain order and peace, and their organization cut across class

575 and occupational lines. When landlords were
579 forced to move into towns during periods of disorder, organized peasants and tenants at times became so powerful that they defied the landlords' demand for exorbitant rents.

467 Among the artisans and workers in China there were for generations both craft guilds (hangs) and regional guilds (pangs). As in Europe, these guilds were not intended to serve the interests of workers as a class, but to promote the crafts and guard their monopoly and trade secrets. Both employers and employees were members, but the employers usually dominated the guilds' activities.[6]

441 Another kind of association existed to serve
575 travelers, who were usually merchants, in cities outside their home county or province. These associations, t'ung-hsiang hui, were organized on a county or provincial basis. By maintaining buildings and personnel in distant cities, they facilitated the dealings of their constituents who might have language or other difficulties.

575 Most significant and disturbing to the social structure were the secret societies. They were, in fact, hierarchical societies within a society. A notable example was the Ko-lao Hui, which was

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[6] Nym Wales, The Chinese Labor Movement, New York, The John Day Company, 1945, p. 7.

575 also called Hung-pang. The bulk ofthe membership of this secret society was drawn from the unemployed in the rural areas and organized under strict discipline. They were instructed to rob the rich, to help the poor, to rescue the oppressed , and to overthrow Manchu rule. Leadership of this society, however, was in the hands of the landlord class. The Ko-lao Hui became such a strong underworld force that Sun Yat-sen had to solicit its co-operation in his endeavor to overthrow the Manchu Dynasty. After the fall of the Manchu regime, many warlords of North China obtained power by way of the Ko-lao Hui hierarchy and by utilizing its mass following.[7]

575 While societies like the Ko-lao Hui aimed at
548 the overthrow ofthe existing order, others like the Ch'ing-pang were utilized by the Manchu government to prolong its power by extra-legal means. The Ch'ing-pang was originally organized among the boatmen and the urban unemployed along the Grand Canal and the Yangtze River. It later spread to big cities and gained recruits among the city poor handicraftsmen, apprentices, industrial workers, policemen shopkeepers, the self-employed, and even among civil servants. Ch'ing-pang organizations dominated the underworld of East China while Ko-lao Hui branches dominated other regions of
575 China. The Ch'ing-pang's highly organized strength provided a strong bargaining position for

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[7] Ko-lao Hui and Ch'ing-pang, Hsi pei yenchiu she, 1941.

575 the support of politicians, warlords as well as capitalists. Even the Kuomintang leaders had to come to terms with the society in their campaign against the warlords, and the Japanese occupation forces during 1937-1945 utilized Ch'ing-pang organizations to rout Communist underground agents.[8]

II. DISRUPTION OF THE TRADITIONAL SOCIAL STRUCTURE

647 596 178 Just as the scholar ideal and the family ideal helped to preserve the stability of the total social order of China, the disintegration of the traditional family system and the abolition of the imperial examination system for recruiting the ruling elite became contributing factors to the dislocation of the traditional social structure.

621 423 565 369 There was no change in the social composition of the rural population in the past several decades. As of old, the village community consisted of farm laborers at the bottom and landlords at the top. Peasant landowners and tenants constituted the bulk of the village population; and village peddlers, merchants, and artisans were members of peasant families, most of which owned land; the village gentry, that is to say the local leaders were mostly retired officials or educated members of landlords' or rich peasants' families.[9]

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[8] Ibid., pp. 64-65.

[9] Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1946, p. 68.

369 178 565 However, the growth of rural population, without a comparable increase in arable land, together with more opportunities for employment in the cities caused the migration of some peasants to the urban centers. The continued high premium placed on learning, practical or otherwise, induced the wealthier rural inhabitants to send their children to modern city schools which offered new opportunities. Thus, the cities became the centers from which the forces of change radiated into the surrounding countryside.

Some of the rural immigrants became permanent residents in the cities; others returned to their home villages. Among the permanent residents, some left their families in the country while others brought their immediate families (wives and children) to the cities. In either case, it meant the breakup of family and clan relations. Industrial work and other city employment changed the outlook of these rural people; new professions such as modern medicine, law, engineering, and banking attracted the attention of those who would otherwise have been occupied in the study of the Confucian Classics. This was especially true after Confucian training had been found "impractical" and not in keeping with the changing conditions. Education in the secondary schools and colleges, however inadequate and artificial it might seem, was

369 designed for better citizenship.[10] Their curricula
178 opened a new and different world, far more
565 interesting and intelligible to the younger generation than the classics of old. If modern education had not always succeeded in giving new skills to the students, it at least had taught them not to be satisfied with their lot, but to look to the future rather than to the past for betterment. With the increase of schools, there emerged in the cities a considerable professional class and a large number of students cut off for years
369 from their original environment. Students and
178 intellectuals, seeking some common meeting
565 ground, banded together, and with their newly-
517 found organizations came a semblance of separate class consciousness. Although many students depended for their subsistence on their families they had nothing to do with the cultivation or management of land. Alienated from the land and anxious to find a new channel of social advancement, the intellectuals were confronted with the problems of social disorder. Furthermore, in contrast to the situation in Europe during a comparable cultural period, when the landed aristocracy contested with the merchants, industrialists, and bankers for positions

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[10] Hu Shih, The Chinese Renaissance, the Haskell Lectures, University of Chicago, 1933, Chicago, University of Chicago Press 1934; Teng and Fairbank, op. cit.

369 in the ruling elite, political power and economic
178 power in modern China continued to be in the
565 hands of a single group. When social mobility
517 was made difficult by the lack of a clear and
recognized channel for upward social movement, social roles were less clearly defined; the sons of high government officials became industrialists, bankers' sons became diplomats, and all owned land. Intermarriages between the new and the old upper-class elements were taken for granted. Modern intellectuals, mostly from middle-class families, were unable to obtain position and status in the new business or political hierarchy and yet were unwilling to return to their home villages. They had been too long removed from their original environment to feel anything but estranged from it.

Influenced by the idea of democracy which they had discovered in school, the intellectuals began to solicit support from the masses, a move which traditional scholars would not have considered. Robert North's study of the revolutionary Kuomintang and Communist leaders shows that the majority came from the middle class, landowning, and merchant families, and attended modern schools.[11] The labor unions, the peasant associations, the rural reconstruction experiments, and the Communist Party became the milieu in which the intellectual began their new careers.

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[11] Robert North, Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Elites, Stanford University Press, 1952, pp. 116-121.

565 701 517 178 During this period of social and political disorder, military men began to gain power, obtaining offices by virtue of their military success. Rather than despising the military as the older scholars did, many intellectuals began to seek similar careers as a means to power. This tendency began with the opening of the Huang-p'u (Whampoa) Military Academy in Kwangtung for the training of officers for the 1923-27 campaign against the warlords. In the war against Japan the prestige of military men was greatly enhanced. A military career has now become a major attraction to ambitious intellectuals as a possible channel for social advancement. Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung, who owe much of their popular success to their military skill, suggest the prestige granted military men in the modern period.

III. SOCIAL STRUCTURE UNDER THE COMMUNIST REGIME

565 668 The Chinese Communists interpret the existing social structure from a Marxist viewpoint, and extoll the ideal of a classless society. Their belief that the transition to a classless society is inevitable justifies the liquidation of certain surviving classes.

A. Class Differentiation among the Chinese Population

In his book *On the People's Democratic Dictatorship* (1949) Mao Tse-tung divided Chinese

565 nationals into those who because of their anti-
668 revolutionary character and their "crimes against the Chinese nation" were deprived of the right to be numbered among the people, and those who were to enjoy all the rights of the people. In the first group were included the Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek, "bureaucratic capitalists" such as H. H. Kung and T. V. Soong, "feudalistic" landlords, and a host of other anti-Communist leaders. The second group consisted of workers, peasants, the petty bourgeois, and the national bourgeois. Workers were considered the elite of the nation; the peasants were to be converted into rural workers through collectivization of agriculture or into urban workers through the development of industry; the petty bourgeois were needed during the New Democratic Stage and were to be "re-educated" in the process of reconstruction; and the national bourgeois, once "enslaved" by bureaucratic capitalism, were now "free" to contribute to the industrialization of China. Mao's classification of the Chinese population and his stipulation of the task of each class at the New Democratic Stage formed the conceptual basis from 1949 to 1954 for the Communist policy toward each of the classes.

The convocation of the National People's Congress in 1954 is considered by the Chinese Communists as the conclusion of the New Democratic Stage and the beginning of a transitional

565 stage which will lead China to socialism. Land
668 reform is completed and the landlords as a class are eliminated, the wings of the bourgeois industrialists and merchants have been clipped by the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, and the "ideology of the working class" has been established in all sectors of China.

B. The New Social Ladder

The Communists distinguish between persons "from the working class" and those "possessing the ideology of the working class." They acknowledge that not all Communists are from the working class but those who have accepted its ideology belong to it. By the same logic, the working-class character of the People's Liberation Army is fixed. The Communists say that, since the People's Liberation Army is led by the working class, viz., the Communist Party, although the bulk of the soldiers and commanders may not be from the working class, the army remains of the working class. Conversely, many workers may not possess the ideology of the working class. The Communists explain that most of the Chinese workers are fresh from the village where "feudalistic ideas" abound and therefore have not had time to acquire the ideology of the working class.

The classification of people according to the ideology they profess is one of the underlying principles governing the activities of the Com-

565 668 munist-sponsored organizations where membership cuts across class lines. The New Democratic Youth Corps, the Federation of Democratic Youth, the Young Pioneers, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, the All-China Federation of Democratic Women, the labor unions, and the study circles at schools and in factories help to disseminate Communist ideology.

555 668 178 Participation in these mass organizations, whether voluntary or compulsory, serves to separate the individual from his family, absorbing his time and energy outside the family circle. Enforcement of the Marriage Law, principally through the promotion and supervision of the Federation of Democratic Women, encourages women to leave the confines of the family. The recruitment of candidates for institutions of high learning and the assignment of jobs to graduates when they have completed their education also serve to uproot the individual from his immediate environment and make him dependent for advancement on the Communist regime. The weakening of family loyalty forces the individual to look toward the mass organizations sponsored by the Communists, who regard the Party itself as a desirable substitute for the traditional social structure. Since the individual relies on mass organizations for political advancement, which is the prerequisite for economic and social betterment, the mass organizations are most important for the stabilization of society under the current regime. The regime exercises the power to control the career expectancies of the members of mass organizations, reward the achievement

555 of those who work for the goals of the Party
178 leadership, and punish with ostracism or more
668 severe penalties those who rebel against the order. For the first time since the abolition of the imperial examination system, a main channel of social advancement has emerged. The mastery of an officially approved body of doctrine is the quickest road to social advancement. The Communist channel of social advancement leads to the selection of conformists. This state of affairs resembles, to some extent, that which prevailed in monarchical times when the mastery of dogmas contained in the classics and their commentaries was the prerequisite to success in the imperial examinations.

The Communist regime has found it necessary to promote as replacements for the old ruling group Communist-reformed and Communist-trained administrative, technical, and scientific personnel. Compared with the traditional social mobility, the new social mobility under the Communist regime does not spring from ideals embodied in Chinese culture but from expedient manipulation by the Communist Party.

In the development of industry, waterway and irrigation projects, the settlement of the Northwest, and the nationalization and collectivization of many enterprises may conceivably absorb a good portion of the ambitious younger generation. If social mobility continues to depend on Party loyalty, purges may be used to secure loyalty, to

555 provide a flow of scapegoats for the grievances
178 which accumulate under a totalitarian system,
668 and to furnish opportunities for advancement
for the coming generation, whose continued
devotion to the regime is crucial to its survival.
But to date in the North China Region the purge of
local cadres and officials at the regional level
has been mainly limited to the elimination of
"old social elements" rather than to the "revolutionaries" themselves.[12]

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[12] Consult the chapter on Political Dynamics in this handbook.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 1g,
Sociological Background

THE FAMILY

1. INTRODUCTION

596 Until almost the end of the imperial period (221 B.C. to A.D. 1912), the family was a vital and universal aspect of the centralized state in China and most characteristic of the society which sustained it. Since then, the family has been in flux. The direction of change and the major causes and problems involved will be sketched out in this section. A more precise picture, as Marion Levy has pointed out, is not feasible with the existing incomplete state of material on Chinese society both before and since the inauguration of the Communist regime.[1]

The tradional family still persists, It proved resistant, but not impregnable, to the influx of modern Western techniques and ideas after 1842 and to the political revolutionary efforts to realize democracy and equality in the present century. The traditional family is still proving tenacious in the face of the Communist regime's persistent effort to turn Chinese society inside out.

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[1] Marion J. Levy, Jr., The Family Revolution in Modern China, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1949, p. 273.

To understand the nature of the Chinese family today, it is necessary first to take account of the structure, function, and attitudes of the traditional family. Second, consideration must be given to the incidence and nature of change in the family preceding the Communist regime. Only then can intelligent consideration be given to the family under the Central People's Government. Finally, attention will be devoted to the unique factors that charcterize the family in North China.

II. THE TRADITIONAL FAMILY

The term "family" in China has been most usefully defined as "a unit consisting of members related to each other by blood, marriage, or adoption and having a common budget and common property."[2] Three main types of family structure have been distinguished -- the conjugal, the stem, and the joint forms. The joint family, consisting of several married brothers, their wives, children, and sometimes one or both parents, was the ideal family of China. It was typical only of the gentry and well-to-do merchant classes. The conjugal family, consisting of a man, his wife, and unmarried children, and the stem family, consisting of the conjugal family

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[2] Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1946, p. 13; Cf., Levy, op. cit., pp. [illegible]

596 plus one married son with his wife and children, were most typical of the peasant, artisan, and small merchant class. For all classes, however, the joint family was the ideal to be achieved if an improvement in family circumstances permitted.[3]

The status of every member of the family was fixed relative to every other member by the criteria of age, sex, and generation. At the top of the family pyramid stood the head of the house, the eldest living male. In practice, he might consult with other adult members of the family on matters vital to its welfare; theoretically, and often in fact, he exercised complete control over the activities, income, property, training, punishment, and marriage arrangements of the family and its members.[4]

However old his sons, their position in relation to him was one of service, obedience, and dutiful respect. A lesser but similar expression was expected of a man toward his elder brothers

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3. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-16. Cf. Levy, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-60.

4. The material presented in this and the following paragraphs on the traditional and changing family is based largely on the comprehensive works on the family by Levy, *op. cit.* and Lang, *op. cit.*

596 and relatives of an older generation.

Females generally were subordinate to males as well as to elders. The wife was subject to the will of her husband and to that of her son when he became head of the house. While a man's parents lived, his wife was expected to be more subservient than he toward his parents. In his mother-in-law, the son's wife more often than not encountered a tyrant. The mother-in-law, rather than her son, governed and judged the actions of the son's wife.

B. Social Role

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842 The principal social function of the family in China was the bearing, rearing, and training of children. Sons were more highly valued than daughters, because only the former remained with the family after marriage, contributing to its labor and income, and only sons could perpetuate the family and perform the yearly rites in honor of the father and the family ancestors after the father's death. Implicit in the ceremony was the idea that the ancestors had a life after death, watched over the family's fortune, and were comforted by the periodic ministrations of the family. For the living, the rites provided an occasion for awe and respect during which the continuity of the family over time was re-emphasized and the solidarity and duties of the family unit in the present reasserted.

The veneration of ancestors was so important to Chinese society that the absence of sons to

596 carry on the yearly observances was regarded
769 as a major failure on the responsible male's part
and a tremendous catastrophe for the family.
842 Concubinage and adoption were socially and legally sanctioned as means of providing sons, if marriage produced only daughters or no children at all. Because of the necessity of providing against a high death rate, the premium on sons resulted in over-population, only partly offset by a high rate of female infanticide.

562 Just as sex, age, and generation determined an individual's status within the family, so did these factors determine his behavior and position in the community and the world at large. An additional determinant of his standing was the status of his family in society.

Authority and dominance were the province of males. Women might, and occasionally did, exercise overt leadership. More frequently, they were the power behind the throne. Such cases were exceptional, however; in modern times at least, supremacy was neither desired by women nor readily admitted to when possessed.

888 Age was honored relatively and absolutely.
561 Long life automatically gave its possessor higher standing in the community, but whatever age he attained, , he was to show respect to his elders and members of an older generation. In the society of traditional China, age implied the accumulation of wisdom and experience vital to society in times of decision or crisis.

000 society in times of decision or crisis.

554 Individual status also improved with education, more particularly with the attainment of a degree in the official examinations and appointment to official position. An individual's educational or official career was usually dependent on the willingness and ability of the family to support him during a long period of study. A particularly promising youngster of a poor family might occasionally be underwritten by the clan or village. Whatever his means of financial support, his success in the examinations was a reflection of proper upbringing and honored his family and, to a lesser extent, his clan and village almost as much as himself. The wealth usually accumulated by an official during his career also materially enhanced the village and clan as well as the family. For these reasons, reflected glory accrued to the kin of an illustrious scholar or official for generations after his death.

C. Political Role

629 To a remarkable extent, the Chinese imperial system operated by moral suasion with a minimum use of force and without a developed, codified system of law. This achievement was made possible through the state's utilization of the family as a training ground for loyalty to the state and the virtues prized by it as part of the machinery of government. The root virtue of

829 filial piety was extolled above all others in the Confucian system. It denoted not only the obedience and devotion of the son to his father, but of the younger to the elder, and of the subject to the ruler.

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621 Two types of organizations built on the foundation of the family were utilized by the state in maintaining peace and uniformity throughout the empire. One was the clan, or *tsu*. It bound together families with a common ancestor to promote their security and advancement. Relying for strength on the maximizing and formalizing of kinship ties, the *tsu* reinforced the authority of the family head and the values he imparted to the younger generation. The *tsu* settled disputes between families, conducted ancestor rites for any member of a family whose line died out, provided help and protection in times of trouble for the lower class members, and safeguarded the social and economic position of the well-to-do. Where the *tsu* was strong, it governed the village with little interference from the central government, except in matters of high crime and taxes. The advantages to the Confucian state of the *tsu* were deemed sufficient to compensate for its encroachment on the state's jurisdiction.[5]

In gathering together all the members of

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[5] On the clan see Hu Hsien-chin, *The Common Descent Group in China and Its Functions* (Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology no. 10), New York, The Viking Fund, Inc., 1948.

618 621 the tsu* for the yearly rites honoring its ancestors, this social institution served to bring the poor and uncultured into contact with, and under the influence of, the well-to-do and educated gentry. Its more accomplished members headed the clan and represented the closest approximation to the ideal of the "superior man" (chün tzu). Meetings with such men, whose behavior was patterned by leisure and education beyond the means of the great majority of society, provided the lower classes with living models for emulation and opportunities to impress the young with the proper attitude of respect toward their social superiors.

631 Another institution based on the family utilized by the state was the pao-chia system. As it was constituted under the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644 to 1912) and again in the 1930's by the Nationalist Government, ten adjacent families were grouped as a p'ai, ten p'ai as a chia, and ten chia, or one thousand households, as a pao. The head of each unit was responsible for the conduct and defense of those households under him, and the head of the pao had to answer to the government for the conduct and protection of the thousand households.

D. Economic Role

423 596 As the definition of the term "family" infers, it was the basic economic unit of the society. Real property such as land, houses,

423 and workshops were owned by the family rather
596 than by individuals. When disharmony caused the breakup of a joint family, its real property was divided among the constituent conjugal families, each as a new family claiming title to the portion of property which fell to its share.

596 The peasant, artisan, and small-merchant families were units of both production and consumption. Male family members worked together in the fields, workshops, or stores to produce the goods on which the family mainly relied for a living. Sons nearly always followed their father's occupation and seldom left home. Women worked in the home, taking care of the children and turning out the family's clothes and shoes. Where sericulture was practiced, women managed the entire industry from the cultivation of mulberry trees to the weaving of cloth. Food and clothing were allotted each member according to his needs, as they were determined by the head of the house and permitted by the family's circumstances.

Some variation from this pattern occurred among the upper-class families. Gentry-officials and merchants were often away from home; they frequently had personal income from salaries or business, from which they met their expenses without resorting to the family treasury.

596 also functioned to provide security in old age, food or material help to the poor, and employment for needy or deserving relatives when possible. That a son should not provide for his parents in their old age was unthinkable. Were the sons dead or in some other way unable to assist their parents, the aged were cared for by other close relatives or by the clan. Deeply sanctioned by kinship morality and firmly rooted in Chinese government and business, nepotism was one of the most resistant factors to the advance of the modern political, industrial, and business system in the twentieth century.

III. THE CHANGING FAMILY

A. Influence of Modern Technology

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596 The transition which occurred in the traditional Chinese family from approximately 1842 to the advent of the Communist regime is traceable to three major influences: (1) modern technology with its attendant factory system and modern business organization; (2) the new environment consisting of rapid transportation, modern government education, rural education organizations, and modern books and periodicals; and (3) the revolutionary political and social ferment which followed in the wake of the Western penetration of China. Change came first and most penetratingly in the ports, which were initially influenced by Western trade and later by the growth of native industry centered on those

596 cities. The same influence also reached into the
178 rural environs of the city ports in the decades before World War II. The great mass of the Chinese people -- the population of the traditional villages, towns, and cities in the interior -- felt the modern impact only in minor ways, if at all.

The first influence of modern technology in China came in the form of an influx of manufactured goods. Their availability at cheap prices changed the consumption and production habits of the family. Articles formerly made at home were bought with cash, necessitating new types of spare-time or full-time occupation removed from the family sphere.

Much more important in effecting a change in the old family pattern was the introduction of modern factory and business methods into China. For one thing, it organized economic activity on a non-family basis. Persons from rural areas attracted to the city by the opportunity to earn an independent income or the necessary supplement to the family's farm income were forced to make their homes near their jobs for at least a part of the year. Either permanently or temporarily they were removed from direct family control and subjected to the new ideas associated with industrial society everywhere.

Another consequence of the factory and business system was a new criteria for employment. The efficient operation of modern produc-

178 5% tion and management required that personnel be hired on the basis of the possession of such skills as a particular job demanded rather than on the old basis of personal or kin relationship to the owner or responsible management. The solidarity of blood relationship and the old employment function of kinship were prime resistants to the spread of modern business enterprises in China, but where the latter succeeded in establishing itself, it forced a fundamental break in the old Chinese familial process.

B. Influence of Modern Environment

In many places where the Chinese population was sheltered from direct contact with modern industrial life, an indirect influence was exerted by the environment. The modern curriculum taught in foreign missionary schools in the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries was approximated by the new government schools and offered to a broader segment of the population in the decade before World War II. New social, political, and economic ideas thus disseminated were supplemented by the outpourings of the press. Some rural villages formerly a day's journey or more away from the nearest great city were brought only hours away by modern methods of transportation, particularly the railroad and the steamship. All these media brought the people and especially the young into contact with ideas and ways of life alien to their own. Awareness of new opportunities, comforts, and pleasures to be had in the modern city planted

178 a seed of dissatisfaction with the old manner of
596 living.

C. Influence of Revolutionary Thought

An even more disturbing influence on the old way of life was the increasing spread of revolutionary social and political doctrines after 1916. The monarchical reformer K'ang Yu-wei had brought the traditional family under attack as early as 1898 by castigating the "virtues" associated with it as either non-existent or harmful to society. These ideas did not achieve any widespread currency in China until the rise of the New Culture Movement in 1916, a revolution in Chinese thought and expression. It emphasized individualism, the equality of the sexes, and the duty of service and loyalty to the nation. Ideas of this sort were spread by the May Fourth Movement of 1919, in the revolutionary propaganda of the Kuomintang during its struggle for power in the mid-twenties, by the student anti-Japanese agitation of the thirties, and in the socially conscious writings of China's new and popular authors.

D. Effects on Family Nature and Structure

In the relatively small area where these influences were felt, traditional family organization and the roles and functions dependent on it were forced to give way. With a part of the family temporarily or permanently in the city, the authority of the traditional family head was

178 undermined. He was still needed at home to
596 carry on the farm work, and so it was generally the daughters, the sons not needed for agriculture, and occasionally, the wives who entered the cities to seek part-time or full-time work. They sent home from the cities whatever part of their wages that could be spared from their own living needs. The family head thus controlled only their excess earnings and not their full income. He no longer directed the production of the family as a unit nor determined wholly every member's share in consumption. For at least part of the year, he could exert no direct control over the city-dwelling members of the family. With the possibility of an independent livelihood in the city, adult family members in nearby villages had an alternative to harsh treatment by the family head. This factor tended to have a moderating influence on paternalistic authoritarianism.

The family in the rural areas adjacent to industrialized cities was also affected in other ways. Men of advanced years, particularly if they had a classical education or held official position, continued to be honored. However, their position of influence and authority was challenged by younger men with the personal qualities of dynamic leadership and success. Ancestor worship continued to give a greater primacy to males in the family, but the ability of daughters to earn a wage enhanced their value to the family and made their early marriage into another family less desirable. It should be noted, 178 however, that women of farming and laboring 596 families worked outside of the home only out of sheer economic necessity. Neither sex approved of female employment in the factory. Whenever possible, it was avoided or terminated. Among upper-class families, women with modern education began gradually to seek employment in the professions and to regard such work as a means of establishing permanent personal and economic independence.

The independent family in the modern city was most subject to change. Though the influence of the past remained strong, the city families tended toward the nuclear, democratic form. Thus, the old criteria of status based on sex, age, and generation were undermined. This tendency was strongest among the new clerical, managerial, and professional groups in the city. They came mostly from the old well-to-do merchant and gentry class which could afford modern education, sometimes abroad, for their children. Having a higher education, the younger members of this group were far more influenced than were the less literate lower class youth by such modern Western ideas as the right of individual happiness, the equality of the sexes, and the duty of the citizen to give his first loyalty to the interests of the nation.

While modern education gave youth increased stature in the eyes of the family elders, it also served to decrease youth's respect for parents. Olga Lang's 1936 survey of youthful attitudes toward parents disclosed that while only 20 per cent of the boys and 16 per cent of the girls in

178 high school were willing to answer the question
596 as to whether they ever disapproved of their parents' behavior, 58 per cent of the men and 62 per cent of the women in college were willing to answer, and their answers were overwhelmingly critical. The greatest objects of censure were the father, his political views, and his personal habits. He was criticized as "conservative," "feudal," acting "against the trend of the time;" and "immoral," "corrupt," "lazy," "egotistic," "too cautious"; and for gambling, smoking opium, and frequenting brothels. Mothers were more gently and less often criticized, but were reproached for "political backwardness," "unhygienic habits," "gossiping, playing mahjong, guarrelling [and] ill treatment of young daughters-in-law." College students also reported more actual disagreements with parents than did high school students. The most frequent subjects of disagreement were marriage, politics, education, participation in the students' movement, recreation, modern hygiene, and fashions, friends, and future professions.[6]

E. Effect on Family Economic Role

The decreasing ability of the family to function as a production and consumption unit or as an employment agency in an industrial society has already been pointed out. The initial break with the old form of employment was forced by

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[6] Lang, op. cit., pp. 284-87.

178 596 foreign firms or government services headed by foreigners. Their prohibition against officers hiring or recommending relatives was only beginning to be copied by wholly Chinese institutions such as banks, factories, and schools in the years before World War II. Where the employment of relatives was forbidden, friendship, a common birthplace, training in the same school, or membership in the same secret society often provided the basis for a personal link between an employer and a prospective employee and for the rise of cliques in business and government offices.

Scattered surveys of various strata of the population in industrial areas indicate that only at the upper managerial or owner level, where the facts of economic operation were most pressing, was the majority in favor of impersonal, rational selection of employees. Even in modern colleges, only about half the students appeared to favor that choice. With each successively lower economic level, the preference was more overwhelmingly for selection on the basis of kinship.[7]

F. Effect on Social and Political Role

178 829 642 596 With the collapse of the imperial system in 1912, the family was no longer fitted to serve

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[7] Ibid., pp. 186-89.

829 642 178 596 as the social and political training ground of China. The political parties and modern schools, particularly the colleges and universities, now began to train youth for the new political world which was coming into being after 1911. No comparable institutions existed to inculcate in youth a moral and ethical code that would serve as a common guide in the new society. Attempts by the Kuomintang leaders during the period of the National Government to restore filial piety along with a revised Confucian code to the service of an increasingly authoritarian-minded state met with failure among the nation's youth.[8]

IV. THE FAMILY UNDER COMMUNISM

A. The Marriage Law

596 671 In reconstructing Chinese society, the Communist regime has undertaken to change the nature and function of the family. The first step in this direction was the new Marriage Law promulgated in May 1950. It is one of the three legal pillars of the state. The other two -- the Labor Union Law and the Land Reform Law -- were announced at a later date but put into effect within a much shorter time and with greater IMMEDIATE SUCCESS.

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[8] Mary C. Wright, "From Revolution to Restoration: The Transformation of Kuomintang Ideology," Far Eastern Quarterly, August, 1955, pp. 515-32.

600 immediate success.[9]

671 Essentially, the outward provisions of the
582 Marriage Law are comparable to the laws affecting marriage and the family in the civil and penal code announced by the National Government in 1930 and 1931.[10] The basic features of the new law are summed up in its first three articles, which provide for:

> (1) ... The abolition of arbitrary and compulsory marriage and the putting into effect of freedom of marriage for men and women.
>
> (2) ... The abolition of the feudal system of marriage ... based on the superiority of man over woman, and the putting into effect ... of monogamy, and equal rights for both sexes.
>
> (3) ... The abolition of the feudal system of marriage which neglects the interests of the children, and the putting into effect of the New Democratic system of marriage, which protects the lawful interests of women and children.[11]

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[9] See comment by the American editors of *Current Background*, Hong Kong, American Consulate General, 236, pp. 1-3; hereafter cited as *C.B.*: Unless editorial comment is indicated, as here, citations from Current Background refer to literal translations of material in Communist magazines and newspapers and should be evaluated accordingly.

[10] See editorial comment of *C.B.*, 136, p. 3.

[11] "Document 7," *C.B.*, 236, pp. 22-29.

671 In propagandizing and implementing the
593 Marriage Law, the regime struck hard against
582 the old authoritarianism of the family head, child marriages, mistreatment of women and discrimination against them as inferior to men, and the mistreatment of children by parents. Wives, especially wives of arranged marriages, were encouraged to seek divorce from intolerant unrepentent husbands. However, if husbands could be made to adopt the new attitude toward women, partners of arranged marriages were urged to remain united.

To help traditionally minded families attain the new Communist-established goal of "democracy" and "harmony," family "struggle" meetings were arranged under cadre supervision. Each member was pressed to confess his own past sins and suffering and to help other family members to remember theirs. The particular transgressions sought out for exposure, condemnation, redress, and rectification were the mistreatment and beating of wives by husbands, similar behavior by mothers-in-law against daughters-in-law, and interference by parents in young people's free choice of marriage partners. Much was made in the Communist press of the suicides or murder of women and young people, attributed to "the old feudal system of marriage."[12]

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[12] See especially *C.B.*, 273, pp. 1-3; 236, pp. 4-14; and *Survey of the China Mainland Press*, Hong Kong, American Consulate General, 932, p. iv; hereafter cited as *SCMP*. The same conditions apply to this source as to *C.B.*

671 Whatever the humanitarian by-products, the
593 Marriage Law aimed at a basic change in Chinese
642 society with two utilitarian purposes in view.
582 One was to change the popular basis of loyalty
from the family to the state. The other was to free the Chinese woman from her preoccupation with the home and children so that she might become a laborer in the field and factory. These aims were quite openly expressed.

For instance, an article in the Peking Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao [China Youth] on the correct attitude toward parents, asserts that under the Confucian system with its emphasis on filial piety, parents had the right to regard their children as private property and demand sacrifices of them. Under the new system, the article points out, "children are not the private property of their parents, but belong first of all to the state and to the people, and ...the interests of the people should be the highest criterion governing our actions toward our parents."[13]

An editorial in the People's Daily in March 1955 notes that remnant feudal ideologies still obstructed "the participation of woman in socialist construction and various political activities." The editorial then goes on the state that it is in order to promote the political and production zeal of women that their rights must be promoted

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[13] SCMP, 973, p. 31.

671 and the Marriage Law implemented.[14] Various
642 comments on the Marriage Law inspired by the
593 regime stress Lenin's dictum that sex relation-
582 ships and family problems are not individual or
small affairs but matters of great social, economic, and political significance.[15]

B. Implementation of the Marriage Law

671 As the Nationalist Government had made
no attempt to put into effect the marriage and
582 family provisions of its 1930-31 codes among the
593 rural population, the spirit and provisions of the
369 Marriage Law were new and alien to this great
majority of the Chinese people. They were still bound to the traditional family and had not encountered the economic experience and education which had pushed the family in Western-influenced cities toward new types of social organization from the beginning of the 20th century. Moreover, the new law offered no immediate or apparent economic benefits as had the Land Reform Law.

671 The result was apathy, when not open re-
645 sistance, toward the reorientation of marriage
593 and family practices among the farming popu-
lation. These attitudes were as typical of most
582 of the village cadres as of the rural people

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[14] Ibid., 106, p. 15.

[15] See, for instance, C.B., 275, p. 4; and SCMP, 1048, pp. 30-31.

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generally.[16] However, Liu Ching-fan's criticism in 1953 of the use of force by village cadres to achieve acceptance of the new Marriage Law's provisions indicates that up to that time violence accompanied this measure as it had other measures in Communist China.[17]

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The regime became aware only slowly of the failure of the Marriage Law to take automatic effect. A preliminary investigation gave such cause for concern that a thorough investigation was made at the end of 1952.[18] The results impelled the Communists to launch a drive for the thorough implementation of the Marriage Law and intensive indoctrination of the people in its principles. The movement was restricted to Han Chinese areas where land reform had been completed.[19]

Summing up the result of the campaign before the Government Administration Council on November 11, 1953, Liu Ching-fan reported satisfactory indoctrination of 80 to 90 per cent of the adults in 15 per cent of the nation's hsien and municipalities where land reform had been completed and, to a somewhat lesser degree, 60 to 70 per cent of the people in 60 per cent of similar local areas. Almost no progress was indicated in the remaining 25 per cent of the localities.[20]

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[16] See editorial comment, C.B., 136, pp. 3-4

[17] C.B., 273, p. 4.

[18] C.B., 136, pp. 3-4.

[19] C.B., 273, p. 1.

[20] Ibid., p. 3.

671 Assuming the population in these areas to be rough-
593 ly equal, these figures would mean that on an
582 over-all basis even partial success was claimed
for only 48 to 55.5 per cent of the population subjected to the indoctrination process.

C. The Communists' Vague Picture of Success

Unfortunately, we cannot precisely judge how successful the regime has been in implementing the Marriage Law nationally or regionally. Communist evaluations are too generalized to reveal a definite picture, and statistics released by the regime are sketchy and, when available, rarely provide a basis for significant comparison. For instance, in the spring of 1955 the Ministry of Internal Affairs reported on the prevalence of free marriages during the first quarter of 1954, stating that of the 402,025 applications for marriage registration in 562 hsien and municipalities of 15 provinces, only 1.07 per cent were denied because the contemplated marriages had been arranged without the willing consent of the couples concerned.[21] No figures were given on the remaining, roughly three-quarters of the country's hsien and municipalities, nor was any indication given to show whether the figures cited were typical of the whole country, the only figures available, or figures selected for propaganda or other purposes. A separate press report on the situation in Peking during 1954 noted

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[21] SCMP, 1002, p. 3.

671 that only 13 of 30,389 couples applying for
582 marriage registration failed to satisfy the re-
593 quirements of the Marriage Law.[22] If the figures can be given credence, they indicate a remarkable advance over the situation existing two years earlier. After an investigation of Marriage Law implementation in 1952, a woman minister of justice, Shih Liang, reported that in only three of the country's 2,086 *hsien* were families reformed up to perfect Communist standards, and that in the East and Central-South regions freely contracted marriages and other reforms had gained no acceptance with the people.[23]

Reports on the results of the 1952 investigations of Marriage Law implementation were evidently intended to illustrate the extent or lack of family reform rather than to give a comprehensive picture of it. One report noted that in ten villages of Ts'ang *hsien*, Hopei, two thirds of the sixty marriages contracted from January to September 1951 had been arranged by parents.[24] Another press account referred to conditions in Ho-chin *hsien* in southwestern Shansi where the groom customarily paid a bride-price of one *shih-tan* (110 lbs) of wheat for every year of the bride's age up to 18.[25] Another news story, citing better conditions in the "old liberated areas,"

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[22] *Ibid.*, 1007, p. 30.

[23] *China News Analysis*, Hong Kong, No. 5, p. 3.

[24] *C.B.*, 236, p. 5.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

671 mentioned eight ch'ü in as many hsien of Shansi
593 Province where approximately 88 per cent of the
2,047 marriages during 1951 were contracted of
582 free choice.[26] By contrast, another news item reported that in northern Kiangsu during the first half of 1952 the number of arranged engagements totaled 39,911 or nearly three times the number of engagements "founded on free love," while 19,894 arranged marriages had taken place, exceeding the number of free marriages by 28 per cent.[27]

A further study of figures issued by Communist sources indicates that the regime did not have exact knowledge of the situation in many areas. To cite one example, an announcement of the results of the 1952 investigation of Marriage Law implementation included "incomplete statistics" on deaths attributed to the existence of problems and mistreatment connected with the "feudal family" system.

According to these figures, 4,105 women were killed or driven to suicide in the East China Region between January and August 1952; and 356 women and 161 young men suffered the same fate in the Northwest Region during the first half of 1952. In lieu of figures for the Central-South Region, the report mentioned 606 young men and women met violent deaths as a result of marriage

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[26] Ibid., p. 4.

[27] Ibid., p. 14.

671 disputes in 39 hsien (out of a total of 86) in Hunan.
593 No statistics were given for the North China
582 Region.[28]

It seems reasonable to assume that the figures are incomplete and the categories not comparable because the Communists had no more accurate material to offer. If the incidence of violence in connection with marital and family disputes is truly reflected in these figures, their extension into yearly rates shows these deaths occurred at the rate of less than two per hundred-thousand population in the Northwest Region, less than four per hundred-thousand in the East China Region, and less than nine per hundred-thousand in Hunan. It should be remembered, however, that these ratios are based on incomplete figures and that the incidence of violence may have resulted as much from Communist pressures as from the authoritarian character of the traditional family.

671 Divorce figures released by the Communists
586 are equally difficult to render meaningful because of gaps in statistics and the different time spans and categories which are given for the figures cited. For the nation as a whole, the number of divorces was reported to have risen from 186,000 in 1950 (the last seven months of it under the New Marriage Law), to 409,500 in 1951, and to 398,000 in the first half of 1952.[29] The latter

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[28] C.B., 236, p. 5.

[29] Ibid., 243, p. 3.

671 figure is only slightly higher than the number of
586 divorces for all of 1952 in the United States, whose population is about one-quarter that of China.[30] So far as is known, no separate figure for the number of divorces in the North China Region has been made public.

The latest picture of the progress of family
671 reform to be released by the Communist regime
582 was contained in the March 1955 report of the
593 Marriage Law Implementing Committee. Although most of the report was couched in generalities, it included a summary of conditions "in certain advanced areas in Shansi and elsewhere." According to the committee, family relationships were improved or improving in 90-95 per cent of the homes and was "bad" in only 5-10 per cent. Of the larger group, 10-15 per cent were described as the "advanced modern type...with a definite degree of socialist consciousness, where democracy and harmony obtain and members are united for production." The report added that in 80 per cent of these homes women were no longer "oppressed, beaten, or scolded," but "remnants of the patriarchal system and the conception of the rights of the husband" still existed to varying degrees.[31]

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[30] Divorces in the United States during 1952 totaled 392,000. See The World Almanac and Book of Facts for 1955, Harry Hansen, ed., New York, New York World Telegram and The Sun, 1955, p. 312.

[31] SCMP., 1002, p. 3.

D. Reorientation of Family Reform

543 After March 1953, the Communist approach to marriage and family reform seems to have
582 undergone a change. There are indications that the regime's emphasis on new freedom for women and the prominent publicity given statistics on divorce had led to the Marriage Law being popularly termed the "Divorce Law."[32] At the same time, resistance in the rural areas to sudden changes in the old institutions of marriage and family relations were becoming evident to Party leaders as the results of the late 1952 investigations were tabulated.

A shift in the pace and in the propaganda emphasis on marriage and family reform was evident in Liu Ching-fan's report to the Government Administration Council at the end of 1953. Although the better treatment and greater freedom given to woman was not to be neglected, greater emphasis was placed on the establishment of "harmonious" and "democratic" relationships within the family, whether originally of the old or new type, and to the positive benefits that would accrue to all members of the family as a consequence of reform.[33]

Analyzing the then current situation, Liu noted that the people still maintained a feudal ideology and consciousness in regard to many

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[32] China News Analysis, 5, p. 2.

[33] C.B., 273, pp. 5-6.

593 582 social problems, and that this attitude in respect to marriage problems was a "more universal and serious one." Liu admitted that the abolition of the feudal marriage system and the establishment of the new system was "a long term and difficult process in the ideological and social reform of the people." To accomplish this reform, he added, the regime would have to co-ordinate its efforts with the people's personal interests and levels of attainment, persuade the people patiently, and raise their level steadily. The process of implementing the Marriage Law, Liu concluded, would have to be made part of the regular tasks of the government and people's organizations at all levels and co-ordinated with the central tasks of production, construction, and elections.[34] These recommendations have become the principles by which the government still seems to be guided in marriage and family reform.

In the cities where modern influences had prepared the people for acceptance of new marriage and family principles, the regime encountered a different kind of problem. Just before International Women's Day, March 8, 1955, an authoritative statement in the Communist press added a new note to the usual references to lingering remnants of feudal obstruction and the long-term nature of family reform. The statement charged that bourgeois ideology had reached into marriage and family relationships.

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[34] Ibid., pp. 4-6.

593 582 The bourgeois influences detected were love of luxury and disparagement of labor, "carelessness" in choosing marriage partners or the desire for new partners after marriage, and devotion to self-interest. They had respectively given rise to the sins of marriage based on money, "the belittlement of sexual relationships," and maltreatment, desertion, and irresponsibility toward parents and children.[35]

The nation's young people were evidently the most prone to this subversive influence. A campaign was launched in the large cities during the spring of 1955 to guard youth against "bourgeoise concepts." In connection with the drive, the Communist press evidenced concern regarding romantic love, heart-break, unsolved marriage problems of workers in sparsely populated areas, and the attractions and diversions of a carefree social life in the cities. These things, the press warned, were subverting many young people from their primary duty of devoting their whole effort and attention to study and work in the national interest. The advice of the Communist editors "to place love in a secondary position in one's life" is hardly likely to solve the problem.[36]

A different sort of problem confronted youth in the countryside. Apparently the possibility was not present there for youth to develop love

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35. SCMP., 1022, p. 4.

36. Ibid., 1006, pp. 15-18; 1052, pp. 25-33.

593 582 and marriage attachments through the ideal and officially sanctioned method of mutual participation in production, indoctrination, and study. A 1955 report on Marriage Law implementation admitted that "in the extensive rural districts... the conditions for adequate communal life and avenues for social intercourse" are lacking. As a result, "most marriages are still being contracted after both parties were first introduced to each other by third parties." The report hastened to explain that as the bride and groom gave their previous agreement to the marriage it was to be regarded as a marriage of free will and not to be confused with the old and outlawed practice of arranged marriage.[37]

E. Replacement of the Family's Social, Economic, and Political Role

596 575 668 811 A second step taken by the Communist regime to change radically the nature and function of the Chinese family was accomplished with the establishment of organizations to regiment every phase of human endeavor. The labor unions in the city, the peasant associations, mutual aid teams, and co-operatives in the country became the center not only of economic life, but of social political, and indoctrination activities as well. Unions were organized in the cities almost as they fell to the Communist armies, but the formation of comparable institutions in the countryside awaited the gradual process of land reform.

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[37] *Ibid.*, 1002, p. 3.

596 Until it was completed in any area, no alternate
575 organization to the family existed to assume its
668 socio-economic role. This fact seems to ex-
871 plain why the Communists during the spring of 1953 limited their marriage law campaign in the countryside to those areas where land reform had been accomplished.

Special organizations were set up to train and absorb the energies of women and children who might otherwise be free of the constant direct influence of the government. These two groups were absorbed respectively into the All-China Democratic Federation of Women and into the Young Pioneers, the Federation of Democratic Youth, and the New Democratic Youth Corps.

596 Aside from its primary role as a unit for
668 procreation and for child-care until the young
871 reached an age when they would prove adaptable to molding by the state, the family was left only with the secondary duty of supporting the state training process. An editorial in the People's Daily in mid-1955 pointed out the "deep solic- of the government toward children, made manifest by the establishment of nurseries and schools and the teaching of proper attitudes toward children and the correct methods for educating them. "The new Socialist generation" was to be brought up "physically strong, courageous, honest, fond of study, patriotic, and imbued with collective spirit." The editorial also stated that trade unions were to help office

596 employees and workers to learn how to educate
668 their children" Teachers and directors of the
871 Young Pioneers were to assume the "important
responsibility" of guiding children in classrooms, meetings, and extra-curricular activities.[38]

With the Communist regime's emphases on youth, loyalty to the state, socialist construction, and the rooting out of feudalistic and bourgeois ideas, the problem of the proper attitude of youth toward parents needed clarification. An article on the subject in the January 1955 issue of China Youth emphasizes that "respect for one's parents is part of ...individual or social Communist morals," but the attitude "must be governed by the interests of the Revolution." If the parents are counterrevolutionaries who have been pardoned by the people and are still able to work, they should be made to Reform-through-labor, and should not be pitied or helped. Only if they are unable to support themselves should they be aided by the children, "for if the children do not support them, then the burden will fall on the state, which is obviously undesirable." As to bourgeois parents, they should normally be shown respect and concern; but if they break the law, "the children should justly and dispassionately examine their crime." Working class parents "should of course be respected, loved, and taken care of." They should not be discriminated against or ridiculed because of the shortcomings

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[38] Ibid., 1064, pp. 11-13.

596 668 891 they have inherited from the old regime, but "should be patiently persuaded to see the light."[39]

V. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NORTH CHINA REGION

A. Diverse Influences on Family Life

198 596 Several conflicting influences on family organization and function have been present in the North China Region during the last twenty-five years. Until the Japanese invasion of China in 1937, the disruptive forces of industrialization and revolutionary ideas on ancient family patterns were less prevalent in the North China Region than in the Central-South and East China regions. Tientsin was the only city in the North China Region where industrialization had made any appreciable headway, and warlord rule in the region had precluded any wide dissemination of new social and political ideas. Olga Lang's study of family trends in China just before the outbreak of the war showed that within comparable socio-economic groups modern tendencies were less apparent in unindustrialized Peiping than in industrialized Tientsin, but that in neither city were modern trends as prevalent as in Shanghai.[40] Sydney Gamble's prewar investigation of the rural area of Ting *hsien* in Hôpei indicated that some modern

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[39] *Ibid.*, 973, pp. 30-32.

[40] Lang, *op. cit.*, pp. 320-327.

178 influences were creeping in to affect family life,
596 but that on the whole, it had not departed appreciably from the traditional mould.[41]

During the war, the cities of Hopei and Shansi and the villages of the provinces along communication routes were occupied by the Japanese and subjected to an influence opposed to that exerted in much of the surrounding countryside where Communist guerrilla armies and political agents were active. To counteract Western and Communist ideas and to make the conquered people of North China more amenable to Japanese rule, the occupation regime promoted a revival of Confuciansim and a return to the traditional ways of living. The authority of the male head of the family was re-emphasized; equality between the sexes was criticized and ridiculed; and Western industrialization was scorned as the creator of cities with their attendent evils and was to be replaced by Japanese industrialization to bring machines to the village and preserve the small community patterns of social organization. Japanese terroristic methods of control and persecution of the modern intellectual and professional groups in North China undoubtedly counteracted any influence the Japanese might have been able to exert in effecting a return to the past. However, the Japanese program did prevent the further intru-

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41. Sydney D. Gamble, Ting Hsien, A North China Rural Community, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1954.

sion of modernizing forces in the North China Region and helped to preserve the traditional form and function of the Chinese family so little influenced by modern trends.[42]

Communist dominance in unoccupied rural areas of Shansi and Hopei during the war introduced the village population to new social ideas as well as to new political theory. Women's and young people's organizations were established to enlist the efforts of these groups in the war effort and local defense units. As far as possible, the Communists attempted to introduce such concepts as the equality of the sexes, marriage by free choice, and the right of divorce that were latter to become elements of the new Marriage Law. Always a minority in the rural areas of Shansi and Hopei, the Communnists had to rely on democratic symbols and persuasive techniques rather than force to promote the new social attitudes. At the more securely held bases established in the border areas of Shansi-Chahar-Hopei, Shansi-Suiyuan, Hopei-Jehol-Liaoning, Hopei-Shantung-Honan, and Shansi-Hopei-Honan, the Communists had somewhat greater influence and control than in the villages occasionally visited by and under the dominance of roving guerrilla bands. After the war, these war bases were redesignated as "liberated areas," and intensive efforts were made to inculcate the people with Communist social and

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[42] George E. Taylor, The Struggle for North China, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940.

178 political philosophy of the "New Democracy."
5% The "old liberated areas" are now referred to as "advanced areas" and publicized as models in the Communist effort to reorient the Chinese family and society.

B. The Pace of Reform

In the pace of family reform, the North China Region is probably the most advanced of any territory under the Communist regime. Although industrialization and modern city life with their influences for change in family form and function have a longer history in the East and Northeast China regions, neither region has been subject to as long a period of Communist influence as the North China Region. Furthermore, the region has been under the direct control and surveillance of the central government and is the testing ground for new Communist policies before they are revised and enforced elsewhere in the country.

If and as the new regime fulfills its plans for industrialization and the organization of rural areas in co-operatives or collectives, more insistent pressures than mere propaganda will be brought to bear on the traditional family. But even this kind of force will not completely wipe out the old attitudes and loyalties of the elder generation. No such drawbacks characterize the heavily indoctrinated youth of today, more enthusiastic than their parents for the new order, but the urge manifested by many emancipated young

178 people toward individualism and romanticism in
586 love and marriage may pose a problem of equal
calibre for the new masters of China.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 1h,
Sociological Background

SOCIAL VALUES AND PATTERNS OF LIVING

1. CUSTOMS AND CHARACTERISTIC WAYS OF LIFE

184 The Chinese imperial system was strikingly successful in fostering common basic attitudes among the peoples which it absorbed within its ever-widening sphere. Nevertheless local and regional sub-cultures, brought into the imperial order at different times throughout more than two millenia, did not lose all of their characteristic traits. The oldest center of "Chinese" civilization was in the fertile plain of the lower Yellow River valley. When, in the course of centuries, areas as diverse as the loess highlands of Shansi and the warm rich lowlands of the Yangtze were brought into the orbit of Chinese civilization, differences in climate, terrain, and folk culture meant that each of these areas preserved a degree of cultural distinctiveness. For example, the loess highlands made it possible for substantial numbers of people in Shensi and Shansi to live in man-made caves, while this kind of dwelling was unknown on the Yellow River plain.

241 At the same time there are factors which give to the area we are now considering important uniformities in culture. The expansion of "Chinese culture from Southern Hopei Honan

241 and Shantung into the whole of North China was essentially the steady outward push of an efficient agricultural technique which displaced the more primitive aboriginal food-gatherers and primitive slash-burn agriculturists, abosrbed most of these people into its operation, and drove the remnants higher and higher into the hills. The characteristically Chinese agriculture is intensive, that is, it uses large quantities of human labor in irrigating, fertilizing, and cultivating land for
361 maximum yields. Its unit of socio-economic
621 organization is the village, composed of those families which cultivate the surrounding fields within easy walking distance of its center. It was in the villages of rural China, spread over a vast area to exploit the land through a common technology, that the characteristic way of life developed. It is his family's village which is "home" to any Chinese, no matter what his class, how far he may wander, or how Westernized his life may have become. There are perpetuated the ties with his own family's past, symbolized by the ancestral temple and the family or clan burial ground. There are the other families with which his own has built an enduring pattern of reciprocal favors and obligations. It is in the farming villages that the Communists are seeking to bring about fundamental changes in the way of life and to break up the old complex of family and local loyalties.

What are the common patterns of village life from the Yellow River plain to the loess highlands and mountains of Shansi? We shall sketch these before discussing variations represented by urban life.

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A. The Pattern of Village Life

511 First of all, life in the farming village is meager. The average Shansi farm in 1946 was 6.4 acres; in the more fertile province of Hopei, the average farm contained only 4.3 acres.[1] Farm families save everything; fecal matter and refuse go into a pit near which a pig is kept, and at the time of spring fertilizing the material from the pit is mixed with topsoil or water and spread on the fields. Grass and grainstalks are carefully husbanded to be used as fodder for the farm animal if the family is fortunate enough to have one, as fuel for cooking, and rarely, for heating the house. Cloth is scarce, and clothing is worn until it falls apart; after that the rags are used to make the soles of cloth shoes. The shortage of wood for all purposes has long been acute, and farm buildings are made of pounded earth, mud bricks, or, in the loess highlands, are hollowed out of loess cliffs. Floors are of earth, and only the dwelling of the wealthiest farmers have glass windows. The dominant fact of life in the Chinese countryside is poverty. This has grown steadily worse during the last

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[1] George B. Cressey, Land of the 500 Million, New York, 1955, p.105. In his earlier work Asia's Lands and Peoples, New York, 1944, p. 87, Cressey estimates that, throughout China, an average farm family of 6.2 persons must obtain its entire livelihood from a farm of 4.18 acres of which but 3.76 acres are actually in crops.

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511 hundred years as factory-made goods destroyed village handicrafts, usury and tenancy increased, wars and ineffectual governments brought disruption and oppression, and overpopulation became steadily worse. "The most bankrupt countryside in Asia is the Chinese. The worst crisis of overpopulation China has yet had to face has been accompanied by a breakdown of traditional ideas and traditional authority so complete as to lead to a state of near anarchy."[2]

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621 The characteristic way of life of the peasants has been slowly disintergrating under manifold pressures. During prosperous periods in the past a delicate balance of human and economic factors fostered a crowded, conformist, but on the whole harmonious village life. Recent decades have seen the old harmony replaced by tension and a predatory struggle for survival. And, despite the isolation of most villages, ideas and ideals from the West have slowly undermined the authority of the older mores and customary laws.

Despite all the fissures that have developed, it is well to remember that peasant life everywhere has a tremendous inertia, that it is incredibly resistant to all the forces of change. Thus much of the sweeping change that occurred in city life under comparable pressures did not occur in the peasant villages.

000 The main economic and social unit of the village is the family, and a special study is de-

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[2] Maurice Zinkin, Asia and the West, London, 1951, p.111.

360 voted to that subject. Here we should sketch the 121 rhythm of village life and something of its annual cycle of activity.

529 The New Year holiday, for the people of China the first fifteen days of the year, is the main period of leisure for the villagers. Food is prepared in advance, and even the women may rest from their cooking during the first days of the holiday. The town is decorated with *nien-hua* (New Year's pictures) and *ch'un-lien* (paired New Year's Day mottoes). Visiting friends, and relatives, gambling, eating the best food of the year, wearing the best clothes, and indulging the children, make this the most festive period in the year. For many families it is the only time in the year when they can afford to eat meat dishes. The special dishes of the season vary from province to province. In the northern provinces *chiao-tzu* (meat dumplings) and other wheat-based elaborate dishes are particular favorites; as one moves south, rice-based delicacies such as *nien-kao* (year cakes) figure more prominently in the New Year's feasts. Besides being a time of celebration, the New Year is also the time for settling accounts; for many farmers there will be little left for celebration when the creditors have been dealt with.

221 241 The regular work of the agricultural year begins immediately after the New Year. In Hopei and Shansi, the farming cycle is governed by the need to conserve water and by the demands of the principal crops -- wheat, millet, and kaoliang.

22/241 In early spring, the Hopei and lowland Shansi farmer begins his year-long effort to conserve moisture that has accumulated in the soil during autumn and winter rains. About half the fields are then in winter fallow awaiting spring plowing; the rest are planted in winter wheat. Fertilizer from the household pit is spread on the fallow fields. The wheat is brought to maturity by careful hoeing and by hand irrigation using well water -- a back-breaking operation in which the farmer is helped by his whole family.

In April or May comes the time to plant his remaining fields in millet, kaoliang, or cotton; in the lowland areas he irrigates to assure the germination of seeds. It is then time to harvest the wheat, and once again the farmer calls on his whole family and often on his neighbors for harvesting, threshing, and winnowing, all done by hand with the greatest care to preserve every grain, stalk, and straw. Then the winter wheat land is planted in soyabeans and corn. The farmer and his family may then slacken their pace, but not for long, as autumn brings the harvest of the summer crops, the fall plowing, and finally the planting of winter wheat.

Autumn, too, is the traditional time for the tax collector to appear with his demands for taxes in money or in kind. And, before the Communist abolition of tenancy, it was the time when the landlord claimed his share of the crop.[3] If

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[3] For landlord-tenant relations in Anhwei, cf. Morton Fried, The Fabric of Chinese Society, New York, 1953, pp. 186-200. Typical rent in 1947-48 was 40 per cent of yield.

221 If the weather had been favorable and the tax gatherer not unduly rapacious, the farmer might retain enough grain to see his family through to the next harvest. If things had gone badly, a grim winter season lay ahead. Winter was in any case the time for repairing farm implements, weaving thatch, repairing buildings, spinning and weaving rough cloth, and doing other household chores. With the approach of the New Year the farmer might look forward to some festivity, perhaps to slaughtering the family pig; if debt loomed large, the pig might have to be sold to help pay the bills.[4]

769 796 The farm year,[5] toilsome in north and south alike, is punctuated by other activities and festivals which relieve some of the monotony of the long seasons of work. The first of the annual festivals after the New Year is that of Ch'ing-ming which corresponds in time to the Western Easter. Like Easter, the Ch'ing-ming observance was one a spring fertility festival. At this time, the ties of the living and dead members of the family and clan are celebrated; the family or clan graveyard is swept and food offerings are made to the dead. The performance of those duties is often made the occasion for a family picnic at the graveyard. All relatives make special efforts to join in this annual celebration of family solidarity, and the outing is a pleasant relief from winter and indoor work.[6]

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4. J. L. Buck's study of 16,786 farms showed 39 per cent were in debt from 1929-32. Cited in Lang, Chinese Family and Society, New Haven, 1946, p. 69.

[5 and 6 next page]

796 On the fifth day of the fifth lunar month is the Dragon Boat Festival. This is of southern origin and is traced by Eberhard to the human sacrificial rites of the Tai aborigines of south China.[7] In modern times it has been somewhat less popular in the north than in the south. It is in the south that the dragon boat races were held on rivers and lakes. For most rural families the festival meant somewhat better food than usual and particularly the steamed rice dumplings known as tsung-tzu, symbolic of the rice sacrifices made on this occasion to the shade of Ch'ü Yüan -- ancient stateman and poet of the feudal state of Ch'u.

796 769 On the fifteen day of the seventh moon, usually in late August, is the feast of souls, the primitive origin of which has been transmuted by Buddhist belief and symbolism. It is at once a festival for the souls of one's ancestors and a community salute to the dead. Ancestral graves

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[5] On the agricultural cycle of the year, see the excellent description in Gerald Winfield, China, the Land and the People, New York, 1948, pp. 34-61.

[6] Wolfram Eberhard, Chinese Festivals, New York, 1942, pp. 113-27.

[7] Eberhard, op. cit., pp. 69-96.

796 are cleared, sacrifices of food are made, and
769 paper replicas of desirable objects are burned. As a further salute to all the dead, lantern-lit boats are floated on some body of water to symbolize the community's concern that all the dead may be guided to the "other shore" -- a Buddhist metaphor for salvation. Many persons pay visits to nearby temples and pay for masses for the souls of the dead, particularly for the souls of the people in the community who died without descendants to commemorate their passing. At this festival, too, special food is prepared for the dead and for the living, and the farmers and their families enjoy leisure and conviviality.[8]

796 The mid-autumn festival is primarily a moon festival, and the ceremonies in honor of the moon carried out at moon-rise on this autumn night are full of the symbols of fertility and longevity. In modern times it has been mainly a festival of women, and the Old Man in the Moon is sacrificed to as the one who arranges all marriages on earth. The moon cakes, in the shape of the full moon, are one of the special delicacies of this season. This too was perhaps originally a fertility festival, and in some areas it is a popular time to make pilgrimages to nearby mountains.[9]

These are the festivals that have retained the most significance for the Chinese farmer into modern times. Many of them have changed

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[8] Eberhard, op. cit., pp. 129-33.
[9] Ibid., pp. 97-112.

796 drastically through time, and we shall shortly see that the Chinese Communists are greatly altering the meaning and symbolism of those few which have been allowed to survive.

585 In addition to the annual festivals, the farmer's life of toil may be relieved by ceremonial family events. For a family with resources or the ability to borrow them, a wedding meant a great feast and ample wine; even the poorest families often went heavily into debt to make a marriage ceremony festive. Practical jokes were played on the bridegroom, traditional songs were sung, and the guests, particularly the men, thoroughly enjoyed themselves. The
584 births of male children were often celebrated as
862 were the betrothals, and other milestones of family and individual life. In modern times the
527 government of the Republic of China decreed certain national holidays, but these were little observed by the farm villages.

536 In addition to these occasions for relaxation,
538 intermittent special events added interest and variety to the routine of village life. Itinerant dramatic troupes occasionally performed, and until very recently, the story teller frequently appeared on the village streets to spin out his tales to an impromptu audience. The election
622 of a village headman often involved political
788 maneuvering and a town meeting. Pilgrimages to famous mountains or shrines were often undertaken in the slack agricultural season for religious reasons or purely for relaxation.

521 Perhaps the most universal recreation was, as in all illiterate communities, gossip and desultory conversation about the weather, the crops, the iniquity of the government, local disputes, and, on their rare occurrence, lawsuits involving fellow villagers. Despite the grim 181 struggle for survival, the average villager tended to be cheerful, self-respecting, and possessed of a robust sense of humor. He went through life with a continuous concern for his own "face" or prestige among his fellows and with the strong determination and unceasing faith that, despite all, the fortunes of his family would steadily improve.

B. The Pattern of Urban Life

621 Urban life, although it meant a different pattern of work, was closely akin to life in the villages. Town and city dwellers -- perhaps 20 per cent of China's population -- kept their ties with their native villages, returned there whenever possible, and many saw commercial activity in the town only as a means to the acquisition of sufficient wealth to buy farming land and return to the village.[10] The town population, then, was mostly made up of artisans and peasants, plus a small number of landlords, retired officials, county functionaries, and established merchant families. The county seats 600

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[10] Cressey, Land of the 500 Million, pp. 18-19. The 1953 Communist census credits cities and towns (undefined) with 13.26 per cent of the Mainland population.

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The county seats

634 (hsien capitals) were the centers for tax col-
438 lection and administration of the surrounding farm-villages and also served as market towns where the peasant might sell his crop and purchase the manufactured goods he could not produce.

511 Town life for the average partisan was as meager as for his relatives in the village. Long hours, hard work, low pay, few holidays were the lot of most, and living conditions were generally poorer and more crowded than those in the villages. Proprietors of many shops required their employees to live on the premises, so that they seldom visited their families. The diet of the town dweller was as poor as that of the poor farmer -- mostly cereals, vegetables, and some condiments, and meat and fruit on
527 holidays only. Brief holidays were allowed at the New Year, the Ch'ing-ming festival, the mid-Autumn festival, and the Dragon Boat Festival. On these occasions, townspeople usually tried to return to their villages; if this was impossible they enjoyed such delicacies as they could afford and strolled the streets, perhaps visiting friends and attending season fairs and theaters.

369 Life in the towns was, then, closely linked with village. But in the larger cities such as Peking, Tientsin, Taiyuan, and Ta-t'ung, life in some respects has been greatly altered by the modernization that spread slowly from the coastal to the inland cities. The streets are paved, and schools, newspapers, motion pictures, and radio make the people more aware of the outside world than are their cousins in the towns and

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villages. In Tientsin and other modern cities,
369 major industries built large dormitories for
466 workers: labor unions and political clubs de-
511 veloped as new foci for social activity. Yet the
living conditions grew worse as workers moved
into the cities. Crowding reached unbelievable
proportions. The only comparable figures are
for Chengtu, a city outside the North China
area, but they suggest the dimensions of this
problem in all urban centers. Chengtu, with
predominantly one-storied buildings, had a
population density of 50,000 per square miles
as compared to 22,500 per square mile in New
York City.[11] One survey suggests that workers
in the newer industries were somewhat better
off than workers in the traditional trades,[12]
but their traditional holidays were shortened
without, in most cases, the introduction of a
six-day week. In the crowded cities the festi-
vals of the agricultural year continued to de-
termine the holidays (although national holidays
were increasingly observed), and, like the town
dwellers, city workers tried to return to their
family villages for at least one of the holidays.
575 Another link to one's native place was the system
of clubs composed of those city-dwellers who
had a common provincial origin; the clubs
operated hostels and sometimes made arrange-
ments for mutual aid. Secret societies provided

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[11] Winfield, op. cit., p. 88. These figures would seem to be for period 1945-47.

[12] Lang, op. cit., pp. 88-89.

575 another focus of social life, particularly in the towns and cities. Their rituals, passports, and secret signs of greeting were all subordinate to their basic aim, which was to provide members with security-through-association and a refuge against the hazards of a disintegrating and increasingly predatory society.

369 It will be noted that the ties of kinship and custom were strong, extending even into the large modern cities and the farm towns. Urban and rural ways of life tended increasingly to diverge, yet one of the strongest cohesive forces of all was the common set of attitudes and values which, even when change has been accounted for, held together all Chinese of village and town and city.

II. THE INFLUENCE OF COMMUNISM

241 654 668 In discussing Communist efforts to alter the Chinese way of life, it should be stressed that our material is unsatisfactory. Statistics, declarations, news releases give few realistic details of life in the villages under Communist domination, and most refugees from Communist China have come from the cities.

First of all, the farmer's annual routine is basically unchanged. Pilot collectives are in operation, but these are few and have no immediate bearing on the farmer's work year. The most striking change in the farmer's life is the new network of associations which the government has imposed upon him and the daily barrage of advice and exhortation to which he is subjected.

241 654 668 No longer does he cultivate his land in the manner of his ancestors with the assistance of his family, his clan, and his neighbors. He no longer sets the periods of work and of rest. The Communist leadership is determined that the peasant shall be transformed in three ways: (1) he must be made to produce more; (2) he must become a politically conscious, active supporter of the Communist regime, and (3) his attitudes and values must be radically changed.

The instrument of this transformation, which is visible and active in the villages, is the Party cadre. Party cadres act as the eyes, the ears, and the mouths of authority.[13] "They are called upon to take the leadership in organizing production and to participate in all types of farm work, such as mobilizing the peasants for cultivation, teaching new farming methods, distributing new seed, performing grain requisitioning, helping in planting, building and repairing dikes, etc."[14] The village cadres have been mainly outsiders, "foreigners," but the Party has recently been recruiting youths from specific localities and training them to return there as cadres. The cadre was the instrument of land redistribution and brought into the countryside the first major change decreed by Peking. The cadre organized the Peasants' Association in the village and manipulated its meetings and its officers. It was the cadre who worked up sentiment and organized the "speak bitterness" meetings in the days of the Land Reform Movement -- occasions used to the full to attack the old familial order in the villages. It is the cadre who organizes the "struggle meetings" in which villagers

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[13 and 14 next page]

241 are made to engage in criticism and self-criticism
654 in order to undermine the old values and instill
668 the new.

The cadres also pushed the organization of "mutual-aid teams" for the sharing of labor and equipment, an effort that struck at the familial organization of farm labor and apparently met with serious difficulties.[15] More recently the cadre has been the instrument for the concerted attempt to build producer co-operatives in the countryside. In such major efforts as the attempt to put Hunan rice farming on a two-crop basis (hitherto only done further south), the cadres were reportedly responsible for training 100,000 farmers.[16]

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13. Walter E. Gourlay, *The Chinese Communist Cadre: Key to Political Control*, Harvard, Russian Research Center, 1952, p. 25.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

[15] W. W. Rostow, *The Prospects of Communist China*, Cambridge, 1954, p. 84.

[16] Reported by New China News Agency, Changsha, April 20, 1955; *Survey of China Mainland Press* (*SCMP*), No. 1036, April 28, 1955.

178 66 The cadre carried on the continuing effort to destroy traditional mores, which are prime resistants in what the Communists call the long and difficult process of ideological and social reform. He publicizes the new marriage law, discourages or prevents arranged marriages, lectures on sanitation, and sometimes with the help of radio, films, and mobile theatrical units, dramatizes the issues of the day, the need for the farmer to sacrifice, to send his sons to the army, to contribute labor to community projects, to inform on his neighbors, to buy bonds, and so forth. The cadre establishes "winter schools" in which the peasants are given intensive political indoctrination, practical training, and instruction in reading and writing. Hunan reported that 2,500,000 peasants were enrolled in these schools in the winter of 1955.[17]

The age-old drive of the vigorous peasant to increase his family's land holdings is checked by fear lest he be re-classified as a "rich peasant" and be subject to higher taxes and other pressures. Yet what the Communists deplore as the peasant's "spontaneous capitalistic tendency," has not been crushed, and the land-holdings of the more enterprising grow in size.[18]

The effort to force various forms of co-operative work has not been completely successful:

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[17] People's Daily, Jan. 30, 1955; SCMP 984, pp. 30-31.

[18] Rostow, op. cit., p. 152, cites Peking People's Daily, Feb. 13, 1954.

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> "...when a serious team-use of labor, tools, and farm animals was attempted, a variety of unsatisfactory results emerged; quarrels among the families interfered with efficient output; no one assumed responsibility for the upkeep of communal property; the claims of inefficient members violated the sense of equity of the more efficient..." [19]

Yet the villagers' way of life has been greatly altered by the intervention of the government, through the cadres, in all social, economic, and political activities. The pressure to conform, at least outwardly, is formidable. Self-chosen leisure-time activities are few, meetings occupy a great deal of time, and attendance at harangues by Party cadres, entertainment furnished by traveling theatrical groups (all with their ideological message) take more of his liesure. The slack winter season may now findhim in winter school or involved in a community work project directed by the local cadre.

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Settlement of accounts before the New Year holiday now means payment of taxes and the sale to the government of most of the balance of the farmer's grain, for which he receives coupons. The cadres carry this out at village level.[20] The New Year festival itself is

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[19] Rostow, op. cit., p. 84.

[20] SCMP 979, Feb. 2, 1955, p. 30.

668 characterized by some traditional activities,
527 modified to promote government aims, and by
178 some new features. The peasant may buy New Year's pictures to decorate his house, but they will probably be romanticized portraits of Mao and other Communist heroes rather than the colorful deities of former days.[21] He may decorate his gate with paired mottoes, but the mottoes will no longer carry the old wishes for long life, happiness, and wealth, but exhortations to conform to Communist standards.[22] The government may allow some additional food for the season, but gambling is forbidden, and social life has been so thoroughly organized that it can no longer be restricted to family and friends. The peasants have been urged to organize their own dramatic troupes to play the approved repertoire, now brought to the villages by traveling troupes. Special mobile teams trained to deliver organized "cultural lectures"; or to show films dramatizing the new order have been moving steadily through the Chinese countryside. The old exchange of visits to relatives in nearby towns now has its Communist counterpart: interchange of visits between urban and rural workers' groups to observe one another's "progress in Communist reconstruction."[23]

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[21] Enlightenment Daily, Jan.23,1955,p.2.

[22] Cf. the collection of mottoes in Hua-nan T'ung-shu [South China Almanac], Canton 1953, p. 32.

[23] Enlightenment Daily, Jan. 23,1955,p.2

668 The seasonal pilgrimage, in company,
527 to some famous shrine also has it Communist
198 counterpart: mass pilgrimages to Mao Tse-tung's native village, which is being publicized as a national shrine.[24] Despite its frontal attack on the old familism, the Communist government last year provided special trains to take city dwellers back to their native villages for the holiday; a mass exodus was reported from Peking.[25]

Ch'ing-ming is no longer an approved festival, presumably because of its function as a celebration of kinship ties and family continuity. The next approved traditional holiday is the Dragon Boat festival in June. The boat races have been revived, and the poet Ch'ü Yüan, now a "people's hero, martyred in protest against a corrupt feudal regime," is the focus of celebrations.[26] The moon festival in autumn is also celebrated with extra food allowances and "cultural" activities. The various anniversaries of the Chinese Communists and of the world Communist movement probably do not break into the agricultural working year, but may be the occasion for special propaganda arranged by the local cadre. It will be seen
178 that the pattern of living in the villages has been
668 drastically altered; what remains of the old pattern consists of elements too deeply ingrained

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[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.; also, SCMP, 972, 1954, p. 21.
[26] SCMP, 1075, June 23, 1955, p. 25.

178 to be abruptly altered without precipitating a
668 crisis, useful to the Communists in the interest of morale, or adaptable in the promotion of their rural program of change and indoctrination.

III. CHANGING PATTERNS OF LIVING

668 In the towns and cities, as in the countryside, the greatest changes in living patterns have been brought about by the network of new associations by which the regime envelops and controls the individual. Workers in various traditional crafts, merchants, industrial workers, all are organized by the Party, and it is within these groups, under the guidance of cadres, that the urban working population is most strenuously indoctrinated. In long and frequent meetings, the city dweller is under intense pressure to manifest "correct attitudes," to show himself free of all "feudal" and "bourgeois" taint, and to demonstrate his complete commitment to Communist goals. Through these and other channels he is under continual pressure to step up his efficiency and productivity. The meetings take such a toll of his energy at the end of the working day that they are openly referred to as "fatigue meetings."[27]

City and town dwellers are also organized into street and ward units, which serve further to mold urban life into the new pattern. The townsman, more than the peasant, is open to

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[27] Rostow, op. cit., p. 160.

[28] Cf., "Regulations of Urban Organizations," Current Background, 310, Jan. 17,1955.

668 an "around the clock" propaganda barrage. From the first call to early morning calisthenics, the radio blares in every street until late at night. There is pressure to join sports groups, study groups -- all with their ideological purposes. The major Communist holidays are 668 527 celebrated in the cities with great parades and endless speeches. Privacy and chance to be at ease with family or friends are rare.

The New Year's holiday has some of its old gaiety, although subject to the same restrictions imposed on the peasant. The cities receive special shipments of seasonal delicacies, as they appear to do at the mid-autumn and Dragon Boat festivals, and trips back to the family village may be possible for a minority of the urban population.[29]

A Communist press account of the New Year's activities in Peking in 1955 suggest the way in which the old and new are blended. Firecrackers, in the traditional pattern, were set off on New Year's Eve. On New Year's Day people crowded the streets and made mass visits to the holiday fair in the southwestern part of the city. Kites, balloons, and dolls were available for children, and some were given model airplanes bearing the slogan "We

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[29] Enlightenment Daily, Jan.23,1955,p.2. In preparation for the New Year exodus from cities in 1955, the Ministry of Railways estimated that "over three and a half million more people will travel than on normal days, mostly to join in united family celebrations of the holiday." NCNA dispatch, Jan. 19,1955; SCMP,972, Jan. 20, 1955, p. 21.

668 must liberate Taiwan." Theaters and cinemas 527 were crowded, and continuous and varied shows--each no doubt with its ideological message --were performed in the "Working People's Palace of Culture." Further innovations symbolic of the new order were an exhibition by Soviet skaters, chess tournament, the finals of the city soccer tournament, entertainments by workers' amateur troupes.[30]

668 511 The cities have been cleaned up and enlarged, and building has apparently proceeded rapidly, although improvements in housing probably mainly affect the industrial workers, the favored class in the drive for industrialization.[31] Yet the Rostow study indicates that there has been no real increase in wages for the urban worker.[32] His diet remains poor, his work hours long. But since the Party is anxious to recruit from urban workers, he does have opportunity to rise in life through Party work. Many industrial workers probably do feel some sense of identification with the most rapidly expanding sector of the Chinese economy. This 668 identification and the opportunities offered by 183 the Party are probably slowly changing the goals of the urban worker. He may be less interested than he was once in returning to a plot of land

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[30] *NCNA* dispatches, Peking, Jan. 21 and 24,1955, and *SCMP*, 974, Jan. 22-26,1955, pp. 31-32.

[31] Rostow, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 160-61.

668 183 in the country, where economic opportunities are increasingly restricted. He knows, after attending one Party meeting, that the peasantry is no longer the favored class in the Chinese economy.

668 565 The elite of the towns and cities are the functionaries of the government and Party. We know little of the pattern of their private lives. But, if the badge of the old Chinese bureaucratic elite was a leisurely and cultivated air, the badge of the new is a daily calendar of meetings, a full briefcase, and an air of purposeful, energetic activity. Their incomes permit their families a life somewhat easier than that granted the rest of the urban population, but they are constantly disciplined, watched by their colleagues, obliged to meet work quotas, and forced to submit to continuous indoctrination and re-indoctrination. Party and government workers are urged to use the New Year holiday to plan their work for the year to come.

The bulk of the old middle class may have survived, but its activities have been increasingly restricted by government controls and the growth of government producing and marketing facilities. They are a tough and tenacious group, but their old comfortable life is already threatened and, as[33] a class, they are scheduled for extinction.

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[33] Rostow, op. cit., pp. 162-64.

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668 The growing cities now appear to be replacing the country as the goal of the ambitious. It is likely that, as urbanization and industrialization proceed, the cities rather than the farm villages will determine, as the Communist plan, the new mores and patterns of living for society as a whole.

II. BASIC ATTITUDES

183 One of the principal reasons for the stability and long life of the old order in China was its special homogeneity. The imperial government fostered uniformity of attitudes and values, and Chinese statesmen believed this to be a more binding, durable, and cheaper cement for the imperial order than government coercion. Old China was primarily a way of life, a system of values and attitudes, and on this premise the state was organized. A foreigner who wished to become "naturalized" had only to show that he accepted Chinese attitudes and values; this he did by adopting Chinese dress and speech and patterns of behavior.

This characteristic of the old order is one of the reasons why we find no important regional variations in basic attitudes. The other reason is that the Communist government is as determined, in enforcing a uniformity of values and attitudes, and far more resourceful than was the imperial government of the past.

There are, however, certain local variations in temperament and ethos which effect, to a minor degree, the basic attitudes and values. A few of these will be noted. For the variant attitudes and values of ethnic and religious minorities, see the chapters on Ethnic Groups and Religion.

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There have been profound changes in basic attitudes over the last century and particularly during the last five years. Change has been brought about by two factors. The first is the disintegration of the old social and political order resulting from its failure to adapt itself to the problems and pressures of the modern world. Consequently, people became critical of the older attitudes and, in increasing numbers, adopted newer "modern" attitudes and values which were considered better suited to a modern China. The second is the power of the Communist state, which, in the last five years, has been used to inculcate a new and uniform set of values and attitudes.

These two factors are closely interrelated. Thus, the Communists have been making a sympathetic use of individual and group-dissatisfaction with the old order to inspire and promote the acceptance of the new attitudes and values; the latter's appeal has been particularly strong with youth -- especially adolescents -- and with women who have been taught to regard the old social order as tyrannical and oppressive. The following will illustrate this last point:

> Co-operative agriculture has
> organization,
> and women are not left out.
> In the old society we were badly
> mistreated,
> but the new society teaches
> friendship and love.[29]

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[29] Fu-nu San-tzu Ching [Three-character Classic for Women], Hsin-hua Publishing House, 1950, Op. 21. [cont'd next page]

183 In addition to capitalizing on discontent, the Communists have been making a peculiar use of traditional attitudes and values. Certain values from the old order still have a strong emotional appeal for the Chinese people. And the Communists seek to make the new order more acceptable by associating some of its elements with selected elements from the traditional culture. For example, they insist that as a guiding principle of personal behavior the idea of "struggle" (tou-cheng) must replace that of "harmony" (ho).[30] People are taught to struggle for self-perfection and to engage in class struggle, in the struggle for a new China, and in the struggle against deviation even when this involves attacking their friends. This is utterly contrary to the old ideal of harmony in personal relations, an ideal that means in practice a comfortable adjustment to one's natural and human environments. Yet in urging all to struggle, the Communists insist that the ultimate goal of all struggle is the Ta-t'ung-ching-yü -- the traditional utopian ideal of a harmonious, frictionless social order.[31]

[29. from previous page] Three-character rhymed verses were widely used in traditional China for the indoctrination of the young.

[30] Cf. Arthur F. Wright, "Struggle vs. Harmony: Symbols of Competing Values in Modern China," World Politics, Vol. VI (Oct. 1953), pp. 31-44.

[31] Mao Tse-tung, On People's Democratic Dictatorship, 3rd ed., Peking Foreign Languages Press, 1950, pp. 16-17. For Mao, of course, term means ultimate world-wide Communist utopia.

183 In discussing certain attitudes and values we should bear in mind that the power of the old and the appeal of the new vary not according to regions but according to social groups. It was among the population of modern cities like Shanghai that the old values were first challenged by the pressures of modern problems, but among the peasantry and rural gentry, despite many discontents and tensions, the old ways still prevailed.[32] Intellectuals and members of the new industrial and commercial groups were the first to discard traditional attitudes and adopt Western values; among other groups this process was slower. These variations affect Communist tactics to the extent that different kinds of persuasion are used with different groups. But the final goal is adoption of the attitudes and values decreed by the Communist leadership.

A. Good and Bad

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579 In traditional China the prevailing belief was that man was inherently good and that social harmful behavior occurred only when men lacked guidance or were placed in adverse circumstances. For example, if the ruler of the state or his officials or the father of the family failed to provide for the basic physical needs of individuals, their dependents were likely to rebel. Or if those in authority failed to provide instruction, particularly if they failed to set an example in conduct, then those subordinate to them would have no guideposts to the good and would fall into evil ways.

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32. For example, as late as 1941-43, one anthropologist found in rural Yunan that the traditional value of hsiao (filial submission) was still, [cont'd next page]

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Bad conduct was not, as in the West, viola- 183
tion of the laws of God but deviation from the age- 577
old norms of acceptable social behavior. Specifically, behavior was categorized as "bad" if it went against such prescribed norms as the following: (1) *hsiao*, filial submission to fathers and elders; (2) *chung*, loyal and submissive devotion to superiors; (3) *hsin*, good faith among friends and associates; (4) *jen*, benevolence or fellow-feeling which should inform all social relationships; (5) *i*, righteousness in one's dealings with others; (6) *Li* (good form), accepted procedures in human relations; (7) *lien*, integrity; and (8) *ch'ih*, sense of shame.

The laws of imperial China provided heavy 183
punishments for violations of these norms; the 671
most heinous crimes were those against *hsiao*, filial submission. Yet the ideal in the application of law was not blindfold justice but punishment administered with due regard for "human feeling [*jen-ch'ing*] and for the specific circumstances surrounding the crime. This attitude is illustrated in the old proverb: "There is one thing worse than a dishonest official and that is an honest official,"

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32. [continued] as it had been for centuries, "the foundation stone...of social organization,...the measuring stick of all behavior and of the worth of the individual.

183 671 which expressed disapproval of a rigorous enforcement of rules and regulations, of an enforcement that fails to take into account "human feelings."[33] The criteria for juding behavior as good or bad were therefore neither religious nor legalistic, but were the prevailing norms in the community, the customary practices sanctioned by tradition and ratified by a high degree of community consensus.

183 599 In traditional Chinese goodness could be cultivated through practice, study, and contemplation. Confucianism held that the path to goodness was open to all, that those who attained a high order of goodness should be a moral elite, a group of exemplars for others. This moral elite was also, in Confucian theory, the group which should hold and exercise political power and enjoy the rewards of status and wealth. This nation sanctioned the long political dominance of the scholar-official.

The Chinese Communists have laid out new standards of good and bad. In the words of their leading theoretician, their aim is "...to reform mankind into the completely selfless citizenry of a Communist society."[34] In setting the new standards the Communists have consciously and unconsciously selected concepts from traditional moral

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33. Ruth Bunzel and JohnWeakland, "An Anthropological Approach to Chinese Communism," Columbia Univ. Research in Contemporary Cultures, New York, 1952, pp. 80-81. Hereafter cited as Bunzel-Weakland.

34. Liu Shao-ch'i, "The Training of the Communist Party Member," first presented as a speech in 1939; cf. trans. in Boyd Compton, Mao's China, Seattle, 1952, p. 146.

183 ideas; some have been discarded, others have
577 been taken over with little adaptation; still others linger between the lines and in the implications of Communist utterances.

The old virtues associated with the traditional family have been discarded because the old family system has been dissolved, its functions taken over by the modern conjugal family on the one hand and by state and Party organizations on the other.[35] Familial virtues are castigated as "feudal" and as backward features of what the leadership calls "the squalid old society of China."[36]

The basic Marxist dogma that the individual is molded by his class position and, indirectly, by the "stage of the society into which he is born, has a good deal in common with the Confucian view of the prime importance of environment in the formation of character. Thus the Communist effort to create a new society, in both traditional Chinese and Marxist terms, will create favorable environment for the development of individual goodness. But the "goodness" expected is different: "To sacrifice the individual for the sake of the Party, for the sake of the class, for national liberation, or the liberation of mankind, even to sacrifice one's own life without the slightest hesitation, with a feeling of happiness -- this is the highest

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35. J.M.H. Lindbeck, "Communist Policy and the Chinese Family," Far Eastern Survey, #20, (July 25, 1951), pp. 137-41.

36. Liu Shao ch'i, quoted in David S. Nivison, Communist Ethics and Chinese Tradition, Stanford University, 1954, p. 15. Nivison's study will appear in symposium, Thought and Officialdom in China,

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expression of Communist morality..."[37]

This is the basic principle: utter subordination of the individual to the Party. But when we examine some of the personal qualities which the Communists want, we find them linked in many ways to Chinese tradition. The good Communist is "able to love others and hate others." (A phrase from the Analects of Confucius); that is, he never injures his comrades for his own benefit, but vigorously fights the enemies of the revolution. Towards his comrades his attitude is one of "genuineness and sympathy." (Analects) He does "nothing to others that he would not have done to himself." (Analects) He "grives before all the rest of the world grieves and is happy only after all the rest of the world is happy." (Buddhist ideal of the Bodhisattva-savior, adapted by an eleventh century Confucian thinker.) He "has no individual apprehensions or private desires to obscure and pervert his investigation of things and understanding of true principles," (a restatement of the late Confucian view of purity of mind as being necessary for true knowledge.)[38]

Univ. of Chicago Press, early in 1956.

[37] Liu Shao-ch'i "On the Training of the Communist Party Member," in Compton, op.cit., p. 110. Nivison, op.cit., p. 18, points out that this prescription is close to the classic descriptions of the traditional virtue of chung -- absolute loyalty to superiors.

[38] These characterizations are all from authoritative treatise by Liu Shao-ch'i, ibid., translated in Compton, op.cit., pp.108-55. Traditional sources are identified by Nivision, op.cit., pp. 19-20.

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599 To attain these and other "good" qualities, the Communist, like his Confucian ancestors, is to pattern his character after approved models and to subject himself to intensive self-cultivation. In traditional China, the models of character and behavior found in the classics and histories were to be studied and followed by individuals who manifested a particular virtue, filial piety, for example, were required reading. Now the Communists set up Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao as personal models; everyone is capable of attaining the great qualities of these revolutionary geniuses if he tries.[39] Even selected heroes from China's "feudal past" are recommended as models.[40] Such models are presented in fiction, in textbooks, in newspapers, and young and old are urged to emulate these heroes. In addition, "model" workers, farmers, soldiers are feted and publicized, and their pictures and idealized biographies appear in all propaganda media.

Self-cultivation consists of being unremittingly conscious of one's faults and of Communist ideals, of being ever alert, in study and action, to the recrudescence of "bad" attitudes which are the residue of one's pre-Communist education. Liu Shao-ch'i stresses the development of consciousness in the individual; through consciousness one is free from the determining forces of

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39. Liu Shao ch'i, op.cit., quoted in Nivison, p. 16.

40. Ch'en Sang, "Tang-hsing Yu Ssu Cheng-huo," [Party Nature and Private Life] , in Lun Tang Yu Ko-jen [On the Party and the Individual] by Ch'en Po-ta and others, Hong Kong reprint, 1948, p. 3, cited in Nivison, op.cit., p. 76, note 16.

183 577 history and environment and becomes capable of working creatively for the aims of the new society. This emphasis on consciousness is connected with both traditional ethics and Soviet psychology. On the one hand, it has "an obvious affinity to the Neo-Confucian notion of cultivation as freeing the individual from the tyranny of blind habit and unconscious selfish motivations."[41] On the other, it reflects the recent development of Soviet psychology; from an earlier denunciation of consciousness as "smacking of bourgeois idealism" the Russians have come to the view that "consciousness is a central process in making man capable of forging his own destinies."[42]

The list of bad qualities denounced by Communism is long; liberalism, formalism, bureaucratism, opportunism, and a dozen others are being continually denounced. How does one rid onself of these vices? The following formula, here used against the vice of individualism, is typical:

> "The methods transmitted by the ancients for raising oneself out of the vulgar state and entering sagehood, becoming a Buddha or a Taoist spirit, all required one to go through a long period of discipline. If we want to shed the early form of individualism and acquire a spiritual form of collectivism, we must cultivate and discipline ourselves over and over; ...we should continually ask ourselves this question: 'Am I or am I not still guilty of individualism?' If we have a thought, utter a sentence, walk a step or do a thing, we should listen for

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41. Cf. Nivison, op.cit., p. 15.
42. [next page]

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the response of others [the group]: this is -- or is not -- individualism."[43] 183 577

The last sentence quoted above introduces the notion of group criticism and group pressure, which is the universal Communist device for fostering approved behavior and eliminating the disapproved. Members of Party organizations, professions, government bureaus, and all other groups meet continually for criticism and self-criticism, and this whole process reaches the population through the publication of confessions and criticism in the mass media. The study meetings, popularly called "struggle meetings," are characterized by an atmosphere of tension and fear. Confessions of deviation or defect are made by individuals and analyzed or "exposed" by the group; criticisms are leveled at individuals and promises of reform are exacted.[44] This appears to be a device of deadly effectiveness for making individuals conform to the new Communist standards for thought and behavior.

B. Time, Change, and Causation

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In traditional China, time and change were

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42. Cf. Raymond Bauer, The New Man in Soviet Psychology, Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1952, p. 164 and passim. The quotations are from Jerome Bruner's foreword to this volume, xxii.

43. Lun Tang Yu Ko-jen [On the Party and the Individual], cited in Nivison, op.cit., pp.45-46, and note 66.

829 regarded as cyclical. Out of their careful adjustment to the seasonal and recurrent rhythms of Nature, Chinese-farmer-thinkers developed a notion of time and change which they applied to the course of individual lives, to changes in political life, to history as a whole. In the life of man, old age was not seen as the end of the line, but as a return to childhood; not in the sense of "second childhood," but as having come full round from the freedom of childhood to the freedom of old age. In political thinking at all levels a notion of the cycle is present. Dynasties, like men and animals, were regarded as having a natural life, from birth, through growth, to maturity, senescence, and death; these phases differed in length but the cycle was never broken. Integration and disintegration followed one another as day followed night. The opening line of the most widely read Chinese classic novel states this prevailing belief: "When empire has long been divided, it will invariably be unified; when it has long been unified, it will invariably be divided."[45]

The Communists seek to extirpate this age-old attitude and substitute for it the modern western idea of straight-line progress. For them the future is not to be a return to the past but the attainment, through protracted struggle, of a Communist world utopia. Textbook Party handbooks, and all other media insist on this new and revolutionary idea of time and change. This dynamic straight - line change

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[45] San-kuo Chih Yen-i [The Romance of the Three Kingdoms], translated by Prewitt-Taylor.

829 is typically and authoritatively expressed by Liu Shao-ch'i:

> "It is in the course of the long struggle of men as social beings against nature, that men's physical forms..., their social relations, their forms of social organization as well as their brains, ideology, etc., are all continuously being changed and improved...."[46]

The traditional Chinese view of causation was related to their views of time and change. Sequences of events were seen to have a certain regularity, but not that of cause and effect. Night follows day -- but day is not the cause of night.[47] Through education one learned how to identify situations and to know the sorts of things that might happen. One learned to place oneself advantageously in a sequence of situations. The Communists seek to replace this older view with the Marxist idea of causation. A student is to learn the Marxist laws of social development, that certain causes always bring certain effects, and that when one has mastered the laws of causation, one can really participate in bringing about the desired and inevitable results.

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[46] Liu Shao-ch'i, "On the Training of the Communist Party Member." For this passage, cf. Current Background, No.   , p. 3.

[47] Bunzel-Weakland, p. 31.

829 The Communist effort to replace the old attitudes toward time, change, and causation with new ones has tremendous implications. It seeks to destroy any tinge of fatalism, any inclination toward resignation, and to foster in the individual a restless search for the goals set by the Party.

C. Work and Leisure

461 In traditional China, leisure was seen as a time for replenishment of bodily and psychic energy; leisure was necessary if one were not to suffer depletion of vital forces.[48] Abundant leisure was also important evidence of membership in the favored social class. In Communist China, work and vigorous activity are given a high value; hard work and ceaseless struggle are characteristic of all the "models" held up before the people in all the propaganda media. The ceaseless activity of the top leaders is meant to set a pattern for those who follow them. Leisure as a contemplative bodily replenishment is devaluated, and active sports which develop competitive spirit are being promoted. Leisure as a mark of high status has disappeared.

D. Authority and the Individual

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829 The father's relation to his sons was the model for the exercise of authority in traditional China. Ideally, the father was to be firm and aloof, seeing to it rather impersonally that his children were well cared for and given proper instruction.

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[48] Ibid., pp. 37-40.

156 809 The son was to submit unquestioningly to his father's will at all times. He had no independence of judgment or action until after his father's death. The son's loyalty and devotion were also to show themselves in providing for the father's comfort in old age, in arranging a proper funeral and burial, and in periodic offerings to his father's tablet in the ancestral hall of the family.

In the political sphere the emperor was the "father" of his people, and the key local magistrates of the imperial bureaucracy were often referred to as the "Fathers and Mothers of the People." To reciprocate the care and concern of those in authority, the people were to provide material support through taxes and labor; they were to serve their masters loyally and submissively; they were to obey the rules which custom (personalized as the wise rulers of the past) and the laws laid down for them. And in those laws the heaviest punishments were decreed for those who showed unfilial behavior in the family, or, in its political counterpart, rebellion against the state.[49]

These were the patterns of authority to which the individual was subject. His personality

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[49] The Classic of Filial Piety says: "Of the 3,000 crimes punishable by the five punishments, none is greater than unfiliality." (i.e., failure to submit to authority.) For a discussion, cf. Etienne Balazs, Le Traite Juridique de Souei-chou, Paris, 1954, p. 144.

156 829 was formed within the family; his status in society was determined by his family's status. To understand the individual of traditional China, we must see him within this setting; to understand the changes being wrought by the Communists, we must take into account some of the tensions and dissatisfactions which the family system -- particularly in its period of decay -- set up in the individual.

The role of the individual was determined by his position in the family, and he was taught to fill that particular role. For example, an older brother was responsible for his younger brother, and was taught to be nice in play to those younger in years. The younger sons were expected to be less sober and responsible; their mothers often spoiled them. Throughout all the complex relations of the family, roles were assigned and the individual's life and character were formed by the role he played. Freedom of choice and freedom to develop individuality were thus rigidly limited.[50]

The well-being of the family group was the individual's prime concern. He was committed to work which would assure the family's prosperity; he was obliged to protect the family's reputation, for example, by paying off the gambling debts of a family member rather than have the family disgraced; to continue to live in a tense and unhappy household rather than to break away and thereby weaken the family's solidarity.

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50. Bunzel-Weakland, pp. 47-64.

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829 In exchange for his submission to authority and discipline in every phase of his personal life, the individual was given the basic necessities of life and the help of the family's influence in obtaining jobs, and in obtaining a bridge, etc. Nepotism was sanctioned by the classics, and family members benefited when one of them rose to wealth or power.

The only social relationship which an individual could enjoy with less family interference was friendship, which was the most cherished thing in life. Many a Chinese poet has dealt with this theme. Popular novels and dramas have treated it with vividness and force. Friendship has the overtones of the elder-brother, younger-brother relationship. As John Weakland has observed, this type of relationship between individuals, self-elected, with virtual equality between the participants, is a refuge from the father-dominated, rigid hierarchy of the family.[51]

The two patterns -- paternal domination and fraternal association -- are reflected in political life. Established governmental authority is of the paternal type; everyone is subject to the will of the emperor-father. But dissident movements are organized on the basis of the brotherly friendship pattern; the romantic rebels of Chinese novels, the organization of bandit gangs, the leadership of rebel armies are all bound together by ties of friendship and blood brotherhood.

When the old social order began to break up under the impact of modern forces, the family

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51. Ibid., pp. 137-47.

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system was undermined and began slowly to disintegrate. Chinese critics held that the old family stifled individuality, prevented the development of individual initiative vital to modern China, and that it was a breeding ground for authoritarianism, hindering the development of democratic citizenship. They also felt that a new kind of individual was needed, and that the family system prevented its birth.[52]

The Communists are developing a new image of the individual and a new relationship between the individual and authority; doing this they are using certain of the old family ideas and, capitalizing on dissatisfaction with the old family system, they are releasing the individual from his bonds and pushing him into a new system of human relations.

The Communists have paid particular attention to the groups which suffered most under the old family: women, particularly younger women, such as daughters-in-law, and adolescents. Bitter denunciations of the tyranny of the old family system by dramatizing its inequities, insistence on the individual's loyalty to the Party rather than to the family -- all these are being resorted to in order to create new individuals suited to the needs of a Communist society. In Communist literature this new type of individual, free of the family and its "feudal" relationships, is presented as having boundless opportunities for self-development. Stories

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[52] Cf. Theodore Chen, "New China, New Texts," Current History, No. 19, 1950, p. 325.

156 829 of young "heroes" who have broken away -- sometimes denouncing their "reactionary" fathers -- and gone on to make striking contributions to state and society are glorified in almost every publication.

"Comradeship," the brother-friend type of relationship, is strongly emphasized in Party and other organizations. During the long years of their suppression, the Communist leadership was bound together by "comradeship," which is continually romanticized and extolled in textbooks and other writings. This pattern of human relationships is built on an age-old Chinese ideal and is most attractive to those who suffered most under the old family system. It is used to encourage co-operation between individuals in a common task. In the textbooks it is fostered by moral tales -- a pail of water is too heavy for Little Brother and too heavy for Big Brother, but it is easily carried by the two; a lone tree is easily shaken by the wind, but many trees standing together can withstand a heavy wind.[53]

The brotherhood-friendship pattern among top Communist leadership has subtly shifted, and Mao and the Party have begun to exercise paternal authority over subordinates, and the people as a whole. Mao has taken on many of the attributes of the supreme patriarchal emperors of old; his paternal guidance is praised in these lines from an officially published song:

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[53] *Ibid.*

The great leader is like a father,
Mao Tse-tung educates us.....[54]

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Another praises his eternal care for his people:

In loving care for the people
He surpasses that of their own
fathers and mothers.[55]

And, in a children's song, his paternal care and affection are invoked while he is likened to the pole star -- one of the old symbols of the emperor's supremacy:

The northern pole star in the sky --
In China, Mao Tse-tung --
Saving Mankind,
Loving little children.
He'll destroy Chiang's dirty rats.[56]

As Mao takes on more and more attributes of the father, the Party and the state take over both the functions and the emotional focus once supplied by the family. A labor heroine is described as

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[54] From a song in Chieh-fang Ko-sheng [Liberation songs] , No. 2, 1949, p. 9.

[55] From a song in K'ang-mei Yuan-ch'ao Hsiao-t'iao chi [A Collection of Resist-America-Aid-Korea Songs] , Wu-han t'ung-su ch'u pan-she, Wukan, 1951, p. 60.

[56] From a song in Nung-ts'un Ko-yao Hsüan-chi [A Song Collection of Rural Themes], Hsin-hua ch'u-pan-she, 1950, p. 24.

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"a good daughter of the Party."[57] A song says

Our great fatherland --
We should pay it the same filial reverence,
As we would show to our mothers.[58]

These quotations suggest the reorientation of loyalties away from the family, but note that the terms and images used are those of the family system itself -- a typical example of the Communist use of the old order to destroy the old order. The functions of the traditional extended family are divided among the Party, the state, and the new type conjugal family. The individual, not the family, now chooses his mate -- often with "advice from Party comrades," and the state, not the family, sanctions the match.[59] The child is taught to rely on himself rather than on his relatives, and state nurseries take over, for many parents, the function of child care.[60] In illness

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[57] Cf. Jen-min Hua-pao [People's Pictorial], Vol. 2, No. 2, 1951.

[58] In Ch'ang-chiang Ko-sheng [Yangtze Songs], No. 7, Hsin-hua ch'u-pan she, Wuhan Branch, Wuhan, 1950, p. 15.

[59] Cf. Lindbeck, op.cit., pp. 140-41.

[60] The poem "Wen Pao-pao ["Ask Baby"] appeared in lower primary grade textbook in 1950. It has baby asking for various members of the family to carry him. But each member is busy at a separate task: hoeing grain, tending a machine, writing speeches, etc., and baby ends by saying, "Everybody has something to do. I'd rather walk alone by holding onto a wall." Translated in Weakland-Bunzel, Appendix B.

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one looks to state and Party health agencies, but responsibility for the care of the aged devolves upon the children of the conjugal family.[61] The family's function as an administrative unit for mutual surveillance and responsibility is now eliminated, and each citizen is responsible to the state. Family connections are no longer a means of getting jobs; they are assigned to individuals by state and Party organizations. In this way the Communists undermine what is left of the old family and strike at the age-old evil of nepotism.

Yet, with the shattering of the old family and the assumption of its functions by the state, the individual is still urged by the leadership to work in a disciplined and co-operative way for the larger social group. The following prescription for individual behavior recalls the formulas for the activity of good members of the traditional family.

> Citizens of the People's Republic are expected to engage in labor and productive activities and to place the common good above personal benefit. They must learn to be helpful and co-operative. They must work hard and submit willingly to the discipline of group life. They must always be ready to learn to accept criticism for the purpose of improvement.[62]

It would appear, then, that the Communist government tries to adapt both patterns of individual-group relationship to its purposes. On the one hand it encourage the equal co-operation pattern

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[61. and 62. on following page]

156 829 associated with the old image of brotherhood and friendship. On the other hand it increasingly subjects each individual to a type of authority that is reminiscent of the old all-powerful father of the family. For certain types of work, for example, team projects carried on by Party cadres, the former may be encouraged as the efficient pattern. But for the masses of the population, submission of the individual to group is the ordained pattern.

E. *Face*

554 In traditional China, "face" meant one's moral reputation (lien) and one's accumulated moral and material prestige in the eyes of the community (*mien-tzu*). One's *lien*, or moral reputation, was solidified by adherence to the ethnical forms of society in all human dealings . One's *mien-tzu* could be increased by making important contacts, by acts of conspicuous generosity; but this could be done only *within* the rôle which society

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61. Cf. *Survey of China Mainland Press*, No. 973, Jan. 21, 1955, pp. 31-32; "...when parents are counterrevolutionaries, the child should treat them as enemies."

62. Cf . Theodore Chen, *op.cit.*, p. 324, and Weakland-Bunzel, pp. 153-54.

63. Cf. Hsien-chin Hu, "The Chinese Concepts of Face," American Anthropologist, Vol. 46, (1944), pp. 45-64. The word *lien* is more current in North China than in the Yangtze Valley and the south. In the lower Yangtze Valley, according to Miss Hu (p. 46, note 5), *mien-k'ung* is used for *lien* .

55 assigned to the individual. To "get above oneself" in a play for prestige was actually "to lose face" (tiu mien-tzu). The widespread use of go-betweens in business, marriages, and political negotiations was a device for insuring that, in the event of failure, neither principal would "lose face." Consideration for the "face" of others was highly regarded, and, in actual behavior, care for one's own and others' "face," particularly of one's family, was conducive to the surface harmony of Chinese social relations.

Modern Chinese critics have argued that this harmony was too dearly bought, that individual concern for "face," intensified by community pressure, stifled by individual initiative and made creative people into timid conformists who sacrificed all for the preservation of superficial prestige in the community. This, they held, worked against China's successful adjustment to the modern world.

The Communists have built on this sort of criticism and dissatisfaction and, in seeking to release individual energies for the purposes of the Communist state, have made a frontal attack on the notion of "face." Mao sarcastically describes the attitude they seek to destroy: "Failing to start an argument in principle with a person, even when you know he is in the wrong, letting things slide for the sake of peace and cordiality, all because he is an old friend, a fellow villager, a fellow student, a close friend, someone beloved, an old colleague, or an old subordinate. Or failing to make any clear decision, speaking about [the error] in allusions in order to preserve harmony and unity...."[64]

The Communists single out for public recognition individuals who have ruthlessly battered their way toward one of the Communist goals with utter disregard for "face, their own or others." They praise children who have denounced their father, which, in older China, would have been condemned as utter destruction of the family's "face." Communist writings indicate that the older attitudes have been hard to overcome. Liu Shao-ch'i is fulminating against them when he says: "Any idea of trying to avoid inner-Party struggle, or of refraining from criticizing others' mistakes so that they will not criticize one's own errors, is utterly wrong."[65] Obviously the universal "struggle meetings" for personal criticism and self-criticism in the presence of the group are destructive of the old feeling for "face." Indeed, the leadership may regard them as one of the principal devices for the complete elimination of this traditional attitude.

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[64] Mao Tse-tung, "In Opposition to Liberalism," written in 1937, translation in Compton, op.cit., pp. 184-85.

[65] Liu Shao-ch'i, "On Inner-Party Struggle," Current Background, No. 105, Aug. 5, 1951, p. 5.

Annex "A," Subparagraph li,
Sociological Background

INTELLECTUAL AND ARTISTIC EXPRESSION

53 Intellectual and artistic expression is interpreted in this chapter to mean the communication of ideas and ideals through creative and academic writing, painting, the plastic arts, dancing, and music.

The Chinese written language is the vehicle for official business and creative expression in all parts of China. Therefore the bulk of the creative and academic writing of the North China Region does not differ from that produced in China as a whole. Because Peking has been the national capital of China (except from 1927-49), North China is usually considered representative of China in cultural aspects. The new literary movement was also originated in Peking. This identification of the bulk of the creative and academic writings of the North China Region with that of the Chinese nation is particularly true today when the nation is ruled by an authoritarian and centralized government and when all cultural innovations emanate from Peking.

The Chinese, especially the Chinese Communists, often speak of literature and the arts as one. In the Communists' policy statements, what pertains to literature also pertains

53 to the arts. Therefore, as far as the theory and policy of the arts are concerned, no separate treatment is necessary.

No attempt is made in this chapter to describe the propaganda and information machine of the Chinese Communists in which literature and art are made to play their part. For this, consult the chapters on propaganda and information in this handbook.

I. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LITERARY ACTIVITIES IN COMMUNIST CHINA

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668 The reform of literature and art (wen-i cheng-feng) at Yenan in 1942[1] made the practice of literature and art in the Liberated Areas overt political activities; the application of the same line to the entire country in 1949 subjugated all writers and artists in the nation to the service

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[1] Mao Tse-tung's speeches at the Party School in Yenan in February and at the Yenan Literary and Art Circles' meeting in May 1942 established the "line" of literature and art which had been endorsed by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and which has since been upheld as the creed of writers and artists in Communist China. The general tenor of the speeches was that literary and art workers at Yenan, being undeniably "revolutionaries by choice," should stop the hitherto blind imitation of alien and imported

53 of the state. Control and regimentation of
668 thought in literature and art became more systematic as the Communists consolidated their power, the victor being the arbiter of artistic "truth." In general, the control over writers, artists, and their work takes three forms, as was true in the Liberated Areas after the 1942 reform: (1) the organization of writers and artists under government auspices; (2) the identification of the duties of the writers and artists with the implementation of government policy; and (3) the unceasing use of literary and

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prototypes and the singing of abstract, contentless tunes which had nothing to do with the revolution and which could not possibly be understood by the peasant-worker-soldier masses. In their place, fresh and lively revolutionary themes in the Chinese style would be appreciated by the masses. Although in principle Mao believed that Chinese literature and art should benefit from masterpieces of other cultures, especially those produced in the Soviet Union, in no instance would he allow the separation of Chinese literature and art from immediate revolutionary tasks; and on this basis, he puts the popularization of literature and art ahead of sophistication. See Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1953, Vol. 3, pp. 833-900.

53 art criticism to keep writers and artists in line.
668 Now, however, the scope is national.

538 A. The All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles

In July 1949, before the establishment of the Central People's Government, writers and artists from various parts of China were "invited" to Peking where the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles was organized to co-ordinate the activities of a number of the nationwide organizations in specific cultural fields, such as literature, art, music, and the cinema; it was to follow the line laid down by Mao Tse-tung in 1942. Theoretically, the federation is not a government body, but it sent delegates to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in September 1949, as did Communist-sponsored political factions and mass organizations. The chairman and vice-chairman of the federation were given posts in the Communist government.

At the organizational meeting in July, Chou En-lai told the gathered writers and artists that they were the representatives of 70,000 literary and art workers in China, of which 30,000 were in the People's Liberation Army, another 30,000 scattered in the old Liberated Areas, and the remaining 10,000 were in areas recently liberated from the Kuomintang. From Chou's statement it is obvious that he identified as writers and artists Party propaganda personnel and those workers

538 engaged in raising the standard of literacy.[2] It is doubtful that the majority of these 70,000 so-called writers and artists had achieved high competence in intellectual and artistic expression. Two years later, the Communists' leading woman author, Ting Ling, was still complaining that as editor she had difficulty in finding passable manuscripts for her magazine.[3]

It is certain that the organization of these writers and artists put the politically dubious under the guidance and supervision of the politically reliable; and the organized state rendered the writers and artists collectively responsible and accountable for their part in the Communist cause. Furthermore, dominated as it was by veteran Communists, the organization embracing all China's well-known writers and artists served as a good Communist-style democratic front.

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[2] Chou En-lai, "Political Report at the Conference of the All-China Literary and Art Workers," (July 6, 1949), People's Literature, Peking, I, 3, Jan. 1, 1950, p. 17.

[3] Ting Miao, A General Analysis of Chinese Communist Literature and Art, Hong Kong, Ya-chou ch'u-pan-she, 1954, pp. 149-50.

B. The Task of the Writers

538 The literary subdivision of the federation was the All-China Association of Literary Workers, which, like the federation's other subdivisions, has its own professional magazine, People's Literature. In the first issue, published in October 1949, the six-fold task of the magazine was stated in part as follows:

1. to participate in the People's Liberation War and in the construction of the "New Democratic nation" through literary forms that are treasured by the people, with ideological content reflecting the growth of the new nation and praising the contribution of the masses in revolutionary struggles and productive activities;

2. to rid literature of imperialist influence, and to reform traditional literature; to accept what is good in foreign literary and artistic endeavor;

3. to guide the masses in factories, villages, and in the ranks in their literary study, and to help increase their "literary strength;"

4. to develop literatures of the ethnic minorities;

5. to study revolutionary theory, and to organize groups for the study and discussion of the new literary productions and the formulation

of a "scientific" theory of literary criticism;

6. to promote interflow of literature and art among nations; to develop patriotism and internationalism; and to participate in the struggle for peace led by the USSR.[4]

Before the writers of the association had time to demonstrate their ability to implement these policies by fulfilling pledges to turn out so many pieces of work in a stipulated period of time, the conflict in Korea began.

The war was utilized by the Party as a schooling ground for class education and was depicted as a panorama of international class struggle. On this pretext writers were sent to the front to learn about "reality" in order to delineate the struggle of/the hero of the day and to draw the moral of his time. They were expected to make the most of their experience, not only by reporting immediate events but also by recording their impressions in notes which would later serve as material for more lengthy literary works. With the exception of Pa Chin's Living Among the Heroes, Wei Wei's Who are the Most Lovable People? Lu Chu-kuo's Shang

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[4] People's Literature, I, 1, Oct. 25, 1949, p. 13. The content of this declaration reads very much like the constitution of the Union of the Soviet Writers in the USSR.

538kan Mountain, Yang Shuo's Three Thousand-li Territory and a few others which are readable and maintain certain literary standards, other writings based upon the authors' experience on the Korean war front do not show maturity even in the handling of the Chinese language. However, the Chinese Communists claimed that these second-rate writings adequately expressed the Chinese Volunteers' patriotism and Communist internationalism.

In the Korean endeavor the Communists departed from one of their most boasted practices. Throughout the war against Japan and the "war of liberation" against the Kuomintang, Chinese soldiers were encouraged to write, and writings from the ranks were hailed and widely publicized. But professional writers were sent to Korea, probably to stimulate a more skillful literary dramatization of the Communist cause.

However, the Korean front was not the only place where writers were to learn about "reality" and to dramatize the "cause of the people." While the war was going on, Ai Wu, Ts'ao Yü, the noted playwright, and other writers were sent to factories; Ho Ching-chih, author of the celebrated The White-haired Girl, was sent to study life in the villages; Ting Hsi-lin, Liu Ch'ing, Li Tzu-hua, Mu Yeh, and a host of other veteran motion picture producers and directors were sent to Shanghai to partic-

538 ipate in the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns.[5]

But these writers were not to record life as they observed it. Before they left for their "life schools," they had to undergo some "training." One can imagine the situation: writers of the calibre of Pa Chin and Ts'ao Yü learning from the speeches of Lu Ting-i and Ch'en Po-ta, the two propaganda chiefs of the regime, "how to describe people, how to abstract living reality and exercise care in collecting material, how to portray and praise, and above all, how to avoid making mistakes." It would appear that the Communists were so eager to prove the righteousness of their actions that they carefully arranged that "history" be recorded exactly in the way they wished it to seem.

Judging from the extent to which the land reform turned the rural social and political order upside-down, the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns destroyed the bourgeois stronghold in the national economy, and the way in which the war in Korea affected the national life, one might expect that those writers who had been given the opportunity to witness these momentous events would accomplish literary feats of equal magnitude. On the contrary, one finds, with only rare exceptions, "formula"

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[5] See the chapter on Subversive Potentialities in this handbook for the content and impact of the campaigns.

538 stories which have all the correct political ingredients demanded of them but which lack originality and attempt at characterization. One story of land reform reads much like another, the only difference being the names given the heroes and some few idiosyncracies of the writers in the use of colloquial expressions and political jargon. The necessary adherence to the prescribed political formula has blighted creativeness.

C. Literary Criticism

What has contributed most to this fear of originality in literature is the influence of officially organized and directed literary criticism, which uses Communist literary theories to coerce and browbeat the writers. The disparity in the respect given critical and creative forces has stunted the young Communist literature and precluded a normal growth.

Outstanding instances of the enervating affect of Communist criticism are the reviews of the play, "The Song of the Red Flags," and the Story, "Old Worker Ku Fu-shan." The play, concerning shock-teams in a production drive, was initially praised by the Communists themselves; later, it was criticized because "it did not give a strong portrayal of the trade union and the party." According to the critics, the author should have used the play to strengthen the prestige of the trade union among the worker-

538 audiences as well as to emphasize the "heroic" qualities of the leading protagonist, a Communist cadre. The portrayal of the Party cadre P'eng Kang in the play was deemed incorrect, "for the Party's leadership is invariably collective, but in the play, P'eng seems to be quite alone." The play was thus rated "of low educational value." The author of the story, "Old Worker Ku Fu-shan," was reprimanded because he "not only distorts the image of a model Party member but also completely ignores the function of Party training and leadership."

546 The classic example of Communist literary and artistic criticism involves the 1951 Shanghai-produced film, "Wu Hsün Chuan," based on the life story of a famous advocate of free education who lived in Shantung Province. Wu Hsün was born into a poor family and was thus deprived of formal education. In order to help children to attend schools, he dedicated himself to hard work and frugal living; and by shrewd investment of his savings, he succeeded in accumulating funds for the education of the poor. Wu Hsün's contribution to Chinese education was never questioned until the Communist critics attacked the film. Wu's effort for the kind of education prevalent at his time, according to the Communist critics, only strengthened the feudal order and arrested the forces of progress; rather than serving as an "accomplice" of the Manchu ruling order, the critics said, Wu should have joined the revolutionary

546 force, i.e., the T$_a$iping revolutionaries. Furthermore, they said, Wu Hsün's means of accumulating wealth was indicative of his subservience to the rich and of his exploitation of the poor.[6]

The evolution of criticism of the film "Wu Hsün Chuan" is illustrative of the nature of Communist literary and artistic criticism. Adverse opinions toward the film were not initiated by literary and art circles, but by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. In fact, the film was till then very enthusiastically received, even by many eminent Communists. On May 20, 1951, the Peking People's Daily, an organ of the Central Committee of the Party, published an editorial alluding to this state of affairs. "Some comrades say that they have already mastered Marxism, but when confronted with concrete issues, they completely lose their critical sense." The "Party Life" column of the same issue ordered all Communists to join in criticism of "Wu Hsün Chuan." On June 4, a directive of the Ministry of Education of the People's Government, published in the People's Daily, instructed all the educational personnel in the nation to carry out discussions of the film. On August 4, the final and definitive verdict on the film was delivered by Chou Yang, the Vice-minister of Cultural Affairs of the Communist Government. He labeled the film as unrealistic

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[6] Ai Ch'ing, "Oppose the Slave Ideology of Wu Hsün," People's Literature, VI, 2, June 1,1951, pp. 9-10.

546 art and a product of anti-historical and anti-popular ideology.[7] Party organs in all parts of China where "Wu Hsün Chuan" had been shown used the film as a target for ideological propaganda. The ideology of the film was also discussed at the third session of the first National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which met from October 23 to November 1, 1951. Members of the All-China Federation of the Literary and Art Circles began to echo the view of the Central Committee of the Party and confessed that, while they had made definite progress in the past two years, nevertheless they always fell behind the development of Chinese society. This confession led the writers to "plunge" into study in an effort to "remold their ideology and to sharpen their critical senses."

538 This conflict between critical and creative forces also manifests itself in the bulk of the incongruous writings of the literary critics in Communist China. The critics has ready an abundance of clichés, jargon, and theories of socialist realism, but they are clearly ill-digested and are used with little discrimination or literary skill. Quotations from Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Gorky, Zhadanov are frequent but are

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7. Current Background, Hong Kong, Amercian Consulate General, No. 113, Sept. 1, 1951.

not integrated into the theme of the text. Even Communist critics have noted that many quotations from orthodox Marxist texts are either irrelevant or superfluous.[8] This excessive verbalism at the expense of content makes literary criticism irreconcilable with the alleged theory of its essentially didactic function. Much criticism is lukewarm and stereotyped, written by writers who are called upon by the Communists to undertake the task of attacking their fellow writers. In this case, what is criticized is invariably the "petty bourgeois standpoint." The exception to the rule is Mao Tse-tung himself, who, from his position of absolute authority, can write criticism which is non-imitative, forceful, and pointed, even by the standards of the free world. Top Communists, like Liu Shao-ch'i, for example, who seem to be more confident in translating Marxism into practice, do not quote from orthodox texts as often or use as many clichés as the lesser Communists.

Since 1949, Chinese Communist literature appears to have concentrated on a number of well-defined themes. It has been most concerned with the individual under the Communist system and the problem confronting him. These have included the social confusion of the New Democratic Period, the doubts of the intellectuals,

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[8] Shen Chu-chung, "The Popularization of Theoretical Criticism of Literature and Art," People's Literature, No. 9, July 1, 1950, pp. 27-28.

538 the "criminal activities of the bourgeois merchants, and the lackeys of the imperialists," the rise of the industrial hero, the struggle against the "enemy of the people," and the appearance of human types based on the newly created Communist "tradition." Even the "return to history" is oriented for the solution of certain present-day problems.[9] Patriotism,

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[9] Writers are told to find evidence in history of the excellent qualities of the Chinese people, and to appreciate and to learn the beautiful styles in Chinese literary heritage. For instance, the poet Li Po (A.D. 701-762) who was an incorrigible individualist, can now be safely described as a "great patriot," for Li Po could not have written such beautiful verses about the magnificent rivers and mountains of his fatherland had he not been very patriotic." His many lyric poems which sang praises of the bright moon are now interpreted to mean his longing for a "cleaner" world, and therefore indicate his personal integrity; his mild protests against the conditions of his time are now interpreted as signs of his progressive spirit. Wang Yao, Li Po, Shanghai, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1955. Ch'ü Yüan, the poet-statesman of the Kingdom of Ch'u in the Chan-kuo period (481-221 B.C.), is lauded for his "patriotism and sympathy for the common people." Kuo Mo-jo, "A Brief Account on Ch'ü Yüan," People's Literature, No. 44, 1953. Emperors like Han

538 aestheticism, and naturalism are all good literary themes, provided they are imbued with the spirit of "socialist realism," which is belief in the inevitability of the development of socialism.

Since 1949 China's best writers have not produced any first-rate work. If there happen to be interesting writings that suit the taste of the reader, they do not fit into the theoretical scheme of the Party. Hsiao Yen-mu's short story "Between Us, Husband and Wife," for instance, was criticized as "employing the

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Kao-tsu and T'ang T'ai-tsung, who increased the national territory and the prestige of the Chinese people, are now praised as heroic. This salvaging of historical characters and literature for Communist posterity could be a sign of a felt need. There are reports that since the Party came to the cities it has been neglecting to supply enough reading material for the people in the old Liberated Areas, and the people have gone back to the old novels. In order that these people may not be "poisoned" by the "feudalistic ideas" in the old novels, the re-interpretation of the characters in old novels according to dialectical materialism seems far more necessary than the writing of novels of comparable stature.

intellectual's viewpoint and taste to distort the image of the working masses and to vulgarize things political."

Some writers are unable to find publishers for their work, not because the work is counter-revolutionary but because its theme is considered untimely. In 1952, Miao Yen-hsiu was advised not to publish his Miao-shan Feng-kuang, a long poem about freedom of love and marriage in Miao communities, because the Communists did not think a celebration of the equality of the sexes useful to the Communist revolution at that time.

Romantic novels of love and sophisticated novels of human relationships are not published. When love does come into the scene, it is shown as subsidiary to other, more "worthy" and "unselfish" problems (i.e., problems social and political).

Although the writer may desire to let human relationships play a decisive part in the development of his material, there is a tendency to utilize abstract characters rather than vivid personalities. Most of the writers who choose to deal with the exposure of corruption and the excesses and tyranny of established institutions are more adept at portraying "negative" personalities than creating "positive" personalities in keeping with the Communists' view of the "heroes" of the new regime. This is true, 538 despite the fact that Communist leaders have repeatedly told the writers "to give the most important position in the plot to the affirmative man," and that "in no case should evil be vividly presented, lest virtue remain an abstraction," for it is now the writers' task to describe the bright possibilities of life under Communist leadership.

The recent development of literature in China seems to parallel that of Russia and praise of industrial and agricultural heroes follows the pattern of Soviet literature. The influence of the war in Korea upon literature in China is comparable to the influence of World War II upon Russian literature. Now that we hear of the "thaw" in Russian literature,[10] can we anticipate a similar development in China? Hu Feng's attempt to liberate literature from the shackle of politics,[11] although it ended in failure and personal disgrace, indicates, nevertheless, conscious recognition by a group of writers of the freedom necessary for the creation of works of art.[12] Only general discussion of minor ways to improve literature has been undertaken

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[10] Walter Z. Laqueur, "Russia in Flux, I. The 'Thaw' and After," Encounter, London, Oct. 1955, p. 35.

[11] Hu Feng is a well-known Communist writer and was the protégé of the Communists' "literary saint" Lu Hsün.

[12] Laqueur, op. cit., p. 35.

538 by leading authors like Mao Tun and Ai Ch'ing, and all discussions are prefaced by fervent dedications to the Marxist-Leninist world outlook. While the parallel we draw of the development of literature in the two countries may aid in the understanding of certain similarities, the parallel is not complete. If we compare the contents of the first six issues of People's Literature (Oct. 1949 to April 1950) with the six issues published in the first six months of 1955, we find a noticeable change: the percentage of creative writing by Chinese has increased, and the percentage of works translated from the Russian has decreased. Among the translated works, the percentage from Soviet Russia is smaller than it was, and there is now a sampling of literature from non-Communist sources, including, surprisingly enough, the tales of Hans Christian Andersen.

II. THE GENRES OF LITERATURE

A. Translations from Russian Literature

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177 Translations from Russian literature are included in this section because of the influence they have had on Chinese intellectuals.

According to a survey made in 1937 in twenty-one Chinese universities and eight high schools, foreign literature, particularly Russian, English, and American, had an important place in the intellectual life of contemporary

538 youth in China. Gorky was mentioned oftener
177 than any other foreign author. Other favored Russian authors included Tolstoy and Turgeniev.[13] This popularity of Russian literature seems remarkable in view of the fact that between 1927 and 1949 there were no Russian schools in China and almost no Russian was taught. Of course many works of Russian literature were translated into Chinese.

The success of Russian literature in China stems from the appreciation of the problems confronting Russian and Chinese society: the conflict of generations, new sexual ethics, the struggle for sexual equality, the struggle between the doctrine of "non-resistance" and a revolutionary attitude toward life. Sympathy with the Russian revolution has also played a part.[14]

Translations of post-1917 Russian writings such as Krymov's Tanker Derbent (1939), Ostrovsky's How Steel was tempered (1937), Simonov's Days and Nights, a novel of Stalingrad, Scholokhov's And Quiet Flows the Don, and Virgin

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[13] Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1946, pp. 276, 363-64.

[14] Ibid., p. 276. O. Briere, Les tendances dominantes de la littérature Chinoise contemporaire, Bul. Univ. Aurore, Ser. III, Vol. IX, No. 35, July 1948, p. 251.

538 *Soil Upturned*, a novel about collective farming,
177 and Fadeyev's *The Young Guard* (1945) were read by secondary school and college students. These novels encouraged young intellectuals with a yearning for a "positive" life of action no less heroic, revolutionary, and romantic than that experienced by the heroes about which they read. These novels had an obvious influence on the radical movement among the students who defied the Kuomintang regime.

Today, Bassov, hero of Krymov's *Tanker Derbent*, and Korchagin, hero of Ostrovsky's *How Steel was Tempered*, are more familiar to the students than many of the characters in novels written by Chinese authors, most probably because the Chinese novels are poor imitations of Russian originals. Mayakovsky's poem "Lenin" is acclaimed by the Chinese Communists as a model of socialist realism, and Michael Prishvin's nature poetry is popular. Chinese translations of Ehrenburg's *Storm* and Nikolayava's *Harvest* are best-sellers.[15]

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15. "'Liberating' the Creative Impulse in China," *The Time Literary Supplement*, August 5, 1955, xlii. For the Chinese Communists' own estimation of the influence of Soviet literature on Chinese writing, see Pa Jen, *Look at the Soviet People through Soviet Literature*, Peking, Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien ch'u-pan-she, 1955.

538 177 811 Since the establishment of the Central People's Government, delegations of Russian authors have visited Peking and other important cities of China. Russian is now taught in Chinese schools as the foreign language. Under the Communist regime, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, which has branches throughout China, has contributed much in the promotion of popular appreciation of Russian culture.

B. Academic Writings

814 Academic writing under direction of the Chinese Communists seems to be concentrated upon the history of peasant rebellion during the last one hundred years, anthropological studies of the ethnic minorities in China, commentaries, political and philosophical, on texts by Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, and Liu Shao-ch'i, and archeology and pre-historic Chinese society.

In the field of modern Chinese history, the Chinese Historical Society[16] is most comprehensive in its program of research. It has sponsored the compilation of a series of documents on modern Chinese history. To date, the published volumes of the series include

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[16] The society is now called the Institute of Chinese History, a division of the Academy of Sciences at Peking.

84 Nien Chün, concerning the peasant rebellion in Kiangsu, Anhwei, Honan, and Shantung in the latter half of the nineteenth century; T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo, the Taiping Rebellion in the middle of the nineteenth century; the Hui Revolt, the revolt of the Hui people in the Northwest and in the Province of Yunnan in the Southwest in the nineteenth century; the Opium War (1839-1842); and The Hundred-Day Reform (1898). This series will include twelve collection of source materials, including works on the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the May Fourth Movement (1919).

The published volumes contain a wealth of source materials. In addition to assembling records kept by previous governments, the works bring together the memoirs of individuals concerned and documents which have lain undisturbed in county archives. However, one cannot find in these volumes any interpretations of or commentaries on the material gathered. In the prefaces to these published volumes it is stated that:

> "Counterrevolutionary forces always try their best to distort fact. Because they often suppress and destroy revolutionary literature, the latter is seldom preserved for posterity. Now research in past revolutionary events can only proceed from the records kept by the counterrevolutionaries. Therefore those who are going to use the

814 the material here assembled must be reminded that they should approach the matter with a viewpoint opposite to that advocated by the authors of the material."

So far no major historical treatises based on this material have been written. The first volume of Part I of Fan Wen-lan's Modern History of China (Harbin, Tung-pei shu-tien, 1948), which deals with the period 1840-1905, is the text on modern Chinese history; Fan's book was published before the Communists achieved national power. Other historians such as Ku Hsieh-kang, who at the beginning of the Communist rule in China expressed his gratitude to the Chinese Communist regime for enabling him to continue his research, have so far produced nothing.[17] Historians in China now prefer to annotate published works rather than write their own view of history, probably for fear that the whims of some Communist critics may someday put them in peril. As a result of the lack of new historical texts, history books written before 1949 are now being reprinted.

815 Of the academic people who have transferred their allegiance to the Communist regime, the anthropologists seem to be faring better than

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[17] The re-writing of history textbooks with a dialectic materialist viewpoint for primary and secondary schol students is not considered in this chapter. See the chapter on Education in this handbook.

815 others. Fei Hsiao-t'ung, author of Peasant Life in China (Lodon, 1939) and China's Gentry (Chicago, 1953), published his Revamping the Universities (Shanghai, Shang-hai ch'u-pan kung-ssu, 1950), in which he anticipated the change of college curricula under the Communist government. Fei has since led several government delegations to visit the ethnic minorities in the South and Southwest and has made some first-hand studies of these peoples. In the field of anthropology much basic study is possible without running afoul of the Communist line. Despite the omnipresent praise for Communist policies, the articles written by the anthropologists do indicate that new facts are being discovered; and the fact that these discoveries are financed by the government and are used in the administration of the minority peoples may suggest the favored position held by anthropologists in China today. On the other hand, anthropologists so busily employed by the government are prevented from doing the work they might do in a free society.

812 In the field of philosophy, especially political philosophy, Mao Tse-tung's books are accepted as of unquestioned authority. His Selected Works has gone through several editions since 1949, each new edition being more beautifully and elegantly printed than the one before. But Mao has not written any new book since 1949. Political theorists who wrote on socialism before 1949 now limit their writings

812 to short articles published in such journals as The New Reconstruction (Hsin Chien-she), explaining Communist terms and government policies. Fung (Feng) Yu-lan, the philosopher, has only published one article, "Mao Tse-tung's On Practice and Chinese Philosophy," since he made his confession. His article is an attempt to establish some continuity in Chinese philosophy in the past centuries, especially as it is concerned with the problem of knowledge and action, and to place the various revolutions in the same context. The article attempts to make Mao Tse-tung's ideology seem respectable, but it adds nothing to the development of philosophy. This state of affairs is necessarily the case since "truth" was declared in Marxian writings before 1949, and there is no room for new ideas except in commentaries on "orthodox views". Cadres and students must study Party and government documents in the light of Marxian texts. By attacking "wrong" views, "correct" dialectic materialist views are vindicated. The recent mass attack on Hu Shih's "bourgeois" philosophy illustrates this point.[18]

C. Fiction

538 North China came under Communist control earlier than other regions of China proper. This region was therefore the first to face

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[18] Criticism on Hu Shih's Ideology (3 vols.) Peking, San-lien shu-tien, 1955.

538 problems of industrial recovery, agricultural revival, the land reform, and the liquidation of anti-Communist forces. Since Communist literature is intended to describe the solution of these problems, stories and novels which dealt with these aspects were first produced in North China; and it is in this sense they are original and unique. Among the literature dealing with the War of Resistance against Japan, stories of the "heroic deeds" of the 8th Route Army in North China have eclipsed other treatments of anti-Japanese activities in other parts of China.

People all over China read *Hsin Erh-nü Ying-hsiung-chuan* [*The Biography of a New Hero and Heroine*], a best-seller by Yüan Ching and K'ung Chüeh. It is a 200,000-word account of the repulse of the Japanese invaders in North China, written in the style of traditional Chinese novels;[19] and Ting Ling's *The Sun Shines on the Sang-ch'ien* (Sang-kan) River, a novel about the struggle of the people in North

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[19] The first edition of 10,000 copies was sold out in twenty days, 80 per cent being sold in North China. Although pleased with its success, the Communists have lamented the fact that the Chinese people are still too fond of the traditional "feudalistic" novels, that a novel of new ideas and new people could be successful only when dressed in traditional forms.

538 China during the 1946-1948 land reform, which won the Stalin prize, is equally popular. Liu Pai-yü's *Lights Ahead*, which describes the crossing of the Yangtze River by General Liu Po-ch'eng's army during the "liberation war" against the Kuomintang, is well-known in North China.

D. Peotry

Although Mao Tse-tung himself has composed poems in the classical style, the "new poetry" which is written in *pai-hua* (vernacular) is in vogue in North China today as in other parts of China.

Wen I-to, Kuo Mo-jo, and Hsü Chih-mo, who wrote *pai-hua* poetry, are still talked of. The publication of Wen's collected poems, *Still Water*, was an important literary event in 1929. Hsü experimented with new forms, including those found in Western poetry. He was less concerned with the theory and art of versification than Wen was. Wen's book, the *Forms and Rules of Poetry* (1926) which lists musical artistic, and architectural skills as the necessary elements of good poetry, is a unique contribution to *pai-hua* poetry. His study of painting in the United States caused him to stress the beauty of forms in his poetry.

Kuo Mo-jo's poetry had energy and imagination, but no discipline and restraint; and had been likened to water running from a broken

538 dam, rushing everywhere. In the 1920's, when Kuo was the leader of the Creative Society, he advocated "art for art's sake." He was the first to introduce untranslated Western words and phrases into pai-hua poetry to enhance the beauty of the metrical patterns of the stanzas. Although Kuo is not productive nowadays, and his poems are not popular today, his present prestige as a "literary personage" is based on his past achievement; and his present political position as a cultural leader in the Communist regime in turn encourages the sale of his poems. He is the only one of the three still living. Being now wholly dedicated to the Communist cause, although not a Party member, he is comparable to Simonov of Russia, for Kuo, like Simonov, spends a good deal of his time heading cultural delegations to other countries and entertaining foreign cultural delegations to China.

Ai Ch'ing and T'ien Chien are established Communist poets. Ai writes prose poems and T'ien writes extremely short verses. The average Chinese reader is apt to appreciate Ai more than T'ien, especially when Ai writes of everyday things familiar to the reader and T'ien draws his inspiration from a vision of the new world which is less comprehensible to the average reader.

Mao Fan-t'o and Li Chi are often spoken of together. Ma's poems are modeled upon

538 popular rhymes. Li Chi's poems are modeled after *Shun-t'ien-yu,* a folk-song pattern popular in Shansi and Suiyuan during the war against Japan.

All the poets mentioned above are known nationally. Their styles are imitated by lesser known poets. Li Chi's poem *Wang Kuei and Li Hsiang-hsiang*, which has a North China flavor, seems to be the most popular poem produced under the Communist regime.

E. Popular Rhymes and Folk Songs

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533 Folk songs in North China are freer in form than those in South and East China. The popular rhymes, which have been preserved orally for generations, are especially neat and clever in expresion.

The Chinese Communists have always been active in fostering folk songs and popular rhymes which welcome or accept the new political order. The best example is "Tung-fang Hung" ["All Red the East"], a folk song originating in Shensi, and now well-known in North China, which likens Mao Tse-tung to the sun rising in the east. Some of the newer folk songs fostered by the Communists praise construction and eulogize the "new people" under the present regime.

533 Some of the older folk songs are now being rearranged so that the old forms may accom-

533 modate the new ideology. The most notable example is Yüan Chang-ching's rearrangement of "The Water of the Chang River," describing the life of three girls in a North China village and depicting "the betterment of women's lot under the Communist regime."

F. Drama

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Stage plays in China can be roughly divided into four kinds: (1) folk plays native to small dialectal districts, (2) ching-hsi, or p'i-huang (Peking opera) which is appreciated in all parts of China proper, but particularly in Peking, Tientsin, and Shanghai, and in big cities of other regions, (3) the new opera, a genre created by the Chinese Communists, and (4) the modern play. These together with motion pictures, are now utilized by the Communists to disseminate ideological and political messages.

1. The folk plays.

Pang-tzu is the most prevalent of all folk plays in North China. It can be found in nearly all the counties along the shores of the Yellow River. It is so called because the rhythms of its music are marked by the beats of a foot-long wooden stick which in North China is called pang-tzu.

P'ing-chü, also called peng-peng-hsi,

536 originated in Tangshan and Luan *hsien* in Hopei Province. In recent decades its influence has reached cities like Nanking and Shanghai in East China. It often portrays love stories in a most vulgar manner and its is most enthusiastically received by the workers in the cities and mining centers. The Communists have tried to suppress the obscene and vulgar aspects of the *peng-peng-hsi* and to substitute a political message.

Other folk plays are even more localized, and the difference between them is, for the most part, due to the difference in dialects. All the folk plays borrow stories from each other, and therefore the same folk stories in North China are presented in different versions in different localities.

2. *Ching-hsi*

A composite of many regional plays, *ching-hsi* is popular in all parts of China. The best actors and actresses of *ching-hsi,* however, have been those associated with the Peking theaters. Shanghai, because of its wealth, has also been able to invite the best actors and actresses to its theaters from North China. The musical accompaniment is carried by the *hu-ch' in*, a string instrument, assisted by other strings and by wood-winds. Percussion is used to accentuate rhythms of body movements and to dramatize heightened moments.

536 At its present state, ching-hsi is a highly polished form of art. It no longer depends for audience appeal on plotting but rather on a display of skill by the actors or actresses. It emphasizes costuming rather than scenery. The verses sung serve to express the feelings of the chief characters. Actors may play the female roles and actresses may play male roles. The musical pattern is not very flexible but permits the well-known actors or actresses to vary the style at will. The spoken dialogue and the spoken patter, consisting of clichés in colloquial language, help the movement of the play, make the literary language of the sung verses more intelligible to the audience, and aid in the variation of rhythm. However, most of the spectators know the play, have memorized the verses, and can sing some of them. They came to the theater to watch and enjoy the art of a stylized performance.

In comparison with the folk plays, the ching-hsi is a much more integrated art. Therefore, it is more difficult to bring innovations to the ching-hsi without damaging its accepted form; in contrast, the folk plays may easily incorporate new elements. This fact accounts for the Communists' effort to revamp the folk plays and to bring them up to the same level of popular and artistic recognition as the ching-hsi . However, in the Communists' effort to reinterpret history, the ching-hsi is at present rendering unique service. The Communists have not only revised many of the

536 old scripts to conform to their ideology, but have also encouraged new scripts to be written. In this attempt, well-known actors like Mei Lan-fang and Ch'eng Yen-ch'iu are asked to lend a helping hand.

Playwrights in Communist China are now told to study ching-hsi, because this form can be used to dramatize personalities. In the Communists' effort to glorify the image of the "new heroes," this art is considered extremely important.

3. The New Opera. The new opera in China is modeled after the operatic forms of the West but the content conveys revolutionary themes. The first experiment in this form was the White-haired Girl (1944), a collective creation of the writers and artists of the Lu Hsün Institute of Literature and Art. In the arias sung by the heroine, the musical pattern of the Hopei pang-tzu is borrowed to convey her changing moods. This is considered a very successful adaptation by the Communists. But the melodies of the other parts, which appear to be of yang-ko origin, are close to folk songs and lack dramatic effect. The White-haired Girl has been characterized as "drama-plus-song," a term which indicates that the operatic form is not well enough developed to enable the music to carry the theme.

This inadequacy was remedied in the

536 second major opera commissioned by the Communists. The opera Liu Hu-lan gives the heroine Liu Hu-lan opportunities "to delineate her heroic personality" in longer and more frequent arias. The musical pattern of the Shansi pang-tzu is used in the arias, and the whole opera has a Shansi color.

The composers were alarmed when they discovered that audiences were humming the melodies which describe the corrupt life of the landlord in the opera The White-haired Girl rather than the arias of the heroine and the chorus of the 8th Route Army. They resolved not to give the "negative" personality strong musicalization. As a result, the opera Liu Hu-lan incorporates queer and disjointed melodies for the villainous roles, and the villains are shallow caricatures. Thus, for ideological reasons, the Communists now limit "true music" to the expression of "lofty passions" for the "right cause."

The new operas are intended for national consumption irrespective of regional difference, although local airs are incorporated into the scores according to the locality of the stories. Both The White-haired Girl and Liu Hu-lan are based on incidents which occurred in North China, although they have been transformed by grossly "dramatic" exaggerations. They are performed by opera troupes all over China, and their influence is therefore national. Other well-known operas include the Long March, in which Mao Tse-tung is impersonated for the first time.

4. *Modern play* (*hua-chü*). The modern play, like the motion pictures, has no regional character. Any acceptable play will be staged in all parts of China, and *kuo-yü* (national language) is used rather than the various dialects. Ch'en Ch'i-t'ung's *Thousands of Rivers and Mountains* proves that the Communists' Long March in the thirties is always "correct" material for dramatization. *The Song of the Red Flags*, concerned with production drives in a textile factory in North China was a collective creation of three playwrights, written after they had agreed on the ideological significance of this type of play and had sketched out the plot under the "guidance" of Chou Yang, the Vice-minister of Cultural Affairs. *The Song of the Red Flags* was performed in Peking, Shanghai, Nanking, Chungking, Lanchou and other big cities. In Shanghai alone, it had 159 performances, and some 125,000 people attended it.[20] If we take into account the fact that theater-going is now an organized activity of the various mass organizations such as the labor unions, the Women's Federation, the New Democratic Youth Corps, the Young Pioneers, and the study circles, the length of the run and the size of the audience do not accurately reflect the enthusiasm of the people but rather the effectiveness of Communist organization of mass participation in the

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[20] *People's Pictorial* [*Jen-min Hua-pao*], Peking, July 1950.

536 field of recreation. Lao She's play Lung-hsü Kou which was long awaited, and which describes the workers of Peking in improving the sanitation of their living quarters behind the Temple of Heaven, is considerably better written than most recent plays.

5. Motion Pictures

546 While Peking decides the policy, Shanghai and Mukden are now the centers of China's motion picture industry. The White-haired Girl, a film based on the opera, won the first prize among the thirty-eight entries at the Communist International Motion-picture Festival in Czechoslovakia in 1951. The Concentration Camp at Shang-jao, which was made in 1951, describes the life of the "patriotic people" in the Kuomintang concentration camp, and, according to the Communist reviewers, successfully "demonstrates the collective heroism" of the Communists under duress, When the rural production drive was about to begin in 1954, the film Good Harvest was timed to be shown to the peasants during the festivities of the lunar New Year in order to emphasize the importance of increasing the output of the land. The People on the Grassland is a movie about the Mongols in Inner Mongolia. Sound tracks in the Mogol and Uigur languages have been made so that this picture may be circulated among the ethnic minorities.

G. Narrative and Song Recitations

545 Public entertainment in North China also includes narrative and song recitations with percussion and string accompaniment. This is called ku-tz'u or ch'ü-i. Since they are informally staged, they are more adaptable to new content, and the singer or narrator is free to give his own version of the moral of the story. Most of the singers and narrators obtain their stories and verses from old novels. Now the Chinese Communists have encouraged them to use the new novels, such as Brother and Sister in Land-clearing and the Marriage of Hsiao-erh-hei, and they are encouraged to compose their own texts. Han Ch'i-hsiang and Wang Chung-san are the two ch'ü-i artists most praised by the Communists.

536 It should be mentioned that the Communists have elevated the social position of actors and actresses from that of "entertainers" to that of "artists." Actors and actresses have their own organizations in the capital and are invited to take part in the deliberation of new policies pertaining to their profession "under the leadership of the Party."

III. ARTISTIC EXPRESSION

532 A. Painting and the Plastic Arts

When one talks of painting in Communist China one is immediately reminded of Ch'i

532 Pai-shih of North China. Ch'i is now 95 years old. He paints flowers, insects, and small animals in their customary surroundings. He uses water color but often accentuates the lines and movements with ink. Although simple in composition, his paintings are invariably fresh and full of life.

Ch'i has the habit of using only a part of his canvas, allowing enough room to add a sentence or two to epitomize the meaning of the composition, as do other traditional artists. His calligraphy, with its rugged and carefree appearance, is equally unique.

The Communists have paid great respect to Ch'i Pai-shih, proclaiming him "the People's artist" because he was once a Peking carpenter and woodcarver. He has been free to choose his subject matter and to compose his paintings as he wishes. Some times he will oblige the Communists by prefacing his paintings with an explanatory phrase "It's done for the occasion of the anniversary of the People's Republic," or by painting a dove accompanied by the characters *ho-p'ing* (peace).

Ch'i has so high a standing among those who are initiated in the art of Chinese brush painting that his mere residing and painting in Communist China are already an asset to the regime, and the regime has found it unnecessary to press him to turn out propaganda pieces, 532 as is expected of younger and lesser known artists.

Painting and the plastic arts are largely utilitarian in China today. The utilitarian spirit puts them either in the realm of propaganda or craftsmanship. As propaganda, they become extremely derivative and stereotyped; as craftsmanship, they utilize local characteristics and traditional skills, although they sometimes appear to be unrestrainedly florid and pretentious, Chinese brush paintings, woodcuts, oil paintings, pencil sketches, water colors, sculpture, ceramic figures, woodcarvings, cartoons, and chalk drawings are entries in most of the art exhibitions. Among these categories, ceramic figures and woodcarvings represent local craftsmanship and are little influenced by Communist ideology. Other art forms have used Communist policies and slogans as themes for depiction. Woodcuts, sculptures, and water colors seem to have been more easily adapted to the new themes than oil paintings and the traditional Chinese brush paintings. The oil paintings done by the Chinese artists lack imagination in composition; at their best, they are only photographic depictions of political activities. Traditional brush painting technique is at its best in landscape paintings and in depicting rural life and is ill-adapted to the illustration of modern people and their activities. No prominent artists in oil or water color have emerged under the Communist regime.

532 Under the general principle, "Accept the heritage of the world," artists like Rembrandt and Leonardo da Vinci are commemorated and reproductions like that of Mona Lisa are used in literary and art journals.

B. Woodcuts

The woodcut, a traditional art in China, is used to adorn story books. Lu Hsün was the first to renew popular interest in this art. Woodcuts became popular in Yenan during the war against Japan because their creation does not require elaborate equipment. Many people remember the lively woodcuts of the Liberated Areas, which showed the influence of Western woodcuts. Woodcuts are popular in Communist China; there is a tendency to incorporate the traditional Chinese woodcut style in the illustration of Communist themes, and there are elaborate woodcuts in multiple colors, the technique of which antedates the Yenan period. In recent woodcuts, rural life is more effectively presented than blast furnaces or anti-US activities.

C. New Year's Pictures (Nien-hua)

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537 In those Chinese households which have not been influenced by the West, a new picture is hung or pasted on the wall on every New Year's Eve to assure a prosperous and peaceful year ahead. The pictures are called

532 nien-hua. New Year's pictures are exploited
529 by the Communists as a means to secure people's consent and support for their regime. The traditional theme of superstitious propitiation to gods has been transmogrified to praise of Mao Tse-tung for bringing happiness and prosperity to the people, to celebration of the Long March of the Red Army, the distribution of land certificates after the land reform, the woman train-conductor, or the "great meeting of Stalin and Mao Tse-tung."[21]

The Communists have boasted of a tremendous sale of the "new" nien-hua in the last few years. The production and printing of the nien-hua are now done entirely by Communist publishing houses, and the Chinese people have no way of buying their traditional nien-hua. The aesthetic value of the nien-hua is practically nil, but it utilizes so well the traditional customs, beliefs, and sayings of the people that its messages are immediately understandable and are apt to be accepted.

D. Comic Strips (Lien-huan T'u-hua)

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The Chinese comic strip is neither literature nor art, but it borrows a little from both to enable the barely literate to entertain themselves with stories. The Communists, knowing the popularity of comic strips among children, women, and the uneducated, have contrived to make them instruments to teach "patriotism," sanitation, and

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[21] People's Pictorial, February 1951.

532 health. They regard earlier comic strips as "feudalistic" and superstitious, and have replaced them with those which are "new, healthy, and educational." The new comic strips, created by artists recruited and guided by the Communists, are seen at street corners and in factories, villages, armies, and schools.

The Communists claim that the sale of comic strips is increasing daily. The Lien-ho Bookstore in Shanghai, which handles the new comic strips, reports the sale of more than 600,000 volumes in January 1951, and more than one million volumes in the following April. The comic strip periodical Lien-huan Hua-pao is reported to have a circulation of 400,000 copies.

The most representative and most publicized new comic strip is The Letter with a Chicken Feather,[22] which uses 243 pictures "to give the Chinese children a patriotic education." The story concerns a young boy who, after receiving a Communist education, successfully fulfilled the "heroic" task of delivering an important message to anti-Japanese guerrilla force. It is claimed that more than 58,000 copies of The Letter with a Chicken Feather have been sold.

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[22] It was a traditional practice to include a chicken feather with an urgent message, to signify the letter's importance and the need for safekeeping.

E. Dance

535 China proper does not have any distinctive form of dancing, although yang-ko is sometimes considered native to China. Yang-ko is a combination of singing and dancing, derived from the song pattern of peasants who sing in groups antiphonically when working in the rice-fields. The dance steps revolve around a basic pattern, that is, two steps forward and one step back, which resembles the movement of the peasants as they work in the fields. In village festivals, yang-ko is sometimes performed, but it became truly popular only after the reform of literature and art in 1942, when the Communists used the dance to propagate new ideas in Shensi, and later in North China. It was brought to different parts of China in time to greet the advancing People's Liberation Army. The opera The White-haired Girl was based on singing and dancing forms of the yang-ko; and at the first stage of land reform this opera was utilized by the Communist cadres in many different parts of China to stir up class struggles in villages. The vogue of yang-ko in East China now seems to be over. The sophisticated cadres seem to prefer the new operas to yang-ko, and Western forms of social dancing to yang-ko steps.

The Chinese Communists have always fostered any art form that would assist their revolution. In 1950, Hsien Hsing-hai's Production Cantata (Sheng-ch'an Ta-ho-ch'ang)

535 was transformed into an operatic spectacle. The new song-and-dance version is divided into four scenes, celebrating the times of spring cultivation, seeding, harvest, and prosperity, to portray the rural working people's enthusiasm for production and their prosperity as a result of the Communist "liberation."[23]

The Central Dance Corps at Peking, sponsored by the government, recently gave a "Lion Dance," which is an adaptation of a traditional festival stunt performed in North China during the season of the lunar New Year.[24] Another dance, "Tea and Butterflies," has also been widely publicized; it concerns tea-gathering maidens in Western Fukien.[25] The purpose of these dances is "to beautify the working spirit" and to set a pattern to be developed by dance corps elsewhere in China.

The Cultural Corps (Wen-kung T'uan) of the Central Institute of Nationalities at Peking has been visiting the minority communities in Southwest China, and has adapted some of the dances of the minority peoples for performance in Peking, in other Chinese cities, and abroad. Among those performed are a flute dance (a courtship dance), and a wedding dance of the Miao people, "Happy Sun" (a tap dance), and "Good Harvest" (a traditional dance around the family cooking stove) of the

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[23] People's Pictorial, August 1950.
[24] Ibid., March 1954.
[25] Ibid., April 1954.

535 Tibetans in Southwest China, "Please Stay, You Guests from Afar" of the Yi people, and the "Peacock Dance" of the Tai (Thai) people.[26]

The Central Experimental Opera Institute at Peking has also given instruction in ballet, and there are many aspiring bellerinas. Interest in ballet is unprecedented in China and is clearly the result of the popularity of ballet in Russia.[27]

The activities associated with dance are organized and directed by the government. There is the All-China Association of Dancers, which is a subdivision of the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Workers,[28] with headquarters in Peking. Tai Ai-lien, a well-known professional dancer, heads the association. She has dedicated herself to the incorporation of folk life, especially that of the minority peoples, into her dances. Her training, however, is Western.

F. Music

177 533 Appreciation of Western classical music has been revived in accordance with the principle of "accepting the culture of the world."

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[26] Ibid., July 1954.

[27] Ibid., May 1954.

[28] The All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles was changed to the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Workers in September 1953.

[177] A municipal symphony orchestra in Peking
performs Beethoven as well as Tschaikowsky
533 and is intended to set an example for musical
activities elsewhere in the nation. The quality
of the symphony's performance is unknown. No
major composer has emerged under the Communist
regime. Most of the musicians seem to
be absorbed in collecting and re-arranging
folk music, in composing scores for the new
operas, or in turning out at short notice
musical accompaniment for propaganda films.

Marching bands have been very popular under the Communist regime; nearly every school has a band. This is in keeping with the Communists' deliberate effort to foster some kind of martial spirit in the youth.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 1j,
Sociological Background

EDUCATION

I. BACKGROUND

871 In order to understand the changes brought about by the Communists in the educational system of China, it is necessary to review the background of educational development under the Nationalist regime.

871 /86 Chapter II, Article 11, of the Nationalist Constitution promulgated in 1946 states that the "people have freedom of speech, [freedom for the] pursuit of knowledge, and [freedom of] publication." Article 21 of the same chapter further spells out the principle of education by stating that the "people have the right as well as the duty to receive basic education." Interpretations of these broad principles are found in Chapter XIII, which specifies, among other things, that the purpose of education includes the development of the spirit of nationalism, and that both public and private educational institutions are subject to government supervision according to law.[1]

Nationalist officials singled out two of

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[1] Chung-kuo Chiao-yü Nien-chien 1948 [Educational Yearbook of China 1948], Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1948, pp. 23-24.

871 186 the most controversial points for further elaboration. One is the so-called "spirit of nationalism" which the Ministry of Education at Nanking defined as the spirit based on San-min Chu-i, the Three Principles of the People expounded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen (See chapter on Political Dynamics in this handbook). Thus a mild reform was adopted as the central theme of the Nationalist philosophy for education. The other controversial point is the extent of government supervision over educational institutions. Official explanation stressed the supervisory function of the government in the system of education and denied that this implied any authoritarian control.[2]

874 212 Under the Nationalist government, efforts were exerted to promote adult education and combat illiteracy. Outstanding records were made by such people as James Yen, (an internationally known promoter of mass education) who organized drives to eradicate illiteracy, and Huang Yen-p'ei, now a member of the Communist central government, who did a great deal for the development of vocational education in China. Since most of these features are discussed in anyone of the numerous books on education in China, it is enough to say here that had it not been for a decade of war, general education in China would have

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[2] Ibid., p. 24. For other influential theories on education expounded during World War II in China see Chan-shih Chiao-yü Lun-chi [Discussions on Wartime Education], Shanghai, Sheng-huo chiao-yü she, 1938.

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871 CHART 1. SYSTEM OF EDUCATION UNDER THE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT*


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*Chung-hua Min-kuo Nien-chien, 1953 [The Yearbook of the Republic of China], Taipei, Chung-hua nien-chien she, 1953, p. 491.

[FACING p. 276]

874 been far more developed than it was in 1949 on the
812 eve of the Communist seizure of power.

871 The application of the broad principles of education under the Nationalist government resulted in a system of regular and specialized schooling as pictured in the following chart.

871 As shown in Chart 1, the primary school consists of six grades divided into two levels. For students in rural schools, the first four years of primary school education may constitute an integral unit by itself and may be sufficiently useful if the students have to take up farming or other professions upon the completion of this unit. This feature was later attacked by the Communists as a mark of discrimination against the peasants and workers. But it is to be remembered that at one time the Nationalist Ministry of Education did attempt to revise the primary school system by making it a five-year, one-level system.

Another feature of the Nationalist system of education attacked by the Communists was its failure to establish vocational schools with college standing, thus forcing vocational school graduates to terminate their education at the high school level. While most of the vocational school graduates did not continue their education, the system under the Nationalists did not preclude this possibility. The doors of the colleges were open to such graduates as were qualified for enrollment. The only restrictive factor was that most of the vocational school graduates because of their specialization had to take additional courses in order to fulfill general requirements before they could pass the entrance examination to the regular college.

By 1946, the Nationalist Ministry of Education announced, 54. 52 per cent of the nation's population above the age of six either had attended

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or were attending school.[3] In 1947, there were 207 institutes of higher learning throughout the country. But this number was unsatisfactory to the government; the Ministry of Education announced that the Central Government devoted only 4.3 per cent[4] of its 1946 budget to education, which is not quite one-third of the amount designated for this purpose by the Constitution.

In North China, 21 schools for higher education were in operation in 1947. Of these only four were technical schools and three were teacher's colleges.[5] The latest pre-Communist figures on education in North China cited in Table I will offer comparison with developments under the Communist regime, to be discussed.

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[3] The Education Yearbook of China, 1948, pp. 1,397-1,483.

[4] Chung-hua Nien-chien, 1948 [The China Yearbook, 1948], Nanking, Chung-hua nien-chien she, 1948, p. 1,623.

[5] Ibid., pp. 1591-94.

Table I. Education in North China (1945-46)*
(Figures in parentheses are 1946 statistics)

Province	Primary Schools		Middle Schools (Secondary Schools)		Institutions of Adult Education	
	Schools	Students	Schools	Students	Schools	Students
Hopei	3,175	392,586	156	63,979	(660)	(40,999)
Shansi	4,127	589,935	54	13,058	(896)	(48,108)

*The Education Yearbook of China, 1948, pp. 1,397-1,483. The institutions for adult education include libraries, museums, night schools, etc. It is obvious that not all the people participating in such activities are counted in the figures for "students" of adult education institutions.

II. MAJOR CHANGES BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE COMMUNISTS

871 A. Basic Policy

Mao Tse-tung stated in his *On New Democracy* that, "A specific culture is the ideological reflection of the political and economic activities of a specific society.'[6] In molding a culture for the "new China," Mao believed that education would be successful if it contained "scientific substance, oriented toward the masses, and adapted to suit China's nationalism."[7] This principle of education was incorporated into the Common Program of 1949 which constituted the basis of the Communist Constitution promulgated in 1954. Article 41 of the Common Program states that the purpose of education is "to elevate the level of the people's culture, to prepare personnel for national reconstruction, to eradicate the thoughts of feudalism, compradorism,[8] and Fascism, and to develop the spirit of service to the people." To apply this basic policy to educa-

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[6] Mao Tse-tung, *Mao Tse-tung Hsüan-chi* [*Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*], Vol. II, Peking Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, p. 666.

[7] Hsia Feng, *Hsiao-hsüeh Chiao-shih Shou-ts'e* [*Handbook for Primary School Teachers*], Shanghai, Wen-hua ch'u-pan-she, 1953, p. 8.

[8] Comprador is a native agent employed by a foreign establishment (commercial houses, etc.) in China to have charge of its native employees.

87, tion, Article 47 of the same document further specifies that " education must be systematically popularized; secondary and advanced education must be strengthened; technical education must be emphasized; spare-time education for laborers and cadres must be stressed; and revolutionary political education must be given to both young and old intellectuals."[9]

These pronouncements became the guiding light for the Communists in their effort to revamp the educational system of China until the promulgation of the Constitution in 1954. In reality, the new Constitution has nothing to add to or subtract from the principles already in practice. Article 94 of the Constitution says that "Citizens of the People's Republic of China have the right to education. To guarantee enjoyment of this right, the state establishes and gradually extends the various types of educational institutions. The state pays special attention to the physical and mental development of young people." The next article in the Constitution "safeguards the freedom of citizens to engage in scientific research, literary and artistic creation and other cultural activity." These are innocuous statements of commonly accepted principles. Reiteration of these principles in the Constitution, however, provides the Communists once more with the opportunity to clarify their educational aims which are "to develop a socialist China."

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[9] Jen-min Shou-ts's, 1950 [People's Handbook, 1950], Shanghai, Ta-kung pao, 1950, section B, p. 9.

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Attention must be given to the gradual shift of emphasis from 1949 to the present in the Communist basic policy for education. At the beginning of the Communist regime, the central theme was to bring to reality a "New Democracy" in education. By this the Communists meant that petit bourgeois and national capitalist classes would still be tolerated on a level with the proletariat. Soon afterwards the Communists made it amply clear that a constant effort was to be made to root out every trace of thought and action in education that did not conform to strict proletarian socialism, Russian style. There have been numerous articles arguing whether there is any difference between the principles of the New Democracy and the socialist principles of education.[10] Apparently the final word on this question was pronounced by an article in People's Education, an official organ of the Ministry of Education since May 1, 1951, which said: "The present stage is no longer the same as the New Democracy stage. We have to not only establish a socialist system of thought for the educators and students (which was the central mission under the New Democracy principle), but to put into practice the principle of 'eliminating step by step the exploitation system and establishing a socialist society' as stipulated in the new Constitution."[11]

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10. See articles on this subject in Jen-min Chiao-yü [People's Education], Peking, June 1953, April 1954, and June 1954 issues.

11. Ibid., Oct. 1954, p. 13.

871 In short, the Communist basic policy of education has been to remove gradually all influences other than those stemming from socialism. In practice, the Communists have attempted to train all levels of personnel required for a complete socialist remolding of China.

B. Changes in Curricula

873 Curricular "reform" was among the first actions undertaken by the Communists in the field of education. Even before their consolidation of power (at a time when a thorough renovation of the educational system was administratively impossible) the Communists instituted changes in the curricula wherever their troops had seized control. As early as September 1949, Communist authorities announced the "Temporary Regulations of Curricular Reform in the Departments of the Colleges of Arts and of Law in the Institutions of Higher Learning in North China." The principal features of this "reform" were (1) the substitution of Marxism and Leninism for the Three People's Principles, (2) abolishment of the course on traditional law and, before new laws were promulgated, the addition of studies on socialist theories of jurisprudence. This action was aimed at institutions of higher learning; reform of curricula for lower level schools was not much publicized.

The same subject was the central theme for the All-China Higher Education Conference of June 1-9, 1950. By that time the movement to reform curricula had reached its second stage. Out of this conference emerged "Decisions Concerning the Enforcement of Curricular Reform in the Institutions of Higher Learning." The main point of this directive was that, "Institutions of higher learning must...abolish the politically reactionary courses, install revolutionary political courses of New Democracy... The curriculum of all departments must practise the principle of proper specialization...must install and strengthen necessary and important courses and omit those overlapping and unimportant courses and materials, in accordance with the principle of intensification and simplification.[12]

Following this conference, major changes in college curricula were carried out. Similar measures were also adopted for secondary and primary schools by modifying the courses and altering the subject-contents. In January 1951, the Communist Ministry of Education moved to check on the results of curricular "reform" by holding a "Conference on Inspection of Teaching Plans for the Academic Year 1950 of All Institutions of Higher Learning." Again, similar actions were taken for schools on the lower level. After Sept. 1951, official efforts were mainly devoted to "thought reform" and the inspection of course material and teaching methods to insure that the reform measures were truly carried out in the

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[12] Hsin-hua Yüeh-pao [New China Monthly], Vol. II, no. 5, Sept. 1950, p. 1,134.

Communist spirit. These efforts have not lessened in the past five years.

Besides changing the materials for courses on political and economic theory, the curricular "reform" also has the mission of dovetailing the schools on different levels and seeing that their doors are open to Party and other professional cadres who have not had the opportunity of a formal education.

One important development closely related to curricular "reform" is the thorough re-examination of all textual materials. The central authorities responsible for education, through their subordinate agencies on provincial and municipal levels supervised the revision of all textbooks, particularly those in the field of the social sciences before releasing them to the schools. That the revised books are politically slanted is obvious, but their technical quality cannot be judged without a detailed comparative study of many such books against the original versions and against similar books accepted as standard works in non-Communist countries.[13]

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[13] For more information on revision and publication of textbooks in Communist China, see the chapters on "Public Information and Propaganda," and "Artistic and Intellectual Expression." Also see Chu Po-ch'i, Chung-kung Ti Hsüeh-hsiao Chiao-yü [Formal Education in Communist China], Hong Kong, Ya-chou ch'u-pan-she, 1954, pp. 218-27.

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C. Changes in Organization

Before 1949, as the Communist Army assumed control of a city or a town, a military delegate was assigned to each school to supervise its administration. The changes the Communists brought to the schools at that time were imposed unsystematically and arbitrarily. Even after the establishment of the Peking regime, the measures designed to revise the educational system and school organization remained haphazard.

Following the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950, the main activity of the Communist Ministry of Education, as far as reorganization of the schools was concerned, appeared to be the seizure of private schools and other schools sponsored by religious groups and foreign missions.[14] The first systematic reorganization was occasioned by the issuance of a Government Administration Council directive, "Decisions Concerning the Reform of the Educational System," on October 1, 1951. The People's Daily of Peking, central organ of the Communist Party, and People's Education both expounded the theory behind the organizational reform:[15] (1) the reorganization will ascertain

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[14] Wu-nien-lai Ti Kung-fei Chiao-yü [Communist Education in the Past Five Years (1951-55)] Taipei, 6th Section, Central Committee, Nationalist Party, 1955, Vol. II, pp. 14-15. A total of 6,360 schools were said to have been seized by the Communists.

[15] People's Education, Oct. 1951, pp. 5-6; Hsia Feng, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

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Chart 2. System of Education under the Chinese Communist Regime*


AGE SCALE
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Universities and Specialized Colleges
Specialized Institutes
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Secondary Specialized Schools
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Junior Middle Schools
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Kindergartens
Proletarian Accelerated Middle Schools (3-4 yrs.)
Spare-time Senior Middle Schools (3-4 yrs.)
Spare-time Junior Middle Schools (3-4 yrs.)
Proletarian Accelerated Primary Schools (2-3 yrs.)
Spare-time Primary Schools

*Communist Education in the Past Five Years, pp. 8-9; Chi Tung-wei, Education for the Proletariat in Communist China, Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, 1954, p. 16. The Chinese term for "middle school" implies "secondary school."

(Chart 2 faces p. 287.)

871 the position of vocational schools, special training programs for cadres, and adult educatioanal classes in the regular schools system; in other words those cadres, soldiers, peasants, and workers who have had no opportunity for formal education may attend special training schools and achieve the same standing as regular school graduates; (2) changing the six-year and two-level primary school system into a five-year and one-level system will enable children of poor peasants to receive a much more complete basic education; (3) the new system will place emphasis on technical education to serve the purpose of the "socialist reconstruction of China;" and (4) the kindergarten will have its definite place in the reorganized system.

Thus the reorganization was launched as the central task for education in China for 1952. By September 1952, it was reported, the major reorganization of schools was completed.[16] However, the Communist Vice-Minister of Education, Liu Shih, reported in January 1954 that "systematic reorganization of the schools was not completed until late 1953."[17] Liu, in reporting on the completion of the reorganization, possibly had in mind the decision of the Government Ad-

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16. Kao Chien-hsing, Chung-kung Ti Nu-i Chiao-yü [Slave Education of the Chinese Communists], Hong Kong Tsu-yu ch'u-pan-she, 1953, p. 36; Walter Crosby Eells, Communism in Education, Washington, D.C., American Council on Education, 1954, p. 201.

17. People's Education, January 1954, p. 24.

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Chart 3. Communist Government Control of Education[a]


State Council
Physical Education Commission
Ministry of Public Health
Ministry of Education
Ministry of Higher Education
Ministry of Culture
Provincial (or Municipal) People's Council
Physical Education Commission
Department of Public Health
Department of Education
Department of Culture
County People's Council
Municipal People's Council
Public Health Bureau
Cultural & Educational Bureau
Physical Education Committee
Public Health Bureau
Educational Bureau
Cultural Bureau
Hsiang (or Minority National Hsiang, or Chen) People's Council
Ch'ü People's Council
Commission on Cultural and Educational Work
Public Health Section
Cultural & Educational Section

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[a] Communist Education in the Past Five Years, pp. 12-13. The term "Physical Education" used here can also be translated as "Physical Culture and Sports."

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87/ ministration Council in November 1953 to "restore the old primary school system of six-year and two-level." According to Premier Chou En-lai, this last action was necessary because of "inadequate preparation" for the new five-year, one-level system.[18]

The main changes brought about in the reorganization were the regrouping of departments in large universities and specialization in the colleges. The purpose was to achieve a balanced distribution of educational facilities prescribed in the program of national economic reconstruction.[19] The system of education after reorganization can best be shown in the chart which follows.

Following the reorganization of the school system, government control over the system was further defined by the promulgation of the 1954 Constitution. As shown in Chart 3, the formal chain of control is not much different from that of the Nationalist system. The following new features, of course, are to be noted: The two ministries of education function differently in that the Ministry of Higher Education is in charge of the education of higher and secondary levels of technical

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[18] Ibid., p. 8.

[19] For a detailed description of the reorganization, see People's Education, Jan. 1954, p. 65; Communist Education in the Past Five Years, Vol. II, pp. 14-15; Chung Shih, Higher Education in Communist China, Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, 1953, pp. 41-47.

871 and administrative personnel to be used in the national reconstruction program, while the Ministry of education is responsible for the administration of teacher's training schools, regular middle (secondary) and primary schools, and adult education schools.[20] Prior to the promulgation of the Constitution, education was under the jurisdiction of a Cultural and Educational Administration of the Government Administration Council. Now, under the State Council, culture and education are separated. The Ministry of Culture continues to supervise all "cultural activites" other than education, such as the press, publication, art, drama, and so forth. That physical education is worthy of an independent commission under the State Council indicates the important position it occupies in the Communist program of youth training.

871 665 One significant development in the control of education by the Communist government is the role played by the Party. Although the official chain of control, as shown in Chart 3, seems to have no place for the Communist Party, Party branches on all levels are actually the authorities for interpretation of official policy and make the final decision on how a school should be run. Evidence shows that some schools report every important question to the local Party secretary before taking any action.[21] Close-range Party supervision, together with the assignment of

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[20] Communist Education in the Past Five Years, Vol. I, p. 11.

[21] People's Education, December 1954, p. 30.

871 well trained veteran cadres to key positions on the administrative staff of the school, serve to maintain the Communists' control over the educational system.

III. MAJOR MOVEMENTS LAUNCHED BY COMMUNISTS IN EDUCATION

A. "Thought Reform"

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871 To effect an ideological revolution among the educators and students is an essential step in the Communist plan to Sovietize completely the educational system in China. Since 1949, every major measure adopted by the Peking regime in the cultural and educational fields involves, either implicitly or explicitly, an effort to remold the thought of the people concerned. However, an organized drive to change the way of thinking of the educators and students did not start until Premier Chou En-lai delivered his speech on September 29, 1951. He urged the educators to abandon their attitude of "study for study's sake" or "art for art's sake" and to step down from their professorial pedestals to serve the masses. He exhorted the students to forget about personal profit and to identify their ambitions with the national interest.

This movement spread rapidly. Criticism and self-criticism were encouraged. "Petit bourgeois sentimentalism," "capitalistic romanticism," "feudalistic individualism," and a host of other "undesirable" attitudes were subject to

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relentless attack. During subsequent months the Communist press was crowded with signed confessions of past ideological errors. This is the mainstay of the Communist program to revamp education, but it is admittedly a most trying task, which requires a long-range plan and sustained effort for its achievement.

Although practically every college professor in China has published his self-criticism (some of them have done so several times) and every student has been through at least one "thought struggle," the movement continues unabated. The Ministry of Education in announcing the tasks for 1954 again pointed out the need for continued vigilance against the "remnant of feudalistic thought."[22] The Government Administration Council in directing secondary schools to improve their courses stressed the importance of strengthening socialist thought.[23] The latest revival of this issue occurred when the philosophy and works of Hu Shih, Yü P'ing-po, and Hu Feng became the subject of a purge.[24] (See chapter on Artistic and Intellectual Expression.)

B. Labor-education Movement

The labor-education movement is design-

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22. People's Education, March 1954, p. 22.
23. Ibid., July 1954, p. 16.
24. Ibid., May 1955, p. 5.

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ed to inculcate a respect for labor in the minds of intellectuals and youth, and is not to be confused with "Reform-through-labor" discussed in the chapter on Forced Labor.

Beginning with the kindergarten, the Communists teach students to respect the "fruits of labor," to care for school property and to aid their parents by doing chores at home. Grade schools children are taught manual work, partly as physical exercise and partly as a means to cultivate respect for labor. Older students are urged to prepare themselves for work on the farm or in the factory. Such a preparation, the Communists say, is the "most glorious" assignment which can be offered "news China's" youth. Students in advanced schools are reminded of their duty to accept government assignments regardless of the working conditions involved. The main purpose of the labor-education movement is to prepare students for work upon the completion of any level of education.

"Study is the only task worth undertaking, and all other professions are beneath it" is a traditional Chinese expression which upholds the high social status of the educated. This has become a target of Communist attack, and the fight to change the minds of the people is still surging.[25]

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[25] See Communist official directives on "labor-education," ibid., June 1954, p. 7; May 1954, p. 7.

C. Physical Education Movement

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Although a specific commission has been established to promote physical education (see Chart 3), the State Council and the two ministries of education have been seriously concerned with the health of students. This concern originates from Mao Tse-tung's instructions to promote "good health, good study, and good work." As early as Spril 1951, Tung Ch'un-ts'ai, Vice-Minister of Education, called the attention of the nation's educators to the importance of guarding the health of students. Tung's declaration was affirmed by other officials in responsible positions during subsequent years, but apparently the situation was not much improved. The students remained in financial straits while the pressure of intensified courses was increased. The Ministry of Higher Education, the Ministry of Health, and the Commission on Physical Education issued in July 1954 a joint directive reiterating an earlier announcement by the Government Administration Council on "Decisions on Improving the Health of Students in Schools at All Levels."[26] However, it is obvious that stress on physical exercise alone cannot take the place of an adequate diet.

Other movements launched simultaneously with the above-mentioned drives have been revived from time to time. They are indicative of the ills plaguing the educational system under the

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[26] People's Education, August 1954, p. 65.

871 668 Communists in China. Language reform, important to primary education and in efforts to combat illiteracy, is associated with "thought reform". The program to establish winter schools, summer schools, and other special training classes for peasants, workers, and soldiers is actually a part of school reorganization. Some of the most important characteristics of these movements will be further discussed.

IV. THE VARIOUS LEVELS OF SCHOOLS

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The Communist policy for education and the movements in education are nationwide, and are subject to only minor regional variations. However, a survey of the schools in North China may reveal the extent to which the Communist policy has been carried out and the response of the people in this region.

A. Kindergarten and Primary Schools

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The development of kindergartens in North China has been tied in with the child welfare program, and there has not been any specific discussion among the educational circles. Reporting educational development in Peking in 1950, Deputy Mayor Wu Han only mentioned that kindergartens as a whole had undergone a process of reorganization with a view to improving their efficiency and bringing better personnel to these

872 schools.[27] It is presumable that kindergartens in other cities in North China have followed suit.

The development of primary schools received closer attention than did the development of the kindergarten system. The policy has been to strengthen the "complete" primary schools in cities and important villages and to encourage the villagers in outlying districts to establish their own primary schools under local government supervision.[28] To consolidate Party control over these numerous primary schools scattered over wide areas, the Government Administration Council in Peking ordered the assignment of experienced political cadres to supervise the educational agencies in county governments. In addition, primary school principals and other administrators were indoctrinated. In Peking, political indoctrination of schools teachers began in April 1950.[29] During the indoctrination, the educators were expected to learn Marxian theories and Peking's policies of education.

The number of primary schools in this region showed no immediate increase after the Communists' seizure of power. Official attention was focused on the reorganization and consolidation of sub-standard schools. In certain areas, more classes were arranged in the same number of schools, thus accommodating more students. Peking, for example, added 27 classes to its suburban primary schools in 1950.[30] Subsequent expansion, according to a Communist report,[31] brought the number of students registered in primary schools in Hopei Province to 4,420,000 in 1954; the number of new schools established since 1949 was 8,693. If these Communist statistics are reliable, the increase is quite significant. Similar expansion is expected to have taken place in Shansi Province, though possibly at a rate somewhat slower than that of Hopei Province.

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[27] Cheng-fu Kung-tso Pao-kao Hui-pien [Compendium of Government Reports], Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1951, p. 236.

[28] Jen-min Shou-ts'e, 1955 [People's Handbook, 1955], Tientsin, Ta-kung pao, 1955.

[29] Compendium of Government Reports, p. 236.

The trained political cadres who were sent to rural areas to establish primary schools reported a shortage of supplies and a lack of financial support. The situation in North China, however, seems to be much better than that in the more remote areas in Central-South China and Southwest China. The North China press quite frequently printed accounts of "the glorious success" of these Party-assigned schoolmasters who fought for and won the support of the villagers

The emphasis in primary school education in North China followed the national pattern of

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[30] Ibid., p. 237.

[31] Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 934, Hong Kong, American Consulate-General, Nov. 24, 1954.

872 Marxian theories to imbue the students with respect for labor and love for their country. Thus in a history course, the students were told that Confucius was not concerned with the "proletariat" and that he offered advice to the kings in order to perpetuate the feudalistic system.[32] The emphasis on political education in primary school was revealed in the persistent effort to "correct" the attitudes of the teachers. Recantations of these teachers continued to appear and as late as 1954, Huo Chan-hsiang, a teacher at the Chin hsien Primary School in Hopei Province, was still struggling to conform to the orthodox party line in education.[33] Schools were lauded when they succeeded in teaching the students to enjoy manual work, to help their parents at home, and to prepare for farm work upon graduation. Primary school teachers were also required to approach the parents of the students to persuade them that it was as noble and as desirable to have their children participate in productive labor upon graduation as to send them to schools of higher education.

B. Secondary Schools

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In 1950, the secondary schools in North China went through the initial stages of consolidation and reorganization according to the Communist policy for education. According to Communist reports, there were 250 schools with

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[32] People's Education, Jan. 1952, p. 52.
[33] Ibid., Jan. 1954, p. 8.

873 a total enrollment of 89, 584 in Hopei Province (excluding Peking but including Tientsin Municipality); and 84 schools with a total enrollment of 20, 584 students in Shansi Province.[34] Establishment of new schools brought the total number of secondary school students in Hopei Province to 214, 689 in 1954.[35] Of this number, 179,000 were students of general middle schools; 27,800 were in secondary schools for teacher training; and 7, 289 were technical students. These statistics indicate that, according to the Communists, a fourfold increase in secondary school students was realized in Hopei Province during the past eight years.

The aim of secondary education, according to the Government Administration Council, which reiterated the point on June 5, 1954, is to cultivate nationalism but not at the expense of "internationalism," to teach the students to love their fatherland, respect labor, and realize their duties and responsibilities to their fatherland.[36] To carry out this official line, a system of rotating indoctrination was inaugurated for the secondary school principals and other administrators, with the commissioners of education of each

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[34] Compendium of Government Reports, pp. 283, 313, and 328.

[35] Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 934, Nov. 24, 1954.

[36] Chou En-lai, "Directive on Improvement and Expansion of Secondary Education," People's Handbook 1955, pp. 571-73.

878 provincial government responsible for the supervision of indoctrination. In addition, the Ministry of Education of the Central Government periodically dispatched inspectors to observe the schools and educational agencies. The last inspection of Hopei schools was reported to have taken place in December 1954.[37] On these inspection tours, the Central Government inspectors did not restrain their observations to secondary schools, and their recommendations were usually referred back to the schools concerned for action.

Some important changes were made in the curricula for secondary schools. To the natural science courses was added a study of the Common Program, later replaced by the new Constitution of 1954 after its promulgation. During the past five years there have been times when a scheduled course was suspended at the last minute because the official textbook for the course was not ready.[38] Many textbooks were revised several times, but the result in 1954 was still not entirely satisfactory to the government. One government inspector remarked that "political education" was not integrated in the courses, and that in most of the classes a section dealing with political thought was merely appended to the course of study as a "tail."[39]

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[37] People's Education, January 1955, p. 11.

[38] Ibid., August 1954, pp. 63-64.

[39] Ibid., January 1955, p. 12.

C. Institutions of Higher Learning

In principle, the control of institutions of higher learning is centralized under the Ministry of Higher Education, except for the teacher's training program which falls under the Ministry of Education (see Chart 3). In practice, the Government Administration Council has instructed the various central government ministries in charge of different industries to "supervise and co-ordinate" the programs for advanced technical schools. These central government ministries in turn can appoint local government personnel to take charge of the schools in order to maintain close supervision. In this connection, local government, provincial for the most part, were given the responsibility of providing the schools with political guidance.[40] With this system of control, the political conversion of the universities and colleges has been carried out with very little delay. The administrative reorganization, however, ran into more difficulties because each of the well-established universities was an academic entity with a definite personality of its own. Some of the experiences on the universities in transition were presented by Fei Hsiao-t'ung, noted sociologist and senior professor at the Tsing Hua University, in his book, Revamping the Univer-

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[40] "Decisions Concerning the Revision of Relations of Leadership for Institutions of Higher Learning," announced by the Government Administration Council on Oct. 6, 1953. People's Handbook 1955, pp. 558-59.

873 sities.[41]

875 Among the more acute difficulties experienced during the conversion and reorganization of universities were:[42] (1) the "thought reform" of college professors, who were subject to public criticism by their students, and (2) the transfer of certain departments from one university to another, which disrupted the administration of both institutions. That the process of indoctrinating college professors did not stop even after 1953 was seen from a statement by Liu Lan-t'ao, Chairman of the North China Administrative Committee, on February 9, 1953. Liu called for continued efforts to raise the level of "political understanding" among the teachers.[43]

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41. Ta-hsüeh Ti Kai-tsao [Revamping the Universities], Shanghai, Shang-hai ch'u-pan kung-ssu, 1950.

42. Accounts of thought reform for college professors are presented (possibly with some exaggeration) in such works as Ts'ui Shu-ch'in, Ta-lu Hsüeh-jen Ti Pei-chü [Tragedy of Scholars on the Mainland], Taipei, Chung-yang wen-wu kung-ying she, 1953; and Kung-fei Ti Nu-i Wen-hua Yü Chiao-yü [The Slave Culture and Education of the Chinese Communists], Taipei, 6th Section, Central Reform Committee, Nationalist Party, 1952.

875 One interesting feature of college operation introduced by the Communists is the "office of teaching planning" and "committees on teaching planning." The purpose of these organizations is to help develop more effective instruction in college. In 1954, Peking University, one of the oldest and most renowned institutions of higher learning in China, had 56 such offices and eight committees.[44] Other institutions in North China also organized similar groups, usually with Russian experts participating.

873 In 1954-55, forty institutions of higher education were in operation in North China, with the majority located in Peking, Tientsin, or Taiyuan. Of these schools, 22 were technical, 7 were for teacher training, and 11 were offering general courses (See Table II). Many of these schools simultaneously conducted two- and three-year special courses. The establishment of short-term special courses is in accordance with the over-all government policy of preparing sufficient technical personnel to meet the needs of the national reconstruction program. There is no report on enrollment of these schools, but one Communist source revealed that in Hopei Province (excluding Peking and Tientsin municipalities), 3,508 college students were registered in 1954.[45]

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[44] *Jen-min Hua-pao* [*People's Pictorial*], June 1954; *Survey of China Mainland Press*, No. 924, Nov. 6-9, 1954, pp. 23-24.

[45] *Survey of China Mainland Press*, No. 934, Nov. 24, 1954.

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TABLE II. Institutions of Higher Learning in North China (1954) */

[P. 302 (4)]

NAME	LOCATION	NO. OF DEPTS	NO. OF SPECIAL COURSES	SPECIALIZATION
Chinese People's University	Peking	10	8	Pol. science
Peking University	Peking	13	1	Gen'l
Nan-k'ai University	Tientsin	8	none	Gen'l
Tsing Hua University	Peking	6	none	Engineering
Tientsin University	Tientsin	7	5	Engineering
Peking Geological College	Peking	1	none	Geology
Peking College of Petroleum Engrg.	Peking	4	none	Petroleum
Peking College of Iron & Steel Industries	Peking	3	none	Iron and Steel
Peking College of Aeronautics	Peking	1	none	Aeronautical Engineering
Peking Industrial College	Peking	1	none	(unknown)
Peking College of Mining	Peking	3	none	Mining
Tangshan College of Railway Engineering	Tangshan	2	1	Railway Engineering
Taiyuan Engineering College	Taiyuan	4	2	Engineering
Peking College of Railway Engrg.	Peking	2	none	Railwy. Engrg.
College of Cartography and Survey, Military Council	Peking	1	none	Cartography, survey

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[p. 302 (2)]

Peking Special School of Meteorology	Peking	none	1	Meteorology
Peking University of Agriculture	Peking	9	none	Agriculture
Peking College of Mechanized Agriculture	Peking	2	none	Agriculture, farm mngmt.
Peking College of Forestry	Peking	1	none	Forestry
Hopei College of Agriculture	Paoting	3	none	Forestry
Shansi College of Agriculture	Taiyuan	2	none	Agriculture
Central College of Foreign Trade	Peking	4	none	Foreign Trade
Peking College of Political Science and Law	Peking	1	none	Political science and law
Peking Medical College	Peking	4	none	Medicine
Tientsin Medical College	Tientsin	1	none	Medicine
Hopei Medical College	Paoting	1	none	Medicine
Shansi Medical College	Taiyuan	2	none	Medicine
Central College for Minority Nationalities	Peking	1	none	Languages of minorities
Institute of Foreign Languages	Peking	1	none	Western languages
Peking Russian Institute	Peking	none	1	Russian
Central College of Music	Tientsin	4	none	Music

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[p. 302(a)]

[continued]

TABLE II. Institutions of Higher Learning in North China (1954) */

NAME	LOCATION	NO. OF DEPTS.	NO. OF. SPECIAL COURSES	SPECIALIZATION
Central College of Dramatics	Peking	4	none	Drama
Central College of Fine Arts	Peking	2	none	Fine Arts
Central College of Physical Education	Peking	1	none	Physical Education
Hua-pei College of Physical Education	Tientsin	1	none	Physical Education
Peking University for Teacher Training	Peking	12	none	General
Tientsin Normal College	Tientsin	7	8	General
Hopei Normal College	Tientsin	10	6	General
Shansi Normal College	Taiyuan	5	6	General
Hopei Special School for Teacher Training	Peking	none	4	General

874 The existence of two leading institutions of sciences makes North China the most important region in China for advanced studies. One is the Central Academy of Sciences which, because it is devoted to advanced research and does not conduct regular classroom instruction, is not included in Table II. As successor to the former Academia Sinica and headed by Kuo Mo-jo, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, the academy has been greatly expanded. As compared with 1950, in 1955 the number of departments had increased 140 per cent and the personnel had increased 400 per cent.[46] A new six-story building was completed in January 1955 to house the academy.[47] Reporting the achievements of the academy on June 1, 1955, Kuo Mo-jo claimed that the institution was responsible for establishing evidences of American "germ warfare" in 1952 and for launching the literary purge against Hu Shih in 1954. The four divisions with 233 active research committee members cover virtually all branches of social and natural sciences. One of their primary tasks in the current Five-year Plan is to do research on atomic energy.[48]

The other leading institution is the Peking Medical College, otherwise known as the Chinese

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[46] K'o-hsüeh T'ung-pao [Science Bulletin], July 1955, pp. 3-14.

[47] Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 962, Jan. 6, 1955, pp. 25-26.

[48] Science Bulletin, July 1955, p. 5.

874 Union Medical College. It is reported to be the best equipped institution in the Far East for the study of medical science and has been greatly expanded since 1949. The hospital attached to the college was reported to have trebled its number of beds by the end of 1954.[49] (See chapter on Health and Sanitation in this handbook.)

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873 Problems were created by the "planned distribution" of college graduates and other students to the places where they would be needed. Throughout their years in schools the students were told that "to think of salary is mercenary and to dodge government assignment is political desertion."[50] From the beginning of 1950 to the end of 1952, the Central People's Government had assigned 74,000 graduates of institutions of higher learning to various parts of China, and another 34,000 were to be assigned during 1953. In August 1955, a report described how 900 students and workers from Tientsin were performing their government-assigned tasks in Sinkiang Province. Apparently the program of assigning students to work where they are needed continues in North China.

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[49] Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 951, December 17, 1954, pp. 29-30.

[50] Kao-teng Hsüeh-hsiao Pi-yeh-sheng Ti Kuang-jung Jen-wu [The Glorious Mission of College Graduates], Shanghai, Hua-tung jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1953, pp. 12-13.

D. The Teachers' Training Program

As shown in Chart 2, colleges and secondary schools for teacher training have equal standing with general schools on the same levels. The urgent need for trained teachers for schools on different levels was first announced in October 1950 by Ma Hsü-lun, then Minister of Education. Ma told the first All-China Conference on Primary Education and Teacher Training that, before 1957, according to the planned expansion of schools, China would need 1,000,000 new teachers. Of these, 200,000 would be for "spare-time" schools for peasants and workers, 130,000 for regular middle schools, 10,000 for colleges, and the remainder for kindergartens.[51] Measures adopted to expedite the training of teachers included the condensation of courses and the setting up of special short-term courses for training primary schools teachers selected for promotion to teach junior middle schools. Many primary school teachers who had left the profession were induced to return. To improve their qualifications, these teachers were encouraged to use their spare time to take refresher courses in evening and Sunday classes specially organized for them. In 1953, there were 1,280 such refresher courses throughout China. For teachers in outlying districts, correspondence courses were distributed and reference materials were brought

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51. The Slave Culture and Education of Chinese Communists, p. 23.

875 to them by mobile libraries. The Communists claim that 407 counties in China were serviced by mobile libraries in 1953. In the same year, the teachers in 220 counties formed correspondence clubs among themselves and exchanged their teaching experiences, thus helping to improve teaching techniques.[52]

Another measure adopted was the employment of some high school graduates, after a period of apprenticeship, to serve as teachers in the schools. These stopgap measures, however, were not enough to meet the shortage of teachers pointed out by Ma Hsü-lun in 1950. In 1954, Tung Ch'un-ts'ai, Vice-Minister of Education, again mentioned the possible shortage of 100,000 secondary school teachers in the next five years.[53] Nine months later, a report from the Ministry of Education stated that, according to plan, the expansion of secondary schools in 1954 would need about 28,000 additional teachers. Yet all the teachers' colleges in China would graduate only 9,600 students in 1954. The report predicted an acute shortage because of the 9,600 graduates, about 2,000 would be absorbed in the program of expansion for the teacher's colleges themselves, leaving only 7,600 new teachers available for other assignments.

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52. People's Education, January 1953, p. 23.
53. Ibid., January 1954, pp. 17-18.

875 Political training for future teachers is stressed in all the teachers' colleges. The curricula designed by the Ministry of Education specify that 33.8 per cent of the total credit hours for a teacher in training must be devoted to the "history of Communist revolution," Marxian and Leninist theories, psychology, the theory of education, the study of teaching methods, and physical education.[54]

In Peking where many of China's leading universities are concentrated, college teachers and professors seem to have a better opportunity for participation in active research. For example, the faculty of Peking University in the winter of 1954 organized some 300 research projects.[55] Such studies were expected to contribute to the qualifications of the teachers.

E. Schools for Peasants, Workers, Cadres and the Illiterate

874 To give political and technical training to peasants, workers, and other "cadres" is one of the basic principles of the Communists' theory of education. A broad program for this purpose was outlined at the All-China Conference on Education for Peasants and Workers by Ch'ien Chün-jui, Vice-Minister of Education, on

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[54] *Ibid.*, September 1954, pp. 9-10.

[55] *Survey of China Mainland Press*, No. 942, December 17, 1954, p. 20.

874 September 30, 1950.[56] He quoted Mao Tse-tung that, because the peasants and workers constitute over 80 per cent of China's population, they were the main force upon which would depend the transition of Chinese society from "New Democracy" to socialism. Ch'ien stressed the following points: (1) The most immediate task was to combat illiteracy. (2) The cadres among peasants and workers must be the first to be educated so that they would provide proper leadership for the masses. (3) This type of education must be fitted to local conditions which might vary from place to place.

No line of demarcation can be clearly drawn between the educational institutions for peasants and workers and those for Party and other government cadres. Altogether these schools form a part of the regular school system. As Ch'eng Fang-wu, former president of the College of the War of Resistance at Yenan, reported in July 1952,[57] the development of this type of education under the Communists could be traced back to Mao Tse-tung's Peasant Movement Institute in Hunan in the early days of the Chinese Communist movement. Later, when the Communists established a stronghold in southern Kiangsi Province, cadre schools were established to train political and military personnel. These institutions were succeeded by the College of War of

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[56] People's Education, May 1951, pp. 12-16.

[57] Ibid., July 1952, p. 6.

874 Resistance and by the Northern Shensi Institute in Yenan in the 1930's and early 1940's. As the Communist Army occupied North China after World War II, the North China University and the North China People's Revolutionary University were established for cadre-training. After 1949, the Chinese People's University emerged in Peking, with 30 per cent of its courses devoted to political education and 70 per cent to the specific fields in which the students were specializing.

In 1950, a Communist survey asserted that about 765,000 workers and over 25,000,000 peasants were enrolled in night schools, "winter schools," and other classes during their spare-time.[58] In the same year, over 60,000 peasants and workers were reported as having registered in such schools in Peking and its vicinities.[59] By the beginning of 1953, Communist officials claimed that over 2,300,000 peasants and workers in North China had received "education" in this program.[60] Of these students, many were illiterate and were given the beginner's reading lessons. In the Army, similar classes were organized. Many soldiers were said to have learned reading by participating in the "accelerated course" invented by Ch'i Chien-hua, a cultural cadre attached to the army.

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[58] Ibid., January 1953, p. 16.

[59] Compendium of Government Reports, p. 236.

[60] Tientsin Daily, March 15, 1953, p. 1.

874 In the proletarian (peasants and workers) accelerated secondary schools (See Chart 2), a formal curriculum is pursued. The courses taught there are similar to those in regular secondary schools except that emphasis is placed on technical subjects and anything without direct bearing on farm or factory work is simplified in order to shorten the time of study. In classes irregularly conducted during the spare-time of the peasants and workers, political study consists of lectures and discussions, using as topics whatever happens to coincide with the most recent official Party propaganda line. For political cadres, regardless of their own professions, study of Marxian and other Communist theories is required. The Central Committee of the Communist Party periodically issues directives listing for study the works of Marx, Lenin, and Mao Tse-tung. Chiefs of local Party branches are charged with the responsibility of supervising these studies at weekly meetings.[61]

Classes to teach beginners to read the Chinese written language are held separately; once the students have graduated from these classes they are given the opportunity to advance to higher levels of learning. An attempt is made to raise the academic level of cadres among peasants and workers to that of graduates of

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61. A sample list of materials to be studied is found in People's Handbook 1955, pp. 535-36.

874 regular schools. In a directive issued by the Communist Party on December 24, 1953[62] it was stated that those who pursued spare-time study at least six hours a week for forty weeks a year, covering the essential courses prescribed for the primary school level by educational authorities, were entitled to enroll in a junior secondary school. Three years of similar spare-time study covering junior secondary school courses would enable students to enroll in senior secondary school. In this way, any person can eventually complete his education by attending night colleges.

Another development in education for peasants and workers is the Communist claim that the percentage of students with a peasant- or worker-family background has risen sharply in the total enrollment figures. By 1955, these figures were 21.94 per cent for institutions of higher learning, 60 per cent for middle schools, and 76 per cent for primary schools.[63] In Tientsin, in April 1955, one-third of the students were from "proletarian" families.[64] However, the Communists also admitted that the schools had not been paying sufficient attention to the children of the proletariat, who felt that they were discriminated against, and that the cost of education often hindered the furtherance of their education.

Official concern was expressed by the Communists over the lack of preparation on the

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[62] Ibid., p. 538.

[63] Communist Education in the Past Five Years, p. 3.

[64] Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1031, April 20, 1955, p. 39.

874 part of some of the cadres enrolled in higher level cadre schools.[65] To remedy this situation, educational authorities are now trying to strengthen the spare-time classes by giving refresher courses to those students who are deficient.

F. Education for Minority Nationalities

871 563 With the slogan, "All the ethnic groups in China are brothers in a big family," the Communists have been encouraging the establishment of a program to provide educational opportunities for minority nationalities. Regular schools are encouraged to enroll members of minority nationalities, and special schools have been established. for minority groups. Communist statistics asserted that in 1951 there were 9,103 special primary schools (with 943,285 students) and 117 secondary schools (with 45,628 students) throughout China. These figures, it was claimed, increased in 1952 to 10,668 (1,474,244 students) for primary schools, and 182 (90,000 students) for secondary schools.[66] At the end of 1953, the Communists claimed that over 4,000,000 members of minority groups were attending school.[67] This would mean that one-eighth of the total number of minority nationals were attending school.

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[65] People's Education, August 1953, pp. 31-32.

[66] Ibid., March 1954, pp. 40-42.

[67] Ibid., October 1954, p. 35.

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In North China, there is no concentration of minority nationals to warrant establishment of educational institutions exclusively for such peoples. However, the Central College of Minority Nationalities is specializing in languages and cultures of the minority nationalities; Peking University also has a special department for training of minority medical students.

As a matter of policy, the appropriate language of each minority group is to be used in schools where the use of Chinese would tend to make teaching more difficult. (For the language policy of the Communists, see chapter on Language.)

V. SOME OBSERVATIONS

A. The Character of Communist Education

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Two significant characteristics of the Communist educational system are the degree of specialization found in schools and the centralization of control over the content of the subjects taught. The measures so far adopted by the Communists in reorganizing the schools, with emphasis on the development of technical institutions, are measures of expediency in view of the urgency of economic reconstruction as outlined in the first Five-year Plan. The centralization of control begins with the indoctrination of the teachers and rigid supervision of publication of textbooks. Every teacher is told what to say and how to say it. To be sure, the Communists have

871 yet to achieve in education complete conformity with the Party line, but all possible efforts are made to guard against deviation.

B. Ideological Orientation and Its Effect on the People

The ideological orientation of the Communist educational system can be readily seen from the basic policies and the major movements instituted in Chinese education during the past five years. Through "education" the Communists expect to teach the Chinese people to hate "American imperialism" and to respect the Soviet Union as "the leader in the revolutionary bloc of nations." The social sciences taught in schools are oriented on the basis of Russian socialism "because China must learn from the Russian revolutionary experiences." In technical courses Russian technique is singled out as an "advanced model" to be copied. This is particularly observable in institutions of higher learning in North China. Hostility toward all non-Communist traditions and ideals is stressed throughout the country. Any person, Chinese or foreign, who is not sympathetic toward Communism is assumed to be either an actual or a potential enemy, and is to be treated as such.

There is a lack of subtlety in the Chinese Communists' attempt to reconcile their theory of patriotism with their pro-Russian propaganda line. When they directed the teachers to abandon the use of English except in foreign language

871 classes, they defended their position by saying that Russian would be taught in certain schools in order to expedite the process of translating certain Russian works in China but that even this practice would be terminated as soon as the goal was attained.[68] However, they failed to specify the time when such practices would cease. Since learning a foreign language is no easy matter, the substitution of Russian for English has been a controversial point and may remain an unresolved issue of the Communist ideological orientation in education.

C. Noted Inadequacies

Lack of teachers, as has been noted, will continue to hamper the development of education and the improvement of the standard of the schools. Lack of educational equipment can only be partially solved by improvisations; the attempt to teach two classes in a single room at Peking Municipal Middle School was found to be unsatisfactory.[69] Lack of financial support for students will make it necessary for them to become preoccupied with their own livelihood when they are studying. Above all, the lack of well-trained educational administrators will be the greatest obstacle to the Communists' efforts to achieve progress.

Despite government efforts to run the schools according to a centralized plan, the lack

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68. People's Education, Feb. 1952, p. 7.
69. Ibid., Sept. 1952, p. 22.

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of coordination leads to the "piracy of teachers and students." Government agencies in need of technical personnel often call away teachers and students without notifying the school authorities. Although such practices seem to be less prevalent in North China than in other regions, the situation was widespread and serious enough in 1951 for the Government Administration Council in Peking to issue an order banning such practices.[70] In North China, as compared with other regions, there have been fewer reports on interruption of school administration and the students' study on account of extracurricular activities required by local governments.

Until adequate, officially approved textbooks become available, the Communists have to resort to the translating of Russian works in order to meet temporary needs. By June 1954, Peking University alone had translated 29 Russian textbooks for use by its natural science department.[71] Since such translated works have not been properly adapted for use by Chinese students, it is doubtful if they will help to improve the educational system of Communist China.

The government's effort to place college graduates wherever they are needed is undoubtedly required by the Communist plan for economic reconstruction. But even if the graduates are all thoroughly indoctrinated in Communism,

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70. Ibid., August 1951, p. 8.
71. People's Pictorial, June 1954.

871 there is still no reassurance that dissatisfaction will not grow among those who have been denied a free choice of jobs.

In summary, it should be noted that although the Communists have launched a thorough reorganization of the Chinese educational system, their efforts are far from complete. The attitudes of so many people involved in the system of education cannot be quickly changed; hence the renewed effort on the part of the government to root out "bourgeois" and anti-Communist thought among teachers and students. The expediency of "accelerated schooling" apparently has had a detrimental effort upon the graduates. According to a Communist report, some students in primary schools spent more than four years in the same grade; in some middle schools about 17 per cent of the students failed; in 1954, 73 per cen of the applicants for engineering department failed in mathematics in the college entrance examination.[72] There is no information available on how the college graduates fared; but it seems unlikely that their efforts were any more successful.

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[72] People's Education, Jan. 1955, p. 5.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 1k,
Sociological Background

RELIGION

I. INTRODUCTION

771/ 178 Religious organization and activity in China has always been strictly limited by what the state felt to be desirable. Public and private morality were not based on any religion but on a combination of philosophic principles (Confucianism) and secular mores. (On this principle, Confucianism is treated in the chapters on Social Values and Patterns of Living.) Governmental authority judged whether a certain religion was conducive to morality and the welfare of the state and then allowed the religion and its adherents a carefully defined range and sphere of activity. Anything beyond that range was regarded as subversive of public welfare and morality, and the religion was curbed or suppressed. As a consequence China has not had, until very recently, any "churches," that is well-organized, centrally disciplined organizations of believers capable of decisively influencing public morality or state policy.

With the slow collapse of the traditional order the effectiveness of government control of religion diminished. The Western powers, as they gained more and more rights and concessions from a weakening China, demanded and

771/178 got "rights" of religious and missionary activity which no strong Chinese government would ever have granted. But the rise of nationalist sentiment brought with it hatred of foreigners and of their religions -- hatred that exploded repeatedly in anti-foreign,anti-Christian riots.[1]

Meanwhile another trend was visible. Religious groups and a number of outstanding political leaders began to feel that China could not become truly modern and Western unless it was reformed from the moral base upward; religion accounted for the power and success of Western nations. Would not a religion -- a religionized Confucianism, a revitalized Buddhism, or even Christianity -- bring about that basic transformation that China clearly needed?

This view was rejected by two overlapping groups which had decisive power in state and society after 1925. The first were the intellectual leaders, increasingly committed to some form of materialistic philosophy -- a philosophy which held all religion to be parasitic, corrosive and "non-progressive."[2] The second group was the Kuomintang elite, many of whom derived their anti-religious views from the intellectual leadership. For others in the Kuomintang elite the

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[1] Tatsuro and Sumiko Yamamoto, "The Anti-Christian Movement in China," Far Eastern Quarterly, Feb. 1953, pp. 133-47.

[2] O. Brière, "Les courants philosophiques en Chine depuis 50 ans," Bulletin de l'université de l'Aurore, No. 40, 1947, pp. 561-654.

771 178 older Confucian view of religions, reinforced by nationalist feeling, reasserted itself; consciously or unconsciously they reverted to the view that no strong self-respecting government should tolerate independent religious bodies that challenged the government's right to control all aspects of public and private life.

Religions in the twentieth century were caught in this crossfire of negative sentiment and attack. To modernize and to become militant was to provoke state suppression, and the effort of religious leaders to stem the rising tide of intellectual materialism failed.[3] In the countryside the old folk religions -- varieties of Buddhism and Taoism -- continued to wither away. Christianity made some advances, but it was always tainted by its foreignness, by the fact that its missionaries came with the backing of Western powers which held China in thrall.

771 798 Communist policy towards religion is in many ways the culmination of the trends we have described. It reflects the trimph of materialist philosophy and the imposition of materialism as the intellectual orthodoxy. It is highly nationalistic and anti-foreign and thus insists that all religious organizations cease receiving support from abroad and assert their distinctive Chinese character. It carries forward, through the most effective apparatus of control and coercion that China has seen, the confiscation of church propert

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[3] O. Brière, *op. cit.*, passim.

771 798 and the secularization of the clergy. The Communist Constitution provides that "Citizens of the People's Republic of China have freedom of religious belief."[4] This means, in practice, that people of various religious persuasions are allowed a limited and shrinking area of belief and action by an authoritarian government which reserves the fundamental right to control all education, communication, and public and private morality. On the grounds of anti-superstition, anti-imperialism, and anti-feudalism, the government and Party move steadily, with only occasional tactical retreats, towards the liquidation of religion in China.

Both pre-Communist trends and Communist policies should be kept in mind as we consider religion in the North China Region.

II. BUDDHISM

779 798 This oldest of imported religions shows, in its recent development, some of the trends just noted. Despite the efforts of the noted abbot T'ai Hsü (1889-1946), Buddhism never competed successfully for the allegiance of the intellectuals. The effort to transform it into a modern religion, by updating both its doctrine and its social program, failed, although for a time it seemed to show signs of an increasing vitality. Under warlord and nationalist governments its personnel and establishments suffered servere attrition.

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[4] Article 88, Ch. III.

779 798 Its establishments were taxed, its temples were converted to secular use by warlords, Kuomintang officials, and the local gentry. Much Buddhist property was confiscated, and tenants on Buddhist land refused to pay their rent. Monks and nuns were driven from their temples in the cities where up to 80 per cent of Buddhist establishments were converted to use as schools barracks, and police stations.[5]

The Japanese attempt to use Buddhism as an ideology to bind together their puppet regimes in China and Southeast Asia generated widespread anti-Buddhist sentiment throughout Free and Occupied China.

The older clergy of monks and nuns was accused of being corrupt and parasitic by modern Buddhists, but efforts at sweeping fundamental reform failed; the motivation for becoming a member of such a clergy remained

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[5] Cf. Wing-tsit Chan, Religious Trends in Modern China, New York, 1953, pp. 55-56. This summary is from Ṭa-hsing, "Fifteen Years of Religious Catastrophes in Retrospect," Hai-ch'ao-yin Magazine, Vol. XVI, No. 1, Jan. 1935.

779 largely negative.[6] Thus gradual extinction of
798 the Buddhist order seemed only a matter of time.
But as late as 1930, the Buddhist clergy and establishments in the North China Region were still numerous.[7]

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[6] Chan, Religious Trends in Modern China, pp. 81-82, citing Reichelt, Truth and Tradition in Chinese Buddhism, pp. 231-34, lists reasons given by Chinese nuns for entering holy orders. Unhappy marriages account for a great number, and 60 to70 per cent made the choice because no other solution presented itself. Other reasons for entering holy orders include: genuine and deep faith; presented to the church by parents because of devotion, sickness, lack of support, or an astrologer's advice; sense of helplessness after husband's death; poverty, family troubles or other disappointments; influence of sisters, et al, who had become nuns; and servants seeking escape from the cruelty of their mistresses.

[7] Shen-pao Nien-chien [Shen-pao Yearbook], 1933, p. T2.

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Provinces and major cities	Buddhist Clergy	Temples, Monasteries, Nunneries
Hopei	2,100	1,170
Shansi	16,640	5,042
Peking	1,490	810

It has not been possible to trace the decline from 1930 onward, but the pressures of war and invasion added to those noted above probably contributed to a sharp reduction of both clergy and establishments in this area. Communist measures have probably eliminated most of what remained. Buddhist establishments in China as a whole appear to have declined in number from 268,494 in 1930,[8] to about 130,000 in 1947[9] to less than 100 in 1954.[10] Estimates[11] on the total number of clergy vary, but in 1931 they appear to have numbered 500,000 to 600,000.

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8. Ibid. Basis of figures is data collected by the China Buddhist Association.

9. Communist Atrocities and Persecutions of Buddhism on the China Mainland, (a four-page pamphlet), Buddhist Assciation of China, Taiwan, 1954; herinafter cited as Atrocities.

10. Ibid.

11. Chan, op. cit., pp. 80-81.

779 Refugees in 1949-50 reported that four out of
798 every seven clerics had been forced to return to lay life.[12] By 1954, it has been estimated, there were only 2,500 clergy remaining in the whole of China, "of which half are Chinese Communist Party agents."[13] Even allowing for exaggeration, it would appear that the Buddhist clergy as a group has been nearly eliminated and that its influence in society has reached the vanishing point.

779 While the traditional clergy was in decline, Buddhist laymen assisted by a few monks attempted the reinvigoration of the Chinese Buddhist community. The leadership of this movement was largely from the East China Region. Modern-minded Buddhists felt that a lesson could be learned from Protestantism in the West: that an entrenched clergy could not be the instrument of sweeping reform. Hence their efforts were concentrated on building lay organizations of various kinds: social welfare organizations such as the Red Swastika Society (modeled on the Red Cross), YMBA and YWBA patterned on the YMCA and YWCA, Buddhist schools and seminaries to train a modern clergy, and research centers for the re-evaluation of the Buddhist heritage. They attempted to reach out and join hands with Buddhists in other Asiatic countries, and good-will tours and conferences were organized. Buddhist writing

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[12] Ibid., op. cit., pp. 90-91.

[13] Artocities.

779 and publishing were encouraged.[14]

The Chinese Buddhist Association, founded in 1914 to oppose the effort to make Confucianism a state religon, continued as the main organization of Chinese Buddhists. It claimed 4,620,000 members in 1947, but its organization was loose and weak; it included heterogeneous components: Buddhist philosophers, simple believers, reformist clergy and many of the old clergy, nationalists, internationalists, and Japan-oriented pan-Asians. The great abbot T'ai Hsü, master monk-politician, tried to weld these elements into a strong, effective, and enduring organization which could formulate an attractive long-range program and defend Buddhism against attack. But he ultimately failed, and the Buddhists of China had not the means to defend themselves against Kuomintang pressure. When the Communists came, the Buddhists had a stronger adversary and neither the means nor the spirit to resist. The following is a breakdown, by provinces, of the number of Buddhist believers claimed in 1930 by the China Buddhist Association. The second column gives the number of modern type Buddhist organizations such as schools, translation and publication societies, missionary societies, etc.[15]

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[15] *Shen-pao Yearbook*, 1933, p. T2.

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Province	Lay Adherents	Modern Organizations
Hopei	12,120	28
Shansi	6,160	1

As these figures indicate, Buddhism in North China was far weaker than it was in the provinces of the Yangtze valley and further south.

779 668 Such Buddhist schools and institutes as had survived until 1949 have been taken over by the Communists. Buddhist periodicals have been stopped, publishing houses closed. Two Communist-sponsored Buddhist magazines have appeared, one in Peking, one in Shanghai; they are devoted to reconciling Buddhism and Marxism.[16] A new Chinese Buddhist Association was formed in Peking in November 1952, with several leading Buddhist scholars among its leaders.[17] Unlike the earlier Buddhist Association, which was organized by Buddhists

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16. Atrocities. According to this report the circulation of Communist-sponsored Buddhist magazines is very limited.

17. According to Buddhism in China, Peking, Nationalities Publishing House, 1955, p. 2, the effective date of organization was June 1953, when 93 persons representing "the monks, nuns, laymen and laywomen of different nationalities and Buddhist schools of the various regions" were elected to serve as its board of directors.

to reform and defend their faith, the new body is sponsored, organized, and manipulated by the state and the Party. In China's relations with the Buddhist countries of Asia, the association will be used as a propaganda device to allay fear that China is an enemy of Buddhism; it will also be used to "soothe" and control Buddhist populations in Mongolia and Tibet.[18] Domestically, the new association, like all others in Communist China, will be used primarily for the indoctrination and control of its members. As early as May 1951, a central committeeman of the Party outlined the chief tasks for Chinese Buddhists: (1) participation in land reform, (2) opposition to counterrevolutionaries, (3) participation in the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Movement, and (4) recognition of the duty to construct a new religion in the new society.[19]

In the principal cities, especially those visited by delegations from Buddhist countries like Burma and Ceylon, a few temples are maintained for religious use. But the greatest number of temples have been converted for use

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[18] The Dalai Lama, the Panchen Ngoerhtehni, the Chagan Kogen of Inner Mongolia, and the Venerable Hsü Yün have been chosen as honorary presidents of the Buddhist Association. Cf. Buddhism in China, Foreword. The same volume shows the effort of the Communists to make Peking again a center of Lamaistic Buddhism which prevails in Tibet and Mongolia.

[19] Richard Walker, China Under Communism, New Haven, 1955, pp. 188-89.

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by the state. One source,[20] admittedly strongly biased, asserts that the number of Peking temples in religious use has fallen from 1,300 to 3, that in Nanking the number has decreased from 400 to 1, in Shanghai from 600 to 2, and in Hangchow from 300 to 1. Certain Buddhist monuments of historical and cultural importance are being restored and preserved.[21]

As we have pointed out, the clergy has been largely secularized. In Shanghai, as in other cities, monks have opened restaurants specializing in Buddhist dishes. Everywhere the clergy has converted temples into small factories in order to produce hand-made articles. Monks of the Fa,tsang temple in Shanghai now work on nearby farms, in Hangchow, some 1,800 monks and nuns have opened restaurants or are working in mills and on farms; they have established an association in order to co-ordinate their enterprises.[22]

There are occasional reports of Buddhist ceremonies, such as the celebration of the

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[20] Atrocities.

[21] Buddhism in China, introduction and plates.

[22] Chan, op. cit., pp. 90-91. Based on testimony of refugees, 1950.

779 Buddha's birthday.[23] But the general impres-
668 sion is that Buddhism is dying out. The old may cling to their beliefs, but their influence on their children is now slight. Buddhist belief is a handicap to youth who must adopt Marxist orthodoxy in order to succeed under the present regime. The cadres in the countryside are attacking "superstition," and their ridicule of old Buddhist-linked observances is further undermining the faith. The clergy, never up to their task of serving a modern religious community, has turned to other pursuits. There is little in Buddhist doctrine to steel the believer to resist totalitarianism or the trend of the times. The willingness of some Buddhist leaders to openly embrace Communist doctrine has probably undermined what little will to resist there may have been.[24]

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[23] New China News Agency, Peking, May 29, 1955; Survey of China Mainland Press, 1058, p. 48; also photograph of the ceremony of "Bathing the Buddha" on May 20, 1953, in Buddhism in China.

[24] The outstanding example is Chü Tsan, a modern-minded reformist monk with an excellent background in philosophy, religious, and social work, the latter particularly in Hunan. He was one of two Buddhist delegates (out of 585) to the People's Political Consultative Conference. Chan, op. cit., p. 92, records Chü Tsan's willingness as of 1948 to support a Communist regime. Cf. Chü Tsan's article, "A Buddhist Monk's Life," in China Reconstructs, Jan.-Feb. 1954, pp. 42-44.

III. TAOISM

779 771 Some of the tendencies noted in the modern history of Chinese Buddhism are also to be found in Taoism. But the differences are many, and they spring from fundamental differences between the two religions.

It is convenient for our purposes to consider two levels of Taoism. One is Taoism as an organized religion; the other is Taoism as a folk religion at the village level.[25] The Taoist religion developed as a reaction to the challenge of the imported faith of Buddhism. It borrowed extensively from its alien rival; its scripture, its clerical hierarchy and organization, its rituals, its heavens and hells were often scarcely disguised copies of those of Buddhism. Its decline over the last five-hundred years has been slow but steady; in recent years its decline has accelerated. Some aspects of this should be noted. Intellectual vitality has long since disappeared, and there was little doctrine on which to base a modern revival of the religion. The priesthood, divided between northern and southern sects, was largely locally recruited; there was no central control exercised by the hereditary "Heavenly Teachers" (T'ien-shih) of the two sects, and the monks gained the reputation

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[25] The residue of philosophic Taoism is dealt with in the chapter on Basic Attitudes in this handbook.

771 779 of being idle and corrupt. If their way of life was hardly inspiring, their practical function no longer involved spiritual leadership but only astrological and magical performances for those of the population who might still believe in them.[26] The last "Heavenly Teacher" of the Southern School was driven from his headquarters in Kiangsi by the Communists in 1927; in 1949 he was again a refugee in Macao and had "decided that it was time for him to buy some books to read."[27] The last abbot of the headquarters of the Northern School, the Po-yün-kuan at Peking, was burned alive by his fellow monks in 1947 when his corruption became too flagrant. The Nationalist Government then confiscated the lands which had long supported the Po-yün-kuan.

779 771 668 Religious Taoism has not had the inspiration or the leadership to develop modern doctrines and programs as Buddhism and Islam have done. There was an abortive effort at a national Taoist association in the years 1912-15,[28] but this was not accompanied by any rallying of believers, nor was it followed by the development of any social, educational, or medical program. Taoist temples have been steadily secularized, and the Communists will complete this process. The Communists themselves recognize that "religious

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[26] Chan, op. cit., pp. 146-52.

[27] Ibid., p. 152.

[28] Shina mondai jiten, [Encyclopedia of China Problems], Tokyo, 1942, pp. 416-17.

779 Taoism" is dead. In 1949, when bidding for the
771 support of religious groups, they invited repre-
668 sentatives of Buddhism, Protestantism, and
Islam to the People's Political Consultative
Conference but no representative of Taoism.[29]

779 Folk Taoism in the present study includes
771 all of the local cults and practices that have,
for millenia, been characteristic of the villages of China. Organized Taoism in many respects simply magnified and encompassed a wide variety of folk cults, giving this amalgam some of the trappings of an organized "religion." Folk Taoism, like organized Taoism, has been in a long slow decline. The gods of its pantheon have been increasingly neglected; the shrines and temples in the towns and villages have fallen into neglect. The arrival of modern school teachers, the appearance, even occasional, of effective modern doctors has steadily undermined belief in the efficacy of magic, alchemy, and charms. The City God, tutelary deity of an urban center, is no longer enshrined and worshiped; in many villages the god of grain no longer has his altar.[30] One sample survey[31] showed that in the early 1930's, 58 per cent of the folk shrines were no longer being used for

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[29] Chan, op. cit., p. 146.

[30] Cf. Chan, op. cit., p. 145, for an excellent summary of their development.

[31] C.S. Braden, Modern Tendencies in World Religions, New York, 1933, p. 113, as cited in Chan, op. cit., p. 145.

779 771 their original purpose; the decline in the last twenty-five years has been accelerated.

779 771 668 In the case of folk Taoism, the Communists have moved to bring to an end a complex of ancient practices that had long been dying out. Their method has been a campaign against superstition, a campaign carried out with all of the many devices of propaganda and pressure which are described elsewhere in this volume. It may be sufficient here to point out a few typical methods of attack on folk religion. In a rhymed[32] indoctrination text for women we find exhortations to stay away from local witch doctors and, when ill, to consult a physician. And they are warned not to believe in prayer to the images of some divinity, "for these are only of mud and lacquer." At all levels of education and in the annual cycles of "campaigns," such as the Patriotic Health Drive, and the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Movement, reference is made to the false and debilitating character of the old beliefs, which are held to be "feudal," unscientific," "reactionary," etc. It is doubtful that the remnants of folk religion -- in recent years the resort only of the aged and the ignorant -- will long survive the campaigns being waged against them.

779 771 575 Another Taoist-linked institution is the secret society. These organizations have

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668 [32] Fu-nü San-tzu Ching [The Three-Character Classic for Women], Shanghai, Hsinhua, 1950, passim.

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traditionally drawn their rituals, liturgies, doctrines, and patron deities from religious and folk Taoism. They have had a variety of social and political functions: they provide, expecially in times of disorder, a closely knit confraternity from which the member can draw help and security. They offer a focus of social and religious life particularly appealing to those who travel beyond the limits of their local kinship groups. Throughout the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1911), many secret societies had a strong political function as a focus of anti-dynastic and anti-official sentiment and activity; they made a notable contribution to the victory of the republicans in 1911. Yet Sun Yat-sen found them unmanageable political allies, and by 1930 Chiang Kai-shek -- despite whatever support he may have derived from them in his seizure of power in 1927 -- began to campaign against them.[33] This was interrupted by his campaigns against the Communists and his preparations to resist the Japanese.

The Communist regime obviously will not tolerate any such closed, self-supporting, potentially subversive groups, and a series of campaigns has been carried out against them. At the end of a major drive in 1953, P'eng Chen reported that "four million duped members had withdrawn from these reactionary sects and societies

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[33] Cf. B. Favre, Les sociétés secrètes en Chine, Paris, 1933, p. 177.

779 and that the battle was essentially won."[34] That
575 his claims of victory were premature is sug-
668 gested by a recent report of the dissolution of
771 five secret society organizations in the vicinity
of Kalgan. The report accused the societies of elaborate clandestine organizations, hidden headquarters, an elaborate hierarchy of leadership, and efforts to inflitrate Communist organizations.[35] (The societies' power of resistance is discussed in the chapter on Subversive Potentialities.)

Secret soc ieties have been particularly numerous in North China.

The Pai-lien Chiao (White Lotus Society) has a long history. It was founded some seven hundred years ago and was then a focus of Chinese resistance to the Mongol invaders. In 1794, 1801, and 1813 its members rebelled against the Manchu dynasty. The society's areas of strength in modern times have been the provinces of Honan, Shantung, and Hopei. It has many branches, some of which will be considered separately below.[36]

The Hung-ch'iang Hui (Society of Redspears), an offshoot of the White Lotus Society, fought bandits, government troops, and warlord armies between 1916 and 1924. It was strong in Shansi,

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[34] NCNA dispatch of Sept. 18, 1953, quoted in Walker, China Under Communism, p. 189.

[35] NCNA, June 16, 1955; SCMP, 1078, June 28, 1955, pp. 27-28.

[36] Chan, op. cit., p. 158.

779 575 668 771 Hopei, Shantung, Honan, and Anhwei, but its center of strength has since shifted to the south and southwest.[37]

The Tsai-li Hui (Principle Abiding Society) is often regarded as a branch of the White Lotus Society. Despite frequent persecution, it has remained strong, particularly in Hopei, Shantung, and Honan. Its public halls were to be found all over the north, especially in Tientsin and Peking. It attracted artisans and laborers, some farmers and merchants, and a small number of intellectuals.[38]

The Ko-lao Hui (Society of Elders) is somewhat more religious than other societies and has a history of resistance to government controls. Founded in Fukien, it has had important strength in Central and West China and in the North. It is "the most extensive, well-organized, and influential of China's secret societies."[39]

The I-kuan Tao (Way of Pervading Unity) was founded soon after the revolution of 1911, but it grew most rapidly after 1928. It gained strength and extended its activities throughout North China during the period of Japanese occupation.[40] Its central office was probably

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[37] Ibid., p. 159.

[38] Ibid., pp. 156-57.

[39] Ibid., pp. 160,-61.

[40] Ibid., pp. 166-67. Willem Grootaers, "Une société secrète moderne, I-koan Tao, bibliographie annotée," Folklore Studies, Vol. V, 1946, pp. 316-52.

779 in Shantung, but its center of publication was in
575 Tientsin. The society was under severe pressure
668 from the Nationalist Government, which seized
two of its local headquarters and dispersed its
771 members.[41] Nevertheless, it has survived. A
Communist release on June 16, 1955, indicated
that the society is still a disciplined and resourceful organization, at least in the Kalgan region.[42]

IV. MOHAMMEDANISM

779 This religion was introduced into China, not by missionaries but by immigrants arriving overland from the west and northwest and by sea to Canton; they have since spread until there are some in every province, although the highest concentration is in the northwest and southwest. Since their ancestors were immigrants, the Mohammedans have been treated by Chinese governments as *both* an ethnic minority and a religious group. (Hence, see the chapter on Ethnic Minorities.) Adherents have tended to live in separate communities, their mores and customs governed by religious law rather than by the laws and customs of China. Not only did Islam prescribe for the believer a different way of life from that of the Chinese, it also had international connections and a tradition of militancy. These aspects of Modammedanism made their communities in China the object of government distrust, and governments in modern times have

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[41] Grootaers, *op. cit.*, pp. 316, 351.

[42] *SCMP*, 1078, June 28, 1955, pp. 27-28.

779 alternated between policies of suppression and of appeasement.

The Chinese Mohammedan is set apart from other Chinese by such special customs and observances as these: many greetings are exchanged in Arabic or Persian; believers wear white headdresses resembling turbans; they abstain from alcohol and pork; marriage and funeral rites are different from the Chinese, e.g., they do not use coffins in burial. Traditionally, they seldom engage in farming but rather in certain occupations which in some areas they virtually monopolize: keeping inns and organizing caravans, butchering, leather working, metal-work, or managing shops which deal in curios and jewelry. Because of oppression and a strong sense of religious community, they tend to live in special districts or streets. They have been more inclined towards athletics and military careers than the Chinese.[43]

The Moslem sector of a city or the Moslem village community centers on its mosque presided over by its Imam, usually elected from among senior leaders; the Imam and the elders invite an Ahung who preaches, settles disputes, interprets Islamic law, and presides at ceremonies.[44] The Ahung is usually versed in Ara-

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[43] Chan, *op. cit.*, p. 6; *Encyclopedia of China Problems*, pp. 421-22.

[44] Chan, *op. cit.*, p. 189; *Encyclopedia of China Problems*, pp. 421-22.

779 bic, although until very recently few had any direct contact with major centers of Islam in the Near East.

In the North China Region, Mohammedan communities are found in all provinces. But the major centers, now recognized by the Communists as "autonomous areas," lie in the southwest, the northwest, and in Central Asia. The following table[45] of believers and religious establishments (probably mosques) gives some indication of their distribution in the two provinces of this region, as of 1938. However, the source of these figures gives the total number of Moslems in China as more than 48,000,000, a figure that some scholars think is far too high.[46]

Province	Mosques	Adherents
Hopei	2,949	3,379,410
Shansi	1,931	1,589,570

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45. Chung-hua Nien-chien [Chinese Yearbook], 1948, pp. 126-27.

46. Cf. the admirable summary of the statistical argument in Chan, op. cit., pp. 187-88. Chan, p. 188, note 12, cites the leading Chinese Mohammedan scholar Pai Shou-i's estimate of between 30 and 40 million Moslems in China. The picture publication Chinese Moslems, Peking, the Foreign Language Press, 1955, gives the figure 10 million.

779 Islam in modern times has manifested some of the tendencies which Buddhism showed under the impact of various modernizing forces. One of these was the tendency for lay leaders to rise in influence over the Ahung. Another was the foundation of a Chinese Islamic Association in 1912 to represent the interests of all Chinese Moslems, to work for social reform, and to foster closer relations between Moslems and non-Moslems. It claimed 3,000 branches by 1923. Its successors participated in the resistance against Japan, sponsored students abroad and the importation of modern scholars of the Koran from other countries, and developed young men's associations and medical services.[47] The total effect of this activity was to foster a trend to liberality and modernity. It served also to identify the Chinese Moslems with the national aspirations of other Chinese.

As the Chinese Moslems came out of isolation and into contact with the rest of Islam and with modern culture generally, there was a considerable difference of view as to the perpetuation of Islam in China. Visits to Mecca in the 1780's had impressed some Chinese Moslems with how far, in their long isolation, they had diverged from orthodox practices. This experience led to the foundation of the New Sect, which stressed return to pure and orthodox

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[47] Chan, op. cit., pp. 190-91.

779 Islamic practices. They were resisted by the Old Sect, which favored holding to the customary ways developed in China through the centuries. A new New Sect (Tsan-hsin chiao) was founded by Ma Fu-ch'u (1794-1874), and this sect, emphasizing religious ethics, the spirit rather than the letter of scripture, and modernism in dress, has recently been strong along the coast of China and has spread to modern cultural centers.[48]

Chinese Mohammedans in the course of the modernist movement, accepted the Chinese translation of the Koran, hitherto only in the sacred language of Arabic, and opened schools which taught general as well as religious subjects. And they began, like modernists of other faiths, to emphasize the compatibility between the Koran and modern science.[49] They published modern periodicals, of which there were nine in 1947; circulation, however, was small. In 1936 the first Chinese Moslem to be so honored received a degree from El Azhar University, the great center of Islamic learning in Cairo. By 1950 the Chinese Islamic Association had set up or coordinated two hundred primary schools and twenty high schools; the Islamic Theological College at the Chungking mosque was opened in 1945. All of these institutions, however, were handicapped by the poverty of the Chinese Moslem community and by suspicion of Chinese

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[48] Ibid., pp. 192-94.

[49] Ibid., p. 198.

779 learning born of religious conservatism.[50]

779 668 What have been Chinese Communist policies toward the problem of Chinese Islam, a problem that involves some areas where they are a major segment of the population and other areas -- such as the North China Region -- where they represent a cohesive, slowly modernizing religious community? (The policies adopted towards centers of Moslem population, are dealt with in the chapter on Ethnic Minorities.) Communist religious policies toward Mohammedanism have much in common with Communist policies toward other religions. The standard pattern of organization has been established by the Peking government: An All-China Islamic Association, which, it should be emphasized, differs from former organizations in being an instrument of control over Chinese Mohammedans operated by a hierarchy ideologically acceptable to the Communists. A Peking propaganda booklet issued in 1955 states that, "The work of education is really tackled seriously now, and the number of primary and secondary school pupils is now double the figure before liberation."[51] This may sound like "progress," but what it undoubtedly means is that the children of Chinese Moslems are

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[50] Ibid., pp. 198-205.

[51] Chinese Moslems. A NCNA dispatch dated June 9, 1955, states that Moslem students in Shanghai have increased from 290 in 1949 to 3,000. Government subsidies (and control) might account for this. SCMP, 1068, June 14, 1955, p. 35.

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increasingly being given the prescribed Communist education.

The cadre is the basic instrument for the Communization of Chinese Islam. Offering the education and prestige inducements of Party work has apparently successfully recruited cadres from among young Chinese Moslems. "In the government organs there have been many Moslem cadres. Some of them have taken up the leadership jobs. In the areas where the Moslems have been comparatively concentrated, the government has paid attention to foster the basic-level Moslem cadres."[52]

The policy of Communization is well reflected in a speech by Ma Sung-t'ing, Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Moslem Cultural Association, on the occasion of the "Second Enlarged Conference" in June 1955. This conference, he said,

> "...will study how to help the government to carry out the ideological education in patriotism, national unity, and socialist transformation among the Moslems, so as to further strengthen and consolidate national unity and continue to develop and raise the Moslem political, economic, and cultural levels in jointly carrying out the construction of the fatherland." [53]

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[52] SCMP, 1068, June 14, 1955, p. 35.

[53] NCNA dispatch, SCMP, 1067, June 11-13, 1955, p. 24.

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668 The Chinese Communists' policy towards the Moslems has been affected by two factors which do not influence their policies towards other religions" (1) the Russian pattern of handling integrated minority groups through various types of "culturally autonomous" organizations; (2) Chinese ambitions in Islamic areas of Asia which foster tactical tolerance towards the Islamic minority in China. Thus the glamorized picture publication Chinese Moslems[54] has texts in English, Chinese, Arabic, and Indonesian, and its introduction ends with the greeting "Salaam to all peace-loving Moslems." Selections from the works of Mao Tse-tung have been translated into Arabic for the indoctrination of the Ahungs who do not understand Chinese; probably these translations will be used in Indonesia and other countries where Arabic is a sacred lingua-franca. Mosques in "show" cities such as Canton, Shanghai, and Peking have been renovated and serve to demonstrate to Moslem visitors the "reality" of Communist China's promise of religious freedom.

We have little reliable information on the Islamic communities of North China today. But some trends should be noted. The education of Islamic youth, although special Moslem schools have been set up by the government, will be in the pattern ordained by the government, and the youth will tend in time to become more Com-

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[54] Chinese Moslems, introduction.

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munist than Moslem.[55] Secondly, the break-up of the closely knit urban and rural communities in North China will probably proceed apace. The Communist government boasts of the increasing number of Moslem youth now classified as "workers";[56] this means integration of the youth into new state-ordained patterns of activity in factories and workers organizations; it means that they will slowly be alienated from their parents' values as well as from their parents' occupational roles. Thirdly, as Moslems increasingly share in government and social activities, there will be less inclination on their part towards a defensive separatism; it is claimed, for example, that 72 Moslems have been deputies to Shanghai municipal and ch'ü congresses, and token participation tends to bring them into new orbits of activity.[57] Among the 29,000 Moslems in Shanghai, measures have allegedly been taken to provide for their special religious dietary needs,[58] and there are references to special food shipments for Ramadan. Such measures would tend to reduce initial suspicion and resist-

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[55] A NCNA dispatch of June 9, 1955 states that there are five primary and one middle school for Moslems in Shanghai and that 90 per cent of the students have received free or reduced tuition. SCMP, 1068, Jan. 14, 1955, p. 35.

[56] NCNA, Peking, June 10, 1955' SCMP, 1067, p 23. The claim is made that of the Moslems of Paoting, Hopei Province, the percentage of workers' families has risen from 14% to 33.3% in 1955.

[57] SCMP, 1068, p. 35.

[58] Ibid.

779 668 ance among the Moslems and, in the long run, to make integration easier. The Moslems of North China do not have the relative safety in numbers possessed by the large Islamic communities in the southwest and the northwest. The processes of Communization, secularization, and integration will probably advance rapidly in this area. The measures we have noted plus the activity of the Moslem cadre, backed by the full force and apparatus of Communist government, will do more to reduce the age-old separatism and resistance of Islam than the measures of earlier Chinese governments.

V. CATHOLICISM

779 The older of the two Christian faiths in China has had 350 years of missionary and organizational experience. It is, in China as elsewhere, resourceful, flexible, and highly disciplined. In modern China, Catholicism has repeatedly come under nationalistic attack because of its foreign support and its allegiance to Rome. The church has countered these attacks in a variety of ways: it has encouraged the Sinicization of Church symbols, e.g., the Virgin is portrayed as a Chinese woman in Chinese dress; it has given its foreign missionaries a more thorough grounding in Chinese language and culture, so that the best of them, wearing Chinese scholars' gowns as habits, speaking excellent Chinese, can make their way successfully in any stratum of Chinese society. The most

779 striking response to nationalistic attacks has been the increasing use of Chinese priests throughout the hierarchy. This is part of world-wide policies in an age of rising nationalism. The following figures indicate the dimensions of the change since 1900:[59]

	Chinese Catholics	Foreign Priests	Native Priests
1900	700,000	1,375	471
1948	3,275,000	3,015	2,676

This process of replacing foreign clergy with Chinese clergy has made greatest progress in the older Catholic areas, particularly in North China. There are 144 dioceses or apostolic prefectures, and 29 of these, in the major cultural and commercial centers, are administered by Chinese prelates.[60] The elevation of a Chinese priest to the College of Cardinals in 1946 was a striking symbol of the Church's intention to advance the process of Sinicization.

Catholic cultural and educational activities have played an important role in the advance of the Church. Schools, colleges, and universities

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[59] Jean Mosterleet, S. J., Les martyrs de Chine parlent: L'Empire de Mao Tse-tung contre L'Eglise du Christ, Paris, 1953, p. 32; hereinafter cited as Monsterleet.

[60] Ibid.

779 have, on the one hand, made it possible for the youth of Chinese Catholic families to have a complete modern education under Church auspices and control; on the other, the colleges and the universities, notably Fu-jen University in Peking, and Aurora University in Shanghai, have given the clergy a chance to win over non-Catholic youth enrolled as students. Catholic scientific and cultural research, such as that carried on at the famous Sikawei Observatory near Shanghai, make it clear that the Church and modern science are not in direct opposition to one another.

779 798 The situation in 1945-46 was encouraging to Chinese and foreign Catholics. The clergy was being rapidly Sinicized, charitable work was going forward, Catholic educational institutions were full. Native and foreign clergy had gained approval for their work in the war of resistance against Japan. At the same time there were developments which, especially in the light of later events, promised trouble to the Church. The exchange of envoys between the Vatican and the Nationalist Government took place in 1946; Bishop Paul Yu Pin was widely believed to have strong influence with Generalissimo Chiang; these and other signs of identification of the Church with the Nationalist Government boded ill for the Church when the government declined

779 798 in power. As the Communist power increased, the persecution of the Church, begun in Communist areas in 1937, was a grim warning of what might be in store for Chinese Catholicism as a whole.[61] Catholic Action, the association of enthusiastic laymen for the advancement of the Faith, had been growing in all parts of the country from 1928 onward; there were 200 groups and thirty youth groups as early as 1930.[62] In 1948 the Papal Nuncio ordered the formation of the Legion of Mary, a more militant, zealous, and disciplined organization of Catholic laymen, which in many areas absorbed the Catholic Action groups. The new organization was set up by an American priest, and it had the Chinese name of Sheng-mu chün. Many experienced Catholic missionaries were doubtful if any strong Chinese government would tolerate this type of militant organization. The group has proved of major propaganda value to the Communists and an object of their most ruthless measures of oppression.[63]

Communist policies and propaganda have made the most of all the vulnerabilities of the Chinese Catholic Church. Its foreign "imperialist" and Kuomintang connections were played up, and nationalistic feelings against it

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[61] Cf. Raymonde de Jaegher and I. Corbally Kuhn, Tempete sur la Chine, Paris, 1953.

[62] Monsterleet, p. 148.

[63] Hsü, Hsin Chung-kuo Ti Tsung-chiao Ko-hsin Yün-tung [The Movement for Religious Reformation in New China], Shanghai, 1951, pp. 9-13.

779 were aroused. Its role as property owner --
798 "foreign capitalist-imperialist oppression" -- was dramatized during the land reform period, and local ignorance and hatred turned against it.[64] Old and long-discredited accusations were made against Catholic charitable organizations: the Sacred Heart Home for Children in Nanking was labeled a "little Buchenwald" and the sisters were accused of torturing, neglecting, and selling Chinese children.[65] The war in Korea provided the occasion for an increasing number of accusations of espionage against Catholic clergy.

Communist government measures have been many, but the main steps resemble those taken against other religious groups. The 1950 campaign for "triple independence" or "triple autonomy" involved freedom from foreign administration, financing, and evangelistic policy control. This was given emotional significance by the warfare in Korea, with the Communists' well-managed propaganda campaigns against imperialism and espionage.[66]

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64. Cf. the dramatic eyewitness account of F. Legrand, Le communisme arrive au village Chinois, Peking, 1947. This observation was made before the nationwide land reform campaign.

65. Cf. Walker, China Under Communism, p. 190. Such accusations recall the stories circulated by the gentry which touched off the Tientsin massacre of Chinese Catholics and foreigners in 1870.

66. Monsterleet, pp. 25-29.

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In 1951 the campaign against the Church was accelerated. All Catholic schools and universities and many hospitals and churches were confiscated. Priests were "tried and imprisoned, and the Papal Nuncio was expelled from China.[67]

The next step in the campaign against Catholicism resembled the policy followed in Russia and in the East European satellites. This was the foundation by the Communists of a "national church" whose guiding spirits were a small minority of disaffected clergy and laymen. This group was constituted as the "Committee of the Reform Church." It was not subject to episcopal or pontifical directives. The group was to decide what was to be taught, who could say mass or give the sacraments; and it advocated "progressive," i.e., orthodox Communit teaching. Under its sponsorship certain "model parishes" were set up with "progressive" priests in charge. Apparently this organization has had only limited success. Monsterleet estimates that only 2 per cent of the clergy went over to the "reformed Church"; nearly all openly proclaimed their faith; some died as martyrs.[68]

From October 1952 -- the time of the "Peace Congress" in Peking -- there was less

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[67] 67. Ibid., p. 28.

[68] 68. Monsterleet, p. 29. It should be emphasized that these figures are given by a Catholic author.

779 persecution of Catholics, although between Jan.
798 1951 and November 1953 the number of missionaries was reduced through expulsion from 3,222 to 364.[69]

779 By far the highest concentration of Catholic
clergy in the North China Region has been Peking. Peking, like Shanghai, had over 200 priests; the entire province of Fukien had only 177.[70] The following table indicates the distribution of Catholics and Catholic centers in North China.[71]

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[69] Mission Bulletin, April 1952, p. 323, and Jan. 1954, p. 56; cited in Walker, op. cit., p. 189.

[70] Monsterleet, p. 33.

[71] Cf. Monsterleet, pp. 16-17, for distribution of Catholic centers. The figures are from Annuaire des missions Catholiques de Chine 1939, Shanghai, 1939.

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Province	Total Population (Million)	Total Catholics	Metropolitan Bishoprics	Suffragan Dioceses
Hopei	31	789,873	Peking	Hsüan-hua
				Yung-p'ing
				Tientsin
				Paoting
				An-kuo
				Cheng-ting
				Hsien-hsien
				Cho-hsien
				Hsing-t'ai (Shun-te)
				Yung-nien
Shansi	11	126,199	Taiyuan	Ta-t'ung
				Shuo-hsien
				Fen-yang
				Lu-an (Ch'ang-chih)
				Yü-tz'u

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779 798 Peking has been for many centuries the center of Catholicism in North China. Unfortunately we have little detailed information on the Communists' moves against the Catholics in Peking. The general course of events in the north followed the nationwide pattern outlined above. The Communists' campaign in 1950 for the "three autonomies" and for a "reformed church" met with disciplined Catholic resistance, although there were some defectors.[72] The Legion of Mary was dissolved by the government in Tientsin on July 13, 1951, and the dissolution was then carried out throughout the country. The Fu-jen Catholic University of Peking was confiscated in October 1950, and the Jesuit Tsinkou (Chin-ku) University in Tientsin was taken over in July 1951. In September 1951, the Communists assumed control of all Catholic primary schools (4,000 throughout the country), seminaries, hospitals, and orphanages.[73] Imprisonment, torture, and expulsion of foreign clergy proceeded steadily throughout these years. In late 1952 the persecution was eased.

While many missionaries predict that under sustained persecution the Church hierarchy and organization will disappear in China, some expect that Catholics will find clandestine ways to preserve their faith. One former superior of a mission in Hopei predicts that in North China,

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[72] Monsterleet, pp. 86-102, *passim*.
[73] Monsterleet, pp. 134-5, 149.

779 where Catholicism is deeply rooted and served
798 by a larger native clergy, it will find means of survival. He points to the numerous all-Catholic villages and believes that Catholics will have a better chance to preserve their faith in the countryside where, he thinks, the influence of the Communist dominated schools may be less strong than in the cities.[74]

Yet the spreading network of state and party organizations, the cadres in every village and hamlet in China, means that Catholics everywhere will face further trials. How can the Church resist a totalitarian state and gain converts when conversion brings political and social sanctions against them? Father Greene, who witnessed the persecution in Kwangai, sounds a sombre note of warning. He is speaking of the cadres.

> "It was impossible for me, as I watched these well-trained youths perform their inhuman tasks, to minimize the seriousness of their convictions and the thoroughness of their methods. These convictions were deeply impressed on their minds... The new ideas and strange thoughts are unconditionally accepted by the young, and accepted with a fanaticism which fears neither suffering, hardship nor death. I saw shy youths changed into courageous

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[74] Monsterleet, p. 214. The commentator is not named.

> 779 798 apostles; I saw the ambitious and selfish give up their goals and possessions; I saw some of my Christian youths break the bonds of family and friendship for this Cause."[75]

The basic question is whether the harassed and persecuted Church can find the means to give its own youth these qualities. If it can not, its future throughout China is dark indeed.

VI. PROTESTANTISM

779 797 In many respects the Prostestant missionaries and their converts set the pattern for the modernizing movements which took place in Buddhism and Islam. Protestant religious work in the twentieth century came to be accompanied by wide-spread, diverse, and large-scale social service, medical, and educational activities. The Protestant missionaries helped to awaken the social conscience of the Chinese, and the missions were major centers for the dissemination of general knowledge about the West. Sun Yat-sen was a devout Christian, and Christian thought left its mark on much of his work. As pioneers in medical education, in many fields of technical education, in women's education, and in many other spheres, the Protestants made striking contributions to the dissolution of the traditional order in China. But it was beyond their powers to replace that order with a Christ-

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[75] Robert W. Greene, Calvary in China, New York, 1953, pp. 76-77.

779 ian democratic society. And they failed also to
797 forge an effective instrument to work for that end: a disciplined, independent, vigorous body of Chinese Protestants.

Protestant missions began in the ports of the China coast that were gradually opened up after China's successive defeats by the Western powers. The rights of residence, travel, and property ownership for both Catholic and Protestant churches were exacted in the successive treaties which China was forced to sign. This background of, as it were, forced entry into China has handicapped Christianity in China in two important respects: as the tide of nationalistic sentiment rose, anti-Christian movements invariably accompanied anti-foreign and nationalistic manifestations. Secondly, the decades of foreign protection and foreign support prevented the Christian churches -- the Protestant perhaps more than the Catholic -- from developing their own means of self-support and their own mechanisms of survival in times of political upheaval.

Protestantism has suffered from its own sectarianism. A rational division of Christian effort was usually impossible when Baptists, Methodists, Episcopalians, and innumerable small sects were at odds with one another and brought diverse and conflicting interpretations

779 of Christianity to the Chinese.[76] Naturally the
797 antagonism between Catholic and Protestant mission workers -- their tendency to depreciate one another when dealing with the Chinese -- further weakened the whole effort. Martin Yang describes the antagonisms that developed in the Shantung countryside between Catholic and Protestant Chinese; this added to the tension that already existed between the mass of the villagers and the converts to both forms of Christianity.[77]

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[76] There were 66 different Protestant missionary societies in China in 1906. By 1919 there were 130 different societies, groups, and other missionary organizations. Cf. Pr. Damboriena, "Les missions Protestantes en Chine," Bulletin de l'Université l'Aurore, Series III, Vol. 8, No. 1, Shanghai, 1947, p. 18; hereinafter cited as Damboriena; Creighton Lacy, "The Missionary Exodus from China," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 4, Dec. 1955, p. 305, observes: "Far more disruptive in almost every mission area has been the swarm of small, independent sects -- pentecostal, holiness, fundamentalist -- most of them divisive. Not only do they assert their unwillingness to co-operate with other Christian groups, but they seek most of their converts from the established churches."

[77] Martin Yang, A Chinese Village, New York, 1945, pp. 158-64.

779 797 Yang, himself a Christian, has this to say of the motivations of conversion in the village he studied "The first converts were members of the Ch'en and Yang families and included a Ch'en scholar and his second brother. They were all ambitious men, and their primary purpose in conversion was to get positions as country preachers, and then to establish a church-subsidized village school, to use foreign influence through the church to deal with their opponents, and to sell food to the missionaries.[78] Chinese governments, imperial and nationalist, found the Christians troublesome, and in the twenties and thirties there were serious efforts to curb them. One of the effects of government sanctions, combined with the relatively poor results after ninety years of effort, was to reduce the enthusiasm for China missions among Christians abroad. This was reflected in the decreased flow of funds, notably from the United States. From nearly $6,000,000 in 1928, Protestant contributions[79] fell to a little over $3,500,000 in 1933 and did not greatly exceed $4,000,000 in 1935 and 1936. This handicapped nearly all fields of missionary endeavor.

Another arena in which the Protestants tried for influence was the great polemical struggle of the 1920's and 1930's over the nature and future of Chinese civilization. In this prolonged and important controversy, the Protestants found themselves handicapped by the divisions among themselves, notably that between modernists and fundamentalists, and also by the rising tide of nationalism. In the end the Protestants shared

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[78] Ibid., p. 159.

[79] Damboriena, p. 83.

779 797 with idealistic Chinese and Western philosophers the failure to stem the rising tide of materialism in thought.

The Sino-Janpanese War and the war in the Pacific disrupted missionary efforts in north central China. At the war's end, the Protestant missionaries returned and set about the rehabilitation of church establishments. Apparently progress was made, but there were disquieting aspects. The interdenominational unions which the Japanese had imposed during their occupation broke apart and sectarian rivalries sprang up again.

> "The measure of self support achieved in wartime necessity collapsed before the inflowing torrent of foreign funds. Leadership which had demonstrated both courage and competence through years of crisis politely yielded to colleagues returning from the West."[80]

American financial support also drew upon the Protestants an increasing barrage of Communist and left-wing criticism as the Nationalist Government -- receiving American support -- became increasingly discredited. Protestants, because of their preponderant emphasis on the social gospel (serving God through service to society) and their less formidable unity and

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[80] Lacy, op. cit., p. 306.

779 discipline, suffered less in Communist-occupied
797 areas than did the Catholics. Yet the more clearheaded of the Protestants could not but dread the rise of Communist power.

779 The timetable of Communist moves against
668 Protestants and their organizations follows approximately that for the Catholics noted above. The "national church," the "three autonomies," the confiscation of church property, church schools and hospitals were accompanied by a steady expulsion of the missionaries. There was a gradual decrease in the number of Protestant missionary personnel between 1935 and 1949 and almost total elimination of missionaries since that time.[81] In 1935, there were 5,816 Protestant missionaries in China; in 1949, about 3,000; in April 1952, only 100.

It is not possible to document the proportion of Chinese Protestants who have been forced to accept the Communist regime, but "modernism," the social gospel, sectariansim, and the lack of such punitive sanctions as excommunication all tend to make the Protestants less resistant to Communist force and persuasion than the Catholics. The " three autonomies" -- in support, government and propagation -- has been a stated goal of Chinese Protestantism since 1851, and the Chinese Protestant community has generally accepted this as a praise-worthy end.[82] A leading Chinese Protestant layman -- under what degree of pressure we do not know -- found a number of ways to come to terms with Communism: (1) as far back as the founding of Judaism, men's highest hope has been the establishment of a solidly united, ideal society; the Communists promise such a society; (2) sectarianism has created dissension, but the Chinese have a genius for compromise; therefore, there is an opportunity to promote (under the Communist government) a "grand union of the churches;" (3) Christianity is a religion of world revolution, but it has been fettered and frustrated by feudal and reactionary institutions. The age of Marxism-Leninism, therefore, is favorable to the realization of "Christian ideals."[83] Chinese Protestants are under a barrage of such statements, which even go so far as to assert that Jesus was a "patriotic anti-imperialist" in defending his country against the Romans.[84] How successfully Chinese Protestants as a whole are resisting this type of persuasion and the manifold pressures and blandishments of the Communist regime is unknown. Again, as in the

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[81] The first figure is from the *Handbook of the Christian Movement*, reproduced in Damboriena, p. 82. The other figures are from Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

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[82] Lacy, op. cit., pp. 307-308.

[83] Ts'ai Yung-ch'un, "Progressive Road for Christianity in the New China," Hsin Kuan-ch'a [New Observation], Vol. I, No. 8, Oct. 10, 1950; Current Background, 40, Dec. 15, 1050, p. 3.

[84] Hsü, op. cit., p. 41.

779 case of the Catholics, loss of Protestant youth to
668 the Communist "religion" would mean that the
future of China is dark indeed.

The North China Region had the following distribution of Protestants.[85]

Province	Population (Million) (1938)	Percentage of Protestants (1938)	Number of Protestants (1924)
Hopei	31.1	6.4	22,283
Shansi	12.0	2.4	8,340

The tendency for Protestantism to have its greatest strength in the accessible coastal provinces has persisted until today. In terms of social composition, the Protestant community has been estimated as 75 per cent rural and 25 per cent urban, with farmers predominating and a lesser number of petty merchants and workers.[86]

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85. Ku T'ing-ch'ang's percentage figures published in the Collectanea Commissionis Synodalis, XI, 1938, pp. 272-81. Tables reproduced in Damboriena, pp. 90-91. The 1924 figures are from the China Yearbook, 1924. Ku's percentages seem unduly high in relation to the total known communicants.

86. Percentage estimates by the Dean of the University of Nanking as of the early 1930's. Damboriena, p. 30.

779 668 Peking has been second only to Shanghai as a center of Protestant religious and educational work. Here were two of the most impressive institutions which the Protestants had built: Peking Union Medical College and Yenching University. Here too were important missionary centers, hospitals, and institutes for social work. The major institutions have been taken over by the Communist state, but it would appear that churches are still holding regular services. We have no direct reports on Peking, but a Chinese Protestant alleged that some 140 Protestant churches in Shanghai were holding services every Sunday.[87] The same source makes much of the fact that the Chinese Protestant sects are taking over their own missionary activities -- one of the "three autonomies." He further states that nearly 200 students have been enrolled in divinity schools in both Nanking and Peking.[88]

The future of Protestantism is uncertain. The key to its survival is whether, within the strict limits imposed by the new Communist-Nationalist orthodoxy, a Christian church can

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[87] Yao-tsung Wu, "Freedom of Religious Belief in a Prosperous and Strong Fatherland," Wen-hui Pao [Wen-hui Daily], Hong Kong, Oct. 1, 1955; SCMP, 1159, Oct. 28, 1955, p. 41. A high level of church attendance in Shanghai is confirmed by accounts of British evacuees. Cf. New York Times, Dec. 11, 1955, p. 32.

[88] Wu, loc. cit.

779 win over a significant number of the youth.
668 Christianity is continually castigated in education and in the press as backward, superstitious and unscientific. The rewards of place and prestige go to those Chinese most fervent in their acceptance of the Communisty orthodoxy. It is doubtful if a significant number of youth will act to cut themselves off from these rewards by embracing an alien religion.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 1p,
Sociological Background

HEALTH AND SANITATION

I. BACKGROUND

744 To the establishment of the Peiyang Sanitary Department in 1902 may be traced the beginning of organized public health work in China. Pleagues in 1911 and 1917 led to the development of organized epidemic prevention work. Under the Nationalist Government, after 1927, a Ministry of Health was established, later reorganized into the National Health Administration. Among its six departments were the Department of Health Organization and Services, which promoted local health work, local sanitary projects, and the training of personnel, and the Department of Epidemic Prevention, which was charged with the prevention and control of epidemic and endemic diseases, anti-epidemic services, and the manufacture of biological products.[1]

The development of health work, however, was greatly disrupted by the long and destructive war of resistance against the Japanese (1937-45). The internal strife between the Communists and

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[1] China Handbook 1937-45, compiled by China Ministry of Information, N. Y., Macmillan Company, 1949, p. 490.

744 the Nationalist Government that followed further hampered progress. In the war years, the North China Region, like the East China Region, had large areas either under Japanese occupation or controlled by successive puppet regimes. Much of the effort of the Nationalist Government in unoccupied areas was devoted to the Army Medical Service, which was affiliated with the wartime Ministry of Military Affairs in 1938 after being separated from the National Health Administration.[2]

With the conclusion of World War II, the Nationalist Government returned to Nanking in May 1946 from the wartime capital of Chungking. Amid manifold attempts at rehabilitation and reconstruction, the restoration and reorganization of health work also was begun anew. Some statistics for North China for 1946 and 1947 are available, but it is obvious that not much could have been done within so short a time, especially with all the difficulties caused by the political situation. In 1947 there were in the two provinces of Hopei and Shansi, and the two municipalities of Peiping and Tientsin of the North China Region, 56 government health organizations at the provincial level, with a total of 1,900 medical and health personnel, and 58 more government health organizations at

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[2] The China Year Book, 1938-39, Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1939, p. 652.

744 the county level.[3] As to preventive medical care, in 1946 in the North China Region 740,027 people received vaccinations against smallpox, 2,684,139 received inoculations against cholera, 21,514 were inoculated against typhoid, and 135,787 were inoculated with combined cholera and typhoid vaccine.[4] (For purposes of comparison, it should be noted that the population of the North China Region in 1948 was 47,460,502. For details on the changes in population and administrative geography, see chapters on Population and Geography.) Statistics of this sort are not sufficient to provide an accurate picture of the health work and health conditions in North China before 1949. No data exists on the contribution made by private institutions and practitioners in the pre-Communist years. Nevertheless, these figures give some indication of the efforts of the Nationalist Government in this field.

II. COMMUNIST OFFICIAL REPORTS

743 When Nieh Yung-chen, Communist mayor of Peking, made his report on February 25, 1950, he stated that according to statistics of 1949, there were only 17 hospitals with 1,600 beds in

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[3] *Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien* [*Statistical Yearbook of China*], Nanking, Bureau of Statistics, 1948, pp. 341, 342, and 344.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 347.

743 Peking. Not only was the number inadequate, but the distribution of the hospitals was uneven. Therefore, the plan for 1950 was to establish more hospitals, clinics, and mobile corps, so that workers, women, and suburban and rural inhabitants might receive more medical attention.[5] A year later, when Vice-mayor Chang Yu-yü made the 1950 progress report of the Peking Municipal Government,[6] some statistics on preventive work and new health and medical establishments were announced. In Peking, according to this statement, 804,000 people received in 1950 vaccinations against smallpox, 87,000 received BCG vaccine against tuberculosis, and 424,000 received inoculations against typhoid. (The population of Peking in 1951 was given as 2,030,986.) One new health center for women and children and five new clinics for workers had been established. With further development of the previously existing public health agencies, the report said, there was an addition of 614 beds and 374 health personnel. In comparison to 1949, continued the Communist report, there were some 180,000 more out-patients and some 1,600 more in-patients, and 172,276 clinical treatments were given and 2,335 in-patients were treated free of charge.

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5. Cheng-fu Kung-tso Pao-kao Hui-pien [Compendium of Government Reports], Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1951, p. 209.

6. Ibid., p. 245.

743 In spite of the alleged progress and improvements, the report declared there was much to be desired in technique, in equipment, in health education, and in the quality of work.

744 An official report made on February 1, 1951 revealed that during 1950 three more health centers were established in Tientsin, the other municipality of North China, making a total of 15, and 6 clinics were established in the rural areas, making a total of 10.[7] Furthermore, 426 herbalists (42 per cent of all practitioners of traditional Chinese medicine in Tientsin) were organized to serve in free clinics. The number of hospital beds in the whole municipality was given as 1,568. Because one of the guiding principles for health work in Communist China was special attention paid to the health of workers, free medical service and special low charges for medical treatments were also given mention in the report. On preventive medical care, it stated that in Tientsin during 1950 486,000 people received inoculations against cholera, 447,000 received inoculations of combined cholera-typhoid vaccine, 13,000 received inoculations against diphtheria, and 1,021,000 received vaccinations against smallpox. In the prevention of tuberculosis, 79,000 people were given B.C.G. shots and 219,000 were given similar experi-

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[7] Ibid., pp. 285-286.

744 mental shots. (For purposes of comparison, it should be noted that the population of Tientsin was 2,693,831 in 1953.) Classes were opened to train health guides in schools and 114 students were graduated, according to the same report. As a part of the municipal public works of Tientsin, the running water system was improved, so that the quantity of piped water increased by some 20,000,000 gallons daily, and more inhabitants could enjoy safe drinking water. At the time of the report, this water project was only 80 per cent completed. Special effort was made to supply clean drinking water to some 50,000 people in certain outlying areas. In addition, the inoculation of domesticated animals was promoted.

Health centers were set up in all the counties in Hopei Province, according to a report submitted by the provincial chairman in November 1950,[8] and initial steps toward the registration and supervision of physicians and drug stores were initiated. In the field of epidemic prevention, the Provincial People's Government in 1950 reported 20,000 vaccination workers trained and 8,890,000 people vaccinated against smallpox. In comparison to the death rate of 7.2 per cent, shown in a statististical survey of some 50,000 cases in the latter half of 1949, the death rate shown in a similar survey of 44,000 Hopei people in the first half of 1950 declined

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[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 312-13.

744 to 6.1 per cent. Even in the famine areas and at the places where water conservation workers congregated, no serious spread of epidemics was reported. For the protection of the health of women and children, 1,501 midwives were trained and 13,660 midwives were re-trained.

In 1950, the People's Government of Shansi Province reported the establishment of one provincial health center for women and children, one hospital for contagious diseases, 33 county health centers, and 25 ch'ü [district] health centers.[9] The same Communist report also claimed that for Spring epidemic prevention, one main prevention corps of 50 workers and 20 smaller corps of ten workers each were organized. Through these corps workers, 1,182,079 people received vaccinations against smallpox, and 630,254 were inoculated against typhoid and cholera. In the training of medical personnel, 4,072, old style midwives were re-educated, and in co-operation with the provincial Federation of Democratic Women, two classes of 57 students in each class were graduated to be special workers for the health of women and children.

III. WOMEN AND CHILDREN

In regard to public health work in Communist China, special emphasis is given to the

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[9] Ibid., pp. 329-30.

744 well-being of women and children. This fact finds its source in the Common Program, an early document of the Chinese Communist regime. There it states, "... attention shall be paid to the protection of the health of mothers, infants, and children."[10] For this reason, the establishment of health centers for women and children, maternity stations, the prevention of children's and puerperal diseases, the training and the reforming of midwives have been stressed and publicized on a nationwide basis as well as in North China.

744 In Peking, according to a Communist
165 report of 1952, the death rate in childbirth decreased from 0.24 per cent in 1950 to 0.13 per cent in 1951, and the infant mortality rate dropped from 0.72 per cent in 1949 to 0.57 per cent in 1950 to 0.25 per cent in 1951.[11] By 1955, three main experimental health centers for women and many similar smaller centers were reported in operation throughout the urban and rural areas near Peking, with a total of 1,000 trained midwives in attendance. For children there were reported to be four special municipal medical and health organizations; in most general hospitals there were departments of pediatrics and obstretrics. This report also claimed that between 1949 and 1954 infant

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[10] The Important Documents of the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1949, p. 18.

[11] Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily] Peking, Sept. 19, 1952, p. 3.

744 mortality and the death rate in childbirth
165 dropped two-thirds.[12]

744 The municipal government of Tientsin claimed great achievements in the protection of the health of women and children in the four years from 1949 to 1953.[13] A central hospital of obstetrics was established as well as a special department for women and children under the municipal Bureau of Public Health, 38 special health station and a network of public health organs serving the women and children of Tientsin. In co-operation with the Federation of Democratic Women, the Tientsin Municipal Government promoted health education for women and children through such various media of communication as newspapers, pamphlets, lectures, broadcasts, motion pictures, and exhibits. Scattered over the municipal area are 536 crêches caring for 10,840 children. The government also claimed to have conducted health examinations of children and that 6,884 children were examined in 1951, 39,888 in 1952, and 40,000 in 1953.

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12. Hua-ch'iao Jih-pao [China Daily News], New York, June 11, 1955, p. 3.

13. T'ien-chin Jih-pao [Tientsin Daily], Tientsin, June 1, 1953, p. 2.

IV. THE PATRIOTIC HEALTH DRIVE

744 668 During the conflict in Korea, the Chinese Communists accused the United States of waging bacteriological warfare. The Communists said it began in Korea on January 28, 1952 and later spread to Northeast China.[14] Obviously this theme was utilized to strengthen the mass feeling against America and to integrate the health drive with propaganda. The Patriotic Health Drive was launched in February as part of the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Movement, and it proved to be so economical to the government and became so successful that it was made an annual affair. In the name of patriotism, the people in the cities and rural areas were asked to contribute free labor for the improvement of general hygiene.

In the national capital, Peking, the entire population was mobilized, with a leader for every ten households. By September 1952, Communists claimed, there were "practically no" flies and mosquitos in Peking.[15] As a matter of fact, the municipal government of Peking had been engaged in projects of health improvement since 1950. Piped water reached all the inhabitants in the city limits, whereas only one third of the people had received it prior to that time.[16] Many open ditches, where insects bred and spread disease, were covered and replaced by underground sewage pipes. Because only one per cent of the households had modern flush toilets,[17] more sanitary equipment and a better system of collecting feces were ordered. Within eighteen days of the launching of the Patriotic Health Drive on March 16, 1952, it was claimed, 90 per cent of the population was participating in the "big clean up" with the following results:

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[14] Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, April 25, 1952, p. 1.

[15] Enlightenment Daily, Sept., 19, 1952, p. 3.

Refuse removed	some 13,000,000 cubic feet
Weeds removed	530,000 cubic feet
Open sewage cleaned	37,000 feet
Bodies of stagnant water dredged	5,033
Rat holes sealed up	347,938
Tree holes sealed up	32,780

By May 14, the report said, 17,890,000 fly larvae, 3,400,000 flies, and 190,000 rats had been exterminated. Glass or screen covers were

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[16] Ibid.

[17] People's Daily, June 27, 1952, p. 3.

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required for all food peddled by vendors or displayed in markets. Some slaughterhouses and fecal drying yards were moved to more suitable locations outside the city limits.[18]

The Patriotic Health Drive in Tientsin began with propaganda early in 1952.[19] From the middle of April, the drive concentrated upon the improvement of sanitation. Statistics collected in May 1952 claimed that 80 per cent of the population had participated in the clean-up campaign, and that specific jobs were undertaken by 210,000 people of all professions with the following results:

Refuse cleaned up	some 200,000 cubic feet
Bodies of stagnant water filled up or disinfected	1,994
Rat holes sealed up	410,000
Tree holes sealed up	10,149
Public comfort stations built	491
Fecal drying yards removed	428

A system of food control was set up to require the registration of food vendors, and food manufacturers were required to submit their products to the municipal Bureau of Public Health for analysis. In mid-June, the Patriotic Health Drive in Tientsin entered a new phase -- mobilization for the extermination of mosquitoes.

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[18] Chieh-fang Jih-pao [Liberation Daily], June 7, 1952, p. 3.

[19] People's Daily, June 28, 1952, p. 3.

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668 The lack of information and publicity about the Patriotic Health Drive in the smaller cities and rural areas in North China leads to the conjecture that the drive either did not do so well or was not so strongly promoted as in the two municipalities. More time and further investigation of source material than this survey permits would be necessary to bear out this surmise. But this belief can be at least partly substantiated by occasional reports. One traveler reported that the people of Ch'ang-hsin-tien did not pay much attention to sanitation work in response to the call of the Patriotic Health Drive. The streets were dirty and there were many flies. Yet Ch'ang-hsin-tien is only about twelve miles southwest of Peking, on the Peking Hankow Railway. Another report of a similar nature came from Ching-hsing, a coal mining district also in Hopei Province, which mentioned that refuse and water-melon rinds were scattered everywhere and flies and mosquitoes were numerous.[20]

V. PEIPING UNION MEDICAL COLLEGE HOSPITAL

743 In 1950, a few months after the outbreak of warfare in Korea, the Communist Government in Peking passed an act to take over all the cultural, educational, relief, and religious

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[20] Kung-fei Ti Wei-sheng I-yao Kung-tso [Health and Medical Works of the Chinese Communists], Taipei, Sixth Section, Central Committee, Nationalist Party, 1955, pp. 14-15.

743 institutions which had been subsidized by financial sources from the United States of America. Statistics cited in this document were based on a survey made in 1936, the year prior to the resumption of Japan's invasion of China. The total amount of American subsidy was set at US$41,900,000, of which 14.7 per cent was used for medical and health work. The number of U.S. financed hospitals was given as over 200.[21] According to an investigation made by the Japanese East Asiatic Reaearch Institute (Toa kenkyujo) on foreign investments in China, which was published during World War II, there were 23 American supported medical institutions, including the well-known Peiping Union Medical College (PUMC),[22] in Peiping, Tientsin, and the two provinces of Hopei and Shansi.

The hospital which formed a part of the Peiping Union Medical College had a long history of achievement and distinction. Founded at Peking (Peiping) in 1906, it was maintained and developed by the co-operation of six American and British mission boards. In July 1915, the Chinese Medical Board of the Rockefeller Foundation acquired and assumed full support of the institution. From this date it was known as

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[21] Compendium of Government Reports, p. 188.

[22] Toa kenkyujo, Sho gaikoku notoishi toshi [Foreign Investment in China], Tokyo, 1943, pp. 528-29.

743 the Peking Union Medical College. In July 1929, the name was changed to Peiping Union Medical College.[23]

The Ministry of Health of the Chinese Communist regime formally took over the Peiping Medical College and its hospital on January 20, 1951, and changed its name to Chinese Union Medical College and Hospital. During the Three-Anti Campaign the new administration of the college and hospital staged a meeting in May 1951 to exhibit "evidences of American imperialism."[24] The principal accusers of the former staff were two manual workers who had been employed there.[25] It is apparent that they had no professional training or medical knowledge whatsoever and were not qualified to judge medical performance or scientific experiments. However, the meeting was held as a gesture of the government's strong determination to "rid China of American imperialism."

A recent report on the Peiping Union Medical College, in a New China News Agency

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[23] W. Y. Chyne, comp. and ed., Handbook of Cultural Institutions in China, Shanghai, 1936, p. 223.

[24] I-wu Kung-tso-che Pi-hsü Chin-hsing Ssu-hsiang Kai-tsao [Medical Workers Must Reform Their Thoughts], Shanghai, Hua-tung i-wu sheng-huo she, 1952, pp. 81-87.

[25] Ibid.

743 dispatch of December 1954, claimed that the Chinese Union Medical College Hospital had more than trebled its number of beds since 1949, according to the director of the college, Li Tsung-en. Li also said that "Soviet advanced methods of medical treatment including painless childbirth, tissue therapy, sleep therapy, and local anaesthesia in major operations had been instituted at the hospital."[26]

VI. OBSERVATIONS

742 In 1936 a Rockefeller Foundation grant made possible a research project in China -- the Cheeloo and Yenching universities Agricultural Sanitation Investigation Project. With the co-operation of many scientists and learned institutions, the project studied the health problems of agricultural population in North China.[27] The investigation was stopped by Japanese troops on December 8, 1941, when World War II officially broke out in the Far East. After the conclusion of the war, James Cameron Scott of the research staff used the data he had preserved in a book which makes public the results of the study. The members of the project hoped that this research would help to

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[26] Survey of China Mainland Press, Hong Kong, American Consulate General, No. 1951, p. 29.

[27] North China here includes Shantung Province, which traditionally had always been considered as a part of North China, until the Chinese Communists revised China's administrative geography and made Shantung a part of

742 solve the health and agricultural problems of North China, and offer solutions to interrelated problems of health and agriculture throughout the world. According to Scott, "the first thing that is necessary is a thorough appreciation and realization of the dual problems of fecal-borne diseases and loss of soil fertility...The second fact that must be realized is that the problems of fecal-borne diseases and loss of soil fertility can be largely solved by application of the methods of agricultural sanitation...The methods of agricultural sanitation involve the setting up of a system of sanitary collection, conservation and composting of all possible human, animal and vegetable wastes and the use of those compost in agriculture. This system should be made applicable to towns and cities as well as to the rural areas. The system would have to be adaptable to meet all kinds of climate, racial characteristics and types of agriculture. It should prevent pollution of the environment and the water supply. It should greatly reduce fly breeding and make the surroundings of the people clean and pleasant. It should ensure the destruction of all organisms which are harmful to man and his domestic animals, and, as far as possible, control such organisms as are harmful to crops. It should conserve the greatest possible amounts of plant nutrients in such a way that they can be easily transported and utilized and be of greatest benefit to agriculture.

East China. As to agricultural habits and modes of living, Shantung is still more akin to the northern provinces than to the south.

742 It should be as simple and as economical as possible and should involve the user in the minimum amount of trouble both in use and in maintenance. It should be planned to fit into the local agricultural system and become an integral part of it. These are the general principles which should apply anywhere. The local applications of these principles may differ a great deal in accordance with local conditions."[28] The author then suggested a "Sanitary System for North China Cities"[29] and a "Sanitary System for the North China Rural Areas."[30] Essentials to the proposals are strong governmental authority and educational work. It is interesting that many of Scott's suggestions are similar to the programs for health and sanitation established in Communist China, especially in connection with the Patriotic Health Drive. This is true despite the fact that some of the adaptations instituted by the Chinese Communists seem both naive and absurd.

743 Peiping fell into the hands of the Chinese Communists in January 1949, without any physical destruction. With its name changed back to Peking, the city became the capital of the People's Republic of China. [Since the city is

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[28] James Cameron Scott, Health and Agriculture of China, London, 1952, pp. 240-42.

[29] Ibid., pp. 242-47.

[30] Ibid., pp. 247-50.

743 known for its beauty and as a center of culture, the Communists seem determined to maintain Peking ~~as a showplace~~. In its western suburb, a "city of learning" has been erected, and on its eastern outskirts an industrial area has been developed.] It was claimed in 1953 that construction had begun[31] on twenty hospitals, clinics, and sanatoriums, including a Moslem Hospital for that minority group, a children's hospital with 600 beds (claimed to be the largest of its kind in China), the Soviet Red Cross Hospital, and a sanatorium for Asian students. The Soviet Red Cross Hospital was said to be a gift from the Soviet people to China and was to be ultra-modern in equipment,[32] supported by Soviet money, and staffed by Soviet personnel. The Asian Students' Sanatorium,[33] with 300 beds, was formally opened on November 17, 1954, and may have been a gesture to impress Asiatic peoples.

744 668 Writers and artists have been enlisted to help spread government propaganda pertaining to improved health conditions by the Communist regime in Peking. For instance, Lao She, the well-known author of Rickshaw Boy, wrote a three-act play entitled The Dragon Beard

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[31] "Half a New City in Five Years," China Reconstructs, Peking, China Welfare Institute, Sept.-Oct., 1954, pp. 6-9.

[32] People's Daily, June 20, 1952, p. 1.

[33] Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 962, pp. 25-6.

744 668 Ditch, first published in 1951, using Peking as its setting and improvement of sanitation as its subject. The Dragon Beard Ditch is in a slum district behind the Temple of Heaven. The open ditch served as a sewer and had been a menace to health for centuries. Between May and September 1950, the open ditch was eliminated and replaced by five miles of concrete conduits. The inhabitants of the area also had piped water for the first time.[34] The play is reported to have been very well received and staged many times, and its production helped to publicize achievements in health and sanitation in Peking.

744 The health of a people depends on many factors. Mere preventive medical care, and the killing of flies and mosquitoes, etc., do not necessarily present a complete picture of improved health conditions. Malnutrition and undue mental strain may offset whatever good has been done by vaccinations and inoculations. Furthermore, when there is a shortage of food facing the people, many of the health programs of the Chinese Communists seem to be missing the most important problems. There are famines and man-made food scarcity situations on the mainland of China. This is particularly true since 1953, after the inauguration of the

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34. Li Te-chuan, "Health for All the People," China Reconstructs, Jan.-Feb. 1952, pp. 14-20.

744 Communist agricultural program of "planned purchase and planned supply of foodstuffs."[35] Therefore, while Communist claims on health and sanitation improvement should be examined with care, one must not forget how many other factors determine the health of a people.

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[35] China Handbook 1954-55, Taipei, China Publishing Co., 1954, pp. 519-20.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 1q,
Sociological Background

PUBLIC WELFARE

I. INTRODUCTION

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Under the Nationalist Government during the war years (1937-1945), the first and foremost agency in the work of public welfare was the National Relief Commission. It was the pivot upon which China's machinery of relief and rehabilitation depended. Through its various efforts from 1938 to 1944, a reported 30,152,131 war and famine refugees were benefited.[1] In addition to immediate war and disaster relief, it operated clinics, occupational relief works, and organizations for the training and care of children. A number of private and semi-private welfare and relief agencies were active, and most of these were founded to meet the needs of war time conditions.[2] For women and children, there were the National Association for Refugee Children, the National Child Welfare Association of China, and the Women's Advisory Council. For Servicemen, there were the Friends of the Wounded Society and the YMCA Emergency Service to Soldiers. And for general war work

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1. China Handbook 1937-1945, compiled by Chinese Ministry of Information, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. 521-37.

2. Ibid.

731 there were the China Wartime Relief Associa-
657 tion and the National Chinese Women's Association for War Relief. Foreign agencies such as the United China Relief and the American Red Cross in China, and British and Canadian contributions distributed through various mediums, also helped to aid China in her distress.

657 The Ministry of Social Affairs as a department under the Executive Yuan of the Nationalist Government was established in November 1940. Throughout the 1940's, during the war years in Chungking as well as in the postwar years in Nanking, this ministry led and guided the development of public welfare and helped to co-ordinate the work of the relief and welfare organizations. The following chart will give some idea of the state of public welfare in 1947 in North China.[3]

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[3] Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien [Statistical Yearbook of China], Nanking, Bureau of Statistics, 1948, pp. 365-72.

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RELIEF AND WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS IN NORTH CHINA

(June 1947)

	Relief Organizations	Farmers' Welfare Societies	Child Welfare Units	Social Service Offices	Employment Agencies	
					Independent	Auxiliary
Hopei	86	3	19	7	---	---
Shansi	10	8	14	23	---	---
Peiping	44		10	1	---	---
Tientsin	72	1	62	1	2	1
Total	212	12	105	32	2	1

1: STANFORD U. 5-4,5 ~~4,56~~ AF12 NORTH CHINA
AF12

657 On November 9, 1943, China became a
648 member of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). The Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (CNRRA), as a department of the Nationalist Government on the ministerial level, was established in January 1945, as was the China Office of UNRRA. In co-operation the two administrations planned and worked on the gigantic problems of the relief and rehabilitation of postwar China.[4] Despite the great contribution to Chinese welfare resulting from the efforts of peaceful projects of this sort, the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration was suspended when the Chinese Communists became the victors on the mainland of China, although such efforts, had they continued, might well have been used by the Communists for purposes of their own.

II. CALAMITIES SINCE 1949

731 Since the establishment of the Communist regime in China, many natural disasters have occurred. Droughts, floods, locust and insect invasions, frost, windstorms, and hail-storms have caused famines in the rural districts and

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[4] China Handbook 1937-1945, pp. 538-41

and throughout the nation. An anti-Communist source[5] estimates the number of people in China adversely affected since 1949 by natural calamities, climaxed by the great flood of 1954 as follows:

1949	60,000,000
1950	38,000,000
1951	28,000,000
1952	33,000,000
1953	47,000,000
1954	180,000,000

No region has escaped entirely from these disasters. If there are differences among them, they are only a matter of degree.

As if these natural calamities were not disastrous enough, the people on the mainland of China suffered further abuse from man-made adversities -- the Land Reform Movement, the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, the conflict in Korea, and the government's "planned purchase" of agricultural products. The number

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[5] Kung-fei Ti Chiu-chi Kung-tso [Relief Work Under the Chinese Communists], Taipei, 6th Section, Central Committee, Nationalist Party, 1955, pp. 5-6. It should be noted that source references originating in Taipei are almost invariably sponsored by the Chinese Nationalist Party. As well as being anti-Communist in intent, they sometimes serve as a media for pro-Nationalist propaganda.

731 of people who have been affected by the Communist quest for power is estimated to have been about 90,000,000 during the first four years of the Communist regime.[6]

In the North China Region, spring and early summer droughts are followed by insect invasions and in many sections there are autumn floods. Certain counties, such as Fu-p'ing and Ku-an in Hopei Province, suffered this cycle of calamities year after year. In 1951, no village was spared among the 204 villages in Fu-p'ing, and in Ku-an the annual crop in 1951 was valued at less than 50 per cent of the value expected in an ordinary year.[7] North China is also one of the principal cotton producing districts of China, but certain insects especially harmful to cotton cause serious trouble in these areas. A report in the summer of 1952 revealed that the cotton in as many as 45 counties in Hopei Province had been ruined.[8] Since cotton is most important to the Chinese people, this loss of a source of revenue has increased the burden of hardship.

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6. Ibid.

7. Ho-pei Jih-pao [Hopei Daily], Paoting, September 23, 1951, p. 1.

8. P'ien-ti Tsai-huang Ai Ta-lu [Widespread Calamities on the Mainland], Taipei, 6th Section, Central Committee, Nationalist Party, 1952, pp. 49-50.

III. COMMUNIST RELIEF AND WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS

731 After the Hwai River flood of 1949, the Central Relief Committee was formed (Feb. 1950) under the Government Administration Council as a temporary but integral part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Later, similar committees were established in the provinces and municipalities. According to reports from various quarters this organization has not accomplished any great amount of relief work.[9]

In April 1950, during the All-China People's Relief Conference, the People's Relief Administration of China was organized as the successor to the China Liberated Areas Relief Administration. This was not a government department but a "People's organization." Soong Ching-ling (Madame Sun Yat-sen) was elected chairman. After the outbreak of war in Korea, this organization assumed control of all charities financed by the United States. Four years later, it was reported that branch offices of the People's Relief Administration had been estab-

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9. Relief Work Under the Chinese Communists, pp. 5-6, lists all of the welfare organizations described in this study. References to the same organizations are to be found in Jen-min Shou-ts'e [People's Handbook 1955], a Chinese Communist source.

731 lished in twenty-three large cities throughout the China Mainland. In North China, branch offices have been established in Peking, Tientsin, and Taiyuan.[10] Meetings and conferences have been held, but the only actual relief work reported was the collection in 1950 of 6,800,000 outfits of winter clothing for the flood refugees in northern Anhwei.[11]

In order to combat the increase in unemployment, the Labor Employment Committee was established in July 1952 under the Government Administration Council. Regional committees were formed on lower administrative levels in the provinces, counties, and municipalities.[12]

744 The Red Cross Society in China has been in existence for fifty years. In August 1950 the Communists assumed control of the Red Cross and reorganized it under the leadership of the Ministry of Health. It has done more medical work than relief work, especially at construction projects where large numbers of laborers are congregated. In North China, medical and epidemic-prevention corps were sent to such construction projects as the Feng-t'ai -- Sha-ch'eng Railway and Kuan-t'ing Reservoir, both in the province of Hopei.[13]

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[10] People's Handbook, 1955, pp. 396-97.

[11] Relief Work under the Chinese Communists, pp. 6-8.

[12] Ibid., p. 8.

[13] Ibid.

744 In June 1938, during the war of resistance against Japan, the China Defense League was founded in Hong Kong by Madame Sun Yat-sen. It acted as a channel for international aid, chiefly to bring medicine and relief to Communist bases. In 1941, its headquarters was moved to Chungking. After the establishment of the Chinese Communist regime, this organization changed its name to the China Welfare Institute (August 1950). Its center of activity has been in Shanghai.[14] In January 1952, the China Welfare Institute began to publish China Reconstructs, an international, propaganda-disseminating, bimonthly magazine in English.

The Chinese People's National Committee for the Protection of Children was formed on November 26, 1951 at Peking in response to the call issued at the Berlin conference of the International Federation of Democratic Women. The head of the Chinese organization is Madame Sun Yat-sen. The principles of this committee, which include the promotion of child welfare, were defined as "anti-imperialism" and the "promotion of world peace."

In 1948, a group of professors in Shanghai founded the China Tuberculosis Prevention Association. The Communist regime brought this

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14. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
15. People's Handbook 1955, p. 396.

744 organization under their control and moved it to Peking. In August 1953, a conference of tuberculosis-prevention workers was called and certain tasks and policies of the association were outlined. More than one hundred tuberculosis-prevention units throughout China Mainland are reported to be affiliated with this organization.[16]

IV. RELIEF AND RELIEF POLICIES

During the convention of the National
657 People's Congress in September 1954, Hsieh Chüeh-tsai, Minister of Internal Affairs under the Communist regime, made a report on the state of relief and welfare on the China Mainland. After alluding to the expanse and severity of natural calamities from 1949 to 1954, he reiterated the stand and policies of the Chinese Communist Government in conducting relief work. The first effort was to mobilize the masses in the prevention of drought, frost, harmful insects, and floods. Secondly, when disaster strikes, the people would be expected to "help themselves through production," "to economize during the famine period," and "to offer mutual-aid." Only when it was absolutely necessary would the government proffer outright relief.[17]

In discussing public welfare and relief in Communist China, it is necessary to recognize

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[16] Ibid., pp. 211-12.

[17] Ibid.

657 how the Communists interpret certain common terms. The word relief, although generally taken to mean "money or necessaries given to people who are in need,"[18] to the Communists carries no implication of unconditional succor. Their basic relief policy, including emergency relief, is "self-help-through-production," and their basic relief method is the substitution of work for relief. For they hold that the state is omnipotent and the individual is subjugated to the state. Therefore, even in relief work their emphasis is on production for the construction of the state rather than for human needs. Most of their projects for water conservation, road building, and the laying of railroads have drawn upon famine refugees to supplement the labor force.[19]

657 464 In the summer of 1950, the Chinese Communist Government at Peking issued several documents concerning relief work. In the cities the problem of increasing unemployment was pressing, and in the rural areas famine was serious. The urban unemployed were ordered to register, and labor employment offices were set up in the cities. "Self-help-through-production" was one of the widely advertised slogans.

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[18] H. P. Fairchild, Dictionary of Sociology and Related Sciences, Ames, Iowa, Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1955, p. 255.

[19] Relief Work Under the Chinese Communists, pp. 9-12.

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In many counties of Hopei Province in 1951, drought and insects caused widespread famine, and the peasants drifted to nearby cities in search of relief. In one county it was reported that a total of 1,422 people from 61 villages abandoned their homes, and this number included 160 who were village cadres.[20] In Tientsin, new jobs were created to absorb the refugees; in 1951, authorities in Tientsin claimed to have found work for 148,100 refugees. Authorities in the North China Region claimed to have found work for 300,000 refugees in the period 1950-52. The Communists also claimed to have "reallocated" 20,000 beggars, pickpockets, and vagrants and "reformed" 2,000 prostitutes during the same period.[21] The Tientsin municipal government claimed to have established forty-five vocational training classes from which some 9,800 trainees had been graduated. Provisions were made for the care and housing of 14,000 old people, vagrant children, and beggars.[22]

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The local branches of the Federation of Democratic Women were especially active in Peking and Tientsin. As early as December 1949, the federation, in co-operation with several offices of the municipal government, closed some 385 brothels in Peking, confiscated

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[20] Hopei Daily, May 15, 1951, p. 1.

[21] T'ien-ching Jih-pao [Tientsin Daily], Octoboer 7, 1952, p. 4.

[22] Ibid., Sept. 30, 1952, p. 3.

548 464 the property of brothel-owners, and began to train the prostitutes for work in factories. Some 2,000 prostitutes were taken into custody and placed in eight vocational training centers. About 400 persons who derived their income from brothels were sentenced by local courts.[23]

The Tientsin Federation of Democratic Women undertook to further the employment of women workers. In a three-year progress report in September 1952, the federation claimed to have placed some 8,000 women workers, conducted twenty vocational training classes from which 4,000 women were graduated, and formed various production units to employ the services of a number of women.[24]

V. CHILD WELFARE

527 657 The Nationalist Government, following the practice of dedicating one day in the year to the nation's children, promulgated April 4 as Children's Day in 1931. The new regime changed this date to June 1, in accordance with a decision made by the International Democratic Women's Federation at Moscow in 1949.[25]

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[23] People's Handbook 1950, Shanghai, Section 7, p. 20.

[24] Tientsin Daily, Sept. 24, 1952, p.1.

[25] Hung Hsin-t'ao, Chi-nien Chieh-jih Shih-shih Tzu-liao [Historical Resources on Memorial Days], Shanghai, 1953, Vol. I, pp. 180-83.

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Children's Day as it is celebrated in the United States and in Great Britain was branded as capitalistic -- i.e., not designed for the welfare of the children of the laboring classes. Around June 1 each year, Communist propaganda media are mobilized for the promotion of child welfare, praise of the "happy state" of children in Communist China and in the Communist bloc of nations, and derogatory references to the "plight" of children in free countries. At this time in most large cities on the China Mainland health examinations for children are conducted. In the period 1950-52, according to a Communist report, more than 1,000,000 children throughout China received health examinations.[26]

To celebrate Children's Day in 1953, a special meeting was held in Peking. In addition to 600 delegates from primary and junior middle schools, the meeting was attended by 100 foreign youths from the various legations and embassies. Vice-mayor Wu Han told the assembled group that in Peking alone some 300,000 children were attending primary and secondary schools, and that of this number some 80,000 had, "gloriously", become members of the Young Pioneers. For younger children, the report added, 190 creches had been established, and Peking Municipality was providing special hospitals, swimming pools, athletic fields, and a dramatic school.[27] Some 3,000 children gathered for

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[26] Hsin-hua Jih-pao [New China Daily], Chungking, May 30, 1953, p. 3.

[27] Tientsin Daily, June 1, 1953, p. 1.

527 657 the celebration of Children's Day 1953 in Tientsin. Present were the mayor of Tientsin, representatives of the local Communist Party and the Youth Corps, and "fighting heroes" and "labor models." The mayor reported that the number of primary schools in Tientsin had increased; the enrollment of 248,000 children was double that of the year before. The various kindergartens and nursing schools in Tientsin were charged with the care of 10,840 younger children.[28]

657 185 The first conference of workers for the welfare of women and children was convened October 3-12, 1951, under the aegis of the All-China Democratic Women's Federation. With national production the prime concern, the conference decided that the objective of welfare work was to serve the masses of working women and their children. Its principal tasks were to promote better health and better health conditions and to solve the problems that arose in the rearing and education of the children of working people. At the confernece it was reported that some 15,700 child welfare organizations, including creches, kindergartens, and relief institutions, had been established on the China Mainland. Another report claimed that in the two years ending November 1951, some 4,340 persons had been trained in child-care and 3,743 had been trained to care for both women and children. In the same period, 7,295,095 persons

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[28] Ibid.

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were reported to have seen the 128 exhibits arranged by propaganda agencies to promote general health.[29]

By the end of 1952, the Communists asserted, there were 34,000 public welfare agencies for women and children throughout the Mainland, with additional mobile units organized under all the provincial governments. In mining and construction centers, in other enterprises, in organizations and schools, 2,738 creches were in operation in 1953; in cities, 4,346 "street creches" had been established, and in the rural areas 148,200 creches had been organized to care for some 850,000 children from families engaged in agriculture.[30] During the annual convention of the Chinese People's National Committee for the Protection of Children, held in Peking in October 1954, the secretary of the committee reported that there were 425,000 younger children in the kindergartens, and the primary schools had been thrown open to the children of farmers and industrial workers. During the previous year, some 3,000 books for children had been published and nine picture-story (comic strip) periodicals were in circulation for younger readers. In the year 1953, the same report stated, 26 motion pictures for children had been circulated, including some films imported from Russia for which the

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29. New China Daily, May 30, 1953, p. 3.
30. Ibid., April 18, 1953, p. 4.

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narration and dialogue had been dubbed in Chinese.[31]

VI. AID TO FAMILIES OF "MARTYRS" AND SERVICEMEN

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In Communist China, aid to the families of "martyrs" and servicemen has been given a great deal of publicity. Concern for the welfare of the members of the armed forces and their families is specified in Article 25 of the Common Program, one of the first documents ratified by the Peking regime. It states: "Dependents of those who have given their lives for the revolution and members of the revolutionary forces who are in need shall receive preferential treatment from the state and from society. The People's Government shall make appropriate arrangements for disabled or retired servicemen who have participated in the revolutionary war, providing them with means of livelihood or with occupation."[32] However, the fact that the nationwide campaign did not begin until late 1950 indicates that the need for provisions of this sort increased during the fighting in Korea.[33] On December 11, 1950, the Ministry of Internal Affairs promulgated five sets of regulations providing compensation for dependents of service-

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[31] Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily], Nov. 27, 1954, p. 1.

[32] The Important Documents of the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1949, p. 10.

[33] Relief Work Under the Chinese Communists, p. 18.

729 736 men. These were provisional regulations governing preferential treatment of families of revolutionary "martyrs" and servicemen' preferential treatment of, and compassionate payments to, disabled servicemen; citations and compassionate payments for revolutionary workers who had been injured or killed and citations and compassionate payments for members of the People's Militia and laborers in military service who had been injured or killed.[34] The preferential treatment of families of "martyrs" and servicemen included the presentation of land and farm implements, government scholarships for children, reduced prices, discounts, etc. Only in cases of extreme hardship were direct payments given.

729 736 527 At the time of the lunar New Year in 1951, the Communists promoted a campaign to honor the families of the Chinese People's Volunteers and the People's Liberation Army. Since 1951, the lunar New Year, usually called the Spring Festival, and Chinese Communist Army Day, August 1, have been made occasions for the honoring of the families of "martyrs" and servicemen.

736 As part of the program to aid families and dependents of the armed forces, those in the cities able to work have been taught various handicrafts to assure their livelihood; for those

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[34] Hsin-hua Yüeh-pao [New China Monthly], Peking, Vol, III, No. 3, Jan. 1951, pp. 516-21.

236 in rural areas unable to work, a system of substitute-tilling has been adopted whereby their plots of land are cultivated for them.

Because North China came under Communist control before other regions, and Peking was designated as the national capital, many programs were first instituted in the North China Region. As early as 1950, production units were reported to have been organized in Peking and Tientsin to arrange for the employment of some 5,100 people designated as dependents of servicemen. The chairman of Hopei Province, speaking on Communist Army Day in 1951, asserted that there were 650,000 families of revolutionary "martyrs" and servicemen and 67,000 disabled veterans in that province. He also reported that in 71 counties, the system of substitute-tilling was in progress, and that work had been found for a large percentage of dependents and disabled veterans. But other reports gave less optimistic pictures, especially in regard to the program of substitute-tilling. In Ch'ing-yüan county, many dependents received substitute-tilling coupons but could not find any one to do the work. There were mistakes in distribution, and some persons who were not entitled to substitute-tilling coupons received them.[35] By 1953, this situation was reported to have been somewhat improved. Both in Hopei and Shansi, the substitute-tilling program was organized under the agricultural production co-operatives or under other fixed arrangements for substitute-tilling.[36]

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[35] Hopei Daily, August 1, 1951, p. 2.

According to a broadcast in January 1955 by the Minister of Internal Affairs, incomplete statistics from 13 provinces showed that more than 60 per cent of the families of "martyrs" and servicemen were participating in mutual-aid groups and co-operatives and many had been elected officers of these organizations. Others were elected as delegates to the People's National Congress or had become village cadres. As of September 1954, according to the minister's report, there were 67 special schools for disabled veterans, with a total enrollment of 50,000, and some 10,000 who had graduated from these schools were given posts in the national reconstruction program.[37] The People's Daily (January 25, 1955) reported that some 382 "rehabilitated" veterans had been elected "labor models." The same source reported that there had been a 20 per cent increase in the number of families of servicemen joining mutual-aid groups and co-operatives in the period 1953-54. In Hopei Province, 60 per cent of the veterans became village cadres and some 1,300 were elected "labor models."[38]

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[36] Tientsin Daily, Feb. 12, 1953, p. 3.

[37] New China Monthly, No. 2, Feb. 1955, p. 19.

[38] People's Handbook 1955, pp. 212-13.

VII. CONCLUSION

657 In almost all documents concerning public welfare and relief in Communist China the emphasis is on production and labor power rather than on human life. In regard to famine relief in the rural areas as well as unemployment relief in the cities, the people are asked to save themselves by "self-help-through-production." Even in concern for the welfare of women and children, concern is manifest only for the increase in labor power which may result. In the charter of the People's Relief Administration, Article 2 explains its function in the following sentence: "This administration is an organization of the people under the leadership of the Central People's Government to unite and guide... relief and welfare workers to help the Government in the organization of the masses for the promoting of production and economy, labor and mutual-aid, so that the relief and welfare works for the masses of the people shall be enhanced."[39]

When one understands the Communists' attitude toward public welfare, it is easier to grasp the overwhelming plight of those within the Soviet orbit who become its victims. Perhaps no written passage could illuminate the situation so vividly and succinctly as a parable recounted in one of the ancient Chinese classics.

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[39] Hopei Daily, Paoting, May 5, 1950, p. 1.

657 "In passing by the side of Mount Thai, Confucius came on a woman who was wailing bitterly by a grave... 'Your wailing', said he, 'is altogether like that of one who had suffered sorrow upon sorrow.' She replied, 'It is so. Formerly, my husband's father was killed by a tiger. My husband was also killed...and now my son has died in the same way.' The Master said, 'Why do you not leave...[this] place?' The answer was, 'There is no oppressive government.' The Master then said [to his disciples], 'Remember this, my little children. Oppressive government is more terrible than tigers.'"[40]

Have man-made disasters in Communist China become fiercer than nature's floods and droughts? This may well be the reason so many prisoners of war in Korea did not choose to return to the China Mainland.

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167 On April 4, 1950, in Taipei, the capital of Formosa, an organization called the Free China Relief Association was formed. Its purpose is to aid Chinese refugees from the Mainland and some of the people still suffering under Communist rule. In the past five years, the asso-

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[40] James Legge, tr., The Liki (The Book of Rites), Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1885, Vol. 27, in The Sacred Books of the East, ed. by F. Max Müller, pp. 190-91.

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ciation has aided more than 967,000 refugees and helped 51,846 people to escape to Formosa. During the flood of 1954, this organization sent thirty-five airplanes to the Mainland and dropped about 100,000 pounds of rice to those suffering from famine. The Free China Relief Association was also responsible for some 14,500 Chinese prisoners of war from Korea, who chose Free China rather than return to the Communist fold. This group arrived in Formosa in January 1954. The FCRA has established connections with the United Nations and the United States and had extended aid to Chinese refugees in many places, including Hong Kong, Japan, and Korea.[41]

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At the United Nations Security Council meeting on November 28, 1950, the American delegate, Warren Austin, spoke of the relief supplies sent to China from the United States, of American efforts to feed and to clothe thousands upon thousands of Chinese people in the postwar years, and of the friendship expressed by the American people for China. Friendship between America and China has a long history, and as a result the Peking regime and the Communists do all in their power to slander the United States.

During a period of two years (1945-47), China received several hundred million dollars worth of relief supplies and relief funds from

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41. Chiu-chi T'e-k'an [Special Bulletin on Relief], published by Free China Relief Association, Taipei, Sept. 1, 1955.

America through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Although these programs were interrupted by the civil strife between the Nationalists and the Communists and was brought to an abrupt end by the Communist domination of the Mainland, many people were benefited. After the outbreak of warfare in Korea, the Chinese Communist Government assumed control of all American-subsidized educational, relief, and religious organizations. According to the Communist report, American assets in these three categories amounted to US$ 41,900,000. Of this sum, 47 per cent was for relief and welfare work, and was used to operate 200 orphanages, 20 leper asylums, 10 schools for the mute and deaf, and 30 schools for the blind.[42] It is apparent that without American aid much welfare work will be suspended. It is unlikely that those who have received the benefits of these subsidized institutions will readily forget such gestures of American friendship.

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[42] Enlightenment Daily, Dec. 30, 1950, p. 1.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 1r,
Sociological Background

ATTITUDES AND REACTIONS OF THE PEOPLE

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The attitudes of an individual, although conditioned by the environment in which he lives and influenced by the persons with whom he comes in contact, are subject to changes that are well-nigh unpredictable; he may simultaneously adopt diametrically opposed attitudes without being aware of inconsistency. This fact, coupled with China's multitudinous regions and groups of people of varying characteristics, makes the task of gauging the attitudes of the Chinese people an exceedingly risky one at best. The Chinese, in general, are traditionally less outspoken than Americans. However, since attitudes manifest themselves in reactions and some of the reactions of the Chinese people are observable even in official Communist announcements, a few very general and broad conclusions may be drawn. In this discussion, attention is focused on the attitudes of the various groups of Chinese toward their country, the Communist government, and the ambitions and aspirations of the individual.

In sociological studies, occupational stratification is one recognized criterion for analyzing any society. In adopting this approach for our discussion, we do not propose to overlook the significance of grouping people according to other equally valid criteria, such as age, sex, and income. Older people, for example, are generally

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more conservative, less willing to adapt to change, and less likely to show enthusiasm for the Communist program. The rich, who have more to lose, are generally more dissatisfied with the Communist regime than their poorer countrymen. These patterns of attitudes tend to cut across the occupational stratification. In view of the technical limitations imposed on this discussion, occupational stratification will be used, with allowance for the exceptions within each category.

I. FARMERS

The rich absentee-landowners of China, whose social status ranks with that of government bureaucrats and whose interests are identified with those of rich merchants, are all but nonexistent in Mainland China today. The Chinese farmer class consists chiefly of poor peasants and "middle farmers" holding small lots of land. These people have had little opportunity to identify themselves with the state or its destiny. However, since the Communists redesignated Peking as the capital and North China once again resumed its role as the most important region in China's cultural and political affairs, the farmers in this region are likely to be more aware of the existence of a community greater than their immediate environs. All the farmers in North China speak Northern Mandarin, which makes them feel quite at home in Peking. Thus they are more concerned with life in Peking than are those farmers in remote southwestern or south-

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eastern areas. In those villages in North China which were overrun by the Japanese during World War II, the growth of a spirit of nationalism is even more noticeable.

The Communist began to "educate and propagandize" the farmers in North China before those in the East China, Central-South, and Southwest region. There are probably more farmers in this region who have mastered a few political terms. Of course, this does not mean that the farmers have developed a strong national feeling. But, compared with other regions, North China has had a longer period of Communist rule, and the farmers in this region have been exposed to more opportunities of Communist indoctrination, a part of which is to foster a spirit of nationalism.

The idea that he is soon to be given land probably has generated apprehension even in the poorest peasant, who always believed he wanted to own land. To be sure, the gain through the process of land reform must have given the poor peasant some satisfaction, but subsequent grain taxes remain heavy and Communist efforts to collectivize the production and marketing of farm produce met resistance. Although there are fewer reports on the farmers' expression of dissatisfaction in North China, there is reason to believe that the poor farmer in this region is less happy than he was in the days immediately after

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the completion of Communist land reform, especially if he had experienced the "softer" kind of Communism in northern Hopei and Shansi provinces during the latter part of World War II. In this connection it is worth noting that land reform was somewhat modified in North China and was carried out with much less violence. The possibility still exists that changes in government policy may regain for the regime some of the farmer's enthusiasm.

There has been a great deal of publicity for the flood control projects on the Yung-ting River in Hopei Province. Farmers who have received benefits from the projects are undoubtedly impressed by the accomplishment of the new regime but subsequent floods may have brought a great amount of disillusionment to these farmers. Others who have never directly profited by the projects will have more reason to be skeptical. Available reports show that neither the government nor the farmers are satisfied with the amount of relief and welfare work done thus far or with the manner in which this work is done. These reports were substantiated by the fact that the authorities in Tientsin have had to initiate a campaign to send many peasants back to their villages, indicating that life in rural communities in North China still does not offer enough incentive for the farmers to stay with their farming. As a result farmers continue to flood metropolitan centers in search of work and a better living.

The Chinese farmer's picture of a foreign culture was originally derived from contact with

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foreign missionaries. At one time foreign churches were established in all important cities and many larger villages in North China. Government efforts to foster xenophobia, supported by the effort of the ultranationalistic segment of the Chinese elite dated from the late nineteenth century. These efforts have been intensified by the Communists, who are trying to create a frightening image of "Western imperialism" in the eyes of the farmers. Many farmers in this region are likely to remember the stories about the Boxer Rebellion which ran rampant in Hopei and Shansi and victimized many foreigners. Memory of such anti-foreign uprisings may cause these farmers to fall easy prey to Communist anti-Western propaganda. A very small number of farmers who have been less influenced by anti-foreign propaganda and who have received benefits from foreign missionaries may be disturbed by the deliberate mistreatment of missionaries. Other farmers who regard the missionaries as an undesirable group may approve the "foreign devils' downfall." But the majority of farmers have had little or no contact with foreigners; they are not particularly concerned with the latter's fate in Communist China.

The Chinese farmer has always hoped to safeguard his family by acquiring land to provide a better education for his children and to maintain the respect of fellow villagers. Now that the farmer can no longer obtain as much land as he hopes, he seeks ways in which his children through education, can advance on the socio-economic ladder. The fact that many young

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people from peasant families have been absorbed in the government "cadre" system may induce the Chinese farmer to look more kindly upon the present regime. Of course, there are exceptions among the farming population. Farmers active in secret societies, which are traditionally resistant to government control, may have an altogether different set of attitudes toward the nation, foreigners, and the individual's role in society. Mass uprisings, in which secret societies played an important part, indicate that sometimes these groups have distinctly anti-foreign or anti-authoritarian characteristics. Members of some of these groups may uphold a standard of loyalty to the individual above traditional loyalty to the family or to the state; others may condone banditry and defy all forms of established social order. Due to closer surveillance by the Communists in North China secret societies are much less active in this region than in other regions.

II. URBAN WORKERS

In an industrial city like Tientsin in North China, the group feeling of organized workers was aroused as early as the 1920's when labor was involved in many political movements. Many industrial workers have long realized that they were "in the group" and somewhat later came to the conclusion that they had to work "for the group" in those movements launched against foreign influence and private capital. Having been involved in these movements, the worker undoubtedly formed a more definite idea of the

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nation and its symbols than that of the average farmer.

The Communists' avowed attempt to raise the status of the worker must have given the worker a feeling of importance as he learns of the Communists' economic reconstruction plan. He derives a measure of pride of achievement when a steel plant is erected or when a bridge is built, although he may not really believe that the workers, as the Communists say, are the masters of the new China. Other promised benefits, including job security and welfare provisions also add to the popularity of the Communist regime among the workers, despite the fact that most of these "benefits" still largely remain promises. Especially in North China where the workers were the first to see a "cultural center" and other recreational facilities dedicated to the Chinese working class, the morale among the workers is expected to be higher than that of the workers in other regions.

On the liability side of the Communist policy toward the worker are: the lack of substantial rise in the standard of living; a harsher working schedule and loss of leisure time; and illusory welfare program, which the Communists themselves admit cannot be realized until the worker has worked still harder to produce still more; and the disillusionment that the "proletariat" has not really become the master of the new China as the Communists had promised. Thus the worker's attitude toward the government and its policy must depend on how much he believes in a glorious "tomorrow" and how well

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he can put up with the physical hardships of "today." The recent let-up in "labor emulation" drives and the sudden flurry of official warnings against driving the workers too hard appear to indicate that the laboring class is showing signs of possible exhaustion. In addition, the worker's attitude may also be greatly influenced by the rise of a new managerial class fostered by the Communists, which, for whatever reasons, receives better treatment than do those who work on the production line.

Foreign advisors had been employed in many factories in pre-Communist days, and many workers may have become accustomed to accepting the general excellence of Western technology. However, any government effort to impose foreign leadership in technical fields may injure the pride of the worker and provoke his resentment. Certainly the demoralizing effect of the privileged treatment accorded Russian technicians in Chinese factories should not be discounted.

There is little evidence that the Chinese worker has abandoned his aspiration of personal advancement in the material sense. Although here again the promotion of the young and ambitious to serve in the huge government machine may satisfy some of the workers, the lack of a substantial betterment in their standard of living will lead many workers to feel that their aspirations cannot be fulfilled under the Com-

565 munist regime.

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III. STUDENTS AND INTELLECTUALS

517 184 Of all the groups of people in China, the intellectuals are probably the most varied in their attitudes. They do not constitute a "class, hence their attitudes do not show any distinctive "group" characteristics. There are those whose strong convictions make them active leaders of social and political movements in defiance of authoritarian rule; there are others whose education and experience make them flexible under pressure. Hence no dependable conclusion on the attitudes of the Chinese intellectuals as a group has been arrived at.

Although the attitudes of Chinese intellectua differ, the great majority of them are exceedingly patriotic. It is therefore conceivable that to some at least the Communist emphasis on loyalty to the state rather than the traditional loyalty to the family must have a great appeal. There is reason to believe that most of them who accepted Communism in 1949 did so because they saw in the Communist program some hope of restoring China to a position of dignity and power. After five years of Communist rule, some of the intellectuals are probably elated by the truculence with which Red China has been conducting its foreign affairs, and by the feeling that China, at long last, has been unified and become a nation of

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importance. But on the nagative side there are the restrictions on intellectual freedom imposed by the Communists. Furthermore, the Communist policy of gradually substituting the freshly trained and well-indoctrinated intellectuals for those who have had a "liberal" or "conservative" background must have created a sense of insecurity among many.

Traditionally, Chinese intellectuals aspired to high positions in the government where they could attain wealth, social esteem, and influence. For those intellectuals who still harbor such personal ambitions, it must be heartening to see people with no seniority in either the Party hierarchy or the government bureaucracy among the ranks of the nation's leaders in all fields. For others, who have modified their personal ambitions and who sincerely wish to make their training useful to the country, something they have not been able to do for many years in the past, Peking's policy of finding a place for intellectuals in the national reconstruction program is undoubtedly a welcome move. However, it must be remembered that in an effort to place college graduates and other trained personnel where they are most needed, the Communist government has admitted misassignments which resulted in dissatisfaction.

Since the early days of the Chinese Communist movement, the Communists have always had enthusiastic support among the students.

517 184 Many loyal Communist cadres are recruited from among the students who, so far, have not shown any lack of enthusiasm for the Communist cause. But while accepting Communism as their ideal, the students may not be able to suppress entirely a simultaneous impulse toward individualism. Furthermore, they may also find the reality of Communism or the individual's place in it less exciting and idealistic than promised by Communist preachments.

IV. BUSINESSMEN AND INDUSTRIALISTS

565 184 Few industrialists are left in Communist China today, but small-business men and manufacturers, who have made up the larger part of China's urban population, continue to exist, although in substantially reduced numbers. Commerce has always occupied an inferior position in traditional Chinese social strata, while industry is something relatively new and its position in Chinese society has yet to be clearly defined. In general, merchants and manufacturers, who had operated under government restrictions even in pre-Communist days are cool-headed realists. They are not easily swayed by high-sounding phrases. There have been few occasions when symbols of the state could evoke sentiment among the merchants and small manufacturers except, perhaps, at a time when foreign goods flooded the Chinese

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market and caused dislocation in the Chinese economy.

Under the Peking regime, businessmen and industrialists as a group fare badly (possibly not much better than rich landowners), and the general mood in industrial and commercial circles is most probably unfavorable toward the government. The Communists have made it clear that small businessmen and manufacturers are only tolerated in the transitional stage of the "New Democracy", and that there will be no room for private enterprise in the socialist society which is the ultimate goal of the Communist regime. Meanwhile, these people have to carry a large share of the tax burden and face the stiff competition of and regulation by state enterprises. There is evidence that the businessmen and manufacturers accustomed as they are to government interference are finding the controls imposed by the Communist government increasingly strict, making it ever more difficult to manipulate or elude restrictive measures. This general mood of discontent is particularly observable among merchants and private industrialists in Tientsin which has been allocated large portions of government bonds, second only to Shanghai in East China.

If profit has been the most common motive among businessmen and manufacturers, under the present circumstances they have been forced to abandon or at least restrain their ambitions. Some of those who were allowed to do so have made a second choice -- that of changing their

565 careers. The more adaptable have escaped the purges by cooperating with the Communist
184 regime. In this connection the Communists have appointed a number of erstwhile influential industrialists to serve in the government; it may be merely a conciliatory gesture of the Communists to win the support of small business, but it does provide this class of people with one temporary alternative to their lost hope.

An additional factor in provoking dissatisfaction among the merchants is the control on foreign trade. Merchants in north China seaports like Tangku and Chinwangtao, who had high hopes when the Nationalist blockade sealed off the rival port of Shanghai, are disillusioned because virtually all foreign trade is now handled by the government. Their role has been reduced to merely conducting limited export transactions supervised by the government, and there is no prospect that they may be allowed to import those Western manufactured goods which are highly profitable.

V. WOMEN

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562 The customary position of women in China is subordinate to that of men. This tradition was so deep-rooted that it took superhuman courage for the first women to claim their "rights"; and the pain of "emancipation" continues under the Communists.

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To the "emancipated" belongs responsibility; this is at least theoretically true, and the Chinese women who have exchanged kitchen for factory are generally expected to have a degree of political consciousness and a love for labor similar to that of men of equal education and comparable environment. In many cases women prove to be even more "patriotic" than men as a result of the unprecedented government effort to show the women that they, too, can achieve enviable social recognition by a show of "patriotism" and devotion to labor.

How much improvement in the status of the women has been brought about by the Communists? Women are encouraged to particiate in political activities and labor; more tangibly and closer to their daily life, they are given child care, adult education, and other welfare benefits if they join the working force. If the increase in number of women workers in factories can be taken as an indication of the women's own free choice, then women in Communist China may indeed feel favorably disposed toward the Communist regime. But upon closer observation this may not be the case; many women who undertook factory work after 1949 may have done so as a financial necessity rather than as a result of free choice.

The much-publicized marriage law in Communist China embodies nothing new, but its vigorous and often arbitrary enforcement is

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unprecedented. It has engendered mixed feelings among the women. Acceptance of this law will mean the destruction of some of the most stubborn traditions in China (See discussion of the marriage law in the chapter on The Family).

Some women hold high posts in government, and there are "labor heroines" in all industries. Housewives in larger cities manage to live in leisure if they belong to the high income group. Younger housewives in families of modest income may have to work outside the home, but there is no indication that they resent it. The age-group differential asserts itself in the reaction of women to the new regime; older women who had learned to live in peace with the extended family system are apt to dread the Communist effort to reduce the extended family to the conjugal family; young women are more likely to feel favorably disposed toward the Peking regime.

A sharp difference in attitude is to be observed between the women in Peking and those in the mountains of southeastern Shansi Province. City life, plus opportunity to receive education, had caused changes in attitudes among women in urban areas even before the Communists announced their policy with regard to women and their status in society; while most of the women in outlying villages remain more strictly tradition-bound and are less prepared to accept the ideas introduced by the Peking government.

VI. MINORITY NATIONALITIES

563 184 It can be said that there is no minority national group in the provinces of Hopei and Shansi. However, wherever such people are found in North China, no matter how few they are in number, the Communist government is making political capital by extending them favored treatment. The Mongols and Manchus in this region are so well assimilated by the *Han* Chinese that no line of distinction can be drawn between them. The *Hui* people, mainly because of their religion, are being given every recognition by the government in order to win support of all the members of Islamic faith within China and the sympathy of those in other countries. Although it is difficult to gauge how thoroughly the scattered *Hui* people in North China have been convinced of the Communists' good intentions, there is no basis to assume that they are not pleased with their priviledged position as a result of the regime's policy toward minority nationalities.

VII. OTHER GROUPS

184 665 647 In addition to the groups discussed, there are other groups which, although minor in numerical strength, are of importance because their attitudes do have a significant bearing on the tensions in Chinese society.

It is evident that all Communist Party members and all government bureaucrats do not necessarily

184 665 647 have the same attitudes, in spite of the fact that they are regimented by a well-controlled machine. High-ranking Communist officials exhibited intense feelings of patriotism and dedication to the "cause" in the early days of their careers, and so far they have shown no sign indicating that their feelings may have changed. Granted that the behind-the-scene struggle for personal power in a Soviet system is most difficult to discern, the downfall of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih in 1954 was the only serious rift in the Communist leadership. Even the Kao-Jao incident, which might have delayed repercussions in Northwest and East China, was quickly settled and left no perceptible political ripple in North China, A purge as violent as that which took place in Russia in the 1930's at present cannot as yet be predicted for China. Overshadowed by the unique personal prestige and cohesive power of Mao Tse-tung, the high-ranking Communist leaders, particularly the military, have yet to offer evidence of power-seeking at the risk of disrupting Party harmony and hegemony. This, of course, does not preclude future development of discord among Party leaders.

The personnel in lower Party echelons are subject to tremendous pressures from all sides. Even the most devoted Party workers are expected to prove their loyalty to Communism. The fact that the Party relies on close surveillance and an atmosphere of fear in order to keep members in line indicates the existence of dissatisfaction

184 and dissidence within the Party ranks. Expansion of industrial centers in China necessitates
665 the promotion of numerous lower-level Party
647 functionaries. This certainly tends to make the old Party cadres resentful when they see the rise of new cadres to positions equal to or higher than their own. Generally speaking, cadres assigned to rural areas are less enthusiastic about the regime than those in urban areas who live in more comfortable circumstances and have more frequent opportunities for advancement, and the amenities of a wider social life.

Former Nationalist officials had their darkest days during the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, when almost all lived under the imminent threat of violence and death. After these intensive campaigns had subsided, a few former Kuomintang personnel remained among the Communist government bureaucrats. There is no doubt that these former Kuomintang personnel are reminded of the necessity of proving their thorough conversion to Communism. A sense of insecurity affects this group more virulently than it does the "securely situated" segments of the Chinese population.

VIII. CONCLUSION

184 The Communist system of multiple control, which penetrates all aspects of life, and the Communist effort to maintain a strong tie with

184 Russia are two major causes of dissatisfaction among the Chinese people. Regimentation, when carried to the extreme, provokes the resistance of the people. Subservience to the Soviet destroys the spirit of nationalism which the Communists have been trying to cultivate in China. There is evidence that Peking is attempting to reduce the possibility of friction between the Russians and the Chinese without damaging the ideological kinship and the diplomatic relationship between China and the Soviet Union. The activities of the wide-spread Sino-Russian Friendship Association, and the continual propaganda on Russian aid to Communist China indicate a sustained effort to create a favorable attitude toward the Soviet Union.

The general patterns of attitudes we have discussed can serve only as indications of the prevailing social mood among various groups. Sociologists agree that it is difficult to predict group response. This, it appears, must apply to a study of a people so varied in temperament as the Chinese.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 2a,
Political Background

CONSTITUTION

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Since the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, adopted in September, 1954, is designed to serve the country as a whole, no attempt has been made to explore its provisions on a regional basis. However, a study of certain interesting phases of the Constitution is included in this handbook as Appendix A, and readers are urged to consult it.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 2b, Political Background

THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

I. NORTH CHINA AS A REGION

631 The term "North China" in a popular sense is understood to refer to the region through which the Yellow River flows. Under the regime of the Chinese Communists, this region has undergone a series of changes. Before the establishment of the Peking government on October 1, 1949, a government of North China was in power. Later a Department of North China Affairs was established as a part of the central government. The provinces of Hopei, Shansi, P'ing-yüan, Chahar, and Suiyuan as well as the municipalities of Peking and Tientsin were placed under the supervision of the department. At the end of 1951, the department was replaced by the North China Administrative Committee.

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631 For the purpose of carrying out guerrilla warfare during the war of resistance against Japan, the Communists sponsored the formation of the Shansi-Hopei-Chahar Border Region with the approval of the Nationalist Government. Although other groups participated, the Communists dominated the area and later established other border region governments to expand guerrilla activity.

631 In 1949, the Peking government had designated an area which included the western part of Shantung, the northern part of Honan, and the southern part of Hopei as a new province to be called P'ing-yüan, "the province of the plain." The Chinese Communists considered this a revolutionary step, because the traditional boundary lines of the provinces were thus ignored. However, three years later the new province was abolished and the various parts restored to their original provinces.

When the North China Administrative Committee was dissolved in 1954, the territory it supervised consisted only of Shansi and Hopei. Of the other three provinces, P'ing-yüan had been abolished, Chahar had been split between the Northeast Region and Inner Mongolia, and Suiyuan had been restored to Inner Mongolia. The present boundaries of Shansi and Hopei are in agreement with pre-Communist lines, except for the northeastern side of Hopei, which includes a few counties which were once parts of the former provinces of Chahar and Jehol.

Within the region of North China, besides Hopei and Shansi, there are two special municipalities -- Peking and Tientsin. Even after the publication of the new constitution these special municipalities remained directly subordinate to the Central People's Government.

II. MILITARY CONQUEST OF NORTH CHINA

726 At the time of the surrender of the Japanese army, the Communists were ready to seize control of North China. They had prepared a list of Communist mayors and governors to be appointed -- a list which Mao Tse-tung delivered to Chiang Kai-shek in the latter part of 1945. However, after the armistice the Nationalist army was flown to the coastal provinces by American military transport, and as a result the provinces along the Peking-Hankow and the Tientsin-Shanghai railway lines again came under the control of the Nationalist Government.

A part of the Communist army was sent to Manchuria, which, under the occupation of the Soviet Army, was accessible to the Chinese Communists. Other Communist armies, hidden in the border area of Shansi-Chahar-Hopei and the border area of Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan, sought to destroy the military forces of the Kuomintang along the two railroad lines in the period July 1946 - October 1948. This was a time of hit-and-run strategy; battles were fought either for the purpose of reducing Kuomintang military forces or in order to isolate Kuomintang strongholds. After July 1947, the Communist armies felt that they had grown strong enough to take the offensive. They attacked

726 the Kuomintang army at Tsinan, where the army of Governor Wang Yao-wu was besieged, and the Kuomintang forces under the command of General Fu Tso-i at Tientsin and Peking. When the isolated cities and strongholds were besieged, North China was not yet united under the Communists. But after the decisive battle of Huai-Hai, which annihilated the tank corps of Chiang Kai-shek, the Communist army attacked Kalgan, Tientsin, and Peiping. These three cities surrendered between December 24, 1948 and January 31, 1949. Thus the provinces north of the Yangtze River came under the control of the Communists. The name Peiping then was changed to Peking and the city became the capital of Communist China.

Shantung and Northern Kiangsu, the provinces on the northern edge of the Yangtze Valley, were conquered by Ch'en I, the commander of the Third Field Army; the provinces of Honan and Hupeh were conquered by Lin Piao. These provinces were assigned to the regional governments of East China and Central-South China.

635 III. THE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE OF THE PROVINCES IN THE PRE-CONSTITUTION STAGE

A. The Governmental Structure of Hopei and Shansi

The governmental structure of the

635 provinces of Hopei and Shansi was at first under the control of the Bureau of Affairs of North China as a department of the Peking regime. In spite of their subordination to the central government, the two provinces were kept intact as administrative units. The structure of government followed the Organizational Law of the Provincial People's Government, according to which "... an area where no regional government or People's Council exists is under the direct supervision of the Central People's
[671] Government."[1] Laws governing the municipality and the county were published on January 6, 1950. But for the lowest levels, such as the village government and the ch'ü government (an area larger than the village), no law was published by the Central People's Government. However, a single paragraph provides that the provincial government is entitled to make provisional rules whenever necessary to bridge such a gap. On the basis of this authority, the Hopei Provincial Government on February 22, 1950 issued four sets of provisional rules: (1) for the ch'ü government; (2) for the hsiang government; (3) for the representatives' conference of the ch'ü; and (4) for the

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[1] "Sheng Jen-min Cheng-fu Tsu-chih-fa" ["Organizational Law of the Provincial People's Government"], T'u-pao Shou-ts'e [Newspaper Reading Handbook], Hankow, Ch'ang-chiang jih-pao she, 1950, p. 107.

635 representatives' conference of the hsiang.[2] These remained in force until a new law for local government and for the People's conference on all levels was published by the Central People's Government in December 1950.

The laws covering provincial government provided for a governor and a number of deputy-governors and council members in each province. They were to be appointed by the Central People's Government. In the provincial government the following departments were established: civil affairs, public security, and national minority affairs when required, all under the supervision of the political-legal commission; finance, commerce and industry, communications, agriculture and forestry, and labor, all under the supervision of the finance-economic commission; culture and education, health, and information and publications, all under the supervision of the cultural-education commission. When required, a committee for overseas Chinese affairs was added. In addition, provision was made for a provincial People's control commission, a provincial People's court, and a provincial People's procuratorate.

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[2] Ho-pei Jih-pao [Hopei Daily], Paoting, Feb. 23, 1950.

635 The functions that the provincial government assumed under this Organizational Law were: (1) to transmit instructions of the Central People's Government to the counties and municipalities and to issue orders within the provincial field of competence; (2) to put into practice the resolutions of the provincial representatives' conference and the resolutions approved by the Central People's Government; (3) to draw up provisional decrees and regulations required by the policies of the provincial government, and to submit them for approval to the Central People's Government; (4) to appoint and dismiss provincial and county personnel with the approval of the Central People's Government or according to its decisions; (5) to abolish and revise the resolutions and decrees eminating from the People's Council and People's Representatives' Conference which were in conflict with the resolutions or decrees of People's governments of a higher level.

Item 3 of the Organizational Law provides that the provincial government shall draw up provisional regulations as required. On the basis of this provision, the Hopei provincial government published provisional rules for the ch'ü and the hsiang governments.

On December 2, 1949, the statute of the Provincial Representatives' Conference was

635 published. A representatives' conference was to be established to act in conjunction with the provincial government. The members of the Provincial Representatives' Conference were to be recommended by the representatives' conferences of the municipalities and counties as well as by the peasants' associations, the trade unions, and other popular People's organizations. When representatives' conferences on the municipal and county levels were not yet established, recommendation of the members of the provincial representatives' conference were to be made by the various People's organizations already mentioned. The functions of the representatives' conference on the provincial level were: (a) to hear and to examine the reports from the provincial government; (b) to make decisions on the suggested measures of the provincial government; (c) to examine and to pass on the budget and the financial statement of the provincial government; (d) to propose reforms; and (e) to elect the governor, the deputy-governors, and other members of the provincial government.[3]

B. The Hopei Provincial Government

The work of the provincial government

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[3] Chieh-fang Jih-pao [Liberation Daily], Shanghai, December 6, 1949.

635 can best be examined in the light of its relationship to the Representatives' Conference of Hopei. The first representatives' conference of Hopei was convened on November 2, 1950 and lasted seven days. The 519 delegates, 490 of whom actually were in attendance, were classified by the Communist press as follows:[4]

Members of Communist organizations:

1) the Communist Party - 7
2) the New Democratic Youth Corps - 5

Members representing the territory:

1) from four municipalities - 14
2) from ten administrative districts - 162

Members of People's organizations:

1) the trade unions - 46
2) the peasants' associations - 42
3) the co-operatives - 16
4) the All-China Federation of Democratic Women - 37
5) the Federation of Democratic Youth - 12
6) literary and artistic workers - 8

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4. Hopei Daily, November 3, 1950.

635 7) students' associations - 6
8) the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association - 3

Members of the military forces:

1) the field army in the province - 6
2) the field army of the military district and militia - 12
3) the Peace-Preservation Corps (police) - 8

Members of other groups:

1) industry - 12
2) commerce - 15
3) education - 16
4) communications - 10
5) medicine and pharmacy - 8
6) the natural sciences - 6
7) industrial technicians - 5
8) veterans - 7
9) religious organizations - 2

Members of the departments on the provincial level - 4

Representatives of the minority nationalities - 5

Representatives receiving special invitations (including members of other parties) - 37

635 Members of the provincial government - 19
(- with the inclusion of alternates - 22)

The first Representatives' Conference of Hopei had three items on its agenda: an annual report of the provincial government, including the tasks proposed for the coming year; the provincial financial report; and the election of a governor, deputy-governors, and members of the provincial consultative conference.

On the first day of the conference, the deputy-governor, Li Hsi-chiu, and the chief delegates spoke. On the second day, the governor, Yang Hsiu-feng, urged increased production and the strengthening of "democratic dictatorship." In the afternoon the commissioner of Finance, Fan Jo-i, submitted a financial statement covering the last six months of 1949 and reported on the revenue and expenditure in the period January to September 1950, the policy for the distribution of the financial burden, financial affairs at the county level, and future financial problems to be met. On November 4th, the committees studied governor Yang's report and the financial report. A chairman was chosen for each committee. The plenary session on November 5th passed a resolution determing the administrative arrangement of the council

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635 and the consultative committee; there were to be one governor, two deputy-governors, and 34 members of the government council, and 75 members (including chairman and deputy chairman) of the consultative committee. In the afternoon, another plenary session examined the governor's report. On November 5th there was a meeting of the chief delegates to discuss and agree upon the nomination of candidates for the governor, deputy-governors, members of the government council, and members of the consultative committee.

Some 1,405 proposals in all were made by the individual representatives and given in toto to a special committee for study and reference to the departments concerned for whatever action seemed necessary.

On November 6th, the plenary session held a debate on the financial report. Some changes were proposed, and the report was passed as satisfactory. Governor Yang then explained that of the 1,405 proposals submitted, some could be acted upon immediately, others must be postponed, and others were to be referred to the departments concerned for action. Finally, some proposals would be submitted to the Central People's Government for approval.

On November 7th, negotiations concerning the election of government members continued

635 among the various delegations. On November 8th, Yang Hsiu-feng, who was in full sympathy with the Communist cause, was unanimously elected governor. Lin T'ieh, secretary of the Communist Party in Hopei, was elected chairman of the Consultative Committee. The committee consisted of 57 members. Nineteen members formed the presidium, presided over by Lin T'ieh as chairman. Thus the first Representatives' Conference of Hopei came to an end.

C. The Shansi Provincial Government

The provincial government of Shansi may also be studied in its relation to the representatives' conference.

The first Representatives' Conference of Shansi, consisting of 401 members and 48 alternatives, was convened March 12-26, 1950.[5] Delegates came from the following groups: Government - 13; Communist Party - 7; Democratic League - 5; Democratic Youth Corps - 5; Taiyuan municipality - 5; Hsin Hsien administrative district - 21; Hsing Hsien administrative district - 21; YÜ-tz'u administrative district - 30; Fen-yang

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[5] Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, May 20, 1950.

635 administrative district - 16; Ch'ang-chih administrative district - 36; Lin-feng administrative district - 30; Yü-ch'eng administrative district - 33; military district of Shansi - 12; public safety forces (police) - 3;

Trade unions - 25; peasants' associations - 25; All-China Federation of Democratic Women - 10; the Federation of Democratic Youth - 4; the students' associations - 7; literary and artistic workers - 4; co-operatives - 5; other organizations - 4;

Industry - 10; communications - 4; commerce - 10; journalism - 4; Sino-Soviet Friendship Association - 2; natural sciences - 2; education - 6; new political science association - 2; branch of the physical education association - 1; medicine and pharmacy - 3; veterans' organizations - 3; Mohammedans - 2; religious organizations - 3; representatives receiving special invitations - 28; alternate delegates - 48.

The first Representatives' Conference of Shansi was convened by the governor, Ch'eng Tzu-hua, who had been appointed in 1949. The first session lasted fifteen days. It heard and approved a report on government activity during the preceding six months, a report on future tasks to be undertaken, a financial statement, a budget for the coming year, and a resolution to support the unification

635 of government policy in financial and economic matters. Another resolution supporting the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association and the alliance between the two nations was passed. Approximately 1,800 proposals were received. They can be classified as follows: concerning production and construction - 654; finance and economics - 394; education, culture, and health - 385; political matters - 308; public safety - 66; military affairs - 9. Many of these proposals were combined until the total was reduced to 654. Of these proposals, those considered as future tasks or having to do with financial arrangements were grouped together for further study. Those which could be handled by the provincial government were submitted to the departments concerned. Only seven proposals were rejected as being against the laws and decrees of the Central People's Government.

IV. THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STAGE

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666 An electoral law for the People's Congress on all levels was promulgated on March 1, 1953.

The National People's Congress scheduled for September 1954 was preceded by the

666 election of deputies to the provincial, municipal,
642 county, and hsiang people's congresses. According to the Electoral Law of the People's Republic of China, delegates to the National People's Congress and deputies to the people's congresses of a province, a county, and "a municipality divided into districts" shall be elected by the People's congress on the next lower level.

Before the convening of the National People's Congress, the provincial governments were busy with census-taking, registration of voters, direct elections of delegates to the congresses at the hsiang and municipality or municipal district levels, and meetings of these and succeedingly higher congresses as they were brought into being. On September 15, 1954, the National People's Congress met for the first time, and on September 20 the new Constitution was passed. In addition, a statute for the organization of the local People's congresses on all levels and the local People's councils was published. This statute delineated the structure of the provincial governments.

A. General Provisions Concerning the Provincial Government

635 Under the Constitution, the provincial governments have been placed on a new basis. Each province has the status of an administrative

435 district under the control of the Central People's Government, a relationship which accords with tradition. However, there is a point of departure from the traditional system in that members of the provincial governments are elected locally (see below) and that the provincial People's congresses share in deliberative functions. The term "legislative," which is applied to the National Congress in Peking, does not appear in the section of the Constitution formulating the principles of organization for the provincial government. As a result, the provincial People's congress only functions as a deliberative body. Thus each province, according to Article 53 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, becomes an administrative district limited in its actions to the passing of budgets, the enforcing of laws, and the safeguarding of the rights of the citizens. Although the provincial government is an elective body and a provincial People's congress sits next to it, it does not resemble an American state, with its reserve powers, nor a British borough, which operates under a special grant of powers.

The province under the Chinese Communist Constitution is only one of a number of administrative districts, which are comprised of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities, all directly responsible to and under

635 the authority of the Central People's Government. The county and the hsiang are considered administrative districts, although they are not directly under the authority of the Central People's Government.

The provincial executive body consists of a governor, a number of deputy-governors, and 25-55 members of the provincial People's council, all elected by the provincial People's congress, a body of commissioners, who head the twelve provincial departments such as civil affairs, public security, finance, grain, and the like, are appointed by the Central People's Government, according to Article 9 of the Organizational Law of the State Council.

The provincial People's congress has the following powers, according to the Chinese Communist Constitution: (1) to insure observance and execution of the laws, decrees, and the resolutions of the National People's Congress; (2) to adopt and promulgate resolutions within the limits of its functions and power; (3) to plan economic construction, cultural construction, public works, pension work, and relief work; (4) to consider and approve budgets and financial statements; (5) to elect members to the provincial People's council; (6) to elect presidents of the provincial People's courts; (7) to elect deputies to the national People's congress; (8) to hear and examine the work reports of the provincial

635 People's council and the provincial People's court; (9) to revise or annul inappropriate decisions and orders of the provincial People's council; (10) to revise or annul inappropriate decisions of the People's congresses of the next lower level and the inappropriate decisions and orders of the People's councils of the next lower level; (11) to protect public property, maintain public order, and safeguard civil rights; (12) to ensure the equal rights of minority nationals; and (13) to recall the members of the provincial People's councils and the president of the court, elected by it.

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666 The members of the provincial People's congress are elected by the congresses in the counties and municipalities, rather than directly by the people of the province. The number of members elected is determined by the population and the number of counties within each province, as stipulated by the Electoral Law of the People's Congress:

> "A province with a population not exceeding 20,000,000 shall elect from 100 to 400 deputies; with a population exceeding 20,000,000, from 400 to 500 deputies. In a province where the population and the number of counties is exceedingly small, the number of deputies may be less than 100 but not less than 50; where the population and the number of counties

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are exceptionally large, the number of deputies may exceed 500 but must not exceed 600..."

"A county with a population not exceeding 200,000 shall elect one to three deputies; a county with a population exceeding 200,000 and not more than 600,000 shall elect two to four deputies; a county with a population exceeding 600,000 shall elect three to five deputies. From the municipalities, towns, and important industrial and mining districts within the province, one deputy shall be elected for every 20,000 population."

These principles give the two provinces of the North China Region the following quotas of delegates to the National People's Congress:

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1: STANFORD U. 5-4,5 1956 AF12 NORTH CHINA
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Delegates to the National People's Congress

Province	No. of Delegates	Population	No. of Counties	No. of Provincial Municipalities	No. of Hsiang
Hopei	568	35,984,644	143	11	11,346
Shansi	315	14,314,485	95	5	6,394
Peking Municipality	264	2,768,149			
Tientsin Municipality	519	2,693,831			

635
666 When the local People's congresses were convened, they first elected the delegates to be sent to the People's congress on the next higher level. Only after the National People's Congress ratified the constitution and the laws of organization of the People's council and the People's congress on all levels did the members of the provincial and county congresses know what their duties were to be, the number of persons to be assigned to local government, and the number of persons they were entitled to elect.

B. Operation of the Provincial Government of Hopei

635 Because the Provincial People's Congress chooses delegates to the National People's Congress in Peking, the former must be convened first. In Hopei, the Provincial People's Congress held two sessions. At the first session, August 1-8, 1954, delegates were elected to the National Congress. At the second session, February 1-5, 1955, provincial government officers were elected.

Some 568 members attended the first session of the Provincial People's Congress of Hopei. Ma Kuo-jui, second secretary of the Communist Party of Hopei, spoke on the constitutional draft, which was later debated.

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635 A resolution giving full support to the proposed constitution was passed.

The governor of Hopei Province, Lin T'ieh reported on the progress of the government over the past five years and on the tasks to be accomplished in the future. In the debate that followed, delegates from rural areas emphasized the importance of the work for flood-prevention, the improvement of methods for growing cotton, and ways of fulfilling the production target. Also the inadequacies of some government measures were pointed out. About 2, 200 proposals were made by the delegates, and some 1, 160 proposals were forwarded to the departments concerned for action.

At the conclusion of the first session of the Provincial People's Congress of Hopei, 52 members were elected as delegates to the National People's Congress.[6]

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185 At the second session of the Provincial People's Congress, Lin T'ieh, the governor, reported on government activities during 1954 and the tasks for 1955. The province was

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[6] People's Daily, August 11, 1954.

635 to increase agricultural production, continue to develop its industries, and fulfill the 185 production target fixed by the central government. The goals set were as follows: increase grain production 16.5 per cent; increase cotton production 14 per cent; and increase the production of peanuts 27.5 per cent. The more than 100,000 producers' co-operatives were to be consolidated. Irrigation, flood-control, and the use of new plowing tools were emphasized as means of raising provincial production. Before the conclusion of the session, delegates re-elected Lin T'ieh governor, and elected 6 deputy-governor, 36 members of the provincial People's court, the president of the People's High Court of Hopei, and 9 presidents of the intermediate courts.[7]

C. Operation of the Provincial Government of Shansi

635 The first Provincial People's Congress of Shansi was convened August 3-11, 1954, with an attendance of 315 members. They studied the constitutional draft and passed a resolution to support it. The proceedings followed the plan of the first session of the Provincial People's Congress of Hopei. Special

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[7] Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily] February 9, 1955.

635 measures were introduced concerning soil-conservation, and the policy of encouraging the practice of Chinese medicine was approved. At the conclusion of the session, 24 delegates were elected to the National People's Congress.[8]

The second session of the first Provincial People's Congress of Shansi was convened February 5-9, 1955. Teng Ch'u-min, a delegate from Shansi who had attended the National People's Congress in Peking, reported on the work done by the congress. The governor of Shansi, P'ei Li-sheng, reported on government activities. The governor's report was debated, and some 50 members criticized or offered suggestions concerning it. Delegates made some 250 proposals regarding the acceleration of the production rates in agriculture and industry. P'ei Li-sheng was re-elected governor, and 6 deputy-governors, 30 members of the Provincial People's Council, a president of the People's High Court, and 5 presidents of the intermediate courts were elected.[9]

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[8] Enlightenment Daily, August 13, 1954.

[9] Enlightenment Daily, February 12, 1955.

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634 D. The Political Subdivisions of Hopei and Shansi

The political subdivisions of the two provinces below the provincial level are tabulated as follows:

Hopei Province. Capital: Shihchiachuang

1. Eleven municipalities: Shihchiachuang, Paoting, Tangshan, Chang-chia-k'ou, (Kalgan), Ch'in-huang-tao (Chinwangtao), Han-tan, Hsüan-hua, T'ung-chou, Han-ku, Po-t'ou, Hsing-t'ai.

2. One mining district directly under the control of the provincial government: Feng-feng Mining District.

3. Nine Districts:

a) Paoting (district administrative office at Paoting), 16 counties: Ch'ing-yüan, Wang-tu, Man-ch'eng, Wan, T'ang, Lai-yüan, I, Hsü-shui, Ting-hsing, Lai-shui, Cho, Hsin-ch'eng, Hsiung, Yung-ch'eng, An-hsin, Kao-yang.

b) T'ung-hsien (district administrative office at T'ung-chou), 13 counties: T'ung, Ta-hsing, Liang-hsiang, Fang-shan, Ch'ang-p'ing, Shun-i, Huai-jou, Mi-yün, P'ing-ku, Chi, San-ho, Hsiang-ho, Ku-an.

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c) Chang-chia-k'ou (district administrative office at Chang-chia-k'ou), 16 counties: Wan-chin, Chang-pei, Shang-i, Shang-tu, K'ang-pao, Ku-yüan, Ch'ung-li, Ch'ih-ch'eng, Lung-kuan, Yen-ch'ing, Huai-lai, Cho-lu, Wei, Yang-yüan, Hai-an, Hsüan-hua.

d) Tangshan (district administrative office at Ch'ang-li), 10 counties: Ch'ang-li, Lo-t'ing, Feng-jun, Yü-t'ien, Tsun-hua, Ch'ien-hsi, Luan, Ch'ien-an, Lu-lung, Fu-ning.

e) T'eintsin (district administrative offic at Yang-liu-ch'ing), 11 counties: Ching-hai, Ch'ing, Ta-ch'eng, Jen-ch'iu, Wen-an, Pa, Yung-ch'ing, An-tz'u, Wu-ch'ing, Pao-ti, Ning-ho.

f) Ts'ang-hsien (district administrative office at Ts'ang-hsien), 16 counties: Ts'ang-hsie Huang-hua, Ch'ing-yün, Yen-shan, Nan-p'i, Tung-kuang, Ning-chin, Wu-ch'iao, Ku-ch'eng, Ching, Fo-ch'eng, Chiao-ho, Hsien, Ho-chien, Su-ning, Wu-ch'iang.

g) Shihchiachuang (district administrative office at Shihchiachuang), 25 counties: Huo-lu, Cheng-ting, Kao-ch'eng, Chin, Shu-lu, Shen, Wu-i, Heng-shui, Tsao-ch'iang, Chi, Chao, Luan-ch'eng, 634 Yüan-shih, Ching-hsing, Chieng-p'ing, P'ing-shan, Ling-shou, Jao-yang, An-p'ing, Shen-tse, Wu-chi, Hsin-lo, Hsing-t'ang Kao-i, Tsan-huang.

h) Hsing-t'ai (district administrative office at Hsing-t'ai), 22 counties: Hsing-t'ai, Nei-ch'iu, Lin-ch'eng, Po-hsiang, Kuang-tsung, Chü-lu, P'ing-hsiang, Jen, Nan-ho, Sha-ho, Ting, Po-yeh, Lü, Fo-p'ing, Ch'ü-yang, An-kuo, Lung-yao, Ning-chin, Hsin-ho, Nan-kung, Ch'ing-ho, Wei.

i) Han-tan (district administrative office at Han-tan), 14 counties: Han-tan, Yung-nien, Fei-hsiang, Chi-tse, Ch'ü-chou, Ch'iu, Kuang-p'ing, Ta-ming, Wei, Ch'eng-an, Lin-chang, Tz'u, She, Wu-an.

Shansi Province. Capital, Taiyuan.

1. Five municipalities: Taiyuan, Ta-t'ung, Yang-ch'üan, Ch'ang-chih, Yü-tz'u.

2. Five Districts:

a) Hsin-hsien (district administrative office at Hsin-hsien), 17 counties: Hsin, Kuo, Tai, Fan-chih, Wu-t'ai, Ting-hsiang, Yang-ch'ü, Ching-lo, Lan, K'o-lan, Hsing, Pao-te, Ho-ch'ü, P'ien-kuan, Shen-ch'ih, Wu-chai, Ning-wu.

634 b) Yen-pei (district administrative office at Ta-t'ung), 12 counties: Ta-jen, Yang-kao, T'ien-chen, Kuang-ling, Ling-ch'iu, Hun-yüan, Ying, Shan-yin, Shuo, P'ing-lu, Tso-yün, Yu-yü.

c) Yü-tz'u (district administrative office at Yü-tz'u), 21 counties: Yü-tz'u, Shou-yang, Yü, P'ing-ting, Hsi-yang, Lin, Ho-shun, Tso-ch'üan, T'ai-ku. Yü-she, Ch'ing-hsü, Ch'i, P'ing-yao, Chieh-hsiu, Ling-shih, Hsiao-i, Fen-yang, Wen-shui, Chiao-ch'eng, Chung-yang, Li-shan.

d) Ch'ang-chih (district administrative office at Ch'ang-chih), 15 counties: Lu-an, Li-ch'eng, P'ing-shun, Fu-kuan, Ling-ch'uan, Kao-p'ing, Chin-ch'eng, Yang-ch'eng, Ch'in-shui, Chang-tzu, Tun-liu, Ch'in-yüan, Ch'in, Hsiang-yüan, Wu-hsiang.

e) Chin-an (district administrative office at Lin-fen); 30 counties: An-i, Ho-chin, Chi-shan, Hsin-chiang, Wen-hsi, Chiang, Yüan-ch'ü, Hsia, P'ing-lu, Chieh-yü, Jui-ch'eng Yung-chi, Lin-i, Wan-yung, Lin-fen, Hung-chao, Huo, An-tse, Fu-shan, I-ch'eng, Ch'ü-wo, Hsiang-fen, Hsiang-ning, Chi, P'u, Ta-ning, Yung-ho, Shih-lou, Hsi, Fen-hsi; one town: Yun-ch'eng.

632 633 E. Provisions Concerning Municipal Government and the Municipality of Paoting

A municipal People's council consists of a mayor, a number of deputy-mayors, and from 9 to 25 members: In a municipality where the population is dense, the number of council members can be increased to 45.

The composition of the municipal people's congress is governed by Article 16 of the electoral law of the People's Republic of China:

> "A municipality with a population not exceeding 100,000 shall elect one deputy for every 500 to 1,000 persons; a municipality with a population exceeding 100,000 and up to 350,000 shall elect one deputy for every 1,000 to 2,000 persons; a municipality with a population exceeding 350,000 and up to 750,000 shall elect one deputy for every 2,000 to 3,000 persons; a municipality with a population exceeding 750,000 and up to 1,500,000 shall elect one deputy for every 3,000 to 5,000 persons; a municipality with a population exceeding 1,500,000 shall elect one deputy for every 5,000 to 7,000 persons.

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633 "The armed forces are entitled to elect from 2 to 10 deputies to the municipal People's congress."

632 The actual work of the municipality of Paoting in the province of Hopei can be cited as an example. The predecessor of the municipal People's congress was the representatives' conference. In Paoting the representatives' conference composed of 175 members held its first session May 9-16, 1950. On the first day, 21 members were elected to serve as a presidum. An opening speech was made by the deputy-governor, Li Hsi-chiu. Representatives from the armed forces, the working classes, and the commercial and industrial classes affirmed the opening remarks made by the deputy-governor. On May 9th, the acting mayor of Paoting reported on the activities of the municipal administration, with special references to economic reconstruction, finance, and revenue, culture, education and health, public security, social work, and municipal improvement.

On the third day of the session, the secretary of the Paoting branch of the Communist Party made a speech in which he pointed out municipal tasks involving the rehabilitation and development of industry, the exchange of goods between the villages and the cities, 632 increased production, and administrative policies concerning revenue, banking, and co-operation between labor and management. The deputy-chief of the Municipal Bureau of Finance outlined the 1950 budget, estimating annual revenue of the municipality at 3,223,472 catties of millet (one catty valued at 925 yuan), or a total of 3,448,677,800 yuan (about US$ 119,904). Estimated expenditures amounted to 3,403,976 catties of millet, leaving a deficit of 180,504 catties.

On the fourth day of the session, delegates approved the proposed plan for the coming year, and it was accepted as the policy of the newly elected municipal government. On the fifth day, the committee studied 264 proposals: 34 proposals concerned problems of finance, 41 concerned culture, education, or health problems; 35 concerned law and politics, and 22 concerned the work of reconstruction.

On the seventh day, the deputies signed an appeal for world peace proposed by the World Peace Council. On the eighth day, the delegates elected the officials of the municipal government: K'ang Hsiu-min, second secretary of the Paoting branch of the Communist party and chief of the Bureau of Public Security, was elected mayor; the former

632 acting mayor, Ting T'ing-hsing, and Chang Hsiao-chih, a teacher at the teachers' college, were elected deputy-mayors; and 19 delegates were elected members of the municipal People's council. Their names were sent by the provincial governor to the Central People's Government for approval.[10]

634 F. Provisions Concerning the County Government and the County of P'ing-shun

According to the Organic Law of the local People's congresses and the local People's councils, the county government is to consist of a county head, a county council, and a few county deputy-heads -- at most 31 members -- whose terms of office are two years. The county People's council functions as follows:

(1) On the basis of the laws, decrees, and resolutions of the People's congress of the corresponding level and the decisions and orders of higher administrative offices, to determine administrative measures, issue decisions and orders, and to check on how these decisions and orders are carried out; (2) to sponsor election of deputies to the

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[10] Hopei Daily, May 10, -20, 1950 p. 22.

634 People's congress of the corresponding level; (3) to convene a People's congress of the corresponding level and introduce bills before it; (4) to direct the work of subordinate departments and of the People's councils at lower levels; (5) to suspend the execution of all inappropriate decisions adopted by the People's congresses at lower levels; (6) to revise or annul inappropriate orders and directives of subordinate departments and of the People's councils at lower levels; (7) to appoint and remove the personnel of state organizations, according to the provisions of the law; (8) to carry out economic programs and budgets; (9) to control the market, local state-owned industry, and commerce, and to direct socialist transformation of industry and commerce; (10) to direct agricultural and handicraft production and mutual-aid teams and producers' co-operatives; (11) to control tax collection; (12) to control communications and public works; (13) to control cultural, educational, health, pension, relief, and social-welfare work; (14) to control military service; (15) to protect public property, maintain public order, and safeguard civil rights; (16) to ensure the equal rights of minority nationalities; and (17) to carry out directives from the higher administrative agencies.

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634 The county People's council divides its work among the following departments or bureaus: civil affairs, public security, finance, grain, taxation, industry and commerce, agriculture and forestry, communications, culture and education, and health. If necessary, other bureaus can be established.

Deputies to the county People's congress are elected by the People's congresses at a lower level; their term of office is two years. The functions of the county People's congress are similar to those of the provincial People's congress.

Preparations for a harmonious relationship between the county People's council and the county People's congress involved the training and indoctrination of skilled personnel. Their duties were to include census-taking, the registration of voters, and negotiations among the representatives or deputies on nominating candidates for the presidium and members of the People's council. Personnel were trained in the procedures for planning elections, holding parliamentary meetings, submitting proposals, conducting debates, and nominating candidates. To suggest the complexity of the tasks involved, the work of the P'ing-shun county government in Shansi Province will be described.

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634 The first session of the People's Congress of P'ing-shun county was convened June 24-27, 1954, and was attended by 137 members.[11] Chao Yen-shou, the county head and chairman of the group designated to study the constitutional draft, reported on the work of the county and on the draft of the constitution. He said that, although P'ing-shun county lacked natural resources, under the leadership of the Communist Party economic conditions had improved. Ninety per cent of the population had joined mutual-aid teams and producers' co-operatives, and some 289 agricultural co-operatives had been formed within the county. The amount of food produced on each mou (one-sixth of an acre) had been increased from 180 to 236 catties (260 lbs.). Before the arrival of the Communists, he continued, peasants in the county were forced to live on chaff for six months of the year, but in the past year the county had a grain surplus of 6,300,000 catties (6,930,000 Lbs.). Before the Communist "liberation," the county had had only one school for primary students; now there were twelve, and a high school had been built. Ninety-five per cent of the children of school-age (approximately 46,000) were attending school. Some 4,000 new homes had been built, and in some rural areas telephones were available. His report drew an ovation from

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[11] People's Daily, June 30, 1954.

634 the assembled delegates.

A number of deputies voiced their approval of the constitutional draft, and after a debate on the activities of the local government, the election of two deputies to the provincial People's congress took place.

At another session following the promulgation of the Organic Law of the People's councils and the People's congresses, members of the county council were elected.

632 G. Provisions Concerning the Hsiang Government and the Yü-yen-shih hsiang

The *hsiang* government is composed of the *hsiang* People's congress and the *hsiang* People's council. The number of deputies to the *hsiang* People's congress is determined as follows: a *hsiang* or town having a population not exceeding 2,000 may elect 15-20 deputies; if the population exceeds 2,000, it may elect 20-35 deputies. A *hsiang* with an exceptionally small population may elect less than 15, but not less than 7 deputies; a *hsiang* with an exceptionally large population may elect more than 35, but not more than 50, deputies. Deputies to the *hsiang* congress are elected directly by the electors. The *hsiang* congress exercises the same function as the provincial and county congress. The *hsiang* People's

632 council is composed of a head, deputy-heads, and 3-13 members of the council. The hsiang council exercises the same functions as the county council.

The administration of the hsiang council is divided among departments devoted to civil affairs, public security, the armed forces, production and co-operation, finance and taxation, education and culture, and mediation.

The application of the provisions concerning the hsiang government can be illustrated by a discussion of the activities in Yü-yen-shih hsiang. Thirgy-five deputies were elected from Yü-yen-shih hsiang; the population of the village, then, is not more than 2,000. Of the 35 deputies, only four did not belong to the cadres of the Communist Party; 26 were Party members and three were members of the New Democratic Youth Corps. Obviously, the power of the hsiang congress rests entirely in the hands of members of the Communist Party.

When the congress met, the hsiang head gave a report on the activities of the local government, and members of the congress submitted 30 proposals concerning the wholesale buying and selling of grain, the repair of ploughing tools, acts of discourtesy by

632 members of the consumers' co-operatives, the digging of wells, and *hsiang*-financed supplies of cattle and fertilizer to peasants who were not in an immediate position to pay for them. The delegates also discussed government personnel in various departments, plans for the establishment of additional schools, and questions concerning the protection of the rights of the citizen.

In conclusion, members of the council and *hsiang* heads were elected. Liu Yen-ch'ih was re-elected as the *hsiang* head, and four deputy-heads and eleven members of the council were elected. All declared that they would devote themselves to the welfare of the people and the *hsiang*.[12]

In reporting the sessions, the *People's Daily* accused the Yü-yen-shih *hsiang* Congress of inefficiency. The paper noted that because a large number of Party cadres were members of the congress, it was a repetition of Party meetings; many members of the congress did not attend its sessions with any regularity; announcements of sessions were sometimes forgotten; and in most cases Party members

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[12] *People's Daily*, December 23, 1954.

632 monopolized the platform.[13] The publicity given this criticism indicates that the Communist Party is anxious to improve the efficiency of the *hsiang* congress and make it appear to be an organization of the people rather than of the Communist Party.

633 V. THE SPECIAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEKING

After Peking fell to the Red Army in December 1948, Yeh Chien-ying, chairman of the military control council, was appointed mayor of the city. In September 1949, he was transferred to the governorship of Kwangtung Province, and Nieh Yung-chen was appointed as successor to Yeh.

In September 1949, Nieh Yung-chen took office as mayor. On November 22, 1949, the members of the representatives' conference of 1950 were chosen and given elective power. Nieh Yung-chen then became the first elected mayor of the municipality of Peking. When Nieh resigned on February 23, 1951, P'eng Chen, chairman of the representatives' conference, was elected mayor and continues to hold the office.

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[13] *Ibid.*

633 When the National People's Congress was summoned in 1945, the Peking municipal congress elected delegates to attend. At this time the municipal congress was not able to elect a new mayor as the new law specifying the duties of local government and the local People's councils had not yet been published by the Central People's Government. After the promulgation of the law in September 1954, P'eng Chen was re-elected mayor.

A. The Executive-Administrative Branch of Peking Municipality

There have been few changes in the administration of the municipality of Peking since the promulgation of the new Constitution. Provisions specifying the number of deputy-mayors to assist the mayor have undergone some revision. Originally, only two deputy-mayors acted as assistants; at a later period, this number was increased to four. Today, eight deputy-mayors are designated. The new Constitution specifies that there shall be 38 members of the municipal council, and the following departments have been established: (1) civil affairs; (2) public safety; (3) justice; (4) control; (5) planning; (6) finance; (7) grain; (8) taxation; (9) industry; (10) commerce; (11) labor; (12) culture; (13) education; (14) health; (15) physical education, and a

633 number of other bureaus for public construction work and public utilities. A bureau for minority nationalities and another for overseas Chinese affairs can be added if necessary.

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178 There is no doubt that Peking since 1949 has been modernized. There are new roads, better systems for drainage and communications, and new housing facilities. A report at the opening session of the first municipal congress by P'eng Chen, mayor of Peking, indicates the areas where the local government has been most active in improving the municipality. P'eng Chen gave the value of industrial products produced in 1954 as being 6.76 times that of 1949, the value of commercial transactions in 1953 as being 4.33 times that of 1949, and the value of agricultural products produced in Peking and its suburbs in 1953 as being 1.21 times that of 1950. New housing developments were reported to have added 6,700,000 square meters (72,092,000 sq. ft.) of living space to the city, an area equal to the total housing previously available in Peking.

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185 In his report on the work of the municipality of Peking, P'eng Chen said that emphasis was to be placed upon the elimination of traditional evils -- corruption, theft, and so forth; preparations for the "liberation of Formosa; socialistic transformation

633 ideological reform; the elimination of counter-
185 revolutionary activities; and a revitalization of the economic life of the workers in accordance with the plan of the National Congress and the newly promulgated Constitution.

633 Chang Yu-yü, a deputy-mayor, read the financial statement for 1953 and the budget proposed for 1954. Taking 1950 as the base year (index 100), the revenues of Peking municipality was reported to have increased as follows:

1951	238
1952	355
1953	634
1954	647

Chang attributed the great increase of revenue to the fact that many public-owned industries had been developed by the municipality: revenue from private enterprises had become of much less importance. Over 46 per cent of municipal expenditures had been devoted to work of economic reconstruction according to Chang.

This first municipal congress of Peking had a membership of 539 delegates. They unanimously elected Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, and Liu Shao-ch'i as representatives to the National People's Congress. Twenty-eight

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633 others were elected by a lesser majority.[14]

B. The Deliberative Branch of Peking Municipality

In the course of five years, the deliberative branch of the Peking Representatives' Conference underwent many changes. The first conference, called on August 8, 1949, consisted of 312 members. Most of the delegates had been recommended by the trade unions, the peasants' associations, the associations of commerce, the students' organizations, and the democratic parties. One third of the representatives were government officials.

In November 1949, at the second sessions of the first representatives' conference, Mao Tse-tung promised that the conference would be authorized to elect the mayor of Peking.

On February 27, 1951, some 519 members attended the third representatives' conference. The majority of the delegates were directly elected by the popular organizations in factories, mines, and schools. Some of the members were indirectly elected by the district councils of the municipality, and 17

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[14] People's Daily, August 18-19, 22-23, 1954.

633 per cent of the total number of representatives were chosen by special invitation of the government. This system of selecting the membership of the representatives' conference was in force for more than three and a half years.

The first Peking municipal congress was a preparatory step to the selection of delegates to the National People's Congress. Of the 574 members of the municipal congress, 564 had been elected by the municipal district councils and ten came from the armed forces.

Jen-min Jih-pao [the People's Daily], the official organ of the Communist Party, called this odd mixture of popular election, limited election, and appointment "universal election,"[15] taking the term from "universal suffrage," in spite of the fact that none of the delegates to the municipal congress were elected by popular vote. Peking municipality is divided into thirteen districts, and these districts "elected" 564 out of 574 members of the municipal congress. Thus the members of the congress are delegates of the council members and not directly elected by the people. The municipal government of Peking, like the whole Communist régime, is

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[15] People's Daily, August 18, 1954.

633 based on what is called "democratic centralism." This system of rule, copied from the Soviet Union by the Chinese Communists, enables the top hierarchy of party and government to initiate and form policy which is passed down the pyramid of mass organizations and congresses to the bases where it emerges as the people's will." It is clear that this type of government from the lowest to the highest level far from expresses the real desires of the people.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 2c,
Political Background

POLITICAL DYNAMICS

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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA AND ITS AFFILIATED ORGANS

Political dynamics, which deals with political power and political processes, has a special meaning when applied to Communist China. It is intelligible only when it is realized that the Communist Party of China is dedicated to the concentration of power in its own hands. Not only does the political process in Communist China follows a course largely determined by the organizational and operational pattern of the Party, but also the will of society itself is manipulate by the Party through the stimulation of people's enthusiasm and support. Hence, the study of political dynamics in the North China Region should examine the regional Communist Party itself, its political control, and the elections and politics of minor parties.

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The Communist Party in this region concerns itself with the maintenance of an efficient and militant Party organization which exercises its control over all types of organization. Through its well-established network of control, popular enthusiasm is aroused and the political activities of the region are regulated. The two chief means employed are the injection of issues and the

665 668 initiation of movements or campaigns. While issues are employed to capture popular attention and to agitate emotion in preparation for ensuing campaigns, movements are the means to achieve assigned goals.

Initiated by the Party,[1] a campaign calls for the concerted action among all Party organizations at all levels. A campaign is not merely a method of executing a mission, it is also a device to test the efficiency of all organs, and a means of eliminating the undesirable ones. A campaign can be either of national or local nature;[2] it may be directed toward either the population as a whole or only a segment of it. In the Communist context, a campaign should be regarded as a political device, rather than as a manifestation of political or social process.

665 The concentration of both government and Party functions is the second factor determining the pattern of political dynamics in the North China Region. Four major means are used by the

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[1] For a discussion of campaigns, see: Richard L. Walker, China Under Communism, the First Five Years, Yale University Press, 1955, pp. 77-100. W. W. Rostow, The Prospects for Communist China, Cambridge, 1955, pp. 72-98.

[2] Typical drives of a local nature are conducted in farming communities: Spring Plowing, Summer Collection, Resist Drought, Resist Flood, Autumn Harvest, and many others.

665 central organs to hold the local organs under central direction: (1) the absolute leadership of the central organs, both state and Party, over th local organizations; (2) the effective centralized control over instruments of terror, the armed forces, the public security agencies and the peop procuratorate; (3) the central control of mass org izations; and (4) the setting of patterns for issues and campaigns for the agitation of popular enthusiasm, and the execution of policies under centra ized directions.

I. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA IN NORTH CHINA

The North China regional Party organizations occupy a unique position in the Party history as well as Party politics of today. For one thing, North China Party organizations have had a long and rich experience both in administration and in Party politics. Ever since the arrival of the 18th Group Army (the reorganized Communist main force of the 8th Route Army) in Shansi and Hopei provinces in 1938 at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War,[3] regional Party organizations have been active in all spheres of operation

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3. K'ang-jih Chan-cheng Shih-ch'i Ti Chung-kuo Jen-min Chieh-fang-chün [The People Liberation Army During the War of Resistance Against Japan], Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1953.

665 No wonder Party leaders in this region are confident and are proud of this "more than ten years' experience." North China is composed largely of so-called "old liberated" areas where the Communists have been longest in power. The "old liberated" areas became the places from which expert knowledge and trained manpower could be drawn. This facilitated the effective and rapid execution of tasks in the "newly liberated" areas of the North China region in the first few years of the Communist rule. The North China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has played a leading role in national Party politics. It has shown its strength in Party policy announcements, drafts of regulations, and in Party operations. The last but not the least important fact is the region's proximity to the central organs of the Party and the Central Government. Such proximity places the regional apparatus constantly under the direct supervision of the central organs; at the same time, assistance both in terms of personnel and technical knowledge can be drawn from outside. A notable example of this outside assistance occurred during the First Conference of County Heads of the North China Region in September 1951. At this meeting, administrative experts and notable professors of the famous universities were called upon to participate in the preparation and direction of the affairs. Another advantage of this proximity has been the presence of leaders of the Central Party organs at the local Party meetings, where their assitance to the local Party organizations has been made possible.

665 Needless to say, the regional Party organizations closely adhere to the policies and directions of the Central Committee of the Party and the following three key principles can be identified:

(1) Party organizations are flexible and are under constant adjustment so as to cope with new tasks assigned to the Party units in their region.

(2) Membership drives are a constant activity of all Party branches and are carried out to attract more workers, technicians, and managerial personnel.

(3) Members of the Party are constantly exposed to Party indoctrination and training, and they are subject to the kind of rectification and remolding which results in a high loss of Party membership.

B. Party Organization

There are three chief principles governing the Party organization in the North China Region: (1) Party organization is an integrated system characterized by the extreme centralization of political power and insistence on unity and discipline. (2) Party structure is pyramidal and is organized upon a territorial and functional basis. (3) Party organization is flexible. The assumption that it is stereotyped would be misleading and unrealistic.

665 1. The Layers of the regional Party Organization. Before the abolition of the North China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in August 1954, Party organizations in this region were divided into two parts: (a) the delegates of the Central Committee of the Party to the region, and (b) the local Party bodies divided into tiers from the provincial Party layer, administrative layer, county and city layer down to *ch'ü* and *hsiang* (villages) layer.

In order to understand Communist Party politics in the North China Region, the inclusion of the Party Bureau in the present discussion is necessary. Until 1954 the North China Party Bureau was extremely important in regional politics. In view of the provision of the Party Constitution under which the Central Committee can establish Party Bureas at its will, the possibility of its reinstitution at some future date cannot be ignored.

a) Delegates of the Central Committee. In the North China Region, the Communist Party was represented by the North China Bureau, which had direct jurisdiction over Party organization in Hopei and Shansi provinces in 1954, and Hopei, Shansi, Suiyuan and Cahar provinces between 1949 and 1954.[4]

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[4] See chapter on "Geographical Setting" in Handbook for change of political division in North China Region.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF 12 North China
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665 The North China Bureau exercised its authority through two channels: the Bureau Secretariat and the Regional Party Conference. While the Bureau Secretariat was the executive organ at the regional level, maintaining an organization comparable to that of the Central Committee, the Regional Conference was a device which the Bureau had not hesitated to employ for the transmission of directives and for periodic control. Departments under the Secretariat had also called meetings of their own, thereby placing the Party functions completely under their respective jurisdictions.

In addition to the Bureau's direction of Party affairs, the North China Region had been unusually active in the direction of regional politics. The Bureau took special interest in the implementation of increased agricultural production in 1950, in rural political construction in 1951, and in the industrialization programs in the cities after 1952. The Bureau's directive of March 1950 to the Pingyuan Provincial Party Committee, charging the latter with severe wrongs committed in administration was the most striking of its kind.[5] The directive not only showed the concern of the Bureau over provincial activities, but the unquestioned leadership of the

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[5] People's Daily, March 15, 1950, p. 1.

665 First Secretary Po I-po in the management of the Party Affairs in that region.

b) Local Hierarchy:[6]

(1) Provincial Party layer: The Provincial Party unit is the highest layer of the Party hierarchy within a province. Since the abolition of the Party Bureau, the relationship between the provincial Party organizations and the Central Party organs has become more direct. This fact strengthens the Party organization's leadership in the province.

(2) Administrative District Party layer: The Party unit at this layer generally corresponds with that of an administrative district under the provincial government. It devotes most of its work to Party affairs and holds great authority in the selection and placement of personnel -- Party as well as government -- within its jurisdiction.

(3) County and City Party layer: A dual task is assigned to the county and city Party organizations. While Party organizations at this level take an active role in the execution of Party directives, they also direct government

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6. For local Party organization, see Constitution of the Communist Party of China; English text in Liu Shao-ch'i, On the Party, Peking, 1951, pp. 185-190.

665 activities and maintain complete control over other administrative and mass organizations.

(4) Ch'ü Party layer: Ch'ü Party units are installed below a city or a county. Like the administrative district Party organs, they are directly responsible for the management of Party affairs and the implementation of Party policies.

(5) Hsiang Party layer: Hsiang Party units form the lowest layer of the local Party hierarchy. It is here that Party and government fusion in personnel and functions is the most obvious, and the Party control over other administrative and mass organizations most clearly revealed.

In addition to the territorial division of Party organizations -- the Central delegates to the region and the local Party hierarchy -- an organization known as Party branch, or Party cell exists in all non-Party organizations. It is organized according to functional divisions of the non-Party organization and is a part of the basic foundation upon which the Party pyramid rests. Article 49 of the Party Constitution provides that Party branches may be organized "in any factory, mine, village, enterprise, street, company of the Army, office, or school, where there are three or more members." They can be grouped into general branches and Party committees, or broken down into sub-branches and Party groups, depending upon the number of Party members and the place of operation.

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2. **Organization within each Party layer:** In each of these Party units, a quadrupartite division of the authority is maintained: the Party Congress, the Party Committee, Control Committe and the Party Conference.

a) The Party Congress: The Party Congress of each of these local units is the highest body of the Party organizations in question. In theory, Party congresses at all local levels meet every two years. The Constitution of the Communist Party states that the Party congress supervise and lead the Party Committee by hearing its report, deciding on questions pertaining to that area, and electing members of the Party Committee and delegates to the Party congress at the immediate higher level. Although the next National Party Congress is scheduled to meet in the latter part of 1956 for the first time since 1945, local Party Conferences have been encouraged to meet more frequently.

b) Party Committee: The Party Committee is the executive body of the Party unit at each level. At the provincial level, a Standing Committee is elected by the provincial Party Committee. Under the Standing Committee there are functional departments to deal with such matters as organization, propaganda, rural work, urban work and social work. In addition to the departments, there are commissions to deal with trade unions, youth and women, and offices in policy planning, military affairs and other matters. Organizations under the Party Committee at other local levels vary in each case. However, the basic functional departments and commissions are included at all levels with the exception that there is no Standing Committee.

c) Control Committees: At the National Party Conference of the Communist Party in March 1955, a new system of Control Committees was established,[7] replacing the Discipline Inspection Committee established in November 1949. Although the Control Committees are elected by the Party Committees, the ultimate authority over them lies not with the local Party Committees but with the Central Secretariat.

The Control Committee at any level may set up branch offices at any location -- in businesses, factories, cooperatives, and mass organizations. It is required to co-operate with the supervisory offices, the people's procuratorate, and the public security agencies.

d) Party Conference: The Party Conference is in fact an executive meeting of the Party unit at each level. It is convened by the Party Committee which appoints representatives to the Conference. The Party Conference has the power to appoint or to remove one-fourth of the members of the Party Committee and to reach decisions on Party work within its jurisdiction. The Party Conferences meet more often than the Party Congresses, and between sessions exercise most of the power for the latter.

C. Party Expansion, Overhauling and Indoctrination:

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[7] English text in New China News Agency Daily Bulletin (London), No. 1277, April 6, 1955, p. 3.

665 1. Party Expansion. In addition to the constant membership drive, there were three special major drives in the North China region: the 1950 expansion in the cities; the 1952 membership drive; and the rural expansion in 1955.

The total membership of the Communist Party in the North China Region[8] in July 1950 stood at 1,600,000, and a year later in June, it rose up to 1,800,000 -- a net gain of 200,000 members. Such an increase in the Party membership serves to illustrate the scope of the expansion taking place during this time. However, this expansion was exclusively carried out in the "newly liberated" areas— those areas seized by the Communists since 1949 -- and in the urban and mining areas. In the "old liberated" areas, Party overhauling was the major task during the same period.

The targets of this Party expansion drive were the activists in the newly liberated areas and the workers, technicians and students in the cities. In the city of Tientsin, for example, it was reported[9] that among all the state-owned factories, underground Party strength in 1949 was a little over 1.9 per cent of all the workers, technicians, etc. In June 1950 Party strength jumped to about 9.26 per cent of the total personnel.

Initiated by the directive of the Central Party Bureau[10] after the conclusion of the Three-Anti and

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[8] 1950 membership in People's Daily, July 2, 1950, p. 1. Speech of Po I-po, First Secretary of North China Bureau, June 29, 1951, p. 1.

[9] Ibid., July 6, 1950, p. 3.

[10] Ibid., Oct. 22, 1952, p. 3.

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665 and Five-Anti campaigns, the 1952 Party membership drive was officially launched. It was deemed necessary, not only because of a large number of activists available after the two movements, but also because many Party members were transferred to serve in the industrial departments. In the whole region, 8,000 Party members were transferred, half of these were supplied by the Hopei Party organization.[11]

The 1952 membership drive was wider in scope than that of 1950. It was carried out in all places in the North China Region, with no restriction in either the old liberated areas or the new. Likewise, it was carried out in both cities and rural districts, although the membership drive in the rural districts did not get started until after the major overhauling of rural Party organization.

The North China Party Bureau stressed in its directive four points to be closely followed by all Party organizations in the region: (1) A longer period of preparation was needed. During this time, additional training and ideological indoctrination should be given to Party members so as to familiarize them with the significance of the expansion and the duties of each member. Secretaries of all Party units were instructed to submit expansion plans. (2) Selection, registration and training of activists constituted a necessary step toward the admission of new Party members. (3) A more lenient policy was adopted so as to encourage more applications. The "closed door" policy of the past was discouraged, but warning was given against the "blind" admission of members. A case in point is that of a transportation company in the city of Kalgan, where of 800 new members, only two were qualified after careful scrutiny by Party Committees at higher levels. (4) Strict adherence to admission procedures.

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[11] Ibid., March 5, 192, p. 3.

After the launching of the membership drive, many new members were admitted. In the two months between June and August, 1952, 2,500 were admitted in the city of Peking. In Tientsin, 600 new members were added; in Taiyuan, Shansi, an additional 1,000, and in Tangshan, another 500. A year later in July 1953, it was reported that[12] Communist Party membership in factories and industrial enterprises in Peking had doubled its 1952 strength. Although rural membership drives were noted, large scale expansion was not reported.

After the expansion, Party organizations in this region were instructed to conduct Party activities according to strict Party regulations and to

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12. Ibid., July 1, 1953, p. 1.

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pay special attention to the training of new members. To make Party activities conform to Party regulations involves the regular holding of Party Branch Committee meetings, periodic reports of committee work to the membership meeting, and the observation of "Party Day" and other indoctrination programs. As to the training of new members, they were required to attend training schools and to take part in all Party activities.

The third large-scale Party membership drive was initiated by the Central Committee of the Communist Party as a result of the convening of the Basic Rural Organization Conference in March 1955.[13] The Conference deemed rural expansion appropriate in view of the establishment of hsiang Party branches in 170,000 of the total of 220,000 hsiang in the nation as a whole, with a rural Party membership of four millions. In the North China region, the rural expansion was implemented as early as 1954.[14] In the nation as a whole, 700,000 peasants were admitted in 1954. In Shansi Province, 10,000 were admitted in the first half of that year.[15] The admission of more workers, technicians and intelligentsia has always been the principal task of the Party in the city. Between June-November 1954, in Peking 8,100 workers and technicians became members of the Communist Party.[16] The 1954 expansion no doubt prepared

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[13] Ibid., March 9, 1955, p. 1.
[14] Ibid., May 19, 1955, p. 1.
[15] Ibid., July 6, 1954, p. 2.
[16] Ibid., Jan. 13, 1955, p. 1.

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665 the way for the 1955 drive.

2. Party Overhauling. Party overhauling as a constant process involves at least four major activities: (1) examination of the ideology and political alertness of Party members; (2) review and criticism of individual work; (3) mobilization of mass participation in the criticism; (4) promotion of political education and increased study.

In North China, there was also periodic overhauling in addition to the constant process of overhauling. A case from the county of Pin-suan of Shansi was recommended to all Party organizations as a model.[17] In this case, Party overhauling was instituted four times a year according to seasonal change. At the end of each season, Party workers were examined in ideology and work. The Party Committee would call a membership meeting at which the committee made its work report, and criticism and self-criticism were developed. Activists were invited to participate in the criticism. In addition to the seasonal examinations, there was also an annual examination. At that time, a series of meetings were called, including the hsiang people's representative meeting and the hsiang government meeting. Party members were again placed under scrutiny and mass participation in the criticism was encouraged.

Another type of the Party overhauling is the overhauling drive. It can be initiated either by the

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[17] New China Monthly, No. 2, Feb. 1, 1955, pp. 33-34.

665 Central Committee of the Communist Party or by the regional or provincial Party Committee, with the consent of the Central Party organs. In the North China Region, at least two regional overhaulings have taken place: the 1950 rectification and the 1952 nationwide rural overhauling.

Although the 1950 Party overhauling affected mainly Party organization in the "old liberated" area, its impact upon the Party as a whole was great. Under the July 1950 directive of the North China Bureau,[18] the central theme of the overhauling was the eradication of dictatorial acts notice among Party members in all rural organizations. According to the instruction, Party overhauling should proceed from the provincial Party organization down to the county and hsiang Party units. Responsible secretaries of the administrative districts and county Party Committees were called to attend classes and to take charge of overhauling upon their return to their respective organizations. The directive also called for the re-election of all Party branches and the further enforcement of Party indoctrination.

The 1950 Party overhauling lasted throughout 1950 and the first few months of 1951. In the province of Hopei,[19] the preparation took four months-from July to October of 1950. The actual overhauling, however, took only about a month. In Shansi province,[20] 66,000 members and activists received training and 3,300 Party branches concluded the overhauling between November 1950 and June 1951.

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[18] *People's Daily*, July 2, 1950, p. 1.

[19] Report of experiences in Hopei in *Hopei Daily* [*Hopei Jih-pao*], Paoting, Nov. 27,1950,p.1.

The nationwide Party overhauling in 1952, in the rural districts was more vigorously carried out than that of 1950. The campaign was aimed at the elimination of undesirable Party members, the newly rich, the "reactionaries" and those guilty of corruption, disobedience, and dictatorial acts. In this connection, the North China Bureau issued regulations governing Party members' economic activities in the rural district[21] and the First Secretary of Hopeh, Lin Ti, made a speech calling for eradication of dictatorial acts.[22]

According to the regulations governing Party members' economic activities in the rural area, Party members who insisted on hiring peasant helpers without proper justification were to be expelled from the Party. Likewise, Party members who invested money for profit, charged a high interest on loans, or rented out land for gain, were subject to severe punishment, possibly expulsion from the Party. Other acts involving waste, corruption, disobedience and dictatorial acts were punished by laws promulgated by the Central Government.

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[20] People's Daily, May 11, 1951, p. 3.
[21] Ibid., Feb. 26, 1953, p. 1.
[22] Ibid., Feb. 17, 1953, p. 3.

To prepare for the drive, Party personnel were trained and experimental overhauling was held in selected areas. In North China, 20,000 Party members were trained to participate in the overhauling of the 11,000 Party branches.[23] Of the 8,000 rural Party branches selected for Party overhauling in the province of Hopei before the end of 1952, 90 per cent were found to be in good order while the remaining 10 per cent were poor.[24] Another report [25] also indicated that out of 49,164 rural Party members, only 1,101 were involved in exploitation of poor peasants; however, a larger number of Party members had committed dictatorial acts, thereby inflicting physical harm upon the people. In the province of Shansi, as many as 15 to 20 per cent of the Party members were reported guilty.

3. Indoctrination and Training. In order to keep the Communist Party from becoming ossified and to maintain its vitality and discipline, a constant indoctrination and training program were imposed upon each Party member. The purpose of this practice is to revitalize individual adherence to Party Doctrine and to give each member additional training along the lines of his work.

In the North China region, Party training was especially emphasized. This can be attributed

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23. Ibid., Feb. 2, 1953, p. 1.
24. Ibid., Feb. 17, 1953, p. 3.
25. Ibid., April 2, 1953, p. 3.

to the fact that a large portion of the region was "old liberated" area wherein most Party members were of rural origin; they were either illiterate or possessed a feeling of self-complacency, which the Party regarded as dangerous to the fighting strength of the Party. As a result, a large-scale training program was launched in 1950 in association with the Party overhauling carried out at the same time.

In October 1949 the North China Bureau issued a directive[26] to this effect. Courses including "new democracy," "Party history," and "Party Constitution" were given at Party schools. Cultural schools were also widely established for the illiterates. As of March 1950, in the five administrative districts, 30,000 Party members and activists had received training;[27] in 15 counties in Shansi Province, another 120,000 went through the various schools. The Pingyuan Provincial Party Committee claimed that one third of the membership had taken some course.

To further this effort, a meeting of heads of the Party departments of propaganda was held in March 1950.[28] At this meeting, an elaborate training program was announced. First, to strengthen Party training at the *hsiang* level, training stations were to be established in *ch'ü* to instruct and super- *hsiang* training programs. Administrative district and county (or city) Party organizations were to be

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[26] *Ibid.*, June 23, 1950, p. 3.
[27] *Ibid.*, March 23, 1950, p. 3.
[28] *Hopei Daily*, March 2, 1950, p. 1.

665 responsible for the training and supply of instructors to the training stations. Classes to be given were held once every ten to fifteen days. Second, provincial Party Committees were to operate Party schools with two courses: a regular course of one year and short courses from one to three months. Political instruction was to be given at these schools to enable Party and non-Party members to become more alert politically and to increase their knowledge of current affairs. Third, cultural schools were to be organized with a view toward raising the educational level of both Party and non-Party cadres. The aim was total elimination of illiteracy within 2 to 3 years and the increase of the educational level of the cadre to the equivalent of the grade school or junior high school graduate within a 4 to 5 year period.

Cultural schools had been widely established throughout the North China Region. As early as May 1950, 41 schools had been organized in Pingyuan province alone, offering 117 courses to more than 6,000 Party and non-Party cadre.[29] Rural cultural schools were reported to number 9,700 in Pingyuan and 6,100 in Shansi.

The January 1954 directive[30] issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party no doubt strengthened the cultural training throughout the North China Region. The directive reminded Party members of the fact that in the country as a whole, one-half of the cadres had less than a junior high school education, and a portion were actually

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29. People's Daily, May 10, 1950, p. 3.
30. Ibid., January 22, 1954, p. 1.

665 illiterate. To remedy this, a nationwide cultural school network was organized, bringing both the individual members and the responsible secretaries below county and ch'ü level into the plan. The plan called for the completion of cadre education to the equivalent of grade school or junior high school. Classes for the illiterate were also included in the program. This program has been put into practice in this region, and its administration rests mainly upon the county Party organizations.

The ideological school has a dual function -- to train Party members and to serve as a center for ideological training for Party candidates and members of mass organizations. Subjects can be taught either in the Party school or in Party branch classes. Courses given by the Party schools are either in a regular school or an evening school. Party branch schools are less formal, but all Party members are required to attend. Training classes in Party branches are governed by the December 1953 directive of the North China Bureau,[31] which particularly emphasized the strengthening of the work of the training stations and the designation of one or two Party members from the ch'ü Party Committee to be in charge of this program.

II. Affiliated Party Organizations

A. New Democratic Youth Corps (NDYC)

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[31] Ibid., December 4, 1953, p. 1.

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1. The Party and the Corps: The relationship of the Party is such that the Corps submits completely to the Party. The constitution of the Corps assures the Party of effective control by providing that Party members shall take charge of Corps organs above the county level[32] and that Corps activity at all levels shall be under the direction of Party Committees. Indeed, the New Democratic Youth Corps is the lieutenant of the Party. Its first function is to provide a reservoir of potential Party members. For example, among the Corps members in the province of Hopei in October 1950, 18,590 had become Party members.[3 To supply personnel for duties in all organizations is another obligation of the Corps to the Party. The Corps membership in Hopei province, for example, stood at 269,267 in May 1950 with 13,092 Corps branches established in all organizations.[34] The final task of the Corps is to engage in the broadest possible range of activities so as to reach all sections of society, where Party organizations are lacking. Corps organizations have existed in North China Region since 1946, While Corps members actively participated in underground youth movements in the cities, others took part in all activities in the countryside. The Peking Youth Corps, for example, was organized from the underground youth organizations. Workers in the city no doubt formed the other force for the Peking Corps set-up.

2. Organization. Organizationally, the Corp

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[32] Chinese text of Constitution of New Democratic Youth Corps, ibid., July 7, 1953, p. 3.

[33] Hopei Daily, Oct. 6, 1950, p. 1.

[34] Ibid, May 4, 1950, p. 1.

in the North China Region follows that of the Party. 665
The Central Committee of the Youth Corps was represented by the North China Working Committee 668
until its abolition in August 1954. Local Corps organs are established at the provincial, municipal, and county level. The Local Corps Committees are empowered to organize and to assign representative working committees to administrative districts and ch'ü.

With the exception of those working committees at district and ch'ü levels, the constituent Corps organs rest upon a dual authority. At each level there is a congress and a committee elected by it. These committees are the executive organs of the Corps at each level, and are responsible to both the congress of the corresponding level and the committe at the next higher level. In the Peking Corps committee,[35] eight departments and commissions were found in March 1950. They included departments of Organization, Propaganda, Youth Worker, University Affairs, High School Affairs, Young Pioneers, and Commissions on Suburb Workers and Peking Government Organs.

Like the Party, Corps organizations can also be established on functional bases. Such organizations are known as Corps branches, which can be formed in any factory, mine, enterprise, farm station, village government office, company of the Army, school, or street where there are three or more Corps members. A general Corps branch and

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[35] People's Daily, March 5, 1950, p. 4.

665 668 and Corps Committee can also be formed when the size of the branch is large enough to warrant it. Corps branches can also be broken down to teams and groups whenever necessary. These basic level organs of the Corps not only serve to agitate and mobilize youth and the masses, but they also act as a substitute organ for the Party hwere Party organs are lacking.

B. The Young Pioneers.

665 857 668 The Young Pioneers as an organization comprising youth between the ages of 9 and 15 years is entrusted to the leadership of the New Democratic Youth Corps. In the North China region the Pioneers claimed a membership of 16,000 as early as June 1950. The theme of the Young Pioneers was originally centered on patriotism. Since 1953, emphasis has shifted to cultural training and to further expansion. National membership was[36] given in March 1955 at 70 millions, about 15 per cent of the nation's youth in that age group.

SECTION TWO: POLITICAL CONTROL

665 The Communist Party exercises its political control in the North China Region through a network of controls, not limited to the Party organs alone, but which extend to government, industrial and mass organizations. This control is insured by placing Communist Party members in key positions in those organizations, by reserving for the Party all policy-making power, and by agitation and mobilization of various political and social forces.

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[36] Ibid., January 31, 1950, p. 3.

I. PARTY CONTROL OVER ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS

A. Party and Government Fusion

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647 The Communist Party control over government organs has been accomplished primarily by the fusion of government and Party in authority, in function, and in personnel at all levels. The chief instrument of the fusion is the subjection of all Party members in all government organizations to Party discipline and the wide establishment of Party branches in all these organizations. The functions of these Party branches in government organizations are twofold: to enforce Party directives and discipline and to instigate propaganda and indoctrination among non-Party members. The regulations governing Party branches working in government organizations issued by the North China Bureau in April 1952 spelled out these functions and techniques.[37] Seven duties were specified for Party branches in government offices, ideological training, thestudy of administrative techniques, adherence to all Party regulations, the strengthening of measures to safeguard security information and suppression of counterrevolutionaries, the direction of activities of the Youth Corps, and the inspection of work. These methods have generally been sufficient to assure abosolute Party control over government organs and other "illegitimate" methods which might result in the disruption of administration have been strongly discouraged.

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[37] *People's Daily*, April 16, 1952, p. 3.

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The Party's well-established system of requiring Party members and branches to report progress and seek instructions is almost a part of administrative practice. To further the Party's control over administrative organs, the North China Bureau issued a directive establishing five further procedures.[38] (1) A Party democratic system was instituted whereby criticism and self-criticism became part of regular Party branch life with a view to strengthening Party discipline. (2) Political work and study were introduced with a view to remedying the lack of political education, especially in the economic and financial departments. (3) A personnel management system was devised to ensure the control of personnel policies in the hands of the department of organization of the Party. Appointments, transfers, promotions, and punishment of government personnel are handled by the appropriate Party department in consultation with the appropriate government department. Both senior Party members and heads of government organizations are prohibited from interfering. (4) More systematic working procedures were ordered so as to facilitate checks over Party branches and individual members. (5) New financial procedures were introduced which would prevent the personal use of official funds and other favors of corruption by senior Party members.

A second means of Party government fusion is placement of Party members in key administrative positions. On the regional level, for example, Liu Nan-t'ao, Chairman of the North China Administrative Committee under the Government

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[38] Ibid., July 9, 1952, p. 1.

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665 647 Administrative Council, was also the third secretary of the North China Party Bureau. Most of the commission chairmen under the regional committee were also Party leaders,[39] thus holding concurrent key positions in the two hierarchies.

Similar patterns are also seen at the provincial level. The then-Chairman of the Shansi Provincial Government, Ch'eng Ts -hua, was also the First Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee, so was Yang Chi-feng, of Hopei Province and Yang Keng-t'ien of Chahar Province. The governors of the present administration bear the same qualification. A governor of a province can either be concurrently the First Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee, as is the case of Lin T'ieh of Hopei, or he may be the past First Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee of the same province, as is the case of P'ei Li-sheng of Shansi. The mayors of both Peking and Tientsin are at the same time First Secretaries of their respective Party Committees. P'eng Chen of Peking and Huang Huo-ch'ing of Tientsin.) -- See section of "Biographies of Key Personalities."

At lower levels, this fusion is even more obvious.

B. Cadre Utilization. Still another method through which the Party exercises its control over the administrative organs is in the selection and appointment of faithful and capable cadres

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39. Chang Pan-shih, head of Dept. of Propaganda of North China Party Bureau, was con-

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645 (Party members as well as non-Party members)
647 to serve in the judicial, administrative and other State organs. The North China Bureau directive previously cited strengthened the Party's authority over personnel. The appointment of Party Secretaries to head personnel departments in government offices has further facilitated centralized amanagement.

After the promulgation of the Constitution, all personnel offices in government organizations were disbanded. This may indicate firmer control of personnel policies and their implementation by the Party.

C. Department of Supervision. Finally the Communist Party exercises direct control over government bodies through the offices of supervision, which were formerly under the People's Control Commission. Offices of supervision exist at all levels from the Central Government down to the county government and are strictly controlled by the Party. As a rule, the heads of these offices are either Party secretaries in charge of Party organization, or chiefs of public security agencies, which are watchful guardians for the Party. Personnel working in these offices are mostly Party members and activists. They carry out only Party directives.

Unlike the People's procuratore, which is called a "judicial organ," the offices of supervision are administrative organs; they investigate government employees to make certain that they have

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[39. continued] currently Chief of Cultural/Educational Dept. of North China Adm. Committee. Appointment found: ibid., May 3, 1952, p. 6.

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correctly executed government directives and are not guilty of misdemeanors, disobedience, or corruption in the administrative organs and state enterprises.[40] Since 1953 offices of supervision have concentrated their attention on financial and economic organizations where waste and corruption are reportedly increasing.

The highest supervisory organ in the North China Region before 1954 was the North China People's Control Commission under the North China Administrative Committee. Similar commissions were organized in the provinces and administrative districts. At the 1955 Supervisory Conference,[41] it was decided to concentrate on the organization of these offices in key cities and counties and on the strengthening of their work in financial and economic organizations.

Supervisory branches are the agents of the department of supervision of a provincial government.[42] They may be established in any state enterprise, or financial, economic, or transportation office. In addition to their normal control functions they supervise production expenditures and the observance of fiscal regulations.

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[40] For functions of People's Control Commissions consult report in ibid., June 13, 1950, p. 3.

[41] Report on Conference, Enlightenment Daily, June 13, 1955, p. 1.

[42] People's Daily, January 6, 1953, p. 1.

665 Three aditional[43] agencies are also operated
664 by the supervisory offices: the supervisory reporters, the complaint boxes, and the reception rooms. People's supervisory reporters may be sent out by the supervisory agencies, or selected from within the organization being inspected. In the nation as a whole, more than 100,000 such reporters have been operating. They are organized into small working teams to spy on the individual workers and to make direct accusations or to accept charges received in complaint letters and interviews with accusers. The complaint box and the reception room are the two major means of encouraging mass accusation. All Party and government agencies are required to offer these facilities and to manage them according to strict rule

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II. PARTY CONTROL OVER MASS ORGANIZATIONS

In utilizing the services of mass organizations for political advantage, Communist policies toward these organizations have been well calculated and effectively carried out. From the Party's point of view, mass organizations are political assets: (1) They serve as links between the Party and the masses. (2) They are the means through which the Party succeeds in organizing all sections of society. (3) Each of these mass organizations represents a specific segment of the populace and is

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[43] Ibid., February 20, 1953, p. 3; and ~~Ibid~~ August 3, 1953, p. 3.

665 itself a social and economic force.

Like the Party, mass organizations have enjoyed a special position in the North China Region for in "old liberated" areas, mass organizations had supported the Party in its underground movements, particularly those among women and youth. After the Communist assumption of power, they became open and were centrally organized under provincial leadership. Among the most influential mass organizations are the trade unions and the women's federations, which will be discussed in order to illustrate the pattern of Party control over mass organizations.

665 467 A. Trade Unions. Since trade unions form the backbone of the industrial development of North China, and since this area is one of the industrialized areas of China, control over them early became one of the foremost goals of the Party organization in this region.

Until August 1954, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions[44] was represented in the North China region by the North China Trade Union Working Committee. Under the regional committee, local trade union councils reach from the provinces to towns, and on to an administrative unit equivalent to hsiang, namely, an urban center of rural communities.

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[44] Chinese text of the Constitution of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions in People's Daily, May 14, 1953, p. 2.

665 467 The basic trade union unit is similar to the Party branch. As a general rule, a committee is formed whenever the membership reaches twenty five. The basic trade union committee sets up workshop (department) committees to direct the work of the departments. Workshop committees may also be broken down into trade union teams in production units. Such an organizational pattern closely resembles that of the Party branch. The reason for the similarity in organization is to enhanve Party control and in turn to convert trade unions into effective and military organizations.

To destroy the old trade union leadership, the Party specifically launched a "democratic regorm" movement in all factories and associated the elimination of the old leadership with the suppression of counterrevolutionaries. However, "democratic reform" was milder in the North China region that in any other for two reasons: (1) Communist underground strength in the unions was greater than in other regions, and (2) it was of particular importance not to dislocate the economy of this region. Nevertheless, a new leadership was by degrees secured through propaganda and the rallying of mass support. As of May 1950, new management councils had been established in 78 out of the total of 123 unions in the province of Hopei.[45] In privately-owned factories, a so-called "collective contract" was signed with the owners, meaning the acknowledgement by private owners of the new trade union leadership.

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[45] Hopei Daily, May 1, 1950, p. 1.

The methods employed by the Party for political control over trade unions are similar to those used to control other organizations. The subjection of trade union affairs to the direction of the Commission on Trade Unions of the Party Committee and the placing of Party personnel in key positions in the trade unions are customary practices at all levels.

However, the most effective method of control is the practice of the implementing of directives through the trade unions themselves,[46] in this manner: First, the Party branch formulates directives, working plans and personnel policies. Second the Party branch suggests to the presidium of the trade union council the issues to be discussed. Party members elected to the presidium guide the trade union meeting successfully and direct the passage of Party proposals by the presidium. Third, after the resolution is adopted, Party and Corps members must accept it unconditionally and serve as activists to make certain that it is carried out. Finally, Party branches in the trade unions were instructed that their primary tasks were the formulation and execution of production plans, and the assignment and fulfillment of production quotas. Party branches were also to supervise cultural programs for the workers to make sure that the "four safeguards" -- against spies, robbers, fire and sabotage-- function effectively in the factories.

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[46] Ibid., March 17, 1951, p. 2.

665C. Federation of Democratic Women (FDW)

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Women's position in society is such that not only do they constitute an important part of the labor force, but their influence is extended to the entire populace. For this reason, women's federations are regarded by the Communists as a political force, and are so organized as to reach all corners of society.

In the villages, women's federations participate most actively in all rural functions, and supply most of the activists in all movements. Their participation in agricultural production should be particularly mentioned. As of March 1950, women's participation in production in the "old liberated" areas in Hopei Province was estimated to represent up to 80 per cent of the female population; even in the "newly liberated" areas, women's participation scored 54 per cent.[47] By March 1955, their participation in the agricultural producers' co-operative was particularly cited. In 5,200 of the 7,000 producers co-operatives in Shansi Province, women were either managers or deputy managers.[48]

In the cities, women's federation teams are organized in the streets and alleys. They engage actively in urban inhabitants' committee work, and in carrying out propaganda among the female populace. During the Three-Anti Campaign in Peking, women activists formed one-half of all

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[47] Ibid, March 10, 1950, p. 1.

[48] People's Daily, March8, 1955, p.1.

665 562 the activists in the city. The Communist Party's attempt to organize women factory workers was also assiduous. As of October 1950, 54 per cent of the women workers in Hopei had joined trade unions; in cities like Paoting and Shihchiachuang, the percentage went up to 90 per cent.[49] In other fields of activity, women's participation was also high. As of March 1950, 4,470 women cadre also worked in government agencies in Hopei. Their participation in the People's courts was particularly great. Twelve per cent of the presidents of People's courts in Shansi were women

665 668 D. Other Mass Organizations. There are in the North China Region a number of other mass organizations with a strong influence on society. The All-China Federation of Democratic Youth has its representative offices in all key cities of this region. Its Tientsin office,[50] for example, was organized in January 1950. Branches of the All-China Federation of Literature and Art Circles were also organized in all cities. However, the most popular organization among them all is the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. Its Hopei branch[51] was officially organized in Novembe 1950 with a membership of 350,000. In the North China Region as a whole,[52] the membership stood at 1,908,202 in April 1951, the highest of any region at that time.

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[49] Hopei Daily, October 31, 1950, p. 2.

[50] People's Daily, January 10, 1950, p.3.

[51] Hopei Daily, Nov. 7, 1950, p. 1.

[52] Ibid., April 15, 1951, p. 1.

III. PARTY CONTROL IN THE RURAL AREAS

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Political power in the rural areas is the key to Communist power in North China. Here lies the strength and the weakness of the region, and of the Party; here the pattern of political dynamics is the most revealing, and the Communist power encounters the greatest opposition.

With the exception of the first few years prior to 1951, when a different set of policies was pursued by the Communists in the North China Region, the general pattern of the development of the Communist political power remained the same as in other regions. In the main, three periods can be: (1) the initial construction period--prior to the completion of land reform in the spring of 1950, when political power was centered in the Peasants Association; (2) the consolidation period -- a period of expansion in areas after land reform and consolidation of agricultural producers' co-operatives in other areas; (3) the election and post-constitutional period. The continuous suppression of opposition during the election of 1953-54, however, gave a firm base to Communist political power. The post-constitution period displayed a renewed consolidation of political power upon the basis of gradual collectivization of agriculture.

A. The Initial Construction (1948 Fall to September 1951)

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Prior to the convening of the First Conference of County Head in North China[53] in September 1951, land reform was the key task in the "newly liberated" areas, whereas in the "old liberated" areas, elections and consolidation of ts'un (village) People's representative conferences topped other business. Experiences gained from the election no doubt served ad models for the areas in the North China Region, as well as in the nation as a whole.

1. Land Reform and Political Construction. In the North China Region,[54] land reform was taking place in the "newly liberated" areas in four provinces: Hopei, Shansi, Chahar, and Pingyuan, but no in Suiyuan, between December 1949 and early 1950. As of April 1950, 25,500 villages (78 per cent of the total villages) in the "newly liberated" area announced the completion of land reform. Although land reform was carried out in a relatively mild way in the North China Region, it accomplished the political aims of abolishing the land-ownership system and of destroying existing political forces in the rural districts.

Owing to the rich experience available in this region and to the small area affected, land reform was rapidly concluded. Nevertheless, all available forces were mobilzed for the tedious task. In Hopei Province alone, land reform cadres of more than 20,000 were organized into teams.

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[53] Report on Conference in People's Daily, Oct. 3, 1951, p. 1. For resolutions adopted consult Yangtze Daily, Nov. 21, 1951, p. 4.

[54] People's Daily, April 24, 1950, p. 2.

423 665 They included land reform "experts" from the old liberated" areas, students, and workers from mass organizations. The land reform team of 469 serving in the suburbs of Peking,[55] for exampl included 135 such "experts." Another feature of the land reform in the North China region was the lenient policy adopted. For example, the establishment of people's tribunals was discouraged and their use was carefully handled so as not to avoid terror among the populace. This lenient policy was deemed necessary because of the proximity of this region to the national capital and of the large number of minority groups in this region.

During the land reform, power centers in the rural areas remained: (1) the Party, (2) the Peasant Associations, (3) the hsiang government, and (4) the militia. Of these four, the Peasant Association and the militia were of special importance.

423 668 665 The Peasant Association was the executive agent of the land reform. It possessed the power to decide all important questions relating to land reform. It was an organization primarily of poor peasants, who constituted two-thirds of the membership; the other one-third was filled by middle peasants. Prior to the active execution of the land reform, Communists attempted to include all poor and middle peasants in the Peasant Association and the membership was large. In Shansi province, it stood at 200,000; in the county

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55. People's Daily, Nov. 23, 1950, p. 2.

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423 of Yü-tsi 80 per cent of the peasants were members
665 of the Peasant Association.[56]

The militia served as another instrument
665 of terror at the disposal of the Party. It is an
423 organization of poor peasants and farm laborers
701 (67 per cent) and of youth (aged 18-30) and is
strongly class-conscious.

At the end of the land reform in North China,[57] the militia's strength was placed at 2,371,900. In Shansi Province alone, it was 373,250 in November 1950. Needless to say, the militia in this region had participated in guerrilla warfare against the Japanese and later assisted the Communists to defeat the Nationalists. They were well-organized and had gone through several consolidations and readjustments. In addition to the normal duties assigned to the militia, such as guarding granaries, bridges and transportation centers and escorting food transportation, the militia was also expected to assist in coastal defense. In most cases, they were organized into teams, such as highway patrol groups, coastal defense squads, and village joint-defense teams. In the Paoting administrative district, 665 such village teams were organized among the 4,715 villages.[58]

665 2. Election of Ts'un (village) Peoples' Repre-
623 sentative Conference and Political Consolidation
in the "old liberated" areas. The election of

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[56] Ibid., April 24, 1950, p. 2.

[57] Ibid., Oct. 25, 1950, p. 1.

[58] Hopei Daily, August 1, p. 3.

665 623 *ts'un* People's representative conferences in the "old liberated" areas was the Communist attempt to consolidate rural political forces. It was an effort to strengthen the Communist hold and was taken immediately after the large scale Party training and overhauling launched in 1950. To strengthen the *ts'un* government, two measures were taken: one was the emphases of "key" village work,[59] and the other, the election of village People's representative conferences and village governments. While the "key" village plan was to create model villages where administrative experience might be gained, village elections were intended to overhaul old political set-ups and were carried out in all places within "old liberated" areas. As of March 1950 in Ting *hsien*, Hopei, 400 villages had completed village elections;[60] in the province as a whole,[61] 60 per cent of the villages had elected new village governments in November 1950.

The directives and plans calling for village elections were so elaborate that the concentrated efforts of all organizations was required.[62] The procedures followed in these elections were followed in the 1951 elections in the "newly liberated" areas and in the nationwide election of 1953-54. For this reason, the discussion of the 1950 election will be taken up in a later section.

665 634 3. *Consolidation Period* (*August 1951-53*).
The convening of the First Conference of County

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[59] *People's Daily*, Jan.28,1950,p. 3.

[60] *Ibid.*, March 26, 1950, p. 3.

[61] Report of Yang Shiu-feng, Chairman of Hopei Province, *Hopei Daily*,Nov.25,1950,p.2.

[62] *People's Daily*, Jan. 28, 1950, p. 3.

665 634 Heads in the North China Region marked the Communists' further attempt to stabilize the region The careful preparation and the wide discussion before and during the Conference signified the importance of this Conference. The Conference heard three important reports made by the head of the North China Bureau of Affairs, the Minister of Internal Affairs, and the First Secretary of the North China Party Bureau, and adopted a resolution outlining the ten tasks of rural administration. The Conference was also significant in that after this date administrative policies were made general in application; that is, the same policies were to apply throughout the region, in both "old liberated" and "newly liberated" areas.

The chief objectives set forth by the Conference were increase in agricultural production and consolidation of political power at the village and county levels. In most areas it was urged that county all-circle People's representative conferences act for the county Peope's congress which would not be elected until after the Constitution. At the village level, the transfer of political power from the Peasant Association to the ts'un government was accomplished. The transfer of power was marked by the overhauling of Party units and mass organization operating in the rural districts, the convening of ch'ü and ts'un Peoples' representatives converences, and the strengthening of ts'un government.

The convening of ts'un People's representative conferences in some of the "newly liberated" areas

665 634 repeated the 1950 experience. Election districts were allocated largely according to the distribution of the mutual aid teams, but elections were held with an average participation of from 70 to 80 per cent of all the voters. The elected ts'un People's representative conference was comprised mainly of poor peasants.[63] A statistical report on the composition of 776 ts'un Peoples' representative conferences showed that poor peasants constituted 56 per cent, while middle peasants took 35 per cent. The remaining 9 per cent went to farm laborers (5 per cent) and to the handicraft workers (4 per cent).

623 The ts'un government was elected from the ts'un People's representative conference. It was to include commissions on civil affairs, finance and food, agricultural production, culture and education, sanitation, public security, militia, and other functions.

474 665 In the organization of mutual aid teams among the peasants, high achievements were repeated in most provinces within the region. In Shansi, the organized peasants amounted to 55 per cent of the total peasant families. Hopei was the second largest with 49 per cent.[64] The other three provinces were poorly organized with 40 per cent for Pingyuan, 30 per cent for Chahar and 10 per cent for Suiyuan. The Communists did not attempt to increase the number of mutual-aid teams

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[63] Ibid., Aug. 10, 1951, p. 3.

[64] Ibid., Dec. 30, 1951, p. 2.

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474 665 and agricultural producers' co-operatives until the nationwide drive of 1953-54. However, new mutual-aid teams continued to be organized in certain areas while consolidation of existing teams in other areas proceeded.

665 Along with the fulfillment of major assigned tasks there were programs to correct various abuses and laxities in rural districts of corruption and inefficiency, reported in the villages. The infiltration of the "reactionary" elements into the Party organization and the increase of newly rich among Party members were cited in many places. There were sign of general apathy among Party cadres caused by the low level of education which restricted the ability of the Party members to handle complicated tasks, and by the continuous overhauling and indoctrination imposed on the Party members this last had resulted in the demoralization and even loss of Party members. Of particular concern to the Party was the wu-to (five-too-many) phenomenon. Wu-to refers to too many tasks, too many conferences and training classes, too many forms, too many organizations, and too many jobs held by one person. The North China Party Bureau held a special meeting with a view to eliminating this phenomenon, and as a result, a directive was issued.[65] At this meeting many cases were cited: In Yü-tz'u county, Shansi Province, in a three-month period, 21 tasks were

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[65] Ibid., June 26, 1953, p. 1.

665 assigned; in Yen-san of Hopei, at a single cadre meeting 18 tasks were announced. A form designed by the Financial and Economic Commission of Shansi comprised 74 pages requesting explanations running to several thousands of words. The many jobs assigned to a person, amounting to an average of four or five jobs per person, and the many meetings a person had to attend, were causes of inefficiency in administration and demoralization of Party members.

666 C. The Election and the Post-Constitution Period.

631 The Communist announcement in 1953 of the forthcoming nationwide elections opened another chapter in political development. This announcement was evidence of the Communists' confidence in the stability of their power at the lower level of administration. Following the consolidation of their power at the *ts'un* level in 1950-51 and at the county and city level in 1951-52, the foundation was laid for the concentration of political power in the hands of the Communist Party of China.

In the North China Region,[66] the abolition of *ts'un*(villages) as administrative units and the reallocation of *hsiang* administrative units was designated as a task to be completed before the national election, and in the North China Region this was done. The

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[66] *Ibid.*, May 31, 1953, p. 1 and *ibid.*, March 6, 1953, p. 2.

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665 631 The Hopei People's government ordered the setting up of reallocation offices at all levels of government under its jurisdiction and mobilized 12,000 trained individuals to complete the task. The major job of reallocation was the elimination of village units and the combining of them into hsiang units. In many cases, according to the report of May 1953, a county, originally made up of two hunded to six hundred villages, was reduced to 140 hsiang. In this way, control was more readily centralized and elections could be handled. Following the reorganization of hsiang administration, election districts were allocated. Voters were organized into teams and the representatives were elected for the Hsiang People's Congress.

After the promulgation of the Constitution in September 1954, Communist power was further strengthened at the basic level. The Hsiang People's Congress now holds the highest authority in the locality, but the true power remains with the Hsiang People's Council. These two institutions have gone through the two stages of construction and consolidation and Communist power is securely entrenched in the rural areas. However, the Communists have encountered serious resistance as a result of rural maladministration.

665 631 474 The overly rapid expansion of agricultural producers' co-operatives in this region throughout 1954 and the program to increase rural Party membership at the beginning of 1955 raised further problems. As a result, the Communists have had to take strong measures to stabilize the rural political conditions. By overhauling the over-expanded co-operatives and by strengthening Party

leadership in the rural districts, the Communsts hope to arrest further peasant resistance. 665 474 631

IV. PARTY CONTROL IN THE CITIES

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Communist political power in the cities was established and consolidated by a program nearly identical with that employed in the rural districts. The democratic reform movement and the campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries, which were directed at the trade unions and at the urban populace as a whole, and the violent Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns , which were directed at the Party, the administration, the industrial and business circles of society, performed functions similar to those of the land reform program in the rural society.

Communist control in the city is maintained through Party control over organizations, extending from the trade unions to the students' federations, and reaching as far as the streets and alleys. The following is a brief discussion of the chief organizations found among the inhabitants of cities.[67]

The Urban Inhabitants' Committees were first organized in 1951 in the city of Tientsin, as an experiment. Their wide introduction in other cities throughout the nation was effectuated in January 1955 when a set of regulations governing their organization was promulgated by the Chairman of the People's Republic of China. The stated aim of the Urban Inhabitants' Committee was residing in or sharing a house with others, a committee represents from one to six hundred families.

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[67] Regulations of Committees in ibid., Jan. 1, 1955, p. 1.

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The Urban Street Office acts as a liaison between the government and the street and is the representative of the city government to the street; it checks on residents and imposes regulations. Its jurisdiction parallels that established for the Public Security Sub-Station, thus providing a double-check among the residents. The Public Security Sub-Station is responsible, in the main, for the maintenance of public order and the suppression of counterrevolutionaries.

As a "mass organization" Mediation Committees are established both in cities and in the villages. Their function is to mediate disputes among citizens, to propagandize government statutes, and for the time being to exercise "judicial" power in the village and street for misdemeanors not covered by the People's tribunal. Although the committee acts as a third party in a dispute, it represents the government view; it employs self-criticism as one of the primary techniques.

The Communist control in the cities is much more rigid and forceful than in the rural areas. The Communist domination over many mass organizations, factories, and other professional organizations also contributes to the stability of this political power. The many street organizations, particularly the public security Sub-Stations, in enforcing obedience and in spying on homes, play leading roles. However, the importance of other organizations, notably the procuratorates and the People's courts, should not be underestimated.

CHAPTER III. ELECTION OF MINOR PARTIES

I. ELECTIONS

665 666 Between April 1953 and July-August 1954, the nationwide election which produced the Peoples' congresses at all levels was held in the North China Region between April 1953 and July-August 1954. The election was conceived as having two functions strange to Western students: first, it provided an excellent channel for government propaganda, with no choice of political platforms. Secondly, it was the occasion for political "struggl to liquidate the opposition and eliminate the unwanted.

A. The Election Committee Article 3 of the Electoral Law of the People's Republic of China,[68] stipulates that "deputies to People's congresses of a province, county, or municipality divided into districts shall be elected by a like Peoples' congress of a hsiang, town, municipal district, or municipality not divided into districts, shall be elected directly by the electors." The electoral law also provides for the establishment of election committees to conduct elections at all levels down to hsiang. Members of a Committee are appointed by the People's government at the next higher level.

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[68] The Electoral Law of the Peoples' Republic of China for the All-China Peoples' Congress and Local People's Congresses of all Levels, Peking Foreign Language Press, 1953.

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The function of the Hsiang Committee was defined as follows in a directive issued in April 1953 by the Central Election Committee.[69] First, the chairman of the committee was to be appointed from the higher level. Second, the committee was to delimit electoral districts. Each district was to have a population of at least 200 and to elect two or three representatives. Third, a voter-qualification examination board was to be set up. Only those who passed the examination were to receive an electoral certificate. Committees at the hsiang level were in a position to control the selection of candidates through negotiations between the representatives or the Committee of the Communist Party and of mass organizations. While the elections to the People's congresses above the county level must be conducted by secret ballot, the election of deputies to the People's congresses of a hsiang, town, municipal district, and the election of a town deputy to a county People's congress may be conducted either by a show of hands or by secret ballot (Article 55). In the latter case, election meetings were held under the supervision of the election committee and every effort was made to force full participation. An average participation of 80 per cent was reported throughout this region.

Elections at county or hsiang levels were more successful in the North China Region than in any other region, largely because of the experiences gained in the past and the relatively stable political conditions existing in this region. A

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[69] People's Daily, April 6, 1953, p. 1.

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large number of electoral officials were trained; 1,378 of these trained personnel were organized into teams and sent to assist in the election in 21 counties in Shansi Province alone.[70]

In the cities, the reallocation of election districts and the examination of voters' qualifications were the two most tedious tasks involved in the election. Generally, the reallocation of election districts was based on the distribution of public sub-stations and the examination of voters' qualifications was entrusted to urban inhabitants' committees. However, in both tasks the public sub-station played the decisive role. Similar problems occurred in the villages, but simpler rural conditions made the tasks easier.

The composition of the People's congress at hsiang and ch'ü (within a city) levels showed the dominant position of the Communist Party and the working class. One report indicated that 8,729 out of a total of 19,379 People's representatives elected from 17 counties in Shansi were Communist Party members. In the mining town of Yang-chuan, among the 964 People's representatives, 42.3 per cent were workers. A similar pattern was also observed in Peking;[71] among the 1,200 representatives selected from 7 ch'ü, workers constituted 32 per cent of the total; other professions followed in this order: government personnel 15 per cent; lawyers and medical profession 15.2 per cent; engineers and technicans 14 per cent; co-operative workers 3 per cent; private industry and businessmen 9.8 per cent; religious workers 1.6 per cent, and urban inhabitants 20.5 per cent.

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[70] Ibid., Feb. 11, 1953, p. 3.

[71] Ibid., April 25, 1954, p. 1.

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B. Selection and Nomination of Candidates

Members of the Communist Party, the various democratic parties, the various People's organizations and electors not affiliated with the above-mentioned parties or organizations may all be nominated as candidates for election as deputies, either jointly through negotiation among the groups or separately by each party, according to electoral districts and electoral units. In practice, however, joint nomination is the rule and the caucus is adopted Negotiations on the nominations of candidates above the provincial and municipal level are conducted through the consultative conferences at their respective level. In counties and hsiang where such conferences do not exist, negotiations are carried out in the election committees. Whenever preliminary lists of the candidates have been agreed upon by the election committee, they are given to the electors' discussion group for approval and returned to the election committee. The final list is then published five days before the election.

C. Election Campaigns and Funds

The adoption of caucus as means of nomination eliminates the need for election campaigning, Candidates from other parties and organizations so selected must, of course, first meet the approval of the Communist Party. Once he is approved, his election is assured. If there should be any campaigning involved, it would take place only at the Party meetings and discussion group meetings, where the individual's qualifications might be

665 questioned and some interrogation might be 666 necessary. With respect to election expenses, Article 8 of the electoral law permits disbursement by the national treasury. Article 62 of the electoral law singles out bribery as an offense. Other unlawful practices, such as violence, intimidation, and fraud are offenses liable to fine and imprisonment.

II. POLITICS OF MINOR PARTIES

665 In the North China Region, minor parties are presented by their branch offices established after 1950 in the key cities in this region. The best known are the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang (RCKMT), the Chinese Association for the Promotion of Democracy (CAPD), the Democratic League (DL), the Chinese Peasants and Workers' Democratic Party (CPWDP), and the Chih Kung Tang (CKT).

As a party composed of former Kuomintang officials, the RCKMT composed of former Kuomintang leaders has the largest representation in North China government of any of the minor parties. The next largest representation is from the Democratic League. This is composed of the intelligentsia and other middle class elements, has been drafted by the Communist Party to participate in government as a symbol of coalition. The CAPD is the party of "the national bourgeoisie," meaning major industrialists and capitalists. Its service is called upon for active support in the nation's economic programs. Other minor parties having

665 some political importance are drafted for other activities.

The status of the minor parties in the government in this region is determined ultimately by their status in the central government. The status enjoyed by the minor parties changed after the promulgation of the Constitution. Although the Constitution calls for the continued functioning of the People's democratic united front led by the Communist Party and composed of various democratic classes, parties, groups, and People's organizations, these democratic elements in China, particularly the minor parties, are rapidly sinking into obscurity.

The local consultative committees of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which represent the united front, have ceased to be organizations of any political importance. The more than ten tasks assigned to them since 1951, ranging from assisting local governments, reflecting people's opinions, examining decrees submitted by the government, to participation in government-sponsored drives, have been reduced to mere observance and enforcement of the Constitution of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and the holding of consultations over the local work of the People's democratic united front and its implementation.[72] (Article 18 of the Constitution of the CPPCC.) Equally significant is the reduction in the number of consultative committees below provincial level. The new constitution of the CPPCC calls for the establishment of these committees only in provinces

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[72] English text of Constitution of Conference in Current Background, No. 308, Dec. 25, 1954.

665 and in municipalities directly under the central authority.

Minor parties' participation in government has become meaningless as power at all levels has been increasingly concentrated in the hands of the Communist Party. For instance, the liquidation of private capitalists in the transition stage will unquestionably reduce the political position of the CAPD. Eventually minor parties will no longer exist as political forces in any ordinary sense.

A. Control and Infiltration.

The most effective way of eliminating minor parties and their activities is to exercise strict control over them, either through direct subjugation or infiltration. A glance at the guiding principles to be observed by all minor parties participating in the CPPCC indicates the degree to which these minor parties have subordinated thems themselves to the will of the Chinese Communist Party. In addition to the acknowledged position of the Communist Party of China as the core of the States power, minor parties "must assist the state organs and set the social forces in motion... maintain close contact with the masses...continue to consolidate and develop the alliance between China and the USSR...and study Marxist-Leninist theories on a voluntary basis, study state policy, elevate political levels, practice criticism and self-criticism and strive for ideological remolding." (General principle of CPPCC Constitution.)

The Communist Party's infiltration into the minor parties to hurry their final extinction

665 constitutes perhaps the most threatening scheme of the Communists. This is accomplished through the control by the Communist Party over membership policies of the minor parties. The resolution of December 1951[73] governing the expansion of the Chinese Peasants and Workers Democratic Party placed many restrictions upon it. Clearly the expansion was aimed at strengthening the united front policy of the Communists, rather than at strengthening the minor parties. Expansion was permitted only in the cities; political activities of the minor party were prohibited in the units of the People's Liberation Army, public security forces, intelligence organizations, and offices dealing with foreign affairs and other agencies, for security reasons. Finally, Communist Party members and members of the New Democratic Youth Corps were permitted to operate within the minor party. This last condition, if carried out, would certainly ensure the minor party's extinction.

B. Minor Parties and "Pressure Politics"

The true nature of a democracy can be revealed by the character of minor or opposition parties and by the freedom of special interest groups to exert their influence. In Communist China, minor parties have only assigned duties to perform and public information is controlled by the Party; they can exert no pressure upon the state organs which the Communist Party of China dominates, nor do they take part in any key decision-making that involves public affairs. Admittedly, deputies of the minor parties have made speeches and commented upon the past government at various

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[73] People's Daily, Dec. 10, 1951, p. 1.

665 Conferences. However, they merely expressed praise for the Communists, with occasional criticisms of faults the Communists themselves had admitted publicly.

CONCLUSION AND COMMENTS

In the North China Region, the Communist Party has succeeded in consolidating its political power, while performing the role of model for the other regions.

The present tasks assigned to the Party calling for rapid industrialization in the cities and gradual collectivization in the rural communities are tasks in which the Party must further prove its competency. The peasant resistance to the collectivization and to the increasing control over all activities in the rural districts is perhaps the most serious challenge to the Communist political power in the nation as a whole as well as in this region. Although the percentage of co-operatives is high in the North China Region (41 per cent of total peasant households in Shansi and 35 per cent per cent in Hopei), rural difficulties are also mounting. The succes or failure of the work of collectivization in this region no doubt will have great effect on the nation as a whole.

At present, peasant resistance to the forming of agricultural producers' co-operatives is due to the peasants' belief in individualism and to the Communist maladministration; force and intimidation remain the two chief methods employed by

665 the Communist compel the formation of co-operatives. The Party members' low level of education handicaps the management of the co-operatives; they often face bankruptcy because of mismanagement. The mounting friction created because of differences in status and wealth between the poor peasants and the middle peasants who form the major part of the co-operatives further make efficient management of the co-operatives difficult. Popular resistance to Communist policies in the rural district was so serious that many remedial measures were taken in the first part of 1955. Yet despite the much-discussed overhauling of the co-operatives and the strengthening of rural Party organization, confusion still exists among the Party leaders. Mao Tse-tung's major speech in July 1955 calling for continuing effort toward collectivization may settle the differences [74] in the views held by Party members. Nevertheless, future difficulty can be foreseen and Party dissension on this point may seriously disrupt Party unity.

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[74] Chinese Daily News

Annex "A," Subparagraph 2d,
Political Background

PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY

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692 In the North China Region, as elsewhere in Communist China, the employment of terror is a major tactic for the maintenance of public order and the consolidation of political power. The policy is implemented through rigid control of the populace and various methods of suppressing opposition. Such public security organs as the People's procuratorate and the People's courts are primary agencies in effecting this kind of control.

The judicial organ of the government is conceived neither as an institution of justice nor as a protector of individual rights but as a weapon of the state for "safeguarding the People's democratic system and protecting public property." In the same fashion, local People's procuratorates are also organs of control "to supervise the decisions, orders, and measures of local state organs and to supervise persons working in organs of state and all citizens to ensure observance of the law." Furthermore, they are the instruments of control of the Communist Party over the People's courts and public security agencies, supervising adjudication of the people's courts and checking the investigations of public security agencies. Unquestionably, the public security agencies, the police, and the security forces are instruments of violence. They assume direct

625 responsibility for the maintenance of public order
692 and constant vigilance over the entire populace.

These organs of control are centrally organized. They are relatively immune from local interference and are rigidly supervised by the Communist Party. This chapter will deal with the People's courts and procuratorates, the public security agencies and police, and the criminal code including laws governing "counterrevolutionary" activities.

I. PEOPLE'S COURTS AND PEOPLE'S PROCURATORATES

A. People's Courts

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When the Supreme People's Court was established in November 1949, the People's courts in the North China Region were already in existence[1] Subsequently the North China Branch Court of the Supreme People's Court was established to serve as the representative of the Supreme People's Court and as the final court in the region. The provincial People's court and courts at lower levels continued to operate with a few changes in personnel. A research institute of law was also established in the College of Political Science and Law in Peking to give elementary and advanced training to both new and the old judicial personnel.[2]

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[1] Report of Shen Chün-ju, Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], June 2, 1950, p. 1.

[2] Ibid., Jan. 5, 1950, p. 1.

692 Students were trained to promote revolutionary consciousness and to "reform" themselves in conformity with new judicial practices. Since September 1950, in major cities like Peking and Tientsin, ch'ü People's courts have been established under the direct supervision of the Supreme People's Court to expedite trials and to increase mass participation.[3]

Serving as a political weapon of the state, the People's courts at all levels have subordinated their judicial functions to political expediency. They have geared their work to the service of the various movements and campaigns and have actively engaged in the suppression of counter-revolutionary activities and the maintenance of public order. In the course of the development of the People's courts, at least three stages can be recognized; at each stage a specific task was assigned. The first stage lasted from the establishment of the judicial authority in 1949 to the end of the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns in June 1952. The Judicial Reform Campaign from August to the end of 1952 constituted the second stage; and the third stage, beginning from 1953, in which the new judicial system was firmly entrenched, followed.

After the Communists' seizure of power, People's courts were employed as instruments of violence. People's tribunals were established throughout the nation and the work of the courts

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[3] Ibid., Aug. 21, 1951, p. 3.

692 were co-ordinated with the execution of the Land Reform Movement in farming communities and the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns in the cities. Once political power was assured, the Communists shifted their attacks to the old judicial agencies. The Judicial Reform Campaign was launched throughout the nationa in June 1952 with the intent of replacing the old system by a new one. The campaign reached the North China Region two months after it had begun in other regions, but the objective remained the same. After Communist power was consolidated in judicial agencies the courts supported the Communist program of 1953. At the same time, the court system underwent further renovation in preparation for the construction of the new People's court system. The nature and spirit of the court were expressed in the Organic Law of the People's Court of the People's Republic of China.[4]

1. The First Stage (1949 to June 1952). The distinguishing feature of judicial activities during the initial period was the institution and use of the People's tribunals to place all judicial activities in the hands of the Party functionaries. In the North China Region, People's tribunals were used for political purposes during the Land Reform Movement and the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns.

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[4] English test of the Law, Current Background, Hong Kong, American Consulate General, No. 303, November 5, 1954, pp. 1-7.

692 The regulations governing the organization of the People's tribunals for land Reform issued by the Government Administration Council[5] provided for the organization of People's tribunals and county People's courts with authority to liquidate landlords, depots, bandits, spies, and all persons engaged in opposition to Land Reform. Ch'ü People's tribunals were established in every two or three ch ü. These tribunals were to deal with criminal matters only and were authorized to inflict sentences demanding no more than five years' imprisonment. They were authorized to initiate arrests and prosecute counterrevolutionaries. In certain counties of Hopei Province, People's tribunals were organized from the judicial teams sent out by the county People's courts. In Hsin-ch'eng county, the People's tribunals were established in all ch'ü; by January 1950, a few months after the Land Reform Movement began, 72 land reform cases in the county were prosecuted by these tribunals.[6]

The method of selecting personnel to serve on the adjudication committee in the People's tribunals indicated the political character of the tribunals. Members of the adjudication committee were drawn from mass organizations. Half were elected by the county People's Representatives' Conference. The other half, including the president of the committee and his deputy, were appointed by the county People's government. In most cases, the

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[5] Hua-tung Ch'ü Ts'ai-cheng Ching-chi Fa-ling Hui-pien [Compendium of Laws and Regulations Concerning Financial and Economic Policies in East China Region] , Financial and Economic [cont'd]

692 county head and the ch'ü heads were concurrently the presidents of these tribunals.

Mass trial and immediate sentence were the two chief means by which the People's tribunal created terror and violence. When cases were heard, judges bombarded the people with propaganda. Past hatreds and injustices were recalled or manufactured until mass emotion was so thoroughly aroused that the people themselves arose to accuse the defendants selected by the Party. After denunciations were made, quick judgments were urged upon the masses. Under such methods of intimidation and violence the defendant was helpless. It is not surprising to find that the memory of violence and cruelty at these trials remained a psychological threat in the minds of the people. Trials by circuit courts were also instituted so that the People's courts exercised authority over a much wider area.

In March 1952, directives on the establishment of Three-Anti People's tribunals and Five-Anti People's tribunals were issued by the Government Administration Council.[7] The Three-Anti People's tribunals were organized in government departments and in the armed forces. The president of the tribunal was generally the head of the department or the commander of the army unit.

Committee, East China Military and Political Committee, Shanghai, September 1951, pp. 1950-1952.

6. People's Daily, Feb. 21, 1950, p. 3.

7. Directives on establishment of Three-Anti Tribunal, ibid., Mar. 25, 1952, p. 1; on the Five-Anti Tribunal, ibid., Mar.1952, p. 1.

692 Members of the courts were either activists within the department or unit or representatives from various Party-controlled organizations. The tribunals were given the power to hold mass trials and to inflict the death sentence. The Five-Anti People's tribunals followed the organizational patter of the Three-Anti tribunals. Under the municipal People's courts, People's tribunals were organized at the ch'ü level. In the city of Peking, 30 Three-Anti tribunals and 59 Five-Anti tribunals were reported to have been established during the last stages of the campaigns. [8]

People's tribunals proved so effective as weapons of control that they were greatly extended during the nationwide election of 1953-54. The main function of the tribunals was to punish electio violators, including unqualified candidates and voters. The tribunals were under the direction of the election committee at each government level. As of February 1954, a People's tribunal had been established in each of the twelve ch'ü in the city of Tientsin. [9]

2. The Second Stage: The Judicial Reform, August 1952. Only minor changes in the People's courts of the North China Region had preceded the launching of the Judicial Reform Campaign. To justify the need for this violent campaign, the Communists blamed the remaining pre-Communist personnel and especially their influence at higher levels. The influence and the crimes of these judicial employees of long standing were probably exaggerated by the Communists. In the Tientsin

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[8] Ibid., Mar. 20, 1952, p. 1.

[9] For the functions of election tribunal see Ibid., Feb. 7, 1954, p. 3.

Municipal People's Court, for example, 97 long standing employees were reported among the 120 people working in the adjudication committees.[10] In Taiyuan, Shansi Province, the number of old-guard participants was as high as 83 per cent; even in Peking, the percentage was reported to be about 52 per cent.[11] Such a large percentage was asserted to be common in all provincial and municipal People's courts -- the higher the court, the higher the percentage. These judicial workers were also charged with corruption on various counts. In Taiyuan, one-half of the judicial employees accused of corruption had once been employed by the Nationalist Government. 692

To eliminate the personnel and practices left over the Kuomintang period, the campaign encouraged mass meetings to identify, accuse, and pass judgment upon "corrupt" judicial officers. The habit criticism and self-criticism involving ideology and performance, was developed within the courts. Meanwhile, the Communists called for the inspection and the reform of prison management.

The Communists also began to dispose of "accumulated" cases -- untried or mistried cases. 698 The People's tribunals were encouraged to investigate past adjudication as well as cases still pending in the courts. In both instances, mass meetings and mass trials were held. The speed with which cases were processed created an atmosphere of terror at these trials. In the county of Ho-chien, Hopei Province,[12] a team of ten people were

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[10] Report of Shih Liang, Minister of Justice, *ibid.*, Aug.23,1952,p.l.

[11] *Ibid.*,Sept.13,1952,p.l.

[12] *Ho-pei Jih-pao* [*Hopei Daily*] ,July 19, 1951,p.1 .

698 reported to have handled all the cases in that county in ten days. In Ts'ang *hsien*, 146 cases were disposed of in four days.[13]

After mass concern has been aroused, mediation committees were established. These committees, organized in both the cities and the rural areas, formed the broad foundation of judicial power and functioned as instruments of local government to influence judicial activities. Composed meainly of activists from various mass organizations, the committees were further subdivided according to the types of disputes to be handled. When a dispute arose, all parties involved were invited to a meeting at which the activists bombarded the participants with propaganda and tried to persuade them to accept the verdict dictated by the committee. In the city of Peking,[14] collective mediation was begun and representatives of all related organizations were invited to present their views. Government policies were stressed during collective mediation, and sometimes smaller discussion groups were organized to facilitate individual "persuasion."

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692 The Communist determination to eliminate the Kuomintang code and the existing judicial system was expressed in the Common Program of 1949. Article 17 of the Common Program proclaimed "the abolition of all laws, decrees, and judicial systems of the Kuomintang Government and the establishment of the People's Judicial System." The Communists justified complete replacement of the Kuomintang code, the *Liu-fa Ch'üan-shu* [The Compendium of the Six Codes of the Repub-

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[13] *Ibid.*, August 11, 1951, p. 2.

[14] *People's Daily*, July 18, 1952, p. 3.

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lic of China] , on four princples.[15] (a) The judiciary is an instrument of the People's dictatorship to serve the interest of the state and to suppress the class opposing the workers and peasants. (b) The exceedingly mechanical procedure of the old courts is burdensome and unnecessary. (c) A purely legalistic approach to a case without consideration of the economic and social relationships in society is contrary to the socialist concept of law. (d) The use of precedents for adjudication should be abandoned as a bourgeois practice.

At the same time, the Communists defended their system from the socialist viewpoint, which entails the following procedures: (a) the reduction of appellant cases and the concentration of judicial authority in the lower courts; (b) the adoption of adjudication committees to render judgment by collegia in special cases; (c) the review and periodic check of non-appellant cases by the higher court and the practice in the lower court of seeking instructions from and reporting progress to the higher court; (d) the conduct of mobile trials, and (e) the use of People's assessors, composed of representatives from various People's organizations; (f) the use of "comrade trial" meetings for cases involving ideology and labor discipline in factories, officer, and enterprises; and (g) such methods as oral inquiries, on-the-spot investigations, the People's reception rooms, and mediation committees.

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15. For discussion, se Li Kuang-ts'an's article "P'i-p'ing Jen-min Fa-lü Kung-tso Chung Chiu-fa Kuan-tien" "Criticizing Old Jurisprudential Viewpoint in the People's Judicial Work," [Study] , No. 7, Oct. 1, 1952, pp. 16-19. 6

693 3. The Third Stage (1953-55) The large-scale elimination of "old-established" personnel necessitated the training of new personnel as replacements. At the second session of the National Judicial Conference held in September 1953, a resolution was passed calling for the training of 200-500 judicial workers from each region.[16] Universities were told to strengthen their law schools, and students of political science and law were encouraged to work for the People's courts.

692 With regard to the gradual introduction of Communist concepts and techniques into the People's courts, effort was concentrated on the strengthening of judicial power at lower levels and the establishment of special courts in industrial and mining organizations. Progress was reported in July 1955 by Shih Liang, Minister of Justice. In the nation as a whole, 3,795 circuit courts and 157,966 mediation committees had been established.[17] In Ting-hsien, Hopei Province, four circuit courts were in operation, of which three were converted to People's tribunals[18] because it had been discovered that the tribunals spent less time over each trial and could settle in a given period more cases than could the circuit courts.

698 The establishment of special courts in industrial and economic organizations was first

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[16] People's Daily, Sept. 10, 1953, p. 1.

[17] Ibid., July 30, 1955, p. 6.

[18] Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily], July 9, 1955, p. 2.

698 carried out in transportation centers. As of September 1954, eight railway courts and one waterway court had been set up in the nation as a whole. To cope with the increasing number of cases involving econmic matters, various judicial organizations were established. The "comrade trial" court is one of these organizations. As of June 1954, 70 of these courts had been inaugurated in major cities throughout the nation.[19] Members of these trial courts were activists from the trade unions. Like the mediation committees, the comrade trial courts employed self-criticism and propaganda as the chief weapons. Their authority extended only to recommending administrative punishment, and their jurisdiction was limited to disciplinary cases.

692 The passage of the Organic Law of the People's Court of the People's Republic of China by the first session of the National People's Congress, which also promulgated the Constitution of September 1954, placed the judicial system on a "permanent" basis. The new law formalized the relationships among the courts -- the Supreme People's Court, the High People's Court in a province and a municipality, and the basic-level People's court in a county, city, and municipal ch'ü. The courts continued to serve as weapons of the state and to subordinate judicial functions to political policies. This gain was achieved by the political selection of judicial personnel and the establishment of People's tribunals. At the

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[19] People's Daily, June 5, 1954, p. 3.

692 provincial and local levels, the president of the court is elected by the respective People's congresses, but the president and members of the various adjudication committees are appointed by the People's council. By control of the People's council, the Communist Party's decisive role in the appointment of a responsible judiciary is assured. The establishment of people's tribunals on a broad foundation also has made possible the widespread use of terror. Whenever necessary, circuit hearings are held in villages and towns to which the power of the county People's court does not reach.

B. People's Procuratorates

693 In the North China Region, the Supreme People's Procuratorate exercised direct authority over the People's procuratorates in the several provinces. This relationship continued after the promulgation of the Constitution. Under the Supreme People's Procuratorate, similar offices have been organized at all levels of government down to the municipal ch'ü. In the past, the establishment of People's procuratorates has been encouraged, but organization in the North China Region is far from complete. At the Provincial Procuratorial Work Conference Hopei Province in February 1955, it was reported that during 1954 some 33 additional People's procuratorates had been established throughout the province.[20]

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[20] Survey of China Mainland Press, Hong Kong, American Consulate General, No. 998, March 2, 1955, p. 25.

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693 The use of the People's procuratorates as an organ of terror and control is manifest in the manner in which members of the People's procuratores are appointed. Article 21 of the Organic Law of the People's Procuratorates grants the power of appointment to the Supreme People's Procuratorate.[21] All Officers and members of the Provincial People's Procuratorate are appointed and removed by the Supreme People's Procuratorate, with the approval of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. In the same fashion the component members of the People's procuratorate in a city are nominated by the Provincial People's procuratore but are appointed by the Supreme People's Procuratore. The concentration of the appointment of procurators in the hands of the Supreme People's Procuratore has facilitated the Party's control over this important agency of suppression. Indeed, chief procurators and their deputies have been concurrently either high officials of the public department of security or Party members serving in the Department of Organization or on the control committees.

The People's procuratorate participated in all nationwide drives and campaigns. Chang Ting-ch'eng,[22] chief of the Supreme People's Procuratorate, speaking at the second session of the National People's Congress in July 1955, made

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[21] English text in Current Background, No. 303, Nov. 5, 1954, pp. 8-9.

[22] People's Daily, July 24, 1955, p. 2.

693 clear the tasks of the People;s procuratorates. They were instructed to concentrate their efforts upon the suppression of counterrevolutionaries and upon the establishment of procuratorates in all transportation centers and among the armed forces. The number of People's procurators increased almost ten times from 199 in September 1954 to 1,963 in July 1955. The number of personnel employed in these organizations increased from 6,963 to 12,155. Further expansion has been designed to cope with a reported increase in counterrevolutionary activities as they occurred throughout the nation..

II. PUBLIC SECURITY AGENCIES AND POLICE

625 With the possible exception of the armed forces of Communist China, public security agencies constitute the most important instrument of violence. Public security agencies exist in all organizations throughout the nation. They maintain close control over the entire populace and are authorized to make arrests to mete out punishment. They also have at their disposal the public security forces, and the police. By collaboratin with other terrorists agencies of the Communist Party and the armed forces, public security agencies exercize a profound psychological and physical coercion among the people.

A. Organization

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The public security agencies form an independent system within the government administration. Under the direction of the Ministry of Public Security of the Central Government, similar departments and bureaus exist in all administrative branches, extending down to the hsiang. The system is highly centralized and completely controlled by the Communist Party.

The Ministry of Public Security has assumed full responsibility for the maintenance of public order and safety in the North China Region. Because of the lack of information on the agencies it controls, their detailed organization and operation cannot be discussed. However, according to a 1953 report by the Nationalist Government on Formosa,[23] the Department of Public Security in a provincial government has five sections in addition to an administrative office. These five sections are charged with responsibility for political security, security administration, police, general service, and "REform-through-labor." Other units such as cadre schools, coastal public security bureaus and forced labor battalions are under the command of the department. Below the provincial level,

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[23] Organizational Chart of the Communist Public Security and Intelligence Agencies, Taipei, The Sixth Section, Central Committee, the Nationalist Party, 1953.

625 public security bureaus are organized at the administrative district and municipality level. A public security bureau within an administrative district also maintains five sections similar to those of the Department of Public Security in a province. Public security bureaus within a county government are no less extensively organized. The county bureau may have four sections (political security, administrative security, investigation, and judicial administration) plus as many sub-bureaus as deemed necessary. The supervision of the management of fire stations, detention houses and prisons is directly under the county bureau. The county bureau is also empowered to establish security stations for the strengthening of public security work in the *ch'ü* and *hsiang*.

B. Public Security in Rural Areas

Apart from the reliance upon the public security agencies in the rural district for the maintenance of public order, other instruments have been employed at various times. During the Land Reform Movement, the Peasants' Association, the militia, and the People's tribunal were agencies for the enforcement of land reform and the suppression of landlords. In the view of the Communists, the landlords are always the cause of rural unrest and their suppression forms the most important task of the rural public security agencies. Landlords who violated the land reform law were subject to suppression. Those who were not killed were either compelled to work in

625 forced labor camps or were placed under the surveillance of the public security agencies. To meet the rising resistance in rural areas in the province of Hopei, the provincial government issued an order calling for the severe punishment of former landlords and rich peasants who seized land from the poor peasants and sabotaged Communist agricultural policies.[24] The order invited accusations from the people at large and urged the strengthening of public security work in rural areas. After the issuance of the regulation on the control of counterrevolutionaries, supervision and punishment were extended to include landlords who gave no evidence of their loyalty to the regime. On the initiative of the ch'ü government, and subject to the approval of the county government, disloyal landlords could be placed under surveillance for three years or more.

After the Land Reform Movement, rural security agencies were strengthened. The establishment of security committees in the rural areas at the conclusion of the Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries Movement in 1951 made public security agencies into a network calling for mass participation. A committee composed of three to eleven members was organized in each village.[25] Members were drawn from various mass organizations and were elected by them. Public security teams under each

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[24] Hopei Daily, Dec. 9,1950,p.1.

[25] On regulations governing the organization of the security committee in the cities and rural areas, see People's Daily, Aug.11,1952,p.1.

625 teams under each committee filled out the network in the village and in local organizations. Under the direction of the public security commission in the hsiang government, these committees formed the foundation for the public security system in the rural districts.

With the revival of secret societies and the constant rural unrest in the North China Region since 1954, rural security has become a problem. Former landlords, the new rich, and members of the secret socities were blamed for rural fires and the destruction of agricultural producer's co-operatives. An aditorial in the People's Daily in April 1954 urged the strengthening of rural public security, particularly on the part of the militia and the security committees.[26] The use of circuit hearings conducted by the People's tribunal and the frequent visits of procuratorial teams to remote villages were encouraged. Growing rural unrest was suggested in a report made by a deputy of the National People's Congress upon his return from an investigation trip to the county of Tungkuang in Hopei Province.[27] In 1954, the number of criminal cases in that county had increased; to 113, as compared to 95 cases reported in 1953. In the first half of 1955, some 50 cases were

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[26] Ibid., April 28, 1954, p. 1.

[27] Ibid., July 2, 1955, p. 3.

625 reported. The inadequacy of public security agencies in that county was further indicated by the fact that almost 50 per cent of the cases reported had not been solved.

In connection with the strengthening of rural public security work, two measures were taken. One was expressed in the directive[28] on strengthening fire prevention in the rural areas, issued by the Ministry of Public Security in May 1955, and the other was the transference of command of security forces below the administrative district from the military to the public security bureaus in the administrative district and county governments.[29]

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633 3. Public Security in the Cities. To maintain public order and safety in the cities, the Communists have undertaken four principal measures: (a) the maintenance of an extensive organization within the public security bureau; (b) the rigid control over residents' movements; (c) the establishment of urban inhabitants' organizations and committees to spy upon the people and the workers in all organizations; and (d) the strict regulation of all commercial and recreational activities.

The public security bureau in the municipal government maintains at least eight sections. They are a secretariat, political protection (including intelligence, investigation, and con-

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[28] Ibid., May 29, 1955, p. 2.

[29] Ibid., July 31, 1955, p. 2.

625 fidential information), public peace and order
633 administration, crimial police, sanitation, fire prevention, general service and supply, and personnel. Other functions under the bureau include the administration of prisons, detention houses, and "Reform-through-labor" camps as well as the training of security cadres and forces. Subsidiary to the bureau, ch'ü sub-bureaus and security sub-stations have been established. The organization of the sub-bureau is as elaborate as the bureau itself. The sub-bureau is charged with the supervising of detention houses and directing the work of security stations and security committees under them.

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625 In the North China Region, ribid census-control was established in July 1951 by a directive issued by the Government Administration Council.[30] Any resident who wished to move had to obtain beforehand a permit from a local security station. Any person who moved into a new district had to report to the local station. Even house guests staying three days or more had to be registered. The nationwide census in 1953 placed urban residents under stricter surveillance. In 1955, a rigid system of registration increased the already established restrictions upon the people.[31]

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[30] Chang-chiang Jih-pao [Yangtze Daily], Hankow, July 18, 1951, p. 4.

[31] Enlightenment Daily, Peking, April 2, 1955, p. 1.

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633 Co-operating with various urban inhabitants' organizations are the Security committees organized in the cities during the 1951 Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries Movement.[32] Established in each street, office, and factory, the security committees are under the direct supervision of the public security agencies. They spread propaganda among the inhabitants, inform them of regulations issued by the public security agencies, and encourage popular participation in all public security activities. Security committees provide vigilance over the populace by giving the government a controlled group of informers among the people. Single committees are linked to make up a general committee, headed by the chief of the public security sub-station in each area.

The sub-station consists of a chief, deputy chiefs, and several policemen. Their assigned functions include the enforcement of laws on public security and social order, the suppression of sabotage, prevention of bandit acitivites, the surveillance of counterrevolutionaries, the administration of the census, and the direction of the security committees' work.

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517 The issuance of regulations governing the conduct of business and recreation in the North China Region by public security agencies is not only a means of supervising business transactions

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[32] Report on security committee work in Peking, People's Daily, Dec. 12, 1951, p. 1.

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but a scheme for retaining control of all activities. For example, the regulation controlling the supply and sale of radio and electrical appliances requires each shop to secure a permit from a public security agency before requesting a license from the Department of Industry of the local government.[33] Monthly reports of sale and inventory are also required. Failure to report suspicious patrons to the public security agency is a punishable offense. Even the purchase or report of electrical appliances necessitate a permit from the security agencies. Other regulations, such as those governing the registration of firearms[34] and inspection of luggage,[35] follow the same rigid pattern. These regulations make the carrying of firearms a crime and grant to the public security agencies the right to inspect personal luggage at any time.

Regulations governing the operation of hotels, warehouses and recreational facilities are rigidly enforced.[36] In order to obtain an operating permit from public security agencies, owners must submit information regarding their personal history, the people involved in the business, a diagram showing the geographic location of the business, and other documents. Hotels must make daily reports and recreational centers are subject to inspection at any time. The regulation

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33. Ibid., July 26, 1955, p. 3.

34. Issued by the Ministry of Public Security, Chieh-fang Jih-pao [Liberation Daily] , June 29, 1951, p. 5.

35. Ibid., May 10, 1951, p. 2.

36. Issued by the Ministry of Public Security, ibid., February 4, 1951, p. 6.

625 of printing and engraving firms is equally
517 strict.[37] These firms must secure permits for operation, and printing activities are subject to inspection by security agencies. In addition to these regulations, commercial firms are subject to additional controls from other departments, including those in charge of public purchasing and marketing.

B. Police

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Since the police force form a component part of any public security organization, its functions are dictated by the public security agency and in addition to the maintenance of public order, it engages in propaganda, explaining and justifying, by force, if necessary, government regulations.[38]

The police should be distinguished from the security forces. The latter are a component part of the People's Liberation Army and are organized by divisions and regiments. As the result of an order issued by the State Council in August 1955, security forces of administrative districts and counties were reorganized into armed police, performing functions similar to those of the security force.

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[37] Ibid., Feb. 20, 1951, p. 5.

[38] Police activities in Peking, People's Daily, Sept. 30, 1954, p. 6.

III. CRIMINAL CODES AND LAWS GOVERNING COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES

669 The Communists' intention to compile a criminal and civil code was evidenced by the organization of the Commission on Codification under the Government Administration Council, which has since become the Bureau of Codification under the State Council. As yet, the commission has not published the results of its work. However, many decrees and orders concerning criminal offenses and counterrevolutionary activities have been issued by the Communist government.

A. Criminal Code

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671 The decree promulgated by the Chairman of the People's Republic of China in December 1954 prescribed the procedures for arrest and detention of suspects.[39] As a result arrests are not made until they have been approved by the People's court or by the People's procurators. The decree also provides guarantees of individual rights -- against arbitrary search -- for a minimum period of detention, and an early trial. But in certain circumstances, public

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[39] Ibid., December 21, 1954, p. 1.

669 671 security agencies can make unauthorized arrests and ignore the individual protections prescribed by law. This is especially true when dealing with "counterrevolutionaries." Persons who cannot establish their identities or have no fixed address are subject to immediate arrest.

687 671 To reveal security information and to violate national currency laws are criminal acts, subject to severe punishment, according to a decree pertaining to the safekeeping of national security information[40] and a law concering national currency.[41] National security information includes not only military information but also any data concerning economic and financial affairs, transportation conditions, judicial and legislative matters. The term "national security information" is so loosely defined that unlawful disclosure of any information can be regarded as a criminal act. An act resulting in the violation of national currency regulations, if judged to have been committed with the intent of contributing to the success of counterrevolutionaries is tantamount to a counterrevolutionary act. Within the loose definitions of the

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[40] Yangtze Daily, June 11, 1951, p. 1.

[41] Ibid., April 18, 1951, p. 4.

687 law governing "corruption,"[42] passed during the
671 Three-Anti Campaign by the Government Administration Council, severe penalties are provided for "corruption" and bribery by a government employee or by a citizen in collaboration with a civil servant.

B. Decrees to Eliminate Counterrevolutionary Activities

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687 Any act deemed contrary to the interest of the state is considered to be "counterrevolutionary." Persons placed by the government in the category of landlords, bandits, former Kuomintang officials, or members of secret societies have been branded automatically as counterrevolutionaries.

Although regulations governing the suppression and control of landlords in the North China Region are not available, the spirit and manner in which landlords are tried and placed under surveillance is the same in this region as in any other. Regulations governing the suppression of counterrevolutionaries,[43] issued by the Government Administration Council in February 1951, applied to all regions throughout the nation. This regulation is allegedly based on the spirit of Article 7 of the Common Program, which registered the determination of the Communist

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[42] People's Daily, April 22, 1952, p.1.

[43] Liberation Daily, Feb. 23, 1951, p.1.

669 687 regime to imprison all counterrevolutionaries and other "criminals" and to employ the method of "Reform-through-labor cultivate their loyalty to the Communist regime." Counterrevolutionaries are subject to trial both by the People's court and by military tribunal. They are deprived both of their political rights and personal property.

Two laws govern the control of counterrevolutionaries: the Law of Control of Counterrevolutionaries [44] and Regulations Governing Labor Service for Reform.[45] The first of these laws, issued by the Ministry of Public Security, provides prison terms for persons who conspired against the Communist regime but have not yet shown their loyalty to it. Decisions repeating their control are vested in the People's courts and the public security agencies at county and municipal levels. Hsiang and ch'ü governments and public security sub-stations in the city may initiate control, subject to the approval of the immediately superior office. Persons under surveillance are deprived of their political rights, including the right to vote. During the period of surveillance, lasting up to three years, counterrevolutionaries are compelled to engage in "productive" work. Former members of the

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[44] Ibid., March 18, 1951, p. 1.

[45] People's Daily, Sept. 7, 1954, p. 2; English text in Current Background, No. 293, Sept. 15, 1954.

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Kuomintang, the Chinese Youth Party, and the Democratic Socialist Party, former intelligence personnel under the Nationalist Government, and officers of that government above the rank of capitain are required to register with public security agencies.

The Regulations Governing Labor Service for Reform, issued by the Government Administration Council in August 1954, provides a detailed scheme for the management of forced labor camps throughout China. The centralized management of forced labor under the public security agencies facilitates both the control and utilization of "counterrevolutionaries," while imposing on them severe hardships and cruelties.

COMMENTS AND CONCLUSION

From the foregoing discussion and from what we know of human reaction to totalitarianism, it would appear that the recent increase of criminal activities in the North China Region is traceable to the regime's excessive demands on the people and attempts to effect control by terror and strict surveillance. In a dictatorship, where a single will is imposed upon the people and force is the primary instrument of persuasion, resistance tends to increase as people become accustomed to the tactors of terrorism and inured to an atmosphere of vociferous domination.

However, public unrest has been less evident in the North China Region, which is under direct supervision of the Central People's Government, than in other regions of China.

669 687 Still, the renewed activities of secret societies and the growing number of unsolved "criminal" cases constitute evidence of either the growing inefficiency of public security agencies or the improvement of evasive tactics on the part of the "criminal" element. That the situation has given the Communists cause for worry is evident in the statement of the Minister of Public Security to the National People's Congress in 1955 urging redoubled efforts to accomplish the complete suppression of counterrevolutionaries.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 2f,
Political Background

SUBVERSIVE POTENTIALITIES

The uncompromising policy of the Communists toward all political opposition throughout the country has been more firm and effective in the North China Region than elsewhere in China. The Communists' assumption of power was least challenged in this region. Since the establishment of the national capital and Party headquarters at Peking, the region has been under direct surveillance and control of the top hierarchy of the new regime.

As the nation entered a new stage of development after the inauguration of the Central People's Government in October 1949, open and clandestine opposition of all kinds has been reported by the Communist regime. Two main sources of subversion have been marked as targets for destruction by the government: (1) "Counterrevolutionaries" or "basically hostile elements" -- inclusive terms embracing all social, economic, and political elements considered enemies of the socialist state. (2) Harmful activities such as corruption, waste, and theft which are reported to have caused degeneration and inefficiency in Party and government organizations, industrial establishments, and rural co-operatives. A third source of danger to the Communist regime -- tension and discontent within the party, government, and the populace -- can be inferred as

687 concommitants of excessive control by an extremely centralized state, though little explicit[1] reference is made to such feelings by the regime.

I. SUPPRESSION OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES

688 The term "counterrevolutionaries" as used by the Communists is only vaguely defined. It includes all persons whose past or present actions are deemed contrary to the purpose and interests of the Communists, particularly "bandits," landlords, armed resistance groups, spies, saboteurs, secret societies, and unrepentant former Nationalist Government officials, army officers, and members of the Kuomintang. The suppression of counterrevolutionaries in the North China Region followed the same pattern as in other regions. However, due largely to the nature and limited scope of the resistance, Communist measures in North China were less violent than usual and were used chiefly for psychological effect. Since the reported increase of criminal activities in the North China Region in 1954, the suppression of counterrevolutionaries has again become one of the immediate tasks of the Communist organizations there.

A. Extermination of "Bandits"

Prior to 1952, the term "bandits" applied

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[1] Studies of USSR can be helpful in understanding this subject. Cf. Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, Cambridge, Harvard U. Press, 1953; Barrington Moore, Jr., Terror and Progress USSR, Cambridge, Harvard U. Press, 1954.

668 only to remnants of the Nationalist Government forces on the Mainland and the long-active bands of robbers. Since then, it has been used broadly to identify all anti-social and subversive groups.

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669 Remnants of the Nationalist Government forces gave the Communists little trouble in the North China Region. Their organized resistance ceased as soon as peace was declared in the region after the capture of Peking on January 31, 1949. According to a Communist report, the surrender of the city by its Nationalist commander Fu Tso-i put out of action a quarter of a million Nationalist troops.[2] In the same month, a total of 628,000 troops went over to the Communists in the North China Region. About half of these captured soldiers were reorganized into Communist units,[3] and the rest were discharged and ordered to their homes. Many of the discharged troops who had not reached home before the complete conquest of the Mainland were recaptured. Non-natives of North China remaining in the region were detained for rehabilitation or forced labor. In Peking, an estimated 15,770 former Nationalist servicemen were arrested.[4]

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2. Ti San-ts'u Kuo-nei Ko-ming Chan-cheng [Brief Summary of the Third National Revolutionary War], Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1954, pp. 140-41.

3. Ibid., p. 218.

4. Report of P'eng Chen, mayor of Peking, Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, Jan. 31, 1950.

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723 After January 1949, Nationalist forces held out in the Taiyuan area of Shansi until May 1949, but most of the Nationalist units in the western part of Suiyuan accepted the Communist "reorganization" plan. The quick end of organized resistance in the North China Region not only released a large portion of the Communist forces for the offensive in Central-South China, but also made unnecessary an extermination campaign against Nationalist "bandits" in the North China Region.

A report issued by the North China Military Command at the beginning of 1950 triumphantly announced the extermination of all Nationalist troops and other "armed bandits."[5] Tasks assigned to the troops under the command of the North China Military Command were then centered on training and reorganization, assistance in agricultural production, and the strengthening of the local militia.

B. Landlords

423 After the Land Reform Movement in the North China Region, landlordism as a system of land ownership was largely eradicated. Some landlords died during the land reform period; others, including those sentenced to imprisonment for a year or less, were placed under the surveillance of public security agencies. The released landlords were given a piece of land

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5. Ibid., January 9, 1950, p. 2.

423 to work or were required to serve in forced labor camps. Others, classified as counterrevolutionaries within the meaning of the term as used in Decree on the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries by the Ministry of Public Security of the Government Administration Council in February 1951, were deprived of all political rights and placed under surveillance[6] for a period of not less than three years. These ex-landlords were placed in forced labor camps under the supervision of public security agencies and were subject to being sent to any area where a large labor force was required. There is no doubt that former landowners constituted the major portion of the forced labor battalions in Communist China.

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After land reform, many peasants and Party members had become members of the so-called "new rich," and as such were regarded by the Communists as "potential landlords." The growth of a new moneyed class was particularly serious in the North China Region. (See Party control in the rural areas in the chapter on Political Dynamics in this handbook.) The activities of these "potential landlords" were exhaustively reported. They were accused of contemplating or actually attempting hostile acts against the regime with the collaboration of former landlords; more particularly, they were accused of attempting to seize control of the rural government and of attempting to destroy

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[6] Test of the regulation in ibid, Feb. 22, 1951, p. 1.

565 the system of agricultural producers' co-operatives. In December 1954, renewed warnings
423 against them were voiced by the Communists.[7]
687 The case of Ch'ang-li hsien was cited. According to the report, former landlords, aided by the "new rich," had succeeded in infiltrating a producers' co-operative in order to destroy it. Having become members of the co-operative, the "counterrevolutionaries" bribed Party cadres and employed collaborators to capture key positions in the organization. They spread rumors and created dissension in an effort to disorganize the co-operative. The Communists accused members of the co-operative of showing contempt for the poor peasants by inviting "rich peasants" to join. (Regulations forbid the acceptance of landlords and "rich peasants" as members of the co-operatives.) Landlords were charged with creating unrest in the rural areas, burning granaries, killing cattle, murdering Communist members, and destroying dams and agricultural implements owned by the co-operatives.

C. Suppression of Nationalist Elements and Espionage Activities

668 The suppression of counterrevolutionaries in North China at first was carried out under joint direction of the Government Administration Council and the People's Supreme Court.[8]

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[7] Ibid., Dec. 15, 1954, p. 1.

[8] Report on the suppression of counterrevolutionaries in Hopei Province, Ho-pei Jih-pao [Hopei Daily] , Oct. 30, 1950, p. 1.

668 Originally, the responsibility for suppression rested upon the public security agencies, the military control committees in the cities, and the People's courts, but the suppression of counterrevolutionaries became a nationwide movement in 1951, engendering mass participation and employing the most ruthless tactics to accomplish its avowed purpose. Upon the conclusion of the movement, the foundation was laid for the construction of a network of mass security organizations.

1. Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries Movement of 1951.

The movement was an attempt to implement the process of suppression and to gain both physical and psychological control of the people. The use of force was common and the employment of intimidation and terrorism was far-reaching. At a session of the All-Circle Municipal and Ch'ü Representatives' Conference (enlarged) at Peking in May 1951, some 505 counterrevolutionaries were sentenced by Lo Jui-ch'ing, Chief of the Peking Municipal Public Security Bureau and concurrently Minister of Public Security of the Central People's Government.[9] Almost half (221) of the counterrevolutionaries were executed. Among them were ex-officials who had served with the Japanese-supported puppet government during the war against Japan, former Nationalist officers and intelligence workers, local "despots," "bandit" leaders, and leaders of secret societies. In addition to the 47 who were imprisoned but received stays of execution, 237 counterrevolutionaries were sentenced to forced labor camps.

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[9] Report made by Lo Jui-ch'ing, People's Daily, May 22, 1951, p. 1.

The organization of mass meetings at which wholesale accusations were made was one of the familiar techniques of Communist terror tactics.[10] According to a report made by the Municipal Public Security Bureau, in Peking alone up to October 1951 some 29,626 mass meetings were held, involving the participation of nearly 3,379,000 people. In Tientsin, from March to July 1951, 2,200,000 people participated in more than 21,400 mass meetings, at which 3,693 people brought accusations against individuals or groups. The writing of letters of accusation was also encouraged by the Communist regime; in a period of two months in 1951, 1,967 letters of accusation were received by the authorities in Tientsin.[11] Mass participation was encouraged by the selection of "activists: who constituted the main force for the establishment of vast security networks among the populace and within all state and industrial organizations. Tientsin in October 1951 was reported to have 12,468 activists[12]

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[10] Repor made by Lo Jui-ch'ing, Oct. 1, 1951, p. 1.

[11] *Ibid.*, June 5, 1951, p. 1.

[12] *Ibid.*, June 16, 1951, p. 1.

668 Although the Communists optimistically declared the conclusion of the 1951 movement in the North China Region, counterrevolutionary activities did not cease after that year. Repeated warnings calling for suppression have been issued since 1954. The convention of the Second Session of the National People's Congress in July-August 1955 again affirmed the Communists' determination to renew the campaign against counterrevolutionaries. Shih Liang, Minister of Justice, reported in a speech to the Congress that the number of cases of counterrevolutionary activity was increasing.[13] During [674] 1954, counterrevolutionary cases constituted only 1.5 per cent of all criminal cases; in 1955 they were estimated at 4.8 per cent.

668 727 2. Former Nationalist Troops and Armed Resistance. The large-scale surrender of Nationalist troops in the North China Region eliminated many organized resistance groups. Either through imprisonment or reorganization, the Communists succeeded in establishing control over the large majority of former Nationalist servicemen. In Peking, in the year following the Communists' seizure of power, some 743 former Nationalist officials were arrested, 6,425 were forced to register, and 15,770 soldiers were placed in custody.[14]

669 Although organized resistance was not offered by Nationalist troops, their activities

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[13] Text of speech, ibid, July 30, 1955, p. 6.

[14] Ibid., Jan. 31, 1950, p. 1.

669 did not entirely cease. Many former Nationalist soldiers accepted reorganization under Communist domination, but others found life extremely difficult under the new regime, especially as the Communist identified all ex-soldiers (Nationalist) as "potentially hostile" elements. Some of them did join with other discontented groups to plot organized resistance. Their influence upon various discontented groups is growing stronger, particularly among the peasants and within secret societies.

With respect to armed resistance in the North China Region, scattered reports are available to us. During the campaign against counterrevolutionaries in 1951, many units were identified by name.[15] A unit called the "Anti-Communist Allied Army" was uncovered in Hopei Province and accused of espionage and armed revolt. In December 1954, three additional resistance groups were reported in the same province.[16] Another unit was identified as the "Oppose the Communists, Reconstruct the State Army" which had been in existence since 1949 and was composed of ex-soldiers and former landlords. They were reported to have seized weapons from military units and used them in attacking Communist strongholds. In 1952-53, this unit was said to have been active in the counties of Ku-ting, An-kuo, and Wan-chüan, Hopei Province.

708 3. Nationalist Spies. Before the movement

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669 [15] Consult report of department head of Public Security, Hopei Province, Hopei Daily, March 31, 1951, p. 1.

[16] People's Daily, June 12, 1954, p. 3.

708 669 for the suppression of counterrevolutionaries, the Communist regime apparently concentrated on the exposure and extermination of Nationalist intelligence networks. In Peking, for example, within a period of nineteen months, 179 cases involving espionage were prosecuted.[17] Among the 1,565 intelligence workers arrested were reported to be representatives of practically every intelligence organization within the Nationalist Party. In Shihchiaohuang, Hopei Province, the Communists announced the discovery of a major intelligence organization, the Kung-chiao Pao-kuo-t'uan, and charged it with engaging in espionage against the regime.[18] Of the organization's personnel captured, only a few were accused of being leaders; one of them was charged with executing 160 underground Communist Party members. The elimination of other Nationalist intelligence teams in cities and rural areas was announced at this time.

727 668 Although the majority of former Nationalist intelligence woekres was arrested, Kuomintang officials and army officers above the rank of captain were placed under surveillance and required to register with public security agencies in 1951. At one time, 392 former intelligence workers and 3,430 Kuomintang Party members above the rank of ch'ü secretary in Peking were placed under surveillance.[19]

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[17] Hopei Daily, Oct. 2, 1950, p. 1.

[18] Ch'ang-chiang Jih-pao (Yangtze Daily), Oct. 22, 1950, p. 4.

[19] Hopei Daily, Oct. 21, 1950, p. 1.

708 668 The nationwide movement for suppression of counterrevolutionaries in 1951 further intensified the Communists' campaign against spies. However, at the end of the campaign, the Communists admitted that only a minimum number of the cases prosecuted during the counterrevolutionary drive directly involved espionage. Most of the persons condemned were found guilty of being bandits of "despots."[20]

With the increase in counterrevolutionary activities on the China Mainland, espionage once again became one of the targets for suppression. Any "destructive act" resulting in the loss of state property and personnel was deemed an [687] act of espionage. In 1954, according to Lo Jui-ch'ing,[21] 619 espionage cases were prosecuted in the nation as a whole. Cases involving the murder of Communist Party members and the transmittal of information to the Nationalist forces on Formosa were widely reported. The manager of the Wu-ta Trading Company at Tientsin was charged with espionage for allegedly supplying military and industrial information to Nationalist agents in Hong Kong.

668 648 4. Foreign "Intelligence Agents." The suppression of foreign "intelligence agents"

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[20] Report of Lo Jui-ch'ing, People's Daily, Oct. 1, 1951, p. 3.

[21] Text of Lo's speech, ibid., July 29, 1955, p. 3.

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668 642 was as important as the liquidation of Nationalist spies. During 1951, church groups and foreign missionaries were accused of engaging in espionage, Mass meetings were held and anti-imperialism" propaganda was disseminated. An Italian, Antonio Riva, was arrested in Peking and charged with spying for the United States Government.[22] A militant Catholic organization in Tientsin known as Sheng-mu Chün (the Legion of Mary) was singled out for suppression.[23] Members of that organization were required to register and were subject to investigation by security agencies. Of the reported 20,000 Chinese Catholics in Peking about 2 000 were said to have joined the Sheng-mu Chün and "other reactionary organizations."[24]

687 668 5. Sabotage. Sabotage cases involving the destruction of factory property, the theft of confidential information, and rumor-mongering were frequently reported in the North China Region. During 1950-52, acts of sabotage were fought by the enforcement of union control and by the organization of security committees in the factories and "safety" teams in the individual shops. With the launching of the first Five-Year Plan in 1953, regulations on safety and labor discipline were strengthened.[25] To observe labor

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[22] Ibid., Aug. 18, 1951, p. 3.

[23] Text of order of Tientsin Military Control Committee, ibid., July 15, 1951, p. 1.

[24] Ibid., Nov. 25, 1951, p. 4.

[25] Text of "regulations on Labor Discipline Applied in State-Owned Enterprises," ibid., July 14, 1954, p. 2.

668 regulations, to guard state property, to
687 safeguard economic information, and to observe all safety and security regulations became the duties of every worker.

487 Despite the enforcement of all these measures, sabotage activities grew with the expansion of industry. The woman minister of justice Shih Liang revealed that there were a total of 364,604 sabotage cases throughout China between January 1954 and May 1955. The destruction of the Hsia Hua Yüan mining area in Hopei in 1955 was cited as a deliberate act of sabotage by counterrevolutionaries.[26] The total number of sabotage cases in Hopei Province in 1954 was reported[27] to be approximately 160 per cent above the number reported in 1953. In Shansi, in 1954, sabotage rate doubled in the course of a year.

D. Secret Societies

669 The most widespread and persistent resistance
575 to the Communist regime in the North China Region was offered by the secret societies. Secret societies, as rebellious organizations, have invariably represented the Chinese people's resistance to social change. Moreover, in a society such as exists in Communist China today, where the individual has lost all sense of identity, the appeal of secret societies which preach stoicism and indifference may be great, especially among the illiterate peasants and workers. For this reason, the Communists have singled out

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[26] Ibid., Jul.3,1955,p. 1.

[27] Shih Liang's report ibid., Jul.30, 1955, p. 6.

669 575 secret societies as one of the chief groups for suppression. Also, the Communists have charged some secret socieites with being agents for the Nationalists, claiming that society headquarters have been used as meeting places for gangsters, vagrants, and subversive groups plotting against the regime.

As early as June 1949, an order to outlaw secret societies was issued by the former North China People's Government. Many of the larger societies, including the I Kuan Tao, the Fo Chiao Hui, the Ta Fo Tao, the Sheng-Hsien Tao, the Ming Yen Tao, and the Hsien T'ien Tao, were outlawed. Among the secret societies existing in North China, some were identified as having nationwide organizations. As of June 1951, according to a Communist report, liason among certain secret societies had been established in all regions.[28] Secret societies in the Southwest China Region, for example, were reported to be receiving their instructions from various headquarters in Shansi Province.

The most active and widespread secret society was the I Kuan Tao,[29] which was formed in the province of Shantung in the 1920's. It expanded throughout the North China Region and was, according to the Communists, one of the most active espionage organizations employed

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[28] Ibid., June 5, 1951, p. 3.

[29] See Shih-shih Shou-ts'e [Current Affairs Handbook] No. 4, Dec. 1950, pp. 77-81; No. 6, Jan. 1951, pp. 38-43.

669 575 by the Japanese to spy on the Communists during the war of resistance against Japan. The effort to eliminate the I Kuan Tao was concentrated in Shansi Province. In 1950 in Shansi, the I Kuan Tao was reported to have a following of 870,000, most of whom were peasants and working people.[30] In a village in Tai hsien in Shansi Province, peasants constituted 74 per cent of the 544 followers of the I Kuan Tao. During 1950, when the Communists were attempting to suppress the I Kuan Tao, the provincial government of Shansi issued orders to concentrate all available forces on the areas where the secret society had its greatest influence.[31] In the 734 villages selected, as many as 82,300 members of that organization were forced to resign; of this number, 1,692 were "leaders" and 133 were "priests" of the society.

Despite long and ruthless attempts at suppression, the activities of the I Kuan Tao have not diminished. There is evidence that the secret society is growing in power in the North China Region and that it has gained influence in other regions. In Kalgan, for instance, an administrative district in Hopei Province, some 36 cases involving the activities of secret societies[32] were brought to trial in 1955. The Communists reported that during

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[30] People's Daily, Dec. 23, 1950, p.3.

[31] Ibid., Nov. 28, 1950, p. 1.

[32] Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily], June 19, 1955, p. 1.

669 these raids they seized many secret meeting
575 places capable of holding several hundred people
and that weapons and other implements intended for espionage purposes were confiscated. During 1951, at least one self-styled "emperor" and many officers were arrested.

668 Apart from the issuance of orders to
575 outlaw secret societies, their suppression involved mass participation in public meetings, at which evidence of crimes committed by the societies was displayed and people were urged to reveal knowledge of membership and the activities in which the societies were involved. Many leaders were captured as a result of these mass demonstrations. Another method employed by the Communists involved a concentrated attack upon all labor organizations suspected of being under the influence or control of the secret societies. The societies had acquired leadership of the labor groups in charge of wharves, railway stations, and wheelbarrow "transportation centers." To eliminate the power of the societies, the Communists launch a campaign to reorganize small transport firms into state-owned companies and to organize workers into Communist trade unions under the disciplined management of Party cadres.

668 II. CORRUPTION, WASTE, AND THEFT

A. The Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns

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The launching of the Three-Anti Campaign against waste, corruption, and bureaucracy and the Five-Anti Campaign against bribery of government personnel, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts, and the purchase of economic information did more than affirm the Communists' determination to eliminate corruption and the most common causes of "degeneration" within the Party, state organizations, public enterprises, and private business firms; the campaigns also enabled the Communist leadership to tighten its grip on private enterprise, heighten discipline throughout the Party and public organizations, and exert closer surveillance and control over the whole state apparatus. These two campaigns were ruthlessly pursued with considerable impact upon society in the North China Region. The Three-Anti Campaign was directed at administrative and Party personnel, and the Five-Anti Campaign was directed at merchants and industrialists. Since Party members were, in most cases, administrative officers, the effect of the campaigns upon Party and administrative organizations was great, and since state-operated enterprises and administrative organizations were involved with private business, the attack upon business also was felt by administrators and Party members.

Both campaigns were conducted under the close supervision of the Central People's Government. Within all organizations at the regional level, a single pattern for suppression was utilized.[33]

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[33] Report of Three-Anti Campaign, *People's Daily*, Mar. 29, 1951, p. 1.

668 From December 1950 to January 1951, propaganda was directed at the populace as a whole; 80 per cent of the cases involving "corrupt officials" were said to have been uncovered as the result of accusations made during mass meetings. During January, a so-called "democratic inspection" was held. Under the direct command of the head of each department, teams were organized to conduct inspections of such matters as finance, housing, meals for workers, medical supplies, and administrative efficiency. During February and March, the "democratic inspection" was followed by concentrated attacks upon concealed corruption and the "big tigers" who were accused of misdeeds involving amounts above one billion _yuan_. The last two months of the campaign were devoted to the prosecution of the cases uncovered and the necessary reorganization which followed.

The Five-Anti Campaign was launched with the same speed and vigor. The campaign was broadened to include all business firms and the populace as a whole, and again mass participation was encouraged. By the end of January 1952, an estimate 110,000 accusations and confessions, involving some 30,000 business firms, were reported to have reached the Municipal Public Security Bureau in Peking.[34] At about the same time in Tientsin, an estimated 160,000 accusations were made against business firms in that area.

During the six months of the campaign, thousands of cases were exposed and many people were imprisoned and executed. The cases exposed

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[34] _Ibid._, Jan. 29, 1952, p. 1.

668 involved, in the main, misuse of government funds, corruption, and lavish use of public funds for personal luxuries.

B. Corruption

663 Immediately after the launching of the
668 Three-Anti Campaign, corruption involving the first secretary of the Tientsin administrative district and his predecessor was revealed.[36] Not only did this case receive the widest coverage in newspapers throughout the region, but the stern language the Party chose to use on this occasion served as a warning to both government and Party workers who might be tempted to similar defiance of the regime. Both men had served the Party for at least twenty years. They were accused of embezzling official funds in the amount of 155 million yuan -- money intended for relief funds and the wages of workers drafted for flood control projects The two secretaries were also charged with collaborating with businessmen for personal profit. Tried before a special tribunal of the Hopei People' High Court, they were executed a month later.

The day following the announcement of this case, 576 people confessed to corruption in the Peking Railway Sub-Bureau.[37] A few days later, 17 employees of the Department of Communications of the Shansi Provincial Government were accused of embezzling 8 billion yuan.[38] Li Chin-wu, commandant of the Motor Transportation School of the North China Military Command, was accused

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[36] Ibid., Dec. 30, 1951, p. 1.
[37] Ibid., Dec. 31, 1951, p. 1.
[38] Ibid., Jan. 23, 1952, p. 2.

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of accepting bribes from businessmen to cheat the government on contracts.[39] Similar charges were made against many government employees throughout the region. During the campaign against the "big tigers," many major cases were uncovered. In the Ch'a-nan administrative district of Chahar Province, 70 high-ranking officials were prosecuted, each accused of embezzling amounts above one billion yuan; in Yang-yuan county in the same province, 28 government employees were arrested.[40]

During the Five-Anti Campaign, many businessmen were the targets of prosecution. Liu Yüan-ching, chairman of the Contractors' Union of Peking, was charged with the theft of state property amounting to 80 billion yuan.[41] Fifteen manufacturers in Tientsin were charged with falsifying government contracts;[42] one individual was said to have made a profit of 260,000,000 yuan. The crimes most often committed by businessmen were the bribery of government personnel and failure to maintain the standards set for government contracts. Of the fifteen firms accused, the majority had resorted to bribery or had furnished the government with below-standard merchandise.[43] However, there is ample evidence

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[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid., Feb. 8, 1952, p. 1.
[41] Ibid., Jan. 15, 1952, p. 1.
[42] Ibid., Jan. 25, 1952, p. 1.
[43] Ibid., Feb. 3, 1952, p. 1.

663 to indicate that the Communists deliberately
668 exaggerated the seriousness of the "crimes" of businessmen in order to justify the severe sentences. In addition, terrorism and threats provided the Communists with a means of keeping government and Party workers in line.

As the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns drew to a close, P'eng Ch'en, the mayor of Peking, estimated that among the 50,000 private business firms in the city, only 5,000 were absolutely free of corruption. This would seem to imply that approximately 90 per cent of the private business firms in the city of Peking were accused and penalized in one way or another.

Although the 1952 campaigns slackened in intensity, corruption cases continued to increase with the expansion of government activities. Of particular interest is the growing corruption discovered in the financial and economic departments of the local government. An editorial in the Ta-kung Pao (Ta-kung Daily), Tientsin, referred to a report made at the conclusion of the inspection of 25 provincial and municipal departments of commerce: from January 1953 to June 1954, some 1,268 instances of corruption involving 1,826 people were investigated by the inspection teams. In the same report, it was hinted that corruption was rife in all major cities in the North China Region. Ch'ien Ying, of the Ministry of Supervision of the State Council,[44] in a

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[44] People's Daily, July 28, 1955, p.3.

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663 668 speech at the Second Session of the National People's Congress, revealed that more than 5,100 cases of corruption were reported in the nation as a whole during the inspection of eight financial and economic departments in 1954.

C. Theft and Waste

Theft and waste were the two "poisons" singled out for prosecution during the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns. "Theft" included cheating on government contracts and engaging in theft of state property; "waste" included any act which resulted in the loss of state property. Although no crime syndicates have been exposed in the major cities of the North China Region, the incidence of theft was reported to be on the increase.

At the same time, instances of waste were made public. Among the wasteful acts singled out for attention in the Communist press were the accumulation of surplus materials, especially food and other necessary commodities, by state-owned commercial firms. It was reported at the National Supervisory Conference in 1955 that, during the second half of the previous year, an inspection of 500 financial and economic agencies and over 23,000 food-storage warehouses had revealed the large-scale surplus accumulation of parts and materials, involving a loss of 350,000,000 yuan (new currency), in factories under the direct management of eight economic ministries.[45] Commodities valued at 8,100,000,000

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[45] Enlightenment Daily, June 13, 1955, p. 1; July 28, 1955, p. 3.

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663 yuan were reported to have been wastefully stored
668 in commercial departments in certain cities, including Tientsin. Equally serious was the announcement of the improper storage of surplus foodstuffs, resulting in the spoilage of a rice crop estimated at 466,000,000 pounds. The waste of rationed food also was cited in certain places in North China, as were the mismanagement and large-scale waste of rationed food in mess halls in the Taiyuan mining area.[46]

III. TENSION AND PUBLIC DISCONTENT

668 Public discontent and tension are invariably the result of excessive centralization of government and strict regimentation of the populace in any state. The Communist regime in China has not only regulated and restricted the people through Party, state and mass organizations, but also has imposed on the population terror, high taxation, and extensive public obligations. Despite the attempts of the Communists to seek popular support and persuade the people to believe in a brighter future, both discontent and tension in China today cannot be overlooked or minimized.

Popular unrest is evident in the regime's continuance and periodic intensification of the program of suppressing the counterrevolutionaries. Other signs are latent in frequent press references to the undesirable effects produced by depriving the various sections of the population of their free time and forcing them to participate

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[46] Ta-kung Pao [Ta-kung Daily] Tientsin, March 16, 1955, p. 1.

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in indoctrination, propaganda, and other activities. Still another clue to domestic unrest may be detected from the regime's admission of popular resistance to implementation of the marriage law and the consequent necessity of making the reorientation of marriage and family practices a long-term and continuing task. From such clues to restiveness in the population and from our knowledg of human reaction to excessive regimentation, the casues and pattern of public discontent and tension can be treated with some accuracy.

A. Public Discontent

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471 The Communists' regimentation of the people and all their activities is a primary cause of resistance and discontent among the populace. The establishment of agricultural producers' co-operatives in the rural districts and the organization of all workers into unions are notable examples of attempts to achieve complete control.

The restrictions resulting from regimentation cause great inconveience. However, the demand that spare-time be deovted entirely to various Party-inspired activities and duties is even more objectionable. Peasants are required to attend meetings, go to winter schools, keep advised of all farm matters, and perform various other duties depending upon the sex and age of the individual. Even how the farmers spend their money is circumscribed by Party counseling. Advice on the disposition of his excess cash is imparted by a Party member in a series of interviews heavily spiked with propaganda. The

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471 process is not only time-consuming but also trying on the collective patience of the peasants.

City dwellers are forced to accept similar restrictions. On the job, workers are required to observe "labor discipline." They are severely punished for tardiness or for leaving the factory early. Loafing and belligerence are punishable crimes. During off-hours, workers are required to participate in all organizational and cultural activities and attend technical and cultural classes. Participation in mass meetings, propaganda discussion groups, and urban community committees is expected.

B. High Taxation and Public Obligation

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668 The high taxes and many business restrictions imposed by the Communist regime are likewise unpopular. In the rural districts, the Communist San Ting policy, formulated at the end of 1953, is a measure to tax and to restrict the production, purchasing, and marketing of farm produce. The forced sale of surplus products-- mainly rice and cotton-- at a central, government-controlled market has created great resentment among the peasantry. Urban businesses are subject to a similar scheme of taxation and control. Businessmen must pay high taxes, purchase bonds, and make regular "voluntary contributions" to government-sponsored organizations.

668
653 Public obligations imposed upon the people are a further cause of public discontent.

668 653 The average peasant, for example, is required to perform duties for the state periodically or on demand. The four seasonal drives in the rural districts require his active participation. In the construction of flood-control projects, peasants are forced to abandon their fields to labor in distant regions. For one such project in Hopei, about 125,000 workers were drafted. The service of the militia has been necessary to force compliance on many occasions. Young peasants are required to perform military service whenever the state deems it necessary. City dwellers are not exempt from similar public service, being subject to patrol duty in their own and neighboring areas whenever needed.

668 Controls imposed upon the people by security agencies and other organizations have been frequent causes of public discontent. The large-scale rationing program enforced in the cities and the constant investigations conducted by public security agencies cause a great deal of anger, if not threat of rebellion. Depsite the Communists' attempts to avoid the flagrant use of threats and force in approaching and controlling the public, the regime has been far from successful in preventing public discontent.

668 647 1. Tension within Organizations. The employment of various control agencies to supervise and ensure the execution of Party directives has created suspicion and tension within the control agencies themselves and the supervised state, Party, and mass organizations.

Because the jurisdictions of the various control agencies often overlap, a government office or a factory may be subject to several controls at the same time. Pressure may be simultaneously exerted by as many as four control agencies-- the Control Committee of the Party, the supervisory office of the administration, the People's procuratorate, and one of the public security teams. Although the immediate focus of the policing agencies may differ, the effect of the multi-control system is to press in on every organization from all sides to extend its control to each member.

Tension within organizations also results from over-centralization. In any centralized and "planned" society, not only are economic decisions based on a master plan, but all political and social policies are determined by directives originating at the head office. Pressures increase in direct proportion to the distance from the originating office; thus tension is greatest at the bottom of the chain of command. In politics, for example, directives emanate from the central government and are pssed on to the provincial government, and then to the governments on lower levels. This process continues until the desired result is achieved at the lowest political unit.

In the field of economic acitivity, each factory is given a production quota, assigned in a manner similar to that followed in political decisions. To fulfill this quota, every possible means of control is resorted to. The pressure, engendered, is constant. Both management and labor are held directly responsible for the attainment of assigned quotas. Failure to meet them

668 means severe penalties. Recently, the Commu-
647 nists attempted to improve their system of checking on the fulfillment of production quotas in order to eliminate the practice of submitting false reports of production achievements -- a strategy attempted in order to afford some temporary relief from mounting pressures.

2. Tension within Party Organizations.

668 Within the Party organizations themselves the
665 increase in pressure and tension is most revealing of the harm done to morale. In the first place, the Party apparatus is the center of power and activity for the regime. All Party directives and government policies are implemented by the Party bureaus. A Party member is subject to at least two systems of pressure -- that of the Party and that of the state. Secondly, Party members are subject to such an endless program of Party indoctrination and rectification that many of them cannot withstand such pressure, resulting often in their expulsion from the Party. Many people, outwardly in favor of the regime, become reluctant to join the Party. Most of the people expelled from the Party are confined in prison or forced labor camps; but some of them remain at large and could conceivably have joined discontented groups. Unless evidence to the contrary is disclosed, it can be presumed that some of the expelled Party members are willing to unite with subversive elements in a concerted effort to oust the present regime.

668 3. Tension within Mass Organizations.

Party pressure on mass organizations also leads

668 to tension. The broadest and also the most unstable mass organizations are the Democratic Youth Corps and the All-China Federation of Democratic Women. Lacking a common political, economic, or community base, these organizations are composed of heterogeneous social and political elements, directly or indirectly coerced into membership. These groups must be handled carefully. The key to preventing tensions within an organization from expanding beyond safe limits seems to lie in constant vigilance and an incessant barrage of propaganda. By instituting stricter controls and by disposing of undesirable members, the Communists have sought to keep these organizations in the service of the Party.

CONCLUSION

Subversive potentialities cannot be always contained however effective a dictatorship or tyranny may be. There are always the forces in opposition to a rule of terror -- the victims of power, the traditional resistance groups. and discontented ex-members of the party in control. The vicitims of Communist power -- landlords, former Kuomintang officials, and others elements which have been named by the Communists as "counterrevolutionaries" -- have made repeated attempts to resist the present regime. As the "new-rich" increases in number and as peasant opposition grows in intensity, it is likely that old anti-Communist elements may become more active. The traditional resistance group, represented by the revived secret societies, has shown

668 perserverance and resiliency under the Communist regime. Although the Communist government in the North China Region has done all in its power to eliminate them, their complete extermination is far from a reality. Since secret societies are composed largely of peasant and working people, it is ironic that a state which claims to protect the interests of the proletariat and "the people" is beginning to find itself unpopular among them.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 2g,
Political Background

PROPAGANDA AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

208 Influenced by Lenin's teachings, the Chinese Communist regime believes in and practices coercion and persuasion. By means of coercion it suppresses opposition and compels obedience. But it is through persuasion that it attempts to change the attitudes and win the support of the masses. One of the Communists' method of winning popular support is propaganda.

Like everything else under the Communist regime, propaganda is strictly directed and controlled by a central authority, especially with regard to issues and themes. With a few exceptions, issues and themes of propaganda are the same for the whole country. Once the central authority has chosen an issue or theme to propagandize, the nationwide propaganda machinery is set in motion toward that common goal.

Reserving the issues and propaganda themes of a national character for detailed analysis in the HRAF handbook on China as a whole, the present survey of propaganda work in North China will be directed primarily toward the propaganda machinery operating in the region, for only in an investigation of the development and operation of specific propaganda machinery

208 can we uncover regional variations.

In the course of this survey an attempt will be made to show the extent to which the people of North China are kept informed of public affairs and to what extent the information is permeated with propaganda.

I. THE ADMINISTRATION OF PROPAGANDA

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647 Prior to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, Communist propaganda work in North China, especially in metropolitan cities such as Peiping and Tientsin, was intensive and influential. But such propaganda work at that time was carried on by underground Communist agents and Communist front organizations. Following the outbreak of the war, Communist party organizations began to function openly in many places in North China where Communist guerilla forces had their bases. From that time on, Communist propaganda work was in the main directly controlled and conducted by the propaganda organs of the Party; and local governments established by the Communists in various places played only a comparatively insignificant role in this regard. This state of affairs, however, underwent a great change upon the establishment of the Communist regime in Peking in 1949. Since then, propaganda in the North China region has been administered under a dual system consisting of the apparatus of the Communist Party of China and of the government at different levels.

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Two agencies existed prior to the abolition, in August 1954, of the regional authorities within both the governmental and party hierarchies: the Department of Propaganda of the North China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Department of Cultural and Educational Affairs of the regional government. Although these organizations took orders from their respective superiors on both the national and regional levels, the relationship between them appears to have been similar to that between the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee and the Commission on Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Government Administration Council on the national level[1]

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[1] Specifically, the Department of Propaganda of the North China Bureau of the Central Committee operated under the direction of the bureau itself and of the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The Department of Cultural and Educational Affairs was directed by the North China Administrative Committee and by the Commission on Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Government Administration Council of the Central People's Government.

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To put it more concretely, prior to August 1954 the Department or Propaganda of the North China Bureau of the Party, like its counterpart on the national level was not primarily an operational agency. It did not do any major publishing nor did it operate any radio sation or cinema. It was devoted to the transmission of the propaganda policy of its superiors to appropriate agencies on the regional and provincial levels, drew up regional plans for the execution of the policy, and supervised the execution of that policy in each region by the Party, government, and mass organizations which operated the media of propaganda.

As for the department of Cultural and Educational Affairs of the North China Administrative Committee, its functions were essentially the same as those of its counterparts on the national level. It was charged with the responsibility of the day-to-day management of propaganda as it found its expression in cultural and educational activities.

More specifically, the Department of Propaganda of the North China Bureau of the Communist Party of China served primarily as a regional representative of the central authorities of the Party in the supervision of the execution of propaganda policy of a national nature, while the Department of Cultural and Educational Affairs of the North China Administrative Committee acted, to a large extent, as the chief regional executor of that policy in the region. But with regard to propaganda issues of a regional nature, the

208 Department of Propaganda of the North China
647 Bureau of the Party was the policy-maker. Its policies regarding regional propaganda issues became the policy of the region and were carried out by the Department of Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Central-South China Administrative Committee. This was achieved not by direct orders but by placing its own men in the latter organization. For example, when the regional authorities were in existence, Chang P'an-shih served as the principal link between the Department of Propaganda of the North China Bureau of the Party and the Department of Cultural and Educational Affairs of the North China Administrative Committee by heading both organizations concurrently. This was perfectly in line with the practice of the Communist Party of China of exercising leadership over the government on the China Mainland.

Such a dual system for the administration of propaganda is found on all local levels within the region. Even the lowliest Party branches or government units have their own propaganda agencies, which have the same working relationship with one another as their counterparts on the higher levels and which are supervised by their respective superior authorities. Thus, in the final analysis all local propaganda activities in the region are ultimately controlled and directed by the department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Although the above-mentioned agencies of the Party and government are charged with the responsibility of administering propagand and releasing information on public affairs, other agencies

208 of the Party and government also have a certain
647 role to play in these matters. Indeed, a considerable part of information, factual or otherwise, on the activities of individual government agencies often emanate from the agencies concerned.

II. MEDIA OF PROPAGANDA AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

208 Ever since the Communist armies established their guerilla warfare bases in North China after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Communist propaganda agencies have been using all available means to communicate propaganda messages and informationon public affairs which they want the people in North China to know. But for many years media of propaganda and public information available to the Communists in this region were meager, chiefly mimeographed newspapers, mimeographed magazines, pamphlets, posters, handbills, and so on. The only districts under Communist control at that time were in rural areas where more modern media of mass communication did not exist. But the lack of modern media of mass communication did not prevent the Communists from successfully disseminating their ideas and arousing popular sentiment sympathetic to their cause. People who visited Communist-controlled territories during the war were frequently impressed by the tremendous influence that Communist songs, Communist agitators' talks , and Communist-sponsored mass meetings had exercised upon the minds and spirits of the masses.

208 After V-J day Communist armies seized many urban centers in North China and, meanwhile, Communist propaganda agencies began to use certain modern media of mass communication such as printed newspapers, radio, and motion pictures in the conduct of their work. But the use of such modern media of mass communication at that time was very limited in scale; more extensive use did not occur there until the "liberation" of Peking and Tientsin. For obvious reasons, this discussion of propaganda and public information media is limited to those which can be best treated on a regional basis.

A. The Press as a Propaganda Medium and its Structure

204 Characterized by a high degree of specialization, the structure of the press in North China, which is but an integral part of the press in Communist China as a whole, is such as to enable each of its parts to reach specific groups of audience and serve a definite function in the socialist (and Communist) upbringing of the masses.

The press in North China is divided horizontally and vertically. The horizontal division follows very closely the hierarchical structure of the government and the Communist Party of China. At each hierarchical level there is an appropriate press to serve the Party, the government, and public organizations.

At the apex of the press pyramid is the central press, serving the central authorities in Peking. While newspapers on the central

204 level are intended for nationwide consumption, most have their largest circulation in North China becuase of geographical proximity. Thus, it would be a great mistake to ignore newspapers on the central level in a survey of the role of the press as a medium of propaganda and public information in North China.

The first place in the central press is held by the official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], which currently has a daily circulation of about 710,000. Since its editorial policy is made by the supreme authority of the Party, it usually sets the tone for the press of the nation in commenting on national issues.

Other well-known daily newspapers on the central level printed in North China include the Kung-jen Jih-pao [Workers' Daily] , the Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily] and the Ta-Kung Pao [the Ta-kung Daily], having a combined daily circulation of 1,040,000.[3]

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2. Liao Kai-lung, "Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-ho-kuoti Pao K'an" ["Newspapers and periodicals in the People's Republic of China"] Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily] , May 20, 1955.

3. Except for the Ta-kung Daily, which is published in Tientsin, all these newspapers are printed in Peking.

204 In addition, there are a number of newspapers on the provincial level. Notable are the Hopei Jih-pao [Hopei Daily] and the Shansi Jih-pao [the Shansi Daily] . The former is published in Paoting, Hopei Province, and the latter in taiyuan, Shansi Province; both are official organs of thair respective provincial authorities.

Below the provincial level are the newspapers on the administrative district level. At the base of the pyramid are newspapers on the hsien or city level.

The horizontal levels of the press hierarchy are subdivided along functional lines into groups of newspapers for various groups of readers. For example, the People's Daily is directed to all citizens throughout the country; the Workers' Daily, toworkers; the Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao [the Chinese Youth News] , to youth; and the Shansi Nung-min Pao [the Shansi Farmers' News], to farmers in Shansi Province.

263 Printed newspapers are supplemented by many mimeographed newspapers and handwritten "wall newspapers" and "blackboard newspapers" in small localities, factories schools, mass communications, and agricultural producers' co-operatives. These special newspapers are also organs of the Party and the government, and they have the usual editors, editorial boards, and correspondents. The local Party branches constantly keep a watchful eye on their operation and development, and from time to time issue new instructions and regulations to keep them in

203 line.

The importance of these special newspapers must not be overlooked. In view of the fact that the combined circulation of all the printed newspapers in the region is still small as compared with the total population, it must be obvious that the Communists have made maximum use of such special newspapers for propaganda and agitation in addition to dissemination of public information. Like the oral agitator and propagandist, the wall newspaper and blackboard newspaper have, for mass communication, the advantages of flexibility and adaptability. These advantages are particularly conducive to the work of agitation. They can deal more effectively with the problem of production by seizing upon the most appropriate opportunities to criticize indifferent workers and praise those who are energetic.

204 While the overwhelming majority of the newspapers in North China is owned and operated by the Communist Party of China, the government, or mass organizations, the Enlightenment Daily is jointly operated by the so-called "democratic parties" and the Ta-kung Daily is financed by private interests. But these two newspapers are, for all practical purposes, a part of the propaganda apparatus of the Communist regime since they are subject to the same strict control and supervision of the regime as are other newspapers. In point of fact, the Enlightenment

204 Daily has been instructed to devote its space to cultural and educational news and to the exposition of the cultural and educational policies of the regime.[4] The Ta-kung Daily, once an impartial and most influential newspaper under the Kuomintang regime, is, now, under orders from Communist authorities to specialize in the dissemination and discussion of news relating to international affairs and economic problems.[5]

Subscription to the newspapers in this region are handled through the local post offices. The Communists claim that this arrangement has resulted in greater speed of delivery and a wider circulation.[6]

B. Propaganda Work of the Press

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208 As an instrument of propaganda, the press constantly devotes a large amount of space to the publication of "lectures," documents, and other pronouncements elucidating Communist theories, the Communist Party line, and the policies of the government, with a view to remolding the ideology of the masses and influencing public attitudes on political issues. Generally, the press is given very little freedom of action. Important material is distributed to the local press by the New China News Agency. According to a regulation promulgated by the now defunct Information Administration of the Government Administration Council, all "large newspapers"

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[4] Enlightenment Daily, Dec. 25, 1952.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Chieh-fang Jih-pao [Liberation Daily], Shanghai, March 13, 1951.

204 in the country must print in full the important
208 news releases and special articles distributed by the New China News Agency.[7] The newspapers in the region, to further Communist ideology and government policies, write and publish articles supplementary to those distributed by national propaganda organs. Supplementary articles are usually written in a more popular style and expound the general themes by linking them with local issues or concrete problems whenever such an approach is permissible and feasible. In point of fact, newspapers in North China are said to be quite successful in this regard.

C. Agitation Work of the Press

The press in North China makes a constant effort to eulogize the "People's Dictatorship," Marxism, Leninism, the thought of Mao Tse-tung, and the history and contribution of the Communist Party of China. It prints ordinary news items in such a way as to inculcate in the people a feeling of national pride and to develop and unwavering faith among them in the socialist construction and socialist transformation of the

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[7] "Hsin-wen Tsung-shu Kuan-yü Pao-chih Ts'ai-yung Hsin-hua Shê Tien-kao Ti Kuei-ting" ["The Information Administration's Regulations Concerning the Use of News Releases of the New China News Agency by the Press"], People's Daily, Jan. 12, 1950.

204 208 country under the leadership of the Communist Party of China. In treating news involving non-Communist countries, the newspapers convey to the readers that the masses of the capitalist system is on its way to destruction, and that present world tensions are all caused by capitalist warmongers, especially those in the United States. After the outbreak of the war in Korea, the anti-American campaign was played up by the press, obviously for the purpose of creating psychological tension in the minds of the Chinese people so that they might be called upon to make greater contributions and sacrifices for the attainment of the ambitious goals set by the region. More recently, the press has been preoccupied with the problem of criticizing and eliminating "bourgeois ideologies" from the minds of the people, especially the intelligentsia.

204 208 461 The most important agitation work done by the newspapers concerns the acceleration of production. This is achieved by summarizing and disseminating information about the most successful economic enterprises and farms and the methods and techniques of "advanced" workers and farmers; by explaining to workers and farmers the meaning of the economic measures taken by the Party and government; by bringing to the attention of the population the economic development of the nation; by glorifying the contributions of outstanding individual workers and farmers; by discussing ways and means for the solution of the difficulties facing the country

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208 in its economic construction; and by exhorting
461 the people to make even greater efforts.

D. The Press as a Medium of Public Information

204 Although the press is primarily used to conduct propaganda and agitation, it also contains a large amount of straightforward information on public affairs. As mentioned in another connection, newspapers in this region, as in Communist China as a whole, usually print the text of some important party or government decision and the text of some responsible official's report on the activities of his agency. This is particularly true in the case of the People's Daily, which serves as an official gazette of the Central People's Government. The press also features announcements concerning the commencement of some campaign, the completion of a water conservation project, or the beginning of the construction of a highway project.

True, as indicated earlier, the newspapers do not limit themselves to publishing the texts of important decisions and announcements. They seek to influence the formation of political attitudes; and for this reason they often accompany such informational material with articles to explain and justify the decisions or activities of the Party or government. But if the reader is both judicious and clever in distinguishing between factual presentation of news and efforts of a political propaganda, he will still be able to learn from the Communist newspapers what the

204 the latest actions and decisions of the authorities are, especially in the field of internal affairs. It is not an exaggeration to say that Chinese Communist newspapers contain more information on governmental activities than did the former official Kuomintang press. Unlike the former Kuomintang regime, the Communist authorities are apparently not satisfied with the practice of publishing government or Party decisions or decrees in official gazettes, It is their intention to have such materials come to the direct attention of the people, and the most certain way of ensuring that the people will see these materials is to fill the daily news with them.

204 208 By making the texts of official policies or decisions available to the average citizen, the Communist regime hopes to win his support in their execution. What is denied to the Chinese people on the Mainland today is the right to receive information from sources other than those controlled by the present regime. Because they obtain news on governmental activities only from official sources, the Chinese oeople have no way of listening to diversified interpretations of news as do the people in the United States. By providing the public with the official version, the Communist press helps the regime to mobilize public opinion and to change attitudes, but it refuses to help the people conduct a public debate on national affairs in a manner we would call democratic. Herein lies the main defect of the Communist press as a medium of public information. Therefore, the charges that the

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208 Communist press treats as news social processes rather than events, and that it does not print news until the "official version" has been announced, are matters of secondary importance in an evaluation of the role of the Communist press in the formation of public opinion.

E. The Press as an Instrument of Public Control

Like newspapers in Communist China as a whole, the press in North China performs another function in addition to being a medium of propaganda, agitation, and public information. It has the responsibility of serving as an instrument of mass or public control. This function of the Chinese Communist press is one of the most important aspects of its total social role. Its importance can be best appreciated if one recalls the complexity of the tasks of the regime seeking to regulate every minute detail of national life. The manifold activities of the regime have rendered inadequate the formal instruments of control such as offices of law enforcement, court machinery, the procuratorates, and other supervisory agencies. To supplement these formal agencies of supervision, the regime has found it necessary to establish informal procedure of control over the execution of a tremendous number of complex regulations and orders.

One of the most important instruments of informal control used by the Chinese Communists is the press. The press performs this function by acting as a medium for official and popular criticism of the course of development of Chinese

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society and its component parts. Such a function of the Communist press, of course, is performed to some extent by newspapers in many other countries. But it differs greatly in many respects from public criticism found in the press of any of the Western countries. In Communist China, "public criticism" in the press is a formalized phenomenon, actively encouraged and carefully guided by the regime. It has little, if anything, to do with the spontaneous development of public opinion or the personal interpretations of newspaper editors or publishers. Like public criticism in the Soviet press, this function of the press in Communist China is an extension or natural development of the practice of self-criticism which prevails within the organizations of the Communist Party.

On April 22, 1950, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China promulgated a document called "Decisions Concerning the Conduct of Criticism and Self-criticism in Newspapers and Periodicals."[8] The Central Committee of the ruling party called upon the press to "induce" the masses to undertake "open criticism" of all shortcomings and mistakes in the work of the Party and government. Since that time, the newspapers in North China, like papers in the country as a whole, have tried hard to perform this function well. They do so by devoting a large proportion of their totoal space to critical decisions issued by the Party and the government and to editorials and articles expos-

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8. For its text, see ibid., April 22, 1950.

204 ing delinquencies on the part of functionaries and
208 institutions, in order to uncover "bureaucratic manifestations" opportunism, and deviation from the Party line. They also carry out this task by publishing "letters to the editor." Written by either the average citizen or a non-professional correspondent (the Chinese counterpart of the rabsel'kor of the Soviet press), letters of this kind usually express certain grievances and complaints or address certain appeals to Communist authorities on a higher level. More than most other resources available to the people in the region, these letters frequently prove effective in the expression of popular feelings and in securing ameliorative action from the authorities. In short, the "Letters to the Editor" columns in the newspapers not only serve as a center to which the grievances of the citizenry are directed, but also provide the Communist Party with an opportunity to check on the activities of local government and public organizations.

The political impact of self-criticism conducted through the newspapers, however, cannot be evaluated entirely on the basis of the preceding description. "Self-criticism" operates within carefully defined limits which considerably restrict its potential influence as a democratic force. The press is not allowed to criticize indiscriminately. In its decision on April 22, 1950, the Central Committee of the Communist Party cautioned that it was necessary for the press to distinguish "between true and constructive" criticism on the one hand and destructive

204 criticism on the other." By "destructive criti-
205 cism" the Communists meant that which was aimed at repudiating the "People's democratic dictatorship," opposing the "Common Program," destroying social discipline, destroying faith in leadership, and "causing pessimism and disunity among the masses." This means that no criticism can be directed against any basic policy established by the Communist regime. Nor is it permissible for the press to make any open criticism of the top leaders of the regime itself. What the press can do is to criticize officials in a lower echelon who are corrupt, disloyal, or delinquent in the execution of certain policies of the regime. Viewed in this context, it is clear that the press as an instrument of public control is not only relative harmless to the existing regime but is actually designed and operated to support it.

F. Radio as a Propaganda and Public Information

207 Radio, as another medium of propaganda and public information used by the Communists in North China, should be briefly mentioned. Like the press, the radio has been recognized by the Communists as a powerful weapon of political propaganda and education. Beset by technical difficulties, the Chinese Communists did not broadcast in the North China Region until September 1946 when they established a station

207 in Han-tan,[9] a medium-sized city in the then so-called Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region. After they had conquered the metropolitan cities in North China in 1949, the Communists took over all the broadcasting stations left intact by the Kuomintang regime and converted them into "People's broadcasting stations," owned and operated by the government. Meanwhile, the Communists assumed control of two privately owned broadcasting stations in Peking and in Tientsin.

Like the press structure, broadcasting stations in North China constitute a pyramidal hierarchy. At the summit of this hierarchy is the Central People's Broadcasting Station. Located in Peking and supervised by the Bureau of Broadcasting Affairs of the State Council, this station is the core of the entire radio network of Communist China, playing a role in the Chinese radio system similar to that of the central broadcasting stations in Moscow in the Soviet system. Since 1950 this station has been, using two separate installations for domestic and foreign broadcasts.

Broadcasting on eight frequencies, the installation for domestic broadcasts is on the

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[9] Mei I, "Wo-kuo Jen-min Kuang-po Shih-yeh Kai-k'uang" [General Survey of the People's Radio Broadcasting in China"], ibid, April 25, 1950.

207 air for 15.5 hours daily, sending out programs in all the major languages and dialects spoken by the Han-Chinese and other ethnic groups of the nation.[10] Directed toward the entire Chinese listening public throughout the country, either directly or by means of network hookups, approximately 50 per cent of the programs for domestic consumption are said to be "news broadcasts," with the remaining 50 per cent made up of cultural and recreational programs.[11] It is to be noted that so-called "news broadcasts" include not only straight news reports and news commentaries but decrees and regulations of the Party and government. Cultural and recreational programs are weighted with political concepts and similar messages.

The station's department for foreign broadcasts presents its programs for audiences in foreign countries in seven foreign languages -- English, Japanese, Korean, Indo-Chinese, Indonesian, Burmese, and Siamese.[12] This suggests that at present the foreign broadcasts

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[10] Seven of the eight wave lengths: 640, 720, 6100, 7100, 7500, 9040, 9730. Information is lacking on the eighth channel.

[11] Mei I, loc. cit.

[12] The three channels for international broadcasts are: 10260, 15060, and 700.

107 of the Chinese Communists are intended for people living in the Far East and Pacific areas. Apparently out of the same consideration, the Central Broadcasting Station in Peking also puts on the air for overseas Chinese special broadcasts in the dialects of Canton, Amoy, Hakka, and Ch'ao-chou.

While data on the exact strength of the Central Broadcasting Station is not available, the Communist regime disclosed in 1950 that the power of the station in question accounted for more than 63 per cent of the combined strength of all Chinese broadcasting stations.[13]

Local People's broadcasting stations in the region operate on two levels, provincial and municipal. They are as follows:

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13. Mei I, *loc. cit.*

RADIO BROADCASTING STATIONS IN NORTH CHINA

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Classification	Location	Wave Length
2 Provincial Broadcasting Stations	Paoting,	---
	Taiyuan	---
3 Municipal Broadcasting Stations	Peking,	850, 670, 920, 750
	Tientsin	620, 920, 670, 1110
	Tangshan	---

Chin Ta-k'ai, "Chung-kung Ti Kuang-po Wang" [Radio Broadcasting in Communist China], Tsu-kuo Chou-k'an [China Weekly], No. 65, March 29, 1954, p. 10.

Radio stations on the provincial level are used primarily to announce decrees and regulations and to broadcast news of the region or province concerned. The main task of municipal stations is to conduct "social education," essentially a form of propaganda and agitation. For news of a national or an international nature, these stations transmit the programs emanating from the Central People's Broadcasting Station in Peking.

For administrative purposes, each of the local stations is under the dual supervision of the Bureau of Broadcasting Affairs and the

207 appropriate station on the next higher level. Daily activities of the provincial and municipal stations are also controlled by the Party and government agencies on corresponding levels.

G. Radio Facilities As of June 1950, there were approximately 200,000 radio-receiving sets in North China. An overwhelming majority were concentrated in Peking and Tientsin. The few radio-receiving sets then found in such cities as Taiyuan and Paoting were owned almost exclusively by government agencies and high-ranking officials.[14] Subsequently, the Communists made efforts to increase radio-receiving facilities in this region, with special emphasis on mining and industrial centers. But the extent to which such an increase has been reached has not been revealed.

H. Radio Broadcast Monitors

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208 The limited number of radio stations and receiving sets, however, is not an accurate indication of the effectiveness of radio as a medium of propaganda and public information in North China. Any measurement of such effectiveness must take into account the "broadcast monitors" operating in government offices and units of the armed forces and in public

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[14] People's Daily, Jan. 4, 1950.

207 gathering places such as factories and schools. Some of these monitors are appointed; others 208 are voluntary workers.[15] But all are utilized to cope with the problems caused by the shortage of radio reception facilities. This practice dates back to September 1945, when the Communist guerrilla forces in North China were, for the first time, able to receive broadcasts emanating from the Communist broadcasting station in Yenan. The Communists hope that, by appointing monitors, they may make the most effective use of the limited number of radio-receiving sets available. The monitors jot down broadcasts, transcribe and mimeograph 203 what they hear, or rewrite the broadcasts in the form of "wall newspapers," thus making it possible for the broadcasts to reach a larger audience.

The fact that monitors can help increase the effectiveness of the radio as a medium of propaganda and public information is enhanced by the two provisions contained in the "Regulations on the Work of Monitors" promulgated on

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[15] See "Shou-yin-yüan T'iao-li" [Regulations on the Work of Monitors], People's Daily, April 30, 1950. When the monitors work in teams, their teams are called "monitoring stations". By 1950 every county government in North China already had such a station. In 1954, the Shansi Provincial Committee of the Communist Party declared that it had decided to establish some 1,400 monitoring stations in selected co-operative farms in the province. Ibid., May 20, 1954.

207 April 29, 1950, by the Central People's Radio Broadcasting Station.[16] One provision requires
208 the monitors to concentrate on receiving programs such as speeches made by the government leaders, social science lectures delivered by famous scholars, government decrees, news reports, and other items which might help to improve the political and cultural levels of the listener. The second provision decrees that the monitors must report to the responsible radio station their reception work and the reactions of their listeners, so that the station can check on their work as monitors and readjust its programs, if necessary, in the light of the reactions of its audience.

I. The Stage as a Propaganda Medium

208 536 The stage is a traditional form of entertainment in China. Operas are understood and enjoyed by both the literate and illiterate and are attended by members of all classes. Having recognized the stage as "an effective instrument for educating the masses with revolutionary spirit and patriotism," the Communists proceeded to make use of local operas for propaganda purposes as soon as they established their guerrilla bases in North China following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. Upon

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17. See Article 2 of the Regulations on the Work of Monitors.

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the conquest of North China, the Communists lost no time in organizing so-called "opera reform committees" in various cities of the region, and particularly in Peking, where the famous Peking opera was developed several decades ago. These committees were charged with the task of reforming the local theaters by replacing their "feudalistic," superstitious, and anti-labor themes with those that might help publicize and eulogize the People's dictatorship, the Communist Party, the People's government; awaken the political conscience of the people; stimulate the zeal for production on the part of the people; and praise the new personalities and events of society.

The reform program is a manifold affair. It includes the re-indoctrination of opera performers, the re-organization of repertory teams, and the rewriting of the repertoire. In Peking, opera reform work is directly supervised by the propaganda agencies of the Party and government, and well-known opera performers such as Mei Lan-fang, Ch'eng Yen-ch'iu and T'an Fu-ying are reportedly taking an active part in it. Unlike the experience elsewhere, opera reform work in Peking seems to have been carried out in an orderly manner without unfavorable repercussions.

Besides the above-mentioned reform measures, the Communists in North China have written new operas, trained new per-

208 formers, and promoted the formation of new
536 troupes, both professional and amateur.

In order to link the presentation of operas with tasks of "national reconstruction," the Ministry of Cultural Affairs issued a directive on December 27, 1952 calling upon all professional opera teams to draw up semi-annual or quarterly schedules of performances and to submit these schedules for approval by the local authorities in charge of cultural affairs.[17] Upon issuance of this directive, the Communist regime acquired the instrument of power by which could be determined not only what operas might be presented by the opera teams but when these operas should be presented.

533 Before turning our attention from the
208 stage, the manner in which Communists use
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17. "Chung-yang Wen-hua Pu Kuan-yü Cheng-tun Ho Chia-ch'iang Ch'üan-kuo Chü-t'uan Kung-tso Ti Chih-shih" ["Directive of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs of the Central People's Government Concerning the Readjustment and Strengthening of the Work of Opera Teams in the Nation"], *People's Daily*, Dec. 27, 1952.

208 spoken drama, music, folk songs, and folk
533 dancing for purposes of propaganda should be
535 mentioned. These devices, nominally planned for amusement or relaxation, are now permeated with Communist ideas and symbols. As well as the professional dramatic groups, ballad teams, and symphony orchestras in Peking and Tientsin, there are many government-organized "cultural and artistic troupes", consisting of thousands of dramatists, dancers, musicians, and singers. / These troupes travel everywhere, performing in villages, mining districts, and industrial plants. Programs presented by these troupes are usually designed to enlist popular support for certain current policies of the regime.

J. Motion Pictures as a Medium for Propaganda

208 The Chinese Communists recognized
546 motion pictures as a powerful weapon of propaganda long before the North China Region came under their control. But their utilization of motion pictures as a propaganda medium did not begin until they captured Peking and Tientsin in 1949. The Communists took immediate measures to prohibit the showing of films with ideological content contradictory to the spirit and provisions of the "Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference" -- a document containing the basic policies of the regime. Meanwhile, they assumed

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control of the film studio in Peking, which had been left intact by the Kuomintang regime. Through the combined effort of the film studio in Peking and two others, one in Shanghai and another in Mukden, the Communists were shortly able to turn out films portraying the "new life of the Chinese people," glorifying the new regime and condemning "reactionary activities and ideologies." Meanwhile, the Communist regime continues to import Soviet films and films produced by Communist satellite countries.

Cinema theaters in the North China Region are located in large and medium-sized cities. Mobile teams have been organized to provide film showings for people in small towns and rural districts, especially at workers' clubs and reading rooms. The use of clubs and reading rooms for the showing of motion pictures has its particular advantage for the Communist Party, for it greatly facilitates the effort to integrate films with other propaganda and agitation efforts. Frequently film showings will be followed by the appearance of a local Communist agitator who "clarifies" the film's content. As it is in the Soviet Union, a good film with ideological content is a powerful instrument in the hands of an experienced propagandist. On the other hand, people who prefer not to have propaganda mingled with their pleasures may be led to avoid such programs.

III. THE MASS PROPAGANDA NETWORK

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665 Besides conventional propaganda agencies such as the press, publishing houses, dancing and singing troupes, motion picture and film-strip projection teams, schools, cadre training centers, and dramatic troupes, another extensive propaganda and agitation apparatus operating in this region is the "mass propaganda network," consisting of so-called propaganda officers and reporting officers. This "propaganda network" is not a unique arrangement in the North China Region; like other propaganda devices, it is an integral part of antionwide organization. But, unlike many other propaganda organs, the mass propaganda network operates under the sole control and direction of the Communist Party of China, having no operational relationship with the governmental hierarchy. This network was established on a nationwide basis in pursuance of a directive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued on January 1, 1951, "Decision Concerning the Establishment Throughout the Party of a Propaganda Network for the Masses."[18] It was designed to intensify and broaden the work of propaganda and agitation, making it a task not only for the working personnel in the formal propaganda organs, but for "every Communist."

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[18] For its Chinese text, see People's Daily, Jan. 1, 1951.

A. The Propaganda Officer

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Propaganda officers are selected by the Party branch headquarters from among Party members, Youth Corps members, the masses in direct contact with the branch headquarters, model workers, and other active "revolutionary" elements willing to engage in propaganda work. In selection, consideration is given to the degree of political consciousness of the candidate, his sense of duty as displayed in his present work, his personal association with the masses close to him, and his potential ability as a propaganda officer.

Upon appointment, propaganda officers are given training in the ideology of the Party, propaganda materials and techniques, and other related matters. Training is conducted through so-called propaganda conferences, Party schools, and propaganda-officer training centers. Besides receiving training and instructions from Party authorities, the propaganda officer is also expected to study, on his own initiative, propagandist handbooks, news handbooks, newspapers, official documents, pamphlets, and other reference materials relating to his work as a propaganda officer.

The propaganda officer performs numerous functions including the dissemination and elucidation, under the direction of the Party and by simplest and most common of means, of current domestic and international developments; the

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publicizing of the policies of the Party and the People's Government, and the duties of the masses, particularly those duties related to the time and locality in question, and the typical experience gained by the people in production and other kinds of work. Furthermore, the propaganda officer is to refute "reactionary rumors" and "mistaken ideas" prevalent among the popular masses, encourages the masses to make a study of typical experiences gained in production and other work, and to report the state of mind of the people in order to assist the Party in the choice of appropriate propaganda material.

Statistical data on the number of propaganda officers in North China is incomplete. We know that, as of February 1954, there were some 220,000 propaganda officers in Shansi Province.[19] It is estimated that the total number of propaganda officers in Hopei Province is about 300,000. Most of these propaganda officers operate in factories, towns, villages, agricultural producers' co-operatives, mutual-aid teams, and other mass organizations.

B. The Non-Party Propaganda Army

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The strength of the propaganda officers cannot be gauged on the basis of their numbers alone. It is to be noted that the propaganda officers, who are referred to by the Communists as the "propaganda army of the Party," often enlist the assistance of volunteer propagandists, called by the Communists the "non-Party propaganda army." The number of volunteer propagandists in a given unit is usually three or four times that of the propaganda officers. On special occasions, volunteer propagandists are also given some sort of training before be ing called upon to take part in propaganda work. For example, early in 1954, approximately 1,400,000 volunteer propagandists in Hopei Province and about 800,000 in Shansi Province were given intensive training in order to help propagandize the so-called "General Line" of the Communist regime.[20]

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[19] Ibid., Feb. 11, 1954.

The propaganda officers give guidance and direction to volunteer propagandists in propaganda and agitation work. Hence, the volunteer propagandists are also called by the Communists "the reserve of the propaganda army of the Party."

C. The Reporting Officer

The reporting officer is "an advanced propaganda officer" whose duty it is to render regular and systematic reports to the people on current developments, Party policies, working aims, work experiences, and so on. As such,

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[20] *Ibid.*, Feb. 27, 1954.

208 he gives guidance to the propaganda officer, who is required to keep him regularly informed of the state of mind of the masses so that the reporting officer may be better able to make his political reports in the light of such information. When such a report is made, the propaganda officers arrange a meeting and inform the reporting officer of the mass reaction. If for any reason his report is not fully understood, the propaganda officer will clarify it by informal discussion at group meetings in order to dispel doubts or to clear up any misunderstanding.

Reporting officers are found in all provincial, municipal, local, *hsien*, and *ch'ü* Party committees. As in the case of propaganda officers, our information on the number of reporting officers in North China is fragmentary and, in some instances, out of date. As of April 1951, there were 3,090 reporting officers in Hopei Province.[21] Early in 1954 Communist press put the total number[22] of reporting officers in Shansi Province at approximately 6,000.

Most of these reporting officers were selected from among the secretaries and members of the Party committees on the provincial, municipal, local, *hsien*, and *ch'ü* levels, responsible officials of government agencies and other Party members.

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[21] *Hopei Jih-pao* [*Hopei Daily*], May 15, 1951.

[22] *People's Daily*, Feb. 11, 1954.

208 The reporting officer makes at least one political report every two months at mass meetings. Generally, additional reports are made at workers' meetings in urban areas. The topics and contents of the reports of a reporting officer are either chosen or approved in advance by the secretary of the Party committee on a given level. After the delivery of a report, the reporting officer is required to submit an account of the reception given it to the Party secretary concerned. All of these devices are designed to enable the Party authorities to maintain close control over the activities of the reporting officer.

According to the Communists, the reporting and propaganda officers have been effective in educating the masses, in mobilizing public opinion, and in enlisting the support of the masses, during various nationwide campaigns. Because they represent a direct line of communication with the Party and with local authorities, the reporting officers and the propaganda officers are said to be called by the masses the "information bureau," the "ministers of thought," and "the messengers of Chairman Mao."

IV. CONCLUSION

In North China there is in existence a propaganda machine which uses various media of public information to remold the ideology of the

208 people, mobilize popular opinion, and enlist popular support for Communist policies. Indications so far suggest that no organized popular resistance has been reported. Would popular reaction to Communist propaganda have been different if the Communists allowed competing propaganda and impartial news reports to reach the people? Certainly, the Communists' monopoly of propaganda apparatus, the denial to other political groups of the right to disseminate propaganda, and their exclusive control of the dissemination of public information to the masses are devices detrimental to the free discussion of public affairs and the natural formation of public opinion. As James Bryce said, Where the materials for the formation of public opinion are so artfully supplied as to prevent the citizens from judging fairly the merits of a question, opinion is artificially made instead of being a spontaneous development resulting from people's genuine consensus on socio-political issues.[23] Certainly the Chinese people would have been far less receptive to Communist propaganda if, unhampered, they were able to exercise their free well and faculties of reason.

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[23] James Bryce, Modern Democracies, Vol. I, New York, Macmillan Company, 1921, p. 109.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 2h,
Political Background

KEY PERSONALITIES IN NORTH CHINA

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North China, comprising some of the oldest "liberated areas" of Communist China, is administered at the upper bureaucratic levels by 47 men. As we might expect in a territory which has had a functioning Communist government since mid-1948, these incumbents are, on the whole, men of considerably more administrative experience than the holders of similar positions in other regions of China. At least 39 of the top bureaucrats are known to have held previous administrative posts in the North China government, and the total number of positions held is almost 100.

The pattern of the distribution of real authority, on the other hand, is the same as in the other regions of China: that is, certain men hold several key jobs concurrently, some hold one or two in addition to lesser regional posts, and so on down to the men whose single job -- almost invariably on a provincial level -- probably gives them very little prestige and only nominal authority. We find in North China, also the same pattern of Communist Party control which distributes Party men throughout

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647 the region in key positions and ensures Party domination of economic and social as well as political activities.

There are certain features of the administration of North China which deserve special mention. For one thing, the number and variety of the semi-political organizations to which these administrative leaders belong offer an excellent example of Communist utilization of "middle" or "third force" groups to win the support of non-Communists and then to guide this support along acceptable Party lines. The significant number of non-Party men who have been given key positions -- sometimes apparently at the expense of Party members -- is illustrative of how the Communists have solved the problem of managing the necessary administrative machinery despite a shortage of adequately trained Party personnel. The presence of two urban centers -- Peking and Tientsin -- also contributes to the special characteristics of the North China administrative personnel.

We shall examine first the common denominators in the background of the group, and then the distribution among its members of administrative and political functions. We can then determine which incumbents, through multiple office-holding, have real power in the regional chain of command, and can examine these key men and their administrative relationship to each other, in order to see how the Communist

647 Party maintains authority despite its relatively small size and the vastness of the administration which it controls.

COMMON DENOMINATORS IN THE BACKGROUND OF THE GROUP

We have information on the background and early careers of only 20 men out of the 47. We know only the present position of 12 men, and we have data on posts held since 1949 for 17. The information available concerns positions held in the North China administration only, and does not reveal the background or training of the incumbents.

The data on the remaining 20, however, reveals several interesting characteristics. Two of the men are of peasant origin, for example, while 14 are well educated, having had normal school, junior college, or university training. Only two of them received their higher education at military institutions. Similarly, while six have had military careers (including guerrilla activities and participation in military revolts as well as regular army careers), 14 are knwon to have had nonmilitary careers in education, journalism, business, and industry; in non-Party political activities (i. e., Kuomintang and various anti-Japanese associations); and in organizational work of the Communist Party of China.

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DISTRIBUTION OF FUNCTIONS

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The 47 key personalities under study occupy a total of 133 positions. On a national level they hold 42 posts, which include delegate to the 1st National People's Congress, member of the standing committee of the 1st NPC, NPC committee chairman, member of the standing committee of the 2d National Committee and member of the 2d National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, member of the National Defense Council, member of the State Council, and, in one case, Minister of Higher Education.

Regionally our survey includes incumbents of the following posts: governor of the Hopei and Shansi provincial People's governments; mayor of the Peking and Tientsin municipal People's governments; deputy-governor and deputy-mayor of the same governments; chairman and vice-chairman of the provincial and municipal committees of the Chinese People's P.C.C. in Hopei, Shansi, Peking and Tientsin; political commissar and commander of the military districts of Hopei, Shansi, Peking, Tientsin and North China. In all 49 such posts are held by 45 of the men under study. The four men who hold two regional positions each are three deputy-governors who are also vice-chairmen of provincial committees of the Chinese People's P.C.C. and the governor of Hopei, who is also political commissar of the Hopei Provincial Military District. The two men who, according to our data, hold only national positions are Yang Hsiu-feng, who is Minister of Higher Education, and Chang Su, who is a member of the standing committee and of the committee on bills of the 1st NPC.

The remaining 42 functions of the North China administrators are all of a political or semi-political nature. In this category we find officials in the Communist Party, the New Democratic Youth Corps, the Democratic League, the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee, the San-min Chui-i Comrades' Association, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, the China Association for Democratic Construction, the Chinese People's Committee for the Preservation of World Peace and Opposing American Aggression, the All-China Association of Industry and Commerce, the Chinese Association of Industry and Commerce, the Chinese Association of History, and the Chinese Association of Political Science and Law. The organized political co-operation of these non-Communist groups is an important element in the Communists' pattern of control, and the Party's emphasis has consistently been on strengthening the ideological and organizational ties of such groups to the Party.

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ANALYSIS ACCORDING TO NUMBER OF POSITIONS HELD SIMULTANEOUSLY

According to our figures, the key personalities in the North China administration average almost three positions each. Nineteen men, however, hold only one job, and in each case this is a regional administrative -- as opposed to national or political -- post. These incumbents include 14 deputy-governors and deputy-mayors, two commanders of provincial military districts (Hopei and Shansi), two presidents of People's high courts (Hopei and Tientsin) and the governor of the Shansi Provincial People's Government. In view of the senior status of the other governor and the two mayors in our survey, we may assume that the inclusion of P'ei Li-sheng, the governor of Shansi, in this one-position category is due to lack of complete information rather than to lack of rank.

Seven men hold two jobs. Only one of these has a national position -- Chang Yu-yü, an editor and legal expert of peasant origin who is now deputy-mayor of Peking and delegate to the 1st NPC. The other six occupy regional and political jobs, including deputy-governor (2), deputy-mayor (1), president of the People's high court (1), committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C. (1), Chinese Association of Political Science and Law (1), New Democratic Youth Corps (2), Communist Party (4). The two NDYC officials are included in the count of Communist Party members; the cases of the other two known Party officials will be considered below in connection with the status of key non-Party administrators.

When we look at the eight men who hold three jobs each, we note a decided increase in the number and rank of national offices. Ten national posts are held by these men; they include membership on the National Defense Council, the standing committee of the 1st NPC and the committee of bills of the 1st NPC as well as delegate to the 1st NPC and the Minister of Higher Education. We also find four Communist Party officials and two NDYC officials. Although these men do not constitute the top leadership in North China, their rank is certainly sufficient to make them significant figures in the administration of the region. Their names and positions are as follows:

Yang Hsiu-feng: Minister of Higher Education; del., 1st NPC; Communist Party official.

Chang Su: chm. committee on bills, 1st NPC; member, standing committee, 1st NPC; del., 1st NPC.

647 Wang Shih-ying: del., 1st NPC; Dep.-Gov, Shansi; V-C., Shansi provincial committee, Chinese People's P.C.C.

Kao Shu-hsün: del., 1st NPC; member, National Defense Council; Dep.-Gov., Hopei.

Lo Sung-sheng: Dep.-Mayor, Peking; del., 1st NPC; member standing committee of the Exec. Com. All-China Association of Industry and Commerce.

Liu Hsiu-feng: Pres., Shansi People's High Court; member, 2d National Committee, Chinese People's P.C.C.; Communist Party official.

Chang Ta-chung: Sec. Peking Municipal Committee of the NDYC; member, Central Committee, NDYC; member, Peking Municipal People's Government.

Ko Pu-hai: Sec., North China Committee of the NDYC; member, Central Committee, NDYC; del., 1st NPC.

647 The remaining 13 incumbents appear to constitute the senior leadership of North China. They hold a total of 75 positions, an average of 5.7 jobs each, which means that they occupy 56.4 per cent of all the posts noted for the entire group. These men are Po I-po, Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, Liu Lan-t'ao, Nieh Jung-chen, P'eng Chen, Li Chu-ch'en, Lin T'ieh, Huang Huo-ch'ing, Teng Ch'u-min, Chou Shu-t'ao Wu Han, Wang K'un-lun, and T'ao Lu-chia.

We find that these 13 men hold 30 -- or 71.4 per cent -- of the 42 national positions noted. All thirteen are delegates to the 1st NPC (out of a total of 20 delegates from the North China area) and they occupy all but 5 of the posts on national committees and councils held by men from the same region. These posts include seven on the standing committee of the 1st NPC, one on the committee on the Budget of the 1st NPC, two on the National Defense Council, two on the State Council, two on the National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C., and three on the standing committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C.

Regionally, these 13 men hold 17 positions - or somewhat over one third of the total in North China. These are, for the most part, key regional posts: commander of the North China, Peking, and Tientsin military districts;

647 political commissar of the North China, Hopei, and Shansi military districts; chairman and vice-chairman of the Shansi Provincial Committee and vice-chairman of the Tientsin Muncipal Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C.; governor of Hopei and mayors of Peking and Tientsin; two deputy-mayors of Peking, one of Tientsin, and one deputy governor of Shansi. Furthermore, the distribution of these regional administrative positions is significant: in addition to three posts for the North China Military District, we find four each in Shansi, Peking, and Tientsin, and two in Hopei. One man, Lin T'ieh occupies both positions in Hopei -- governor and political commissar. We may assume that in Hopei, interest is concentrated in the urban centers of Peking and Tientsin.

The 28 political functions which these 13 key men fulfill constitute two-thirds of the total among the entire group. Such posts include eight members of the CPC, seven members of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, two members of the Central Executive Committee of the Democratic League, one member of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee, two members of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Committee for the Preservation of World Peace and Opposing American Aggression, two members of the Executive Council. of the All China Association of Industry and Commerce, two members of the Executive Council of the Chinese Association of History, 647 one member of the standing committee of the National Committee of the China Association for Democratic Construction, one member of the standing committee of the Central Committee of the San-min Chu-i Comrades' Association, one member of the standing committee of the National Committee of the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth, and one member of the Executive Council of the Chinese Association of Political Science and Law.

The regional affiliations of the men who hold these various political posts reveal a heavy concentration in Peking and Tientsin (11 and 7, respectively) and considerably less in the provincial areas (5 from Shansi, 1 from Hopei). This suggests the extent of the emphasis which the Communists have placed on political and semi-political groups in the urban centers.

THE ROLE OF NON-PARTY OFFICIALS

Five out of the thirteen key men discussed above are non-Party men. These five hold 12 national positions (40 per cent of those held by this group), 5 regional posts (39%), and 18 political jobs (64%). A total of 26 of these positions are held by men in Peking and Tientsin. This high proportion of posts held by non-Party key men indicates the successful degree to which the Communists put into operation the principle of broad coalition, particularly when they took over urban centers.

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647 We know, for example, that after the capture of Tientsin in January 1949, Liu Shao-ch'i traveled to the city for the purpose of reassuring the commercial and industrial leaders about their future under the Communist government. Thus we find that Li Chu-ch'en, a priminent Tientsin industrialist, holds top positions on the Tientsin Municipal Council of the Chinese People's P.C.C. and the standing committee of the 1st NPC; Chou Shu-t'ao, another businessman, is a deputy-mayor of Tientsin; both men are members of the standing committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C. and they hold, between them, six ranking positions in political organizations.

We find, furthermore, three CPC members whose status, according to our data may have suffered by the inclusion of more highly trained or experienced non-Party personnel in the Communist administration after 1949: Chang Ch'eng-hsien, Ch'eng Hung-i, and Liu Hsiu-feng. Liu Hsiu-feng, for example, joined the Party in 1924 and devoted the next thirty years to guerilla, organizational, and administrative activities for the Party. He is now president of the People's High Court of Shansi Province, and a member of the National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C., but he does not seem to have rank equal to Teng Ch'u-min, a former professor who first joined the Communist administration in 1949 (as a member of the 1st National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C.) and is now vice-chairman of the Shansi Provincial Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C., deputy-governor of the Shansi Provincial People's Government, a member of the standing committee of the 2d National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C., a delegate to the 1st NPC and a member of the standing committee of the 1st NPC in addition to holding five offices in political political organizations. Teng Ch'u-min is not a Party member, as far as is known.

Ch'eng Hung-i held official positions in the CPC from the time of the Sino-Japanese war, but his exact Party status at present is unknown, and he is identified only as a deputy-mayor of Peking. Two non-Party deputy-mayors of Peking, on the other hand, are found among the 13 key men; Wu Han, a noted educator who is currently a member of the standing committee of the 2d National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C. and a delegate to the 1st NPC in addition to holding top position in four political organizations, and Wang K'un-lun, a former Kuomintang Central Executive Committee member who is now a member of the standing committee of the Central Committee of the San-min Chu-i Comrades' Association, the Central Committee of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee, and the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association as well as being delegate

647 to the 1st NPC and a member of the standing committee of the 1st NPC.

Chang Cheng-hsien, now a deputy-governor of the Hopei Provincial People's Government, was the director of the department of propaganda of the P'ing-yüan Provincial committee of the CPC from 1949 to 1952, and a member of the North China Administrative Committee from 1952 to 1954, but his present Party status and any official positions which he may hold at present are unknown. In contrast, Kao Shu-hsün, a former Kuomintang army commander, who ia also a deputy-governor of Hopei, is in addition a member of the National Defense Council and a delegate to the 1st NPC.

We find, in these instances, concrete illustrations of the basis for the alleged disapproval of some members of the Communist Party of the "New Democratic" principle of co-operation with the "middle parties." This policy was necessary not only to enable the Communist government to utilize the trained personnel it so badly needed and to retain the organized support of the politically uncommitted groups whose friendship it had had during the civil war, but also to provide for the sharing of the responsibility for the implementation of government programs. It appears, however, to have resulted in the displacement and displeasure of some veteran Communists

647 who have inferior technical or administrative training but who feel that their past sacrifices and contributions to the Communist cause entitle them to senior status.

KEY COMMUNIST PERSONNEL

647 Despite the apparent dislocation of some
665 Party men in favor of unaffiliated administrators, we find that top authority is not only definitely in Communist hands in North China, but substantially in the hands of men who are powerful on a national as well as a regional level. A brief glance at the positions of the eight Communists in the group of 13 senior officials indicates the extent to which this is true.

Po I-po, the well-known Communist leader long active in the North China area, is secretary of the North China Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC and political commissar of the North China Military District (in addition to national posts on the State Council and 1st NPC). After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Po was commissioned by General Yen Hsi-shan to organize the Hsi-sheng Chiu-kuo T'ung-meng Hui (Self-Sacrifice Save-the-Country League), and after the occupation of Taiyuan by Japanese forces, he went to Southeast Shansi at the head of the first and second detachments of the so-called Chüeh-ssu Tsung-tui (Dare-to-Die

647 Column). Early in 1949 he revolted against Yen Hsi-shan and went over to the Communist 665 camp with all the forces of the Chüeh-ssu Tsung-tui. In 1945 Po was elected a member of the Central Committee of the CPC, and during 1948-49 he served as first vice-chairman of the North China People's Government.

Nieh Jung-chen, who holds the second leading post in the regional party organization, is commander of the North China Military District and of the Peking and Tientsin garrison forces, vice-chairman of the National Defense Council, and a member of the standing committee of the 1st NPC. During the Sino-Japanese War, Nieh Jung-chen was commander of the Communist forces in the Shansi-Hopei-Chahar Border Region. In 1948-49 he was commander of the North China People's Liberation Army and subsequently served as deputy chief-of-staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, former Chief of Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and concurrently a member of the Central Committee of the CPC is deputy-commander of the North China Military District.

The present regional position, if any, of Liu Lan-t'ao is not known, but he holds ranking positions on NPC committees and, as a reserve member of the North China Administrative Committee, probably outranks all but a

647 few of the senior leaders.

665 The other four key Communists hold top positions in the provincial and municipal administrations. They are the mayors of Peking and Tientsin, the governor of Hopei and the chairman of the Shansi Provincial Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C.

P'eng Chen, mayor of the Peking Municipal People's Government, joined the CPC in the 1920s and was active in workers' movements for many years. After serving for three years as chairman of the Northeast Bureau of the CPC and political commissar to Lin Piao's United Democratic Army, he became secretary of the Peking Municipal Committee of the Party in February 1949. In addition to his mayoralty, he is vice-chairman of the 2d National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C. and a delegate to the 1st NPC.

Huang Huo-ch'ing, secretary of the Tientsin Municipal Committee of the CPC, is also mayor of the Tientsin Municipal People's Government and a member of the standing committee of the 1st NPC. Lin T'ieh, governor of the Hopei Provincial People's Government, has been secretary of the Hopei Provincial Committee of the CPC and political commissar of the Hopei Provincial Military District since 1950. T'ao Lu-chia, the secretary of the Shansi Provincial Committee of the CPC, is also

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political commissar of the Shansi Provincial Military District, chairman of the Shansi Provincial Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C., and delegate to the 1st NPC.

These eight leaders, then, occupy the key positions in North China. Here, as in other parts of China, the central leadership of the CPC appears to keep a tight control over decisions in the regional and provincial government administrations. More detailed and revealing analyses of leadership patterns must await the availability of further biographical data.

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000 For the sake of brevity, certain abbreviations have been used in the biographical sketches which follow.

A-C FL -- All-China Federation of Literature
A-C FDY -- All-China Federation of Democratic Youth
A-C FDW -- All-China Federation of Democratic Women
Centr. Com. of CPC -- Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
C.A.P.D. -- China Association for Promotion of Democracy
CPC -- Communist Party of China
Chinese People's P.C.C. -- Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
D.L. -- Democratic League
Exec. Com. -- Executive Committee
JCRR -- Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction
KMT -- Kuomintang
NPC -- National People's Congress
NCNA -- New China News Agency
NDYC -- New Democratic Youth Corps
North China A.C. -- North China Administrative Committee
North China M.P.C. -- North China Military and Political Committee
P.A. -- Peasants' Association
prep. -- prepatory
R.C. of KMT -- Revolutionary Committee of Kuomintang
WDP -- Workers' Democratic Party

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BIOGRAPHIC SKETCHES OF KEY PERSONALITIES IN NORTH CHINA

CHANG CH'ENG-HSIEN

Background: dir. of Dept. of Propaganda of P'ing-yüan Provincial Com. of CPC (1949-52); mem. of North China A.C. (1952-54).

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of Hopei Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

CHANG HSIAO-TUNG

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of Shansi Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

CHANG MING-HO

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of Hopei Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

CHANG SU

Origin: b. 1909 in Chahar Province.

Background: took part in Gen. Feng Yü-hsiang's Anti-Japanese Associated Forces (1933); participated in Fukien People's Govt. (1934); chm. of South Chahar Anti-Japanese

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000 Govt. (1938-?); dir. of East Hopei Adm. Dist. Govt. (1944-?); chm. of Chahar Provincial People's Govt. (1945-?); mem. of North China People's Govt. (1948-49); V-C. of North China A.C. of Govt. Adm. Council (1952); V-C. of North China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54); del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54).

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); mem. of standing com. of 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); chm. of Com. on Bills of 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-).

CHANG TA-CHUNG

Background: mem. of People's Control Com. of Peking Municipal People's Govt. (1949-54).

Current Career: Sec. of Peking Municipal Com. of NDYC (1949-); mem. of Central Com. of NDYC (1953-); mem. of Peking Municipal People's Govt. (1955-).

CHANG WEI-LI

Background: mem. ob People's Control Com. of Tientsin Municipal People's Govt. (1949-54).

000 Current Career: Sec. of Tientsin Municipal Com. of NDYC (1949-).

CHANG YU-YÜ

Origin: b., 1901, Ling-shih, Shansi Province; son of a poor peasant.

Background: studied at university in Peking; graduate of Tokyo School of Law and Pol. Science; worked at Shih-chieh Jih-pao [the World Daily] while studying in Peking; counselor of Tientsin Municipal Govt. (1930); editor of Shih-chieh Jih-pao (1931-?); prof. at Natl. Peiping Univ., Min-kuo College, and Sino-French Univ. (1931-?); editor of Hua-shang Pao [the Chinese Merchant Daily], Hong Kong, (1939-41); after outbreak of Pacific War, left Hong Kong for Chungking and became editorial writer for Hsin-hua Jih-pao [the New China Daily], and Hsin-shu Pao [the New Szechwan Daily]; subsequently forced by KMT to leave Chungking because of anti-KMT editorials; went to Ch'engtu and collaborated with Shen Chih-yüan in organizing "New Century Institute," which published a series of books, and also lectured at universities in Ch'engtu; when KMT P.C.C. convened in Chungking, served as counselor to Communist delegation (1946); editor-in-chief of Hsin-hua Jih-pao (1946); arrested by Chungking Garrison Headquarters and forced to withdraw from Chungking to Yenan (1946); V-C. and Secretary-General of Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region Govt. (1947); worked at North China People's Congress (1948); Dep.-Mayor of Tientsin Municipal People's Govt. and chm. of Com. on Financial and Economic Affairs (the first few months of 1949); Dep.-Mayor of Peking Municipal People's Govt. and dir. of Dept. of Labor (1949-54); mem. of North China A.C. (Jan. 1953-54).

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); Dep.-Mayor of Peking Municipal People's Govt. (1955-).

CH'EN FU

Current Career: Pres. of Tientsin People's High Court (1955-).

CH'ENG HUNG-I

Origin: b. 1915 in Yü-hsien, Shansi Province.

Background: graduate of Nan-k'ai Univ.; chief of secretarial section of Northeast Shansi Administrative Office of Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region Govt.; Dean of Faculty of

000 Resistance and Construction College of same border region; adm. inspector of 4th adm. dist. of same border region; Secretary-General of same border region govt.; Mayor of municipality of Yang-ch'üan and Sec. of Yang-ch'üan Municipal Com. of CPC. (All of these posts were held at different times during Sino-Japanese War); mem. of Peking Municipal People's Govt. and dir. of Bureau of Commerce of same govt. (1949-54); V-C. and Secretary-General of Com. of Financial and Economic Affairs of same govt. (1949-54).

Current Career: Dep.-Mayor of Peking Municipal People's Govt. (1955-).

CHENG LIN

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of Shansi Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

CHIA T'ING-SAN

Background: deputy-director of Bureau of Industry of Peking Municipal People's Govt. (1949-?)

Current Career: Dep.-Mayor of Peking Municipal People's Govt. (1955-).

000 **CHIAO KUO-NAI**

Background: mem. of Shansi Provincial People's Govt. and dir. of Dept. of Finance of same govt. (1949-54).

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of Shansi Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

CH'IAO YÜ-FU

Background: Sec. of Hopei Provincial Com. of NDYC (?); mem. of People's Control Com. of Hopei Provincial People's Govt. (?-1954).

CHOU SHU-T'AO

Origin: b., Anhwei Province.

Background: Dep.-Mayor of Tientsin Municipal People's Govt. (1949-54); del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. and mem. of Commission on Financial and Economic Affairs of Govt. Adm. Council (1949-54); mem. of standing com. of Preparatory Com. of All-China Assoc. of Industry and Commerce (1949-53); mem. of North China A.C. (Jan. 1953-54).

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008 **Current Career:** general-manager of Tientsin Ch'i-hsin Cement Company (?-); mem. of standing com. of Executive Council of All-China Assoc. of Industry and Commerce (1953-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); del. to second Natl. Congress of Sino-Soviet Friendship Assoc. and mem. of Executive Council (1954-); mem. of 2d Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. and mem. of standing com. of 2d Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1954-); elected Dep.-Mayor of Tientsin Municipal People's Govt. (1955-).

FENG CHI-P'ING

Background: dep.-dir. of Bureau of Public Security of Peking Municipal People's Govt. (1949-?).

Current Career: Dep.-Mayor of Peking Municipal People's Govt. (1955-).

HSÜ HSIANG-CH'IEN

Origin: b., 1902, Wu-t'ai Hsien, Shansi Province.

Background: on graduation from Taiyuan Normal School, taught at elementary school

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000 in Wu-t'ai Hsien; in 1924 attended the first class of Whampao Milit. Acad. in Canton; in 1925 took part in Northern Expedition; in 1926 joined CPC and served as instructor at Milit. and Pol. Acad. in Wuhan; after KMT purge of Communist elements, inflitrated into forces of Gen. Chang Fa-kuei to do underground work on behalf of CPC; took part in Canton uprising in 1927; participated in defense of Soviet authorities in Hai-feng and Lu-feng later in 1927; fled to Shanghai after Soviets in Hai-feng and Lu-feng were wiped out by KMT forces; in June 1929, arrived in Hopei-Honan-Anhwei Border Region and organized 31st Division of Workers' and Peasants' Red Army; Commander-in-Chief of 4th Group Army of Chinese Red Army (1931-37); led 4th Group Army in march from Hupei-Honan-Anhwei Border Region to Szechwan; in 1932, 4th Group Army reached the Nan-ch'uan and Pa-chou area in Szechwan; in 1933 Hsü's forces dealt fatal blow against Gen. T'ien Sung-hao's Army, winning nationwide fame, shortly, Hsü's forces defeated forces of Gen. Yang Sheng and Gen. Liu Tsung-hou; in 1935 when main forces of Red Army passed through Szechwan under command of Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, Hsü's forces joined it in Mou-kung and subsequently fought in Szechwan-Sikang Border Region; in July 1936, Hsü's forces withdrew from Szechwan and arrived in

080 southern part of Kansu; after outbreak of Sino-Japanese War, was appointed Dep.-Comdr. of 129th Division of 18th Group Army; directed guerrilla warfare in Shantung, Southeast Shansi, and Northwest Honan during early period of Sino-Japanese War; during later stage of war, became comdr. of Communist forces in Shansi Province; after V-J Day, Hsü's forces were continuously engaged in battles with forces of Gen. Yen Hsi-shan until capture of Taiyuan early in 1949; mem. of North China People's Govt. (1948-49); Comdr. and pol. commissar of 18th Army Corps of People's Liberation Army (1949-?); del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. and mem. of First Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); mem. of Central People's Govt. Council (1949-54); mem. of People's Revolutionary Milit. Com. (1949-54); Chief-of-Staff of Chinese People's Liberation Army (1949-54); dir. of Taiyuan Milit. Control Com. (1949-54); del. to 2d Natl. Congress of Sino-Soviet Friendship Assoc. (1954).

Current Career: Dep.-Comdr. of North China Milit. Dist. (1949-); mem. of Centr. Com. of CPC (1945-); del. to 1st NPC and mem. of standing com. of First NPC (Sept. 1954-); V-C. of Natl Defense Council (1954-).

600 **HSÜEH TZU-CHENG**

Background: sometime chief-of-staff of milit. dist. of People's Liberation Army (prior to liberation of Peking); mem. and Sec.-Gen. of Peking Municipal People's Govt. (1949-54); dir. of Bureau of Public Property and Confiscated Property Disposal Affairs. (1949-?).

Current Career: Dep.-Mayor of Peking Municipal People's Govt. (1955-).

HU K'AI-MING

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of Hopei Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

HUANG HO-CH'ING

Background: chm. of Consultative Com. of Tientsin Municipal People's Representatives' Conference of All Circles (1951-54).

Current Career: Sec. of Tientsin Municipal Com. of CPC (?-); del. to 1st NPC and mem. of standing com. of 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); Mayor of Tientsin Municipal People's Govt. (1955-).

000 **KAO SHU-HSÜN**

Origin: b., Hopei Province.

Background: originally a follower of Gen. Feng Yü-hsiang; later served as Comdr. of Nationalist forces; immediately after V-J Day, Kao went over to Communist camp when on a mission to accept surrender of Japanese forces along northern section of Peiping-Hankow Railway (1945); del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. and mem. of 1st Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); mem. of Hopei Provincial People's Govt. (1949-54); V-C. of same govt. (Jan. 1953-54).

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); mem. of Natl. Defense Council (1954-); Dep.-Gov. of Hopei Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

KO PU-HAI

Current Career: Sec. of North China Com. of NDYC (1949-); mem. of Centr. Com. of NDYC (1953-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-).

000 **LI CHU-CH'EN**

Origin: b. 1892 in Yung-shun Hsien, Hunan Province.

Background: graduate of Ch'ang-te Normal School (1909); studied at school of engineering in Tokyo (1912-?); teacher at Ch'angsha Technical School (1909-12); engineer of T'ang-ku plant of Chiu-ta Salt Refining Company (1918-19); from 1920-37, served at Yung-li Alkali Refining Company as factory manager and deputy general-manager; chm. of Chungking Municipal Assoc. of Industry (1941); del. to P.C.C. (1946); chm. of Hopei-Peiping-Tientsin Regional Assoc. of Industry (1947-48); del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); chm. of Tientsin Municipal Com. of China Assoc. for Democratic Construction (1949-?); mem. of Central People's Govt. Council (1949-54); V-C. of North China A.C. (Jan. 1953-54); V-C. of Consultative Com. of Tientsin Municipal People's Representatives' Conference of All-Circles (1950-54); V-C. of Chinese Trade Delegation to Japan (March 1954); del. to 2d Natl. Congress of Sino-Soviet Friendship Assoc. (1954); V-C. of Tientsin Municipal Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1955).

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Current Career: general-manager of Chiu-ta and Yung-li Chemical Companies (1941-); mem. of standing com. of Natl. Com. of China Assoc. for Democratic Construction (1949-); mem. of Natl. Com. of Chinese People's Com. for Preserving of World Peace and Opposing American Aggression (1950-); chm. of Tientsin Municipal Assoc. of Industry (1952-); V-C. of Executive Council of All-China Assoc. of Industry and Commerce and V-C. of standing com. of Executive Council of All-China Assoc. of Industry and Commerce (1953-); del. to 1st NPC and mem. of standing of 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); mem. of 2d Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. and mem. of standing com. of 2d Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1954-); V-C. of China Com. for Promotion of International Trade (1952-).

LI KENG-T'AO

Background: dir. of East Hopei Adm. Dist (prior to 1950); mem. of Tientsin Municipal People's Govt. (1950-54); V-C. of Commission on Financial and Economic Affairs of same govt. (1950-54).

Current Career: Dep.-Mayor of Tientsin Municipal People's Govt. (1955-).

LIN T'IEH

Background: del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); mem. of Hopei Provincial People's Govt. (1950-Nov. 1952); chm. of Hopei Provincial People's Govt. (Nov. 1952-54); mem. of North China A.C. (Jan. 1953-54).

Current Career: Sec. of Hopei Provincial Com. of CPC (1950-); pol. commissar of Hopei Provincial Milit. Dist. (1950-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); Gov. of Hopei Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

LIU HSIU-FENG

Origin: b., 1911, Wan-hsien, Hopei Province.

Background: joined CYC in 1924 and took active role in student movement; arrested by government authorities in Pao-ting in 1926; after release from prison, appointed Sec. of Wan-hsien Com. of CPC; subsequently, engaged in underground activities in Tientsin; shortly, arrested again and imprisoned for nine years; released from prison in 1935; became dir. of Dept. of Organization of Hopei Provincial Com. of CPC; after outbreak of Sino-Japanese War, became leader of some guerrilla forces in Hopei; Sec. of Kalgan Municipal Com. of CPC (1945-?); chm. of Kalgan Municipal People's Congress (1945-?); Dep.-Mayor of Tientsin Municipal People's Govt. (1949-?); V-C. of North China A.C. (1952-54).

Current Career: mem. of 2d Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1954-); Pres. of Shansi People's High Court (1955-).

LIU LAN-T'AO

Origin: b., Shensi Province.

Background: Third Sec. of North China Bureau of Centr. Com. of CPC (?-1954); Minister of North China Affairs (1950-52); del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); mem. of Commission on Legal and Pol. Affairs of Govt. Adm. Council (1952-54); Pres. of North China Revolutionary Univ. (1949-?); chm. of North China A.C. of Govt. Adm. Council (1952); chm. of North China A.C. (Jan. 1953-54).

Current Career: reserve mem. of Centr. Com. of CPC (1945-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); mem. of standing com. of 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); chm. of Com. on Budget of 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-).

606 LO SUNG-SHENG

Origin: b., 1908, Peking.

Background: graduate of Yü-ts'ai Junior College; mem. of Peking Municipal People's Govt. and mem. of Com. on Financial and Economic Affairs of same govt. (1951-54).

Current Career: general-manager of T'ung-jen-t'ang Pharmaceutical Company (?-); mem. of standing com. of executive com. of All-China Assoc. of Industry and Commerce (1954-); chm. of board of directors of Peking Hsing-yeh Investment Company (? -); del. to 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); Dep-Mayor of Peking Municipal People's Govt. (1955-).

NIEH JUNG-CHEN

Origin: b., 1899, Chiang-chin, Szechwan Province.

Background: studied at Chungking Middle School; went to France in 1920 as student and worker; joined CYC and CPC in 1921; went to Moscow in 1924 and studied milit. science at Moscow Milit. Acad.; in 1925, returned to China and served for two years as instructor at Whampoa Milit. Acad.; took part

600 in Northern Expedition forces; joined Workers' and Peasants' Red Army in 1927; labor organizer in Shanghai (1927); dep.-director of Dept. of Pol. Affairs of Kiangsi Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and subsequently pol. commissar of 1st Red Army (1931-?); Dep.-Comd of 115th Division of 18th Group Army (1937-?); Comdr. of Communist forces in Shansi-Hopei-Chahar Border Region (Nov. 1937-?); mem. of North China People's Govt. (1948-49); Comdr. of North China People's Liberation Army (1948-49); del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); mem. of Central People's Govt. Council (1949-54); Mayor of Peking Municipal People's Govt. (1949-51); dir. of Peking Milit. Control Com. (1949-54); Deputy Chief-of-Staff of Chinese People's Liberation Army (1949-54); del. to the 2d Natl. Congress of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Assoc. (1954).

Current Career: Comdr. of North China Milit. Dist. (1949-); Comdr. of Peking and Tientsin Garrison Forces (1949-); del. to 1st NPC and mem. of standing com. of 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); V-C. of Natl. Defense Council (1954-).

PAI CHIEN

Origin: b., Shensi Province.

600 **Background:** Deputy Secretary-General and dir. of general office of North China A.C. (1951-54); mem. of North China A.C. (Jan. 1953-54).

Current Career: Dep.-Mayor of Tientsin Municipal People's Govt. (1955-).

P'EI LI-SHENG

Origin: b., 1897, Shansi Province.

Background: V-C. of Shansi Provincial People's Govt. (1949-50); chm. of same govt. (1950-54); mem. of North China A.C. (Jan. 1953-54).

Current Career: Gov. of Shansi Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

P'ENG CHEN

Origin: b., Shansi Province; son of poor peasant.

Background: graduated from elementary school at age of twenty-one and studied at a middle school while working; influenced by new thought when studying at middle school;

000 P'eng joined CYC and registered as mem. of CPC; soon became leader of students' and workers' movements in Taiyüan; then served as secretary of Cheng-ting-Taiyüan Railroad workers' Union; remained active in workers' movement for many years until arrest by KMT authorities in 1921; in 1937 released from prison in Peiping and immediately went to Yenan; subsequently, served as secretary of North China Bureau of Centr. Com. of CPC and dir. of Dept. of United Front Affairs of same bureau; Secretary of Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region Com. of CPC (1941-?); secretary of Northeast Bureau of the Centr. Com. of CPC (1945-49); del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. and mem. of 1st Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); mem. of Central People's Govt. Council (1949-54); V-C. of Com. on Legal and Political Affairs of Govt. Adm. Council (1949-54); dir. of Dept. of Organization of Centr. Com. of CPC (Oct. 1950-summer 1953); mayor of Peking Municipal People's Govt. (1951-54).

Current Career: mem. of Centr. Com. of CPC (1945-); Secretary of Peking Municipal Com. of CPC (1949-); mem. of Pol. Bureau of Centr. Com. of CPC (June 1950-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); V-C. of 2d Natl Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1954-); elected Mayor of Peking Municipal People's Govt. (1955-).

P'ENG MING-CHIH

Background: Brigade Comdr. of 3rd Division of the New 4th Army (during later stages of World War II); Ambassador to Poland (1950-52); Dep.-Comdr. of Kwangsi Provincial Milit. Dist. (1952-54).

Current Career: Comdr. of Hopei Provincial Milit. Dist. (1954-).

PO I-PO

Origin: b., 1907, Ting-hsiang Hsien, Shansi Province.

Background: graduate of Kuo-min Normal School in T'aiyüan, studied at several universities in Peking as student engaged in underground activities for CPC while a student and was arrested by KMT authorities in 1932; imprisoned by KMT for three years; after outbreak of Sino-Japanese War, commissioned by Gen. Yen Hsi-shan to organize Hsi-sheng Chiu-kuo T'ung-ment Hui [League for Self-Sacrifice and National Salvation], which had a total membership of more than 100,000 persons, most of them students and intellectuals; after occupation of Tai-yüan by Japanese forces, went to Southeast Shansi at head of first and second columns of so-called Chueh-ssu Tsung-tui

000 [the Ready-to-die Detachment], and was appointed by Gen. Yen Hsi-shan dir. of Southeast Shansi Office of Shansi Provincial Govt.; early in 1939 revolted against Gen. Yen Hsi-shan and went over to Communist camp with all forces of Chueh-ssu Tsung-tui; in appreciation for milit. revolt against Gen. Yen Hsi-shan, elected mem. of Centr. Com. of CPC in 1945; appointed secretary of North China Bureau of Centr. Com. of CPC; first V-C. of North China People's Govt. (1948-49); pol. commissar of North China People's Liberation Army (1948-49); del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); mem. of Central People's Govt. Council (1949-54); V-C. of Commission on Financial and Economic Affairs of Govt. Adm. Council (1949-54); Minister of Finance (1949-Sept. 1953); mem. of North China A.C. (Jan. 1953-54).

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); chm. of Commission on National Construction of State Council (1954-); dir. of 3d Adm. Office of State Council (1954-); pol. commissar of North China Milit. Dist. (1949-).

SUN KUANG-JUI

Current Career: Pres. of Hopei People's High Court (1955-).

T'AO LU-CHIA

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Background: mem. of Shansi Provincial People's Govt. (1950-54); dir. of Dept. of Propaganda of Shansi Provincial Com. of CPC (1950-?).

Current Career: secretary of Shansi Provincial Com. of CPC (?-); pol. commissar of Shansi Provincial Milit. Dist. (1950-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); chm. of Shansi Provincial Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1955-).

TENG CH'U-MIN

Origin: b., 1898, Shih-shou, Hupei Province.

Background: worked with Natl. Govt. in Wuhan (1927); after fall of Natl. Govt. went to Japan for study; on return, taught at Sun Yat-sen Univ. in Canton and then at Kuei-lin Normal School; during Sino-Japanese War, active in leftist circles; prof. and chm. of Dept. of Pol. Science and Law of Ta-te College in Hong Kong (1947); del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. and mem. of 1st Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); V-C. of Shansi Provincial People's Govt. (1949-54); mem. of Executive Council of Sino-Soviet Friendship Assoc. (1951-54); mem. of North China A.C. (Jan. 1953-54).

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Current Career: mem. of standing com. of Central Com. of China Democratic League (1945-); pres. of Shansi Univ. (1949-); mem. of Natl. Com. of Chinese People's Com. for Preserving World Peace and Opposing American Aggression (1950-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); del. to 2d Natl. Congress of Sino-Soviet Friendship Assoc. (1954-); mem. of 2d Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. and mem. of standing com. of 2d Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1954-); Dep.-Gov. of Shansi Provincial People's Govt. (1955-); V-C. of Shansi Provincial Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1955-); mem. of standing com. of 1st NPC (July 1955-).

Publications: Cheng-chih Hsüeh Ta-kang [Outline of Political Science]; She-hui Shih Chien-ming Chiao-ch'eng [A Concise History of Social Development].

WAN HSIAO-T'ANG

Background: dep.-director of Bureau of Public Security of Tientsin Municipal People's Govt. (1950-?).

Current Career: Dep.-Mayor of Tientsin Municipal People's Govt. (1955-).

000**WANG FEI-JAN**

Origin: b., 1897, Fu-p'ing, Hopei Province.

Background: graduate of Cheng-ting Normal School; dir. of Dept. of Justice of Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region Govt. (1938-?); adm. inspector of 1st Adm. Dist. of same border region (?); Pres. of High Court of same border region (?); V-C. of trial Com. of North China People's Court (1948-49); mem. of Peking Municipal People's Govt. (1951-54); Pres. of Peking Municipal People's Court (1953-54).

Current Career: mem. of executive council of Chinese Assoc. of Pol. Science and Law (1953-); Pres. of Peking People's High Court. (1955-).

WANG K'UN-LUN

Origin: b., Wu-hsi, Kiangsu Province.

Background: graduate of Natl. Peking Univ.; joined Min-chih Chu-i Comrades' Assoc. [a student organization organized early in 1920's and affiliated with KMT] while studying in Peking; took part in Western Hill

0-00 Conference [a group of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's followers who met on Western Hill in Peking in 1925 in opposition to the then leftist wing of KMT who wanted to continue KMT-Communist Alliance] ; mem. of Legislative Yüan of Natl. Govt. (1935-45); reserve mem. of Centr. Exec. Com. of KMT (1935-45); del. to 6th Natl. Congress of KMT (1945); incited Chiang Kai-shek's displeasure at meeting of above-mentioned congress by criticizinb Chiang's policies; went abroad following adjournment of same congress; returned to China via Soviet Union after Communists came into power; del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); mem. of Govt. Adm. Council (1949-54); V-C. of Com. on Ideological Studies of 1st Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1952-?).

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC and mem. of standing com. of 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); mem. of standing com. of Centr. Com. of San-min-chu-i Comrades' Assoc. (1949-); mem. of standing com. of Centr. Com. of KMT Revolutionary Com. (1949-); mem. of 2d Natl. Congress of Sino-Soviet Friendship Assoc (1954-); Dep.-Mayor of Peking Municipal People's Govt. (1955-).

ooo WANG SHIH-YING

Background: V-C. of Shansi Provincial People's Govt. (1949-54).

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); Dep.-Gov. of Shansi Provincial People's Govt. (1955-); V-C. of Shansi Provincial Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1955-).

WANG TZU-FENG

Current Career: Comdr. of Shansi Provincial Milit. Dist. (1950-).

WU HAN

Origin: b., 1909, I-wu, Chekiang Province.

Background: graduate of Natl. Ching-hua Univ.; instructor and subsequently prof. of history at Natl. Ching-hua Univ. (prior to outbreak of Sino-Japanese War); prof. of history at Southwestern Associated Univ. (during Sino-Japanese War); critic of KMT regime throughout war; prof. of history at Natl. Ching-hua Univ. (1946-?); active in student movements during years of civil war; went to Communist

000 territory in central Hopei in 1948 and returned to Peking when it was "liberated" in 1949; del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. and mem. of 1st Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); Dep.-Mayor of Peking Municipal People's Govt. (1949-54); mem. of Com on Cultural and Educational Affairs of Govt. Adm. Council (1949-54); mem. of standing com. of Com. on University Affairs of Ching-hua Univ. (1949-?); chm. of Dept. of History and Dean of School of Arts of Ching-hua Univ. (1949-?).

Current Career: mem. of standing com. of Central Com. of China Democratic League (1945-); mem. of standing com. of Natl. Com. of All-China Federation of Democratic Youth (1949-); mem. of executive council of Chinese Historical Assoc. (1950-); mem. of 1st Executive Council of Sino-Soviet Friendship Assoc. (1949-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); del. to 2d Natl. Congress of Sino-Soviet Friendship Assoc. (1954-); mem. of standing com. of 2d Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1954-); elected Dep.-Mayor of Peking Municipal People's Govt. (1955-).

Publications: Chu Yüan-chang Ch'uan [A Biography of Chu Yüan-chang]; Li-shih Ti Ching-tzu [History as a Mirror]; and articles contributed to learned and political magazines.

000 WU KUANG-YANG

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of Shansi Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

YANG HSIU-FENG

Origin: b., 1898, Ch'ien-an, Hopei Province.

Background: graduate of Peking Higher Normal School; studied in France; on return, taught at various universities in Peking; for sometime served as dir. of Dept. of Education of Hopei Provincial Govt.; lecturer in history at Peking Normal Univ. (1935-37); after outbreak of Sino-Japanese War, Yang left Peking with a group of students and went to T'ai-hang Mountains to engage in guerrilla warfare against Japanese; chm. of Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region Govt. (1941-48); 3d V-C. of North China People's Govt. (1948-49); chm. of Hopei Provincial People's Govt. (1949-52); del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); mem. of standing com. of 1st Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); mem. of North China A.C. of Govt. Adm. Council (1952); mem. of North China A.C. (Jan. 1953-54).

000 Current Career: del. to 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); Minister of Higher Education (1954-).

YANG I-CHOU

Current Career: Dep.-Mayor of Tientsin Municipal People's Govt. (1955-).

YEN TA-K'AI

Background: sometime dir. of K'ai-luan Coal Mine Adm.; V-C. of Hopei Provincial People's Govt. (1953-54).

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of Hopei Provincial People's Govt. (1955-); V-C. of Hopei Provincial Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1955-).

YÜAN PO-SHENG

Background: V-C. of Hopei Provincial People's Govt. (1954).

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of same govt. (1955-).

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
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RICE
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Scale in Miles
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PROVINCES
A-Shansi
B-Hopei
E. Conaghan

[Facing p. 682--A]

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
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PROVINCES
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B-Hopei

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
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B-Hopei
L. Conaghan

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
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COTTON
DISTRIBUTION
Scale in Miles
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PROVINCES
A-Shansi
B-Hopei
F. Conaghan

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
Yang River
Wei-shui River
Sang-ch'ien River
PEKING
Yung-ting River

Kuan-t'ing Reservoir Project
NORTH CHINA

[Facing p.682--E]

Annex "A," Subparagraph 3a, Economic Background

AGRICULTURE

241 A poem[1] describes the vast plains of Hopei and the plateau of Shansi:

> "Endless prairies beneath a brilliant sky,
> where herbs are seen when blowing winds
> bend low the grass so high."

The fertile plains of Hopei (and, to a lesser extent, the plateau of Shansi) have encouraged the development of agriculture in North China. The most remarkable feature of North China farming communities is the enormous production of raw cotton, which may constitute over 40 per cent of China's total output. Grain production is of only secondary importance in this region. And, unlike the regions of East China and Central-South China, few special crops are produced in North China.

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[1] Current Background, Hong Kong, U.S. Consulate General, March 1, 1954, p. 20, as translated from China News Service, January 1954.

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[FACING p. 683]

Table 1. Cultivated Land and Rural Population of North China*

Unit: 1,000

S = shih-mou

A = acres

H = households

P = persons

	1946			1955				
	Hopei	Shansi	Total	Hopei	Shansi	Peking#	Tientsin^x	Total
Cultivated Land	109,132 S (18,189 A)	72,879 S (12,146 A)	182,011 S (30,335 A)	137,179 S (22,863 A)	72,879 S (12,146 A)	1,106 S (184 A)	160 S (27 A)	211,324 S (35,220 A)
Rural Population	24,177 P	9,876 P	33,993 P	31,320 P	12,441 P	350 P	62 P	44,173 P
Farm Households	4,244 H	1,874 H	6,098 H	6,264 H	2,488 H	70 H	12 H	8,834 H
Acreage Per Household	25.8 S (4.3 A)	38,9 S (6.5 A)	32.4 S (5.4 A)	21.9 S (3.7 A)	20.3 S (4.9 A)	15.8 S (2.6 A)	13.3 S (2.2 A)	22.0 S (3.7 A)
Acreage Per Capita	4.5 S (0.8 A)	7.4 S (1.2 A)	5.9 S (1.0 A)	4.4 S (0.7 A)	5.9 S (1.0 A)	3.2 S (0.5 A)	2.5 S (0.4 A)	4.1 S (0.7 A)

* The data for 1946 is based on the Statistical Year Book of the Republic of China, Nanking 1948, pp. 70-71. For 1955 data, estimates from the Communist census of 1953 and the People's Republic of China by Provinces, Shanghai, 1953, p. 21.

# Cheng-fu kung-tso Pao-kao hui-pien 1950 [Compendium of Government Reports], 1950, Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1951, pp. 249-57.

x Ibid., pp. 294-95.

(Table 1 faces p. 683)

I. CULTIVATED LAND AND RURAL POPULATION

161 The limited area of arable land in relation to the vast population is one of the chief problems of Chinese agriculture, and the two provinces and two municipalities of North China are not exceptions.[2] The total population of North China, according to the recent census undertaken by the Communists, is 55.76 million.[3] The ratio of population in rural and urban districts is 87 to 13, according to the Communists.[4] A comparison of cultivated land and rural population in the years 1946 and 1955 is presented in the following table:

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[2] J. L. Buck, Land Utilization in China, Chicago, U. of Chicago Press, 1937, pp. 267-69.

[3] Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Nov. 1, 1954.

[4] Tu-pao Shou-ts'e [Newspaper Reading Handbook], Hankow, Ch'ang-chiang jih-pao she, 1950, pp. 679-80.

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161 It is evident from the foregoing table that the average land holding per farm household in the suburban area of Tientsin municipality was only 13.3 shih-mou (2.2 acres) in 1955, the lowest amount in the region. Shansi Province, with 29.3 shih-mou (4.9 acres), was the highest. Compared with the national average per household (15 shih-mou, or 2.5 acres), Hopei is somewhat lower and Shansi is almost 100 per cent higher.[5]

II. THE LAND REFORM MOVEMENT

423 The Land Reform Movement in North China was carried out in two stages: (1) in the old "liberated" areas the program had been completed before the end of 1949 and (2) in the so-called "new areas," land reform began in December 1949 and was all but complete in April 1950. The methods used in land reform in this region, as in Northeast China, differed somewhat from the methods used in other regions. In areas where the redistribution of land had been completed, the

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5. Mao Tze-tung's report on the collectivization movement, Hua-ch'iao Jih-pao [China Daily News], New York, Oct. 28, 1955.

423 peasants were allowed to maintain their status in order to continue production. In "new areas" which had suffered from flood and drought land reform was temporarily postponed. In principle, the property belonging to landlords was confiscated and apportioned among "poor peasants" and "laborers". Landlords who owned small businesses were granted a certain measure of protection so that normal industrial production and trading activities need not be interrupted.

The Communists adapted land reform to the two suburban districts of the municipalities of Peking and Tientsin. In Peking, about 1,105,800 shih-mou (184,600 acres) of cultivated land were divided into seven districts consisting of 180 hsiang (villages), with a total population[6] of 640,000. The land reform program in these districts began in October 1949 and was completed in March 1950. In this area the following measures were introduced: All the land "confiscated" from the landlords was reserved as sites for public buildings and industrial plants. In order to make full use of these lands for productive

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[6] Compendium of Government Reports, 1950, Peking, 1951, pp. 249-57.

423 purposes, the government allowed plots of land to be cultivated by "poor peasants" and "farm laborers". Only a portion of the rented lands of the "rich peasants" was requisitioned; they were allowed to keep as much land as they could work as well as their draft animals, farm tools, and other property. The land, draft animals, farm tools, and other property of the landlords were confiscated; in an effort to persuade them to continue agricultural production, they were given a portion of land and other properties equivalent to that given an ordinary "poor peasant" or "farm laborer".[7]

The whole process of "land reform" in the suburbs of Peking took place in less than six months, and the results were reported to be "satisfactory," meaning, perhaps, without unnecessary violence or civil disturbance. According to the 1950 report on the municipality of Peking, 402,900 shih-mou (67,150 acres) of land, 1,743 draft animals, 69,083 farm tools, 13,320 shih-piculs (732.6 tons) of grain, and 27,278 dwellings and/or "rooms" were confiscated or requisitioned during the "land

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[7] Ibid.

423 reform." [8] The confiscated land was redistributed among 229,892 persons. "Local despots" were arrested and tried in the local People's court. Only a few were sentenced to death; the remainder were imprisoned or set free to engage in productive labor.[9]

The principles of "land reform" as instrumented in the municipality of Peking were adopted for the suburban districts of Tientsin, an area where the total amount of land under cultivation is 160,000 shih-mou (26,667 acres). Of this amount, 107,157 shih-mou (17,859 acres) were confiscated, and some 50,170 shih-mou (8,361 acres) of land were divided among 40,271 persons.[10]

It has been estimated that, during the "land reform" period in North China, some 126.2 million shih-mou (21 million acres) of land, over 252 million farm animals, 2,524 million shih-piculs(about 140,000 tons) of grain, 12.6 million farm implements, and 1.262 million dwellings, including huts and barns, were confiscated or requisitioned.[11]

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[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid., pp. 294-95.

[11] Tsu-kuo Chou-k'an [China Weekly], Hong Kong, March 9, 1953, p. 12.

III. COLLECTIVIZATION

474 The establishment of co-operative organizations is the first step of the so-called "collectivization" movement in Communist China. On December 15, 1951 the Chinese Communist Party announced its intention to organize agricultural producers' co-operatives in the rural areas. The formal promulgation of the order was not issued until December 16, 1953, and by that time some 14,000 co-operatives had been established.[12] The number of agricultural producers' co-operatives increased from 100,000 in the spring of 1954 to over 650,000 in the summer[13] of 1955. The number of peasant households belongong to agricultural producers' co-operatives increased from 1.8 million to 16.9 million during the same period. If this estimate is approximately correct, it would account for almost 15 per cent of all the peasant households in China.[14]

The speed of the development of producers' co-operatives in North China was uneven. A large part of the rural areas in North China had been "liberated" before 1949, and the peasants in this region were more experienced

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12. China Daily News, New York, Oct. 27, 1955.

13. New China News Agency Bulletin, London, Oct. 19, 1955, p. 3.

14. Ibid., p. 4.

474 in "organized farming" and the mutual-aid teams which serve as a foundation for "agricultural co-operation." In Shansi Province, for example, about 41 per cent of the total number of peasant households belonged to producers' co-operatives in 1955; in Hopei Province, approximately 35 per cent.[15] In the summer of 1955, some 3,200,000 peasant households in the North China Region had been organized in approximately 160,000 agricultural producers' co-operatives.

475 In addition to this vast number of producers' co-operatives, there were nine large state farms, twenty district state farms, and about 400 hsien (county) farms, as of 1952, and the number has probably increased since that time, although no recent data is available.[16] Nine of the larger state farms in North China are the subjects of the following table.

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[15] Ibid.

[16] Kung-fei T'u-kai Pen-chih Chi Yen-pien [Land Reform and Its Development in Communist China], Taipei, Sixth Section of the Central Reform Committee of the Kuomintang, 1952, pp. 61-62.

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Table 2. The Leading State Farms in North China (1952)*

(Unit: S = shih-mou A = acres)

Name	Location	Area	Description
Shuang-ch'iao State Farm	Shuang-ch'iao, Tung-hsien, Hopei	2,100 S (350 A)	Mechanized; used for training agricultural students
Wu-li-tien State Farm	Wu-li-tien, Hopei	3,000 S (500 A)	Mechanized
Chi-heng State Farm	Hengshui, Hopei	-	Mechanized
Ch'ing-ho State Farm	Ch'ing-ho, Peking	90,000 S (15,000 A)	Model farm for prisoners; best equipped
Lu-t'ai State Farm	Lu-t'ai, Hopei	52,000 S (8,667 A)	Modern facilities; electrically operated irrigated system

Ch'a-pei State Farm	Chang-chia-k'ou, (Kalgan) Hopei	-	Mechanized
P'ing-yüan Po-ai State Farm	Po-ai, Hopei	-	Mechanized
Hopei Provincial Experimental State Farm	Paoting, Hopei	-	Partly mechanized
Shansi Provincial Experimental State Farm	Taiyuan, Shansi	-	Partly mechanized

* Kung-fei T'u-kai Pen-chih Chi Yen-pien [Land Reform and Its Development in Communist China], Taipei, Sixth Section, Central Reform Committee, Nationalist Party, 1952, pp. 59-60.

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433 In order to effectively promote the movement toward collectivism, Communist propaganda media was used to demonstrate the superiority of co-operative farming over the efforts of individuals. The following table illustrates how the production yields of the agricultural producers' co-operatives in Shansi Province, according to the Communists, compare with those of the mutual-aid teams and individual farms in the same province.

Table 3. Comparison of Production Yields Among Various Farm Groups*

Locality	Farm Groups	Yields of Grain	
		Catties per shih-mou	Pounds per acre
Taiyuan, Shansi	Agricultural Producers' Co-operatives (average 31 units)	267	1,762
	Mutual-aid Teams	-	-
	Individual Farms	247	1,643
Ch'ang-chih, Shansi	Agricultural Producers' Co-operatives (average 984 units)	306	2,019
	Mutual-aid Teams	253	1,670
	Individual Farms	240	1,584

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* *Chugoku keizai nempo* [*Economic Annual of China*], Tokyo, Chugoku Keizai Kenkyujo [Chinese Economic Research Institute], 1954, p. 308.

474 433 The average yield per unit of land of the 31 agricultural producers' co-operatives was about 7 per cent more than that of the individual farms in Taiyuan district in 1953; in Ch'ang-chih district, the average yield per unit of land was 21 per cent more than that of the mutual-aid teams and 27 per cent more than that of the individual farms.

IV. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

243 The dominant factor in the economy of North China is the region's vast output of raw cotton. The production of grains is only secondary; other products such as peanuts, hog bristles, and poultry are also produced in large quantity.

A. Grains

The North China Region produces only 11 per cent of the country's grains. Wheat constituted 24.5 per cent of the region's total grain production[17] in 1953. The production of rice plays only a minor role in the total output of North China since the diet of the local population is unlike the most common in East China and the Central-South Region,

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[17] Ching-chi Tao-pao [Economic Bulletin], Hong Kong, March 10, 1953, p. 12.

243 where the principal food is rice. The general diet in North China consists, in the main, of wheat flour, millet, corn, and koaliang. Of the land in North China planted in various crops in 1946, approximately 46.12 million shih-mou (7.69 million acres) was devoted to millet, and some 37.7 million shih-mou (6,283,000 acres) was given to wheat. The acreage in Shansi and Hopei provinces in 1946 for each of several grains is shown in Table 4.

Table 4. Grain Acreage in North China (1946)*

Unit = 1,000 S = shih-mou
A = acres

	Hopei Province	Shansi Province	Total
Rice	3,186 S (531 A)	257 S (43 A)	3,443 S (574 A)
Wheat	19,393 S (3,232 A)	18,307 S (3,051 A)	37,700 S (6,283 A)
Millet	23,796 S (3,966 A)	22,325 S (3,721 A)	46,121 S (7,687 A)
Corn	23,703 S (3,950 A)	6,530 S (1,088 A)	30,233 S (5,039 A)
Other Grains#	13,584 S (2,264 A)	9,544 S (1,591 A)	23,128 S (3,854 A)
Tubers	3,935S (655 A)	726 S (121 A)	4,661 S (777 A)
Total	87,597 S (14,598 A)	57,689 S (9,615 A)	145,286 S (24,214 A)

* Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien 1948 [The Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China 1948], Nanking, Chu-chi-pu [Director of Budget], 1948, pp. 73-74.

# including kaoliang, barley, oats, peas, and broad beans.

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Table 5. Grain Production in North China

Unit = Million S = shih-piculs
T = tons

Grains	1946*	1949#	1951#	1952x	1953y	1954y	1955z
Rice	5.4 S (0.3 T)	4.4 S (0.2 T)	2.6 S (0 .1 T)	3.2 S (0.2 T)	3.3 S (0.2 T)	3.4 S (0.2 T)	3.5 S (0.2 T)
Wheat	40.5 S (2.0 T)	37.4 S (1.9 T)	70.1 S (3.5 T)	88.2 S (4.4 T)	89.9 S (4.5 T)	91.3 S (4.5 T)	96.2 S (4.8 T)
Soybeans	7.3 S (0.4 T)	6.6 S (0.3 T)	13.1 S (0.7 T)	16.6 S (0.8 T)	16.9 S (0.8 T)	17.1 S (0.9 T)	18.1 S (0.9 T)
Tubers	47.8 S (2.4 T)	46.2 S (2.3 T)	34.3 S (1.7 T)	43.1 S (2.1 T)	44.0 S (2.2 T)	44.8 S (2.2 T)	47.1 S (2.3 T)
Others**	132.6 S (6.6 T)	125.4 S (6.3 T)	165.9 S (8.3 T)	208.7 S (10.4 T)	212.8 S (10.6 T)	216.3 S (10.8 T)	227.8 S (11.4 T)
Total	233.6 S (11.7 T)	220.0 S (11.0 T)	286.0 S (14.3 T)	259.8 S (17.9 T)	366.9 S (18.3 T)	372.9 S (18.6 T)	392.7 S (19.6 T)

* The Statistical Year Book of the Republic of China 1948, Nanking, Director of Budget, 1948, pp. 75, 76.

# Ching-chi Nien-pao 1952 [Economic Year Book 1952], Hong Kong, 1952, pp. 37-38. The production data for various crops were estimated according to the percentage distribution of 1946.

x Economic Bulletin, Hong Kong, March 10, 1953, No. 309, p. 12.

y China Daily News, New York, August 4, 1955, Ch'en Yün's report to the National People's Congress on July 21, 1955. The production data of various crops were calculated on the percentage distribution of 1952.

z Based on Li Hsien-nien's Budget Report of 1955, NCNA, July 28, 1955. The production data of different crops were calculated on the percentage distribution of 1952.

** Including millet, kaoliang, corn, barley, oats, broad beans, and peas.

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243 Production in North China increased during the period 1950-54 under the Communist regime. Production data on various grains are shown in the accompanying table:

243 "Other grains," including millet, corn, and kaoliang, led the list by 6.6 million tons, constituting 60 per cent of the total grain production, whereas the output of wheat constituted only 25 per cent of the entire grain stock in 1954. An upward trend in production has been noticeable since 1951. If 1949 production is assumed to equal 100, total output rose to 130 in 1951, 163 in 1952, 166 in 1953, 169 in 1954 and 178 in 1955.) The steady increase in grain production in North China may, in part, be accounted for by the early liberation of this region and the success of the Communists in completing the "land reform" program early in 1950.

B. The Adequacy of Grain Supply

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243 One of the essential problems in North China is the determination of the adequacy of grain supply relative to local demand. In order to properly approach the problem, the following steps are necessary: (1) data on the gross production of various grains in 1954 were used as the basis for calculation; (2) seed, fodder, and waste of unhusked grains were taken into account, allowed, and deducted; (3) the percentage allowed for the milling of various grains varies according to the local demand and was taken into consideration;

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Table 6. North China Grain Supply in Terms of "Rice-Equivalents" (1954)

Unit = Million

S = shih piculs
T = tons

Grains	Gross Production	Supply After Provision for Seeds, Fodder, and Waste		Supply After Milling		Total Net Supply After Converting Into "Rice-Equivalents"	
		Standard of Conversion*	Quantity	Standard of Conversion	Quantity	Standard of Conversion x	Quantity
Rice	3.4 S (0.2 T)	92.01	31.3 S (1.6 T)	92#	28.8 S (1.4 T)	1.00	28.8 S (1.4 T)
Wheat	91.3 S (4.6 T)	86.47	78.9 S (3.9 T)	80	63.1 S (3.2 T)	1.02	64.4 S (3.2 T)
Soybeans	17.1 S (0.8 T)	81.94	14.0 S (0.7 T)	100	14.0 S (0.7 T)	0.99	13.8 S (0.7 T)
Tubers	44.8 S (2.2 T)	64.00	28.7 S (1.4 T)	100	28.7 S (1.4 T)	0.28	8.0 S (0.4 T)
Others^y	216.3 S (10.8 T)	76.80	166.1 S (8.3 T)	89	147.8 S (7.4 T)	1.00	147.8 S (7.4 T)
Total	372.9 S (18.6 T)		319.0 S (15.9 T)		282.4 S (14.1 T)		262.8 S (13.1 T)

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* FAO Balance Sheet for 1931-37, compiled from FAO World Food Survey, Food Balance Sheet for China, 1931-33.

# The official milling standard for rice, as announced by Chinese Communists, is 92, and this figure has been used for the present calculations.

x Derived from the quantity of calories of various grains and tubers using the standard set by FAO, United Nations; 3,430 calories equal to one kilogram (2.2 lbs or 2 Chinese catties) of rice as the basis of calculation.

y Including corn, kaoliang, barley, millet, oats, broad beans, and peas.

433 243 (4) after reducing all the unhusked grains to milled products available for human consumption, it was necessary to convert all the various grains other than rice into "rice-equivalents," based on specific standards; (5) in calculating the total demand for grain, it was advisable to convert the real population of North China, regardless of age or sex, into the equivalent number of "adult males." These steps were followed in order to construct Table 6, which follows:

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Table 7. North China's Population
(In Terms of Equivalents of Adult-Males)*

Location	Population	Population in Equivalents of Adult-males
Hopei	35,984,644	29,507,408
Shansi	14,314,485	11,737,878
Peking	2,768,149	2,269,882
Tientsin	2,683,831	2,208,941
Total	55,761,109	45,724,109

* In making this conversion, the co-efficient 0.82 is used. It represents the mean between 0.76 derived by C. M. Chiao in his work China's Food and Population Problem, Shanghai, 1937, and 0.88 worked out by T. H. Shen in his book Agricultural Resources of China, New York, 1951.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF12 North China
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AF 12

243 433 Using as a basis for calculation the statistics quoted in Tables 6 and 7, we can say that the total supply of "rice-equivalent" grains available for consumption in North China in 1954 was 262.8 million shih-piculs (13.1 million metric tons). If we use a basis for calculation the Wu formula of 217 metric tons of milled "rice-equivalent" grains for each 1,000 "adult males" per year,[18] the total amount of "rice-equivalent" grains required to supply the 45.7 million "adult males" in North China in 1954 was 9.8 million tons (10.8 million short tons) whereas the total supply of "rice-equivalent" grains in the same year was 13.1 million metric tons (14.4 million short tons), giving a surplus of 3.6 million tons of "rice-equivalent" grains in North China in 1954.

C. Cotton Production

248 During the first five years of the Communist regime, cotton production in North China showed a considerable growth, although there was some fluctuation. Statistical data on cotton production in this region is compiled in the following table:

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[18] Yuan-li Wu, An Economic Survey of Communist China, New York, Bookman Associates, 1956, p. 165.

Table 8. Cotton Production in North China*

Year	Hopei Province		Shansi Province		Total	
	Shih-piculs (1,000)	Bales (1,000)	Shih-piculs (1,000)	Bales (1,000)	Shih-piculs (1,000)	Bales (1,000)
1949	2,950	676	362	83	3,321	759
1952	8,924	2,144	807	185	9,731	2,329
1953	8,023	1,839	778	178	8,801	2,017
1954	7,221	1,655	700	160	7,921	1,815
1955	8,709	1,996	844	193	9,553	2,189

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* Estimated and compiled from the following sources: Economic Bulletin, Hong Kong, October 1, 1954, p. 4; Hsin Chien-she [New Construction], Peking, Kuang-ming jih-pao she, July 16, 1950, p. 30; Li Hsien-nien, Budget Report 1955, New China News Agency, Peking, July 8, 1955; Hua Shu"Chung-kuo Ti Mien-hua Sheng-ch'an Wen-ti" [The Chinese Cotton Production Problem"], New Construction, May 3, 1955, pp. 47-53.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF12 North China
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248 It is evident that raw cotton production has shown an upward trend since 1949, although some fluctuation has been noted. If 1949 production is assumed to equal 100, production rose to 307 in 1952, 266 in 1953, 239 in 1954, and 288 in 1955. Two possible reasons account for the fall in cotton production since 1952. First, the parity price between cotton and grain was reduced in 1953; secondly, although the ratio of cotton and grain prices was adjusted in 1954, the output of cotton was even lower than that of the previous year in consequence of the drought and insect invasions to which the North China Region was subject. The production target set by the Communists for 1955 was 20 per cent above that for 1954. In view of the favorable climatic conditions which prevailed throughout the year, this goal may have been realized.

There have been increases in the total amount of land devoted to cotton production in North China since 1949, although the upward trend has not by any means been consistent. The growth of cotton acreage is illustrated in the following table.

Table 9. Cotton Acreage in North China*

Year	Hopei Province		Shansi Province		Total	
	Shih-mou (1,000)	Acres (1,000)	Shih-mou (1,000)	Acres (1,000)	Shih-mou (1,000)	Acres (1,000)
1949	12,054	2,009	2,178	363	14,232	2,372
1952	20,646	3,441	1,968	328	22,614	3,769
1953	16,289	2,714	1,890	315	18,179	3,029
1954	17,200	2,867	2,004	334	19,204	3,201
1955	20,743	3,457	2,418	403	23,161	3,860

* Estimated from the following sources: New Construction, Peking, July 11, 1950, p. 30; May 3, 1955, pp. 47-53; People's Daily, July 24, 1955; Economic Bulletin, Hong Kong, September 13, 1954, p. 4; October 1, 1954, p. 4.

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1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF12 North China
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AF 12

243 The sudden jump in the amount of
248 acreage planted in cotton in North China was
433 probably caused by the adjustment of a
435 favorable parity price between cotton and
grain and the improvement of unit area yield. The effect of the changes in the parity prices was reflected very sensitively by changes in cotton acreage. The prices which were quoted in grains in various crop regions are shown in the following table:

Table 10. The Ratio of Cotton Prices to Grains*
(in weight-units of grain to one unit of cotton lint, 7/8" grade)

Region	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955
Wheat Region	7.0	8.0	7.5-8.5	6.25-7.5	6.75-8.00	6.75-8.00
Millet Region	8.0	8.5	8.0-9.5	6.75-8.0	7.50-8.25	7.50-8.25
Rice Region	6.5	8.5	8.0-9.0	6.75-8.0	7.25-8.25	7.25-8.25

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* Newspaper Reading Handbook, Hankow, 1950, p. 574. Ching-chi Chou-pao [Economic Weekly], Shanghai, May 28, 1953, p. 21; New China News Agency, March 3, 1954.

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1:Stanford U, S-4, 5 1956 AF12 North China
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243 248 Some sections of the provinces of Shansi and Hopei are wheat-producing regions and some are millet regions. In 1953, when parity prices were lowered, the acreage planted in cotton dropped correspondingly. In an effort to increase the average cotton yield per unit of land, the Communists promoted the so-called "bumper harvest" campaign. One of their devices for encouraging intensive cultivation was the public recognition promised "model producers," including those who had discovered means to increase per-unit yield. In 1952, the Wu Ch'un-an Agricultural Producers' Co-operative in Shansi Province established a record of 1,021 catties per shih-mou (3.4 tons per acre).[19] The average yield in Shansi Province in that year was only 41 catties per shih-mou (271 lbs. per acre). The average cotton yield per unit of land during 1949-55 is shown in Table 11.

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[19] New Construction, Peking, May 3, 1955, p. 50.

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Table 11. Cotton Yield in North China*

	Hopei Province		Shansi Province		National Average#
	Catties per shih-mou	Pounds per acre	Catties per shih-mou	Pounds per acre	Pounds per acre
1949	25	162	17	110	141
1952	41	271	41	271	203
1953	33	218	46	336	216
1954	34	224	46	336	-
1955	39	257	46	336	-
5 year Average	34	226	39	278	

* Estimated from the following sources: Hua Shu, Chung-kuo Ti Mien-hua Sheng-ch'an Wen-t'i [The Chinese Cotton Production Problem], Hsin-chien-she [New Construction], Peking, Kuang-ming jih-pao she, May 3, 1955, pp. 47-53; People's Daily, January 27, 1950; Survey of China Mainland Press, August 17, 1954, p. 29.

# New Construction, Peking, May 3, 1955, p. 52.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF12 North China
AF12

248 The average yield of cotton in Shansi Province is greater than that in Hopei, possibly because drought and pests have damaged the cotton crops in Hopei since 1952. There have been comparatively fewer natural calamities in Shansi. If we compare production in North China with average national yields in the same period, North China produced more in 1952 (33%) and 1953 (55%) and less in 1949 (about 22%).

D. Other Agricultural Products

244 Hopei Province produces a large quantity of peanuts, since the loamy soil found in some parts of Hopei is well-suited to their cultivation. The yearly crop is second only to that of Shantung Province. Some seventy years ago an American missionary brought into China the large-grained American species of peanut which yields large crops of excellent quality. In 1949, the total production of peanuts in Hopei was 6.521 million shih-piculs (358,655 tons).[20] (Data on production since 1949 is not available.) Peanuts are one of the

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[20] Chinese Economic Journal, Shanghai, Bureau of Foreign Trade, September 1936, p. 257.

244 important oil-bearing crops in China. The rationing of edible oils was introduced in China in 1953, and since that time farmers have been encouraged to devote additional acreage to peanut crops.

237 North China also produces a considerable supply of hog bristles. Hsü-ko-chuang, Feng-jun district, Hopei, is the center for bristle collection. At Hsü-ko-chuang the bristles are graded and packed before shipment to Tientsin for export.

235 Among the poultry products of North China, the Peking duck is known for its superior quality. It has creamy white feathers and yellow beak and is raised in a few small rivers near the Jade Spring Mountain, a suburb of Peking. The female weighs about 5.5 pounds, the male anywhere from 6 to 8 pounds. It is forcibly fed pellets of grain and bean flour during the fattening period.[21]

V. FISH

226 Ten hsien along the Hopei seacoast produce an abundance of fish. There are two

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[21] T. H. Shen, Agricultural Resources of China, New York, 1951.

226 principal offshore fishing areas, Chinwangtao and Sha-l'ei-t'ien. Many species of fish as well as shrimp, lobster, and crab are caught in large quantities in these fishing areas. Fresh-water fish are caught in the Ta-ch'ing River, the Pai River, and the Yung-ting River in Hopei Province. Fresh fish and shrimps are shipped to Peking and Tientsin for local consumption. Some are salted and dried for local consumption and for export.[22]

VI. IRRIGATION AND OTHER TECHNICAL IMPROVEMENTS

312 In November 1949, the Communists drafted a plan to control the Yung-ting River, which often floods the surrounding countryside, and to develop the water resources in the valley of the Yung-ting. The key problem on the upper reaches of the river is soil conservation. Because so much soil is washed down from the mountains and hillsides and chokes the main tributaries of the river, a large afforestation program has been launched.[23] However, to solve the major problem of the troublesome

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[22] Pao-shu Chang, *Chung-kuo Yü-yeh* [*China's Fishery*], Taipei, 1954, pp. 27-34.

[23] *Economic Year Book 1954,* Hong Kong Ching-chi Tao-pao she, 1954, p. 55.

3/2 Yung-ting, flood detention basins must be constructed on the middle courses. The Chinese Communist regime planned the construction of three flood detention basins; the reservoir at Kuan-ting, completed in 1954, is the most important. It serves to control flood waters, stores water for irrigation and for navigation, supplies drinking water to Peking, and is a source of power for the generation of electricity. If we estimate the benefits in irrigation alone, the reservoir, in addition to safeguarding some 800,000 shih-mou (133,333 acres) from the possibility of flood, has helped to increase the land under irrigation by some 2,000,000 shih-mou (333,333 acres).[24] The Fen River Flood Control System in Shansi Province, completed in August 1955, has increased the amount of irrigated farm land by 1,600,000 shih-mou (266,667 acres).[25]

2/2 Other factors which have tended to increase agricultural production are a number of technical improvements introduced in the cotton-growing regions of North China. The

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[24] Ibid.

[25] Hua-chiao Jih-pao [China Daily News], New York, Aug. 3, 1955.

242 Communist regime, the Communists assert, has provided the farmers with modern farming implements, a quantity of seeds of good quality, and bean cake and chemical fertilizers. Methods have been developed to combat locust invasions, which have plagued China for more than 2,500 years.[26] In 1951, locusts swarmed over 15 million acres in Hopei and neighboring provinces; in 1952, locusts swarmed on an additional 3 million acres, destroying crops. The Communists organized teams of peasants and equipped them with benzine hexachloride powder, other insecticides, and equipment. In 1953, planes were used to spray the crops. The Communists assert that the threat of locusts no longer plague the Chinese farmer.[27]

407 If the Chinese farmer has been furnished with modern farm implements -- or has the use of such instruments, owned by the local producers' co-operative or mutual-aid team -- there is a possibility that efficiency has increased as the Communists insist. It has been reported that the North China Agricultural Machinery Works, on the outskirts of Peking,

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[26] People's China, Peking, Sept. 1, 1953, p. 26.

[27] Ibid., p. 27.

407 is manufacturing many types of farm implements, including horse-drawn ploughs, cultivators, reapers, rice-threshers, corn shellers, silage cutters, water wheels, and water pumps, which are first tested in the fields before being produced in quantity.[28] The new plough, it is reported, is light, ploughs deeper, does a better job of turning up the soil, and is easier to handle than the old. It can aid in increasing crop yields from 16 per cent to 44 per cent. The three-bladed cultivator can weed four times as fast as the hoe, and the mechanical reaper is twenty times as efficient as the sickle. Of course these reports of increased efficiency are derived from a Communist source.[29]

248 The so-called "advanced Soviet method" used in the close-planting of cotton is now practiced in North China as in other regions, according to Communist reports.[30] For example, the Communists say that Shuangch'iao State Farm, in the eastern suburbs of Peking, harvested between 20 per cent and 30 per cent more cotton when the number of cotton plants per hectare were increased from 30,000

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[28] Ibid., p. 28.
[29] Ibid., July 1, 1954, p. 25.
[30] Ibid., Feb. 16, 1954, p. 18.

348 (7, 500 per acre) to 45, 000 (11, 250 per acre) to 67, 500 (16, 875 per acre).[31]

VII. COMMENTS

464 668 166 In the spring of 1955, the "Back-to-the-Villages Campaign was launched in most of the large cities in China in an effort to persuade or force peasants to return to the rural districts. Many peasants, dissatisfied with the rigorous demands made upon them and the arduous life on the farms, had abandoned farming and gone to the cities in search of an easier livelihood. Although conditions in North China are not as discouraging as in the East and Central-South China regions, the fixing of production quotas (often increased arbitrarily), the collection of grain tax (always a heavy drain on the farmer). and the forced sale of grain (at fixed prices) to the government have exerted a tremendous burden on the poor farmer. Communist cadres have attempted to foist agricultural producers' co-operatives upon the rural masses, who found no way of expressing their resentment or reluctance at this forced change in their farming methods except by abandoning their plots of land and seeking work in areas less

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[31] Ibid.

464 strictly controlled. Most of the peasants
668 who fled to the cities found it difficult to make
a living, since industry cannot quickly absorb
166 inexperienced workers. Another serious problem caused by the increase of city populations was the subsequent need for grain-rationing. Furthermore, prices are relatively higher in the city, and this fact alone may tend to drive the unemployed to rural districts where the danger of starvation is not so immediately felt. However, it is doubtful if these serious problems can be solved by the Back-to-the-Villages Campaign, unless the Communists recognize the need to modify the severity of their rural policies.

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
NORTH CHINA
INDUSTRY
Scale in Miles
0
50
100
112
116
120
40
36
A
B
Kalgan 7
3 Lung-yen
2 Hsüan-hua
4 Kuan-t'ing
2, 3, 7 Ta-t'ung
Men-t'ou-kou 2
Shih-ching-shan
1, 4, 6, 7, 8 Peking
2 Kailan
1, 4, 5 Tangshan
4 T'ung-chou
Liu-li-ho 5
Tientsin 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
Tangku 5
5 Taku
6 Shihchiachuang
5 Ching-hsing
Taiyuan 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
Yang-ch'üan 1, 2
7 Yü-tz'u
6 Han-tan
Feng-feng 2
Chang-chih 2
(Lu-an)
PROVINCES
A Shansi
B Hopei
1 Iron and Steel
2 Coal Mining
3 Iron Mining
4 Electric Power
5 Chemical Industry
6 Cotton Textiles
7 Machinery Industry
8 Flour

[Facing p. 718-A]


NORTH CHINA
METALLIC ORE
Scale in Miles
0 50 100
1 Gold
2 Lead
3 Copper
4 Iron
5 Zinc
PROVINCES
A-Shensi
B-Hopei
A
B
112
116
120
40
38

[Facing p. 718--B]

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
NORTH CHINA
NON-METALLIC ORES
Scale in Miles
0 50 100
PROVINCES
A. Shansi
B. Hopei
NON-METALLIC ORES
1. Coal
2. Petroleum
3. Phosperous
4. Sulphate
5. Rock Salt
6. Asbestos
7. Graphite
8. Barites
A
B
112
116
120
40
38

[Facing p. 718-c]

Annex "A," Subparagraph 3b,
Economic Background

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

I. MINERAL RESERVES

135 As geological survey and mineral prospecting continue, knowledge about the volume and nature of China's underground resources undergoes a continual change. The following account of North China's mineral reserves is an apt illustration of this situation.

Generally speaking, Hopei and Shansi are not particularly well endowed in terms of most minera resources. On the basis of 1947 data,[1] iron ore reserves in Hopei, Shansi, and the former provinc of Chahar, the iron producing area of which has now been incorporated into Hopei, totaled only 767 million short tons, which may be compared with an estimated minimum national reserve of 5,976 million tons, or under 13 per cent. Hopei has some bauxite; aluminum is reported to be producec both in Shansi and Hopei; and the Hopei salt fields rank first in the country's salt production. But there is relatively little copper except some small deposits in Shansi,[2] practically none of the ferro-alloy metals such as manganese, chrome,

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[1] Bureau of Information, K'ang-t'ieh [Iron and Steel], Nanking, 1947, pp. 6-15; and Geologica Survey of China, General Statement on the Mining Industry, 7th issue, Chungking, 1945, pp. 88-9; and Chung-hua Nien-chien [Chinese Yearbook], Vol. II, Nanking, 1948, p. 1,568.

[2] Geological Survey of China, General Statement on the Mining Industry, 7th issue, passi Chungking, 1945.

135 and nickel, and few known deposits of lead and zinc. Moreover, there is no known petroleum deposit in this area.

This relative paucity in many mineral resources would have made Hopei and Shansi industrially unimportant for Communist China but for some other considerations.

First of all, Hopei and Shansi are by no means required to develop as a separate entity independently of the rest of the Chinese economy. For instance, the newly discovered iron ore reserves at Pao-t'ou, present terminus of the Peking-Suiyuan Railway, are close at hand. The discovery of mineral reserves in Northwest China as a result of stepped-up geological explorations would open up new vistas for industry in Hopei and Shansi.

In the second place, Hopei and Shansi contain a large part of China's known coal reserves. According to the 1948 Statistical Yearbook,[3] about 50 per cent of the country's total coal reserve is found in present Hopei and Shansi. However, this ratio was based on a total reserve of 282.4 billion tons only. Another Nationalist report, which took into account certain later discoveries, gave a total reserve figure of 330.6 billion tons for present Hopei and Shansi alone.[4]

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[3] Bureau of Statistics, Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien [Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China] , Nanking, 1948, pp. 106-107.

[4] Yuan-li Wu, An Economic Survey of Communist China, New York, Bookman Associates, 1956, p. 26.

135 According to Sun Chin-chih, a noted geographer in Communist China, as a result of revised estimates and new discoveries under the Communist regime China's known coal reserves have been boosted to not less than 1,100 billion tons.[5] Even if the figure for Hopei and Shansi had not bee revised upward at the same time, which is unlikely, it would still amount to 30 per cent of the country's coal reserve.

Finally, it should be noted that, although according to earlier statistics the North China Region did not appear to be rich in iron ore from the point of view of the country as a whole, nevertheless on the basis of Nationalist data it accounted for 767 million tons out of a total of 2,044 million tons attributed to China proper (i.e., excluding Manchuria).[6] A Communist report in 1953, however, stated that China's total iron ore reserve had been revised upward to 7,456 million tons (later revised to 11 billion tons). The same report also claimed that new discoveries at the Lung-yen mine in former Chahar (present Hopei) had placed its reserve second only to the Anshan

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[5] Sun Chin-chih, Chung-kuo Kung-yeh-hua Ti T li T'iao-chien [The Geographical Conditions of China Industrialization], Peking, All-China Association for the Popularization of Science and Technology, 1955, p. 15.

[6] Iron and Steel, pp. 6-15; General Statement on the Mining Industry, pp. 88-9; and Chinese Yearbook, Vol. II, Nanking, 1948, p. 1,568.

135 deposit, and that Hopei's iron ore reserve was now second only to that of Manchuria.[7]

II. BASIS FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

In spite of certain deficiencies, the two North China provinces possess the basic natural resources for industrial development, viz., coal and iron, in relative abundance. In addition, Hopei's salt fields and large cotton production are especially favorable to the development of the chemical and textile industries.

471 Nor should one overlook the historical background which has contributed to industrial development in this area. The role of Tientsin as a major treaty port, followed by its intensive development under the Japanese, led to the establishment of certain industrial enterprises in the Tientsin-Peking-Tangshan triangle prior to the ascendancy of the Communists. In the province of Shansi, on the other hand, a nucleus of heavy industries was formed under the former warlord and provincial governor, Yen Hsi-shan, who was intent on building up the economy of Shansi in the period before the war with Japan.

Given such a historical setting and physical background, it is only natural for the Communist regime to regard North China as a major area for industrial development. By developing North

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[7] Ching-chi Chou-pao [Economic Weekly], Shanghai, No. 15, April 1953, p. 3.

471 China intensively, the Communists apparently hope to establish not only an industrial base this side of the Great Wall both to complement and to balance the industrial redoubt that is Manchuria, but also to furnish an advance base for the exploitation of the potential of the reputedly fabulous Northwest. Since the political center of gravity of Communist China now rests in North China, this economic reasoning would appear to be in line with the Communists' political thinking.

III. DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS UNDER THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN

185 The relative weight given to North China in industrial development may be seen in some of the construction projects scheduled under Communist China's First Five-Year Plan. According to one survey, which lists 144 construction projects other than the cotton textile industry and some of the coal mines, 12 major constructions are credited to North China, second only to Manchuria's 95, which represent the lion's share.[8] These projects include the Lung-yen iron mine, the Kailan, Ta-t'ung, and Feng-feng coal mines, power plants at Tientsin, Taiyuan, and T'ung-chou, and ordnance plants at Taiyuan and Chin-yüan. This list of major constructions is, of course, not exhaustive and would be much longer if the many new cotton mills were included. The following

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[8] Yuan-li Wu, op. cit., pp. 265-69.

185 survey will serve to provide more particulars about some of the individual industries.

IV. SURVEY OF SELECTED INDUSTRIES

316 A. Coal Mining

North China accounts for a large part of Communist China's coal production outside Manchuria. This situation is clearly illustrated by the following figures, comparing the region's coal output with that of China proper as well as with that of the Chinese Mainland as a whole.[9]

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[9] New China News Agency (NCNA), Dec. 28, 1953; Ti Ch'ao-pai, "I Nien-lai Ti Chung-kuo Ching-chi Ch'ing-k'uang," ["Communist China's Economic Conditions in the Past Year,"], Economic Weekly, Jan., 1950, p. 7; Chung-kuo Kung-yeh [China's Industry] , Shanghai, Mar. 17, 1950, p. 18.

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Coal Production
(in thousand short tons)

Year	North China	China Proper	Mainland China
1949	6,749	17,050	28,600
1950	8,621	23,660	37,752
1951	12,042	31,249	46,904
1952	14,974	37,420	57,772
1953	17,347	40,389	62,920
1954	21,683	64,733	90,189

Thus during 1953, the first year of the current Five-Year Plan, 42 per cent of the coal produced in China proper, or 36 per cent of that produced on the entire Mainland, was contributed by North China. These ratios dropped slightly during 1954 following the expansion of Manchuria production, but they were nevertheless very large.

The principal coal mines of North China in Hopei Province are Kailan, Ching-hsing, Feng-feng, and Men-t'ou-kou; and in Shansi Province, Ta-t'ung, Yang-ch'üan, and Lu-an. According to a 1954 report, 32 coal shafts, some of which were in reconditioned existing mines, would come into full operation by 1957, and thereby, it is claimed, doubling the 1953 output of the region's stateowned mines, i.e., all of the large ones. Included in the expansion program were those at Kailan, Ta-t'ung, and Feng-feng, as mentioned earlie

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10. NCNA, March 19, 1954.

316 This statement appears to be in line with an earlier report which mentioned a plan to increase North China's coal production at an average rate of 25 per cent per annum between 1953 and 1957.[11] The over-all increase in coal production is to be accompanied by a probably greater increase in coke for the country's expanding iron and steel industry.

The largest coal mine of the area is at Kailan, which accounted for 10 per cent of the country's coal output during 1953, i.e., about 6.6 million tons. Most of the output is shipped to such urban centers as Peking, Tientsin, Wuhan, Shanghai, Nanking, and Tsingtao to serve as industrial and household fuel. Shipments are also made to the Anshan Iron and Steel Works in Manchuria for coking.[12] Some export was reported during 1953, although, unlike the pre-war years, the volume was small. A general program to modernize the technique and organization of coal mining in the country was initially introduced at Kailan in 1954. More than 85 per cent of the total output at the mine, it is reported, is now cut by machinery, while underground transportation and ventilation have also been somewhat improved. The official plan seems to aim at raising the mine's output to around 13.2 million tons by 1957.[13]

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[11] Ching-chi Tao-pao [Economic Bulletin], Hong Kong, No. 50, Dec. 1953, pp. 4-5.

[12] Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, Dec. 19, 1953.

[13] Ibid., April 15, 1955.

3/6 The Ta-t'ung coal field in Shansi, one of the principal expansion projects under the Five-Year Plan, has eight mines, the largest of which is said to have been destroyed at the end of World War II. According to Communist sources,[14] rehabilitation of this mine was completed during 1954 and hand-hewing is said to have been done away with. The latter development probably contributed to an alleged 45 per cent increase in Ta-t'ung's coal production in 1954 over that of the preceding year.[15] The 1954 output may be roughly estimated at 7 million short tons,[16] and thus is fast approaching the production of Kailan. As may be seen from the production estimates, the mines at Kailan and Ta-t'ung together are responsible for the bulk of North China's coal production. The Ta-t'ung output is of particular significance to the expanding machinery and metallurgical industries at Taiyuan.

The Feng-feng coal mine, which produced around 2.2 million tons of coal in 1953,[17] is a much smaller mine than either Ta-t'ung or Kailan. However, it is being rapidly enlarged, the Communists say, to become one of China's largest high-grade coking coal production centers. During 1954 four pits were enlarged, two others

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[14] Taiyuan, NCNA Nov. 27, 1953, and Far Eastern Economic Review, Feb. 10, 1955, p. 73.

[15] NCNA, Taiyuan Mar. 13, 1954.

[16] People's China, No. 7, April 1, 1955. pp. 31-33.

[17] NCNA, Dec. 18, 1953.

3/6 were reconditioned, and an abandoned pit was reopened. The Communists expect the output at Feng-feng to reach over 6.6 million tons a year upon completion of the present program.[18]

B. Electric Power

377 The abundance of coal in North China means that a regional fuel shortage is not likely to develop, which in turn assures the continued operation of the area's electric power and light industry, as virtually all the power plants are thermal plants. The only hydro-electric plant is located at the Kuan-t'ing Reservoir, 75 kilometers(45.6 mi.) northwest of Peking.

At the time the Communists took over North China, the total generating capacity in the region was rated at approximately 164.5 thousand kilowatts, the principal plant being located at Tientsin, Tangshan, Peking, and Taiyuan. The rated capacity in 1953 was probably about 209,000 kilowatts or about 19 per cent of the rated capacity on the Mainland, excluding Manchuria.[19]

The expansion of capacity now under way includes power plants at Tientsin, Taiyuan and T'ung-chou. A 20 per cent increase in generating capacity was said to have been recorded at

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[18] NCNA Feb. 19, 1954.

[19] NCNA Peking, Jan. 11, 1954; Wen-hui Pao [Wen-hui Daily], Hong Kong, Aug. 26, 1953.

377 Tientsin during 1954.[20] The new Taiyuan power plant, which is to be the largest thermal plant in China, is scheduled for completion in 1957. The plant was to be in partial operation in 1955.[21] A 130 kilometer (81.3 mi.) 110,000 volt transmission line now links Peking to Tientsin and Tangshan.[22] The Kuan-t'ing hydroplant will also be connected to this network.

The electric power industry of Communist China has been plagued by obsolete equipment, technical inefficiency, and a high incidence of accidents. The North China plants have not been an exception to this situation, and official Communist reports have invariably stressed the need to step up the rate of equipment utilization, to minimize line loss of coal consumption, to substitute low grade for high grade coal wherever possible, to ration household consumption of electricity, and to stagger the power load of industrial users. The new and expanded power plants and their geographical concentration in the Peking Tientsin and Taiyuan areas must be viewed in this light.

C. Iron and Steel

327 The two principal centers of North China's modern iron and steel industry are located at Taiyuan

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[20] NCNA, Tientsin, Jan. 22, 1954.

[21] NCNA, Mar. 18, 1954.

[22] NCNA, Mar. 18, 1954.

in Shansi and the Peking-Tientsin-Tangshan area in Hopei. Pig iron is produced at the Shih-ching-shan Iron and Steel Works near Peking, the Northwest Iron and Steel Works at Taiyuan and the Yang-ch'üan Iron Works at Yang-ch'üan in Shansi Province.

The Shih-ching-shan plant originally possessed three blast furnaces. Beginning in July 1949, operation was resumed, with a damaged 275-short-ton furnace producing 110 to 165 tons of pig iron a day. According to Communist reports, the daily output increased to 220 tons in early 1950, and later to 385 tons. A 418 ton capacity furnace was then being repaired while 660-ton furnace was being converted to 440-ton capacity. A later Communist report alleged that the output of pig iron at Shih-ching-shan in 1952 was 529 per cent over the highest record scored under Japanese occupation.[23] The plant derives its iron ore from Lung-yen in former Chahar and its coal from Kai-lan, Ching-hsing, and Yang-ch'üan. Its total coking equipment, as reported in 1949, consisted of four batteries of 25 Semet-Solvay wasteheat ovens each and one regenerator coke-oven with a daily capacity of 220 tons.

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[23] Tu-pao Shou-ts'e [Newspaper Reading Handbook], Hankow, 1950, p. 511; China's Industry, Jan. 17, 1950, pp. 26-55; Feb. 1950, pp. 15-16 Hsin-hua Yüeh-pao [New China Monthly], Nov. 15, 1949, p. 112; NCNA, Peking, Mar. 20, 1953; Economic Weekly, 1953, No. 10, p. 17.

327 The northwest Iron and Steel Works was originally equipped with three 44-ton and one 132-ton blast furnaces, which were taken intact by the Communists. The output of pig iron in 1952 was said to be equal to at least 270 per cent of the record output under Japanese occupation. The plant is also equipped with one or two batteries of coke ovens. Little recent information is available on the iron works at Yang-ch'üan, which originally had three small blast furnaces.[24]

In the field of steel production, the Northwest Iron and Steel Works is probably the largest works in North China and was originally equipped with three 33-short ton open hearth furnaces, one 600-mm. large rolling mill, and one small rolling mill. Light steel rails were produced at this plant and attempts were made to convert the rolling mill to the production of heavy rails. Production of all steel and steel products in 1953 probably amounted to 15,400-16,500 tons a month.[25]

The Tangshan Steel Works, which derives its pig iron from Shih-ching-shan, was equipped with

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[24] Ibid.

[25] Ching-chi Ts'an-k'ao Tzu-liao [Reference Materials on Economics], No. 29, July 1952, p. 7; China's Industry, Feb. 1950, p. 15; Ta-kung Daily, Dec. 23, 1952; Shan-hsi Jih-pao [Shansi Daily], Taiyuan, Jan. 6, 1954.

327 two furnaces and one rolling mill in 1949. The plant was subsequently expanded and a 58 per cent increase in ingot capacity was reported during 1954.[26] Steel bars and angles and tool steel are produced at the plant in addition to ingots.

The third steel plant in North China is the Tientsin Iron and Steel Works, which also derives its pig iron supply from Shih-ching-shan. It was originally equipped with one open-hearth furnace, two electric furnaces, and four rolling mills. Only one rolling mill, however, was reported to be in existence in 1949 when the Communists took over. One additional bar mill was said to have been restored to operation in 1953. Among the finished products are round and flat steel blooms and spring and crucible steel wire.[27]

D. Machinery Manufacturing

402 The development of a machinery industry in North China has very naturally taken place at the iron and steel centers at Taiyuan and in the Tientsin-Peking area.

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[26] NCNA, Tangshan, July 5, 1954.

[27] China's Industry, Feb. 1950, p. 15; Chin-pu Jih-pao [Progress Daily] , Tientsin, Dec. 25, 1952; NCNA, Tangshan, Dec. 4, 1953; NCNA, Peking, Feb. 16, 1954.

402 A heavy-machinery plant to produce large metal-cutting machines, coke ovens, overhead cranes, etc., has been under construction at Taiyuan since 1953.[28] Also reported under construction are repair plants for mining equipment at Taiyuan and Ta-t'ung.[29] The largest textile machinery plant in Communist China is located at Tientsin, while Peking is said to have a large machine-tool plant under construction, as well as a farm machinery plant reported to have manufactured the first combine harvester in China.[30] A mining machinery plant has also been reported at Kalgan.

However, the entire machinery industry of North China is in its infancy and the bulk of the country's production is still concentrated in Manchuria, especially at Shen-yang (Mukden).

E. Cement Production

339 In the constuction field two of the principal cement plants are located at Liu-li-ho and Tangshan, both in Hopei Province. There is also a smaller plant at Taiyuan. Another plant located at Ta-t'ung, reportedly destroyed at the end of World War II, was put back into operation in January 1955, while a large new mechanized

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[28] Wen-hui Daily, Hong Kong, June 20, 1953.

[29] Cheng Chu-yüan, Chung-kung Wu-nien Chi-hua P'ou-hsi [An Analysis of Chinese Communist First Five-Year Plan] Hong Kong, July 1955, p. 40.

[30] NCNA, Dec. 19, 1953 and April 12, 1955.

339 plant was under construction in the same city.[31] Completion of the latter plant would greatly enhance the importance of Ta-t'ung as a cement production center. Such a development would be highly advantageous for construction work in North and Northwest China and would make available more cement for export to Manchuria from North China.

F. The Chemical Industry

385 Since Hopei ranks first in China's salt production, the province has also developed a chemical industry, based, in the first place, on salt. The present Yung-li Company, largest manufacturer of chemicals, grew out of the Chiu-ta Salt Refinery, and the latter's name suggests its chief product.

Before the war with Japan, Yung-li had an annual capacity of 77,000 tons of soda ash and 11,000 tons of caustic soda. Production was expanded during the war and the products included soda ash, caustic soda, ammonium sulphate and chlorine gas.[32] The company was placed under joint management by the Communist government in 1952. The annual rate of soda ash production,

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[31] Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, Feb. 10, 1955, p. 172.

[32] Yuan-li Wu, op. cit., pp. 300-301.

385 approximately 264, 000 tons in 1952, was reported to be 400 per cent greater than the peak output under the Japanese, and production of ammonium sulphate in the same year was estimated at 170 per cent of the prewar peak.

Two other chemical manufacturers came on the scene at Tangku and Han-ku during the Japanese occupation. Taken over first by the Nationalists, then by the Communists, these firms, together with two other former Japanese concerns, have become through amalgamation the second largest chemical manufacturer in Tientsin. Production shortly after the Communist occupation included solid caustic soda, magnesium hydroxide, magnesium chloride, sodium sulphate, cyanogin sulphide, hydrochloric acid, glue, bleaching powder soap, gypsum, salt, and bone meal.[33]

Outside Hopei, some chemical plants are believed to be under construction at Taiyuan. But Tientsin remains the center of North China's chemical industry as well as the major chemical production center outside Manchuria.

C. Cotton Textiles

288 Heavy industry is gradually increasing in North China. In the meantime, however, further

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[33] Ibid.

expansion of the region's cotton textile industry has also been carried out under the Communist regime. This development has taken place on the basis of an existing textile industry, of which Tientsin is a major national center. It has been given particular impetus in this area because of the desire for self-sufficiency in the supply of cotton textiles, the cessation of cotton imports which is so fervently hoped for by the Communists and the consequent location of new cotton mills in areas close to cotton supply.

At the time of Communist occupation, North China accounted for about one-tenth of Mainland China's 5.1 million spindles and about 17 per cent of the country's 67,000 machine looms.[34] Since North China usually produces 40 per cent of Mainland China's raw cotton, it is only natural for the new mills to be located in North China, as well as in other cotton surplus areas. According to a compilation of data on new cotton mills,[35] of some 23 cotton mills established or under construction during 1951-54, Hopei accounted for six Construction of two additional mills is said to have started in Hopei during 1955.[36] In addition to Tientsin, other cities emerging as important textile centers are Shih-chia-chuang (4 new mills) Peking (3 new mills), and Han-tan (one new mill).

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[34] Yuan-li Wu, op. cit., p. 305.

[35] Ibid., p. 307.

[36] China Daily News, New York, May 2, May 10, 1955.

288 It is planned that the new mills currently under construction will be equipped with about 100, 000 spindles each, and thus will be considerably larger than the mills built before 1953. By the time all the new mills have been completed, North China will have doubled its cotton spindleage and will have a larger share of the Country's over-all textile production.

It should be noted that some of the textile machines installed in the new mills are being domestically produced and that, with the completion of the Ching-wei textile machinery plant in Shansi, an increasing volume of domestic textile machines will be available. Textile machinery may become the first group of machines in which mainland China will succeed in developing a modicum of self-sufficiency, and North China will be principally responsible for such a development.

H. Flour Mills

256 Next to cotton textiles, the most important modern light industry of North China is the flour industry. A survey in 1950 reported the existence in this area of 171 large and small modern mills, with a total 24-hour capacity of 86, 000 bags, each weighing 48 lbs,[37] or over 16 per cent of the national total. On the basis of the available

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[37] Chung-kuo Kung-yeh [China's Industry] , Vol. II, No. 6, Shanghai, Oct. 1950, p. 4.

-256 information, it appears that relatively little effort has been made in the last few years to establish new facilities. In fact, a considerable portion of the available plants remained idle for some time during the first few years of the Communist regime as a result of marketing difficulties. Some of the mills have been turning out flour from coarse grains instead of wheat flour. However, as the urban population increases, the demand for flour from modern mills will undoubtedly grow.

V. CONCLUSION

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178 The above review serves to point out that North China is being intensively developed industrially on the basis of the region's resources of coal, iron, salt, and cotton and on the industrial base established by pre-Communist government and private enterprises. This development, owing much to the Communists' political motivation, has apparently been ruthlessly pursued. However, as far as the heavy industries are concerned, neither regional self-sufficiency nor a high level of output in the absolute sense are in sight. This is true especially in the case of the metallurgical and machinery industries.

Whatever industrial developments the Communists have been able to carry out have taken place under strict government control and within the general framework of national planning. There is, of course, no separate planning system for

471 the North China region as such. As for the gradual process of socialization, its application in
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178 North China is discussed in the following chapter.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 3c, Economic Background

BUDGET AND TAXATION

I. THE NATIONAL FISCAL SYSTEM

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Since Communist China is a unitary state, its fiscal policy is national in scope and has relatively few regional variations. Accordingly, unless otherwise indicated, what is said here of one region is often equally true of the other regions.

From the data shown in the tabulation below, certain facts are obvious.

1. During 1950-54, the revenue derived from the profit of government enterprise rose steadily from 12.76 per cent of the total government receipt in 1950 to 36.47 per cent in 1954. Moreover, profit is not the only contribution that government enterprises made to the government treasury. In the course of these years, they also contributed an increasingly large share of taxes which the People's Republic of China (the Communist government) imposed upon industries and trade. This tendency is clearly shown in the following statistics

SOURCE OF GOVERNMENT RECEIPTS*

Year	Government-owned Enterprises	Government-participating Enterprises	(combined)	Co-operatives	Farmers	Private Industries and Trade
1950	-	-	34.08	-	29.63	32.93
1951	-	-	49.35	-	18.17	28.66
1952	-	-	56.33	-	17.08	22.36
1953	-	-	59.79	-	14.56	17.02
1954	62.24	3.65		1.66	14.23	13.34
1955	69.47	3.65		1.98	11.76	10.70

* (In percentage of the total annual receipt of the current year.) Economic Weekly, Feb. 26, 1953, p. 17; People's Daily, June 18, 1954, July, 10, 1955. The figures for 1955 are budgetary estimates.

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1: Stanford U. 5-4,5 1956 AF12 North China
AF12

Unlike the usual concept used in Western countries, the profits of governmwnt-owned concerns and enterprises in which the government participates as listed in fiscal reports of the Communist government include allowances for depreciation of assets, which, according to the Western practice, should not be included in net profit. At the same time, all the outlays of government enterprises for improvement and replacement are listed as government expenditures for economic construction. The procedure used by the Chinese Communists means a substantial increase in both government receipts from its enterprises and outlays for economic construction.

2. During the five-year period ending 1954, the relative importance of the agricultural tax has been substantially reduced. In 1950, it accounted for 28. 01 per cent of the total government expenditure. In 1954, the percentage declined to 13.33 per cent. The decrease was due to the rapid expansion of receipts from other sources (particularly profits from government enterprises and urban taxes) rather than to the reduction in the agricultural tax itself. This development should be interpreted to mean that the tax on rural economy has not been reduced; it reflects merely that the increase of the agricultural tax has not been as rapid as the increase of other government receipts.

3. Similarly, the fact that the ratio of the

652 taxes on industry and trade to the total government expenditure remained almost constant during these years should not be interpreted to mean a constant tax burden imposed on these sectors of the Chinese economy. In absolute terms, their contributions have continually increased in order to meet the ever-expanding expenditure of the government.

As a whole, the fiscal policy of the Communist government has been more unfavorable to industry and trade than to agriculture. During the five-year period under consideration, private enterprise in industry and trade not only has had to bear a great burden of the increasing expenditure of the government, but also has been forced to accept stiff competition from government enterprises which, according to the Communist policy, ,will ultimately monopolize all the important trade and industries in the country.

On the expenditure side, military outlay constituted 41.5 per cent of total government expenditure in 1950 and 1951, respectively. After 1952, because of the truce in Korea, the relative importance of the military outlay has been substantially reduced. In 1954, it was only 21.1 per cent of the year's total expenditure. The outlay for economic construction has become the leading item on the debit side of the government account.

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701 In making these comparisons, several observations should be noted. First, the

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military expenditures as listed in the records of the Communist government do not include salaries and maintenance of military personnel, which are classified as government administrative expenses. Military outlays listed in the budgets of the Nationalist Government, on the other hand, consisted mainly of such salary and maintenance payments. If the definition of military expenditure were broadened to include such outlays, and if one-half of the administrative expenses listed in the Communist budget were for the payment of military personnel and administration, then the military expenditure for the years 1950-52 of the Communist government would have been as tabulated here.

Year	Ratio of Military Expenditure to Total Government Expenditure
1950	51.11
1951	49.83
1952	32.15
1953	29.45 (budget estimate)
1954	30.06
1955	32.98 (budget estimate)

In the fiscal report for 1953 the military and government administration expenditures were lumped together under one item. It is rather difficult to separate the military from

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the non-military outlays on the basis mentioned above. For this reason, the budgetary estimates, where these outlays were separately listed, were used in this tabulation.

A second point which should be noted concerning the military expenditure of the Communist government is that a part of its expenditure for economic construction might well be considered military rather than economic. In the budget of the Nationalist Government, for example, outlays for developing aircraft-manufacturing industries, ammunition industries, and so forth, were usually classified as military expenses, whereas they would probably be considered as economic outlay in the Communists' report.

A third point to be noted is that, if the depreciation charges and outlays for maintenance and replacement in government enterprises were excluded from government receipt and expenditure, as should normally be the case, the relative importance of military expenditure of the years under consideration would have been much greater than those shown in the fiscal reports.

652 Even allowing for these adjustments, the fact that government outlays for economic, social, and educational purposes has been substantially increased under the Communist

652 regime is obvious when compared with the conditions under the Nattionalist Government. Whether these expenditures have actually contributed to improving the economic and social welfare of the people is, of course, another question entirely.

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EXPENDITURES AND RECEIPTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA*

	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954
Expenditure					
Military	41.50	42.52	26.23	-	24.19
Government administration	19.21	14.71	11.83	44.62	11.74
Other	2.64	2.01	3.49		
Economic construction	25.51	29.50	44.79	40.38	52.07
Cultural construction	11.11	11.26	13.66	15.00	12.00
Receipts					
Agricultural tax	28.01	18.24	15.69	14.90	13.33
Taxes on undustry and commerce	43.84	49.16	42.28	43.43	36.46
Receipts from government enterprises	12.76	25.64	28.55	35.40	40.49
Income from credit and insurance	4.87	4.79	1.53	3.00	1.26
Other	-	-	-	14.41	-

1: STANFORD U. S-4.5 1956 AF12 NORTH CHINA AF 12

* (In percentage of total government expenditure) Compiled on the basis of actual government outlays and receipts as given in fiscal reports of the People's Republic of China. Economic Weekly, Feb. 26, 1953, p. 17; People's Daily, June 18, 1954, July 10, 1955.

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1: STANFORD U. S-4.5 1956 AF 12 NORTH CHINA
AF 12

652 In the discussion that follows, we shall examine at length some phases of Communist China's fiscal policy during the first five years of occupation of Mainland China. They include the agricultural tax, the taxation on commerce and industry, and government bonds. As will be seen, the revenues discussed are all recurrent in nature. No attempt is made to study such non-recurrent levies as those imposed during the Five-Anti Campaign. Because of the nature of these impositions, it is not likely that these measures can be successfully used again in the near future.

II. URBAN TAXATION

651 In Communist China, the core of urban taxation has consisted of the business tax, the tax on business income, and the commodity taxes.

None of the trio is new in China. Under the Nationalist Government, the business tax was collected as a local tax, the tax on business income was a part of the income tax system, and the commodity tax constituted one of the main revenues of the Nationalist Government.

Under the Communist government, all these taxes were drastically reorganized, apparently under the influence of the Russian tax system. From 1949 to date, the system of

65/ urban taxation has already undergone several important changes. Its history, which may be divided into two stages, covers the period from January 1950 to December 1952.

During the first period, the industrial and commercial tax constituted the greater part of urban taxation. The tax was a composite levy consisting of an import based on gross turnover and another on net taxable income. The "business tax" was collected on the basis of a proportional rate schedule. While the tax rates remained constant regardless of how the amount of the tax base changes, they varied according to the nature of the business or industry. The rates on manufacturing industries, for instance, were in general higher than those on undertakings which consisted only of sales of services (such as public utilities, professional services, hotel services, insurance, banking, etc.). For undertakings deriving their income in the form of commission (such as trade agents, etc.), the rates of business tax were much higher than any of the other types of businesses mentioned heretofore.

In addition, the tax rates varied according to the nature of the commodity produced or handled by taxpayer. Those who deal in such commodities as are essential to the national economy are liable to a lighter tax than those who are associated with the production of non-essential commodities. The business tax

65/ rate on the production of cigarettes, for instance, was much higher than the rate applicable to the iron and steel industry.

The characteristics of the income tax system, which was used early in the Communist regime and is still in effect, may be summarized as follows.

A. Like the system in Soviet Russia, the income tax system in Communist China consists of a series of income taxes applicable to different types of income. Besides the agricultural tax, which may be considered as an income tax on agricultural income, there are income taxes on business profit derived from the earnings of business enterprises and on interest derived from bank deposits. Wages and salaries, however, are not subject to tax. Because of the disappearance of landlords under the Communist system, the tax on rent income is non-existent in the tax system of Communist China.

B. Like the Soviet system, there is more differentiation in the Chinese income tax than in the system commonly used in the West. There is, for instance, the differentiation in favor of military or industrial "heroes", and of earnings from industries against earning from commercial undertakings (particularly those derived from services, such as commissions, etc.).

C. The progressive rates used in the

65/ Chinese income tax are applied on the entire taxable income rather than progressively by income brackets.

D. Inventory valuation for income-tax purposes is computed on the basis of the historical cost. This apparently means an unduly heavy tax burden on taxpayers at the time of rising prices.

E. Depreciation charges are computed on the basis of either the straight line method or the method of constant percentage. In either case, the income tax will mean, under the condition of rising prices, a tax to be paid out of capital as well as current income rather than a genuine tax on income.

After December 31, 1952, the "tax on commodity circulation," or the turnover tax, was introduced. This new tax is a composite levy consisting of parts of farmer commodity and business taxes. In many respects, it is also reminiscent of the turnover tax of the USSR. The introduction of the turnover tax brought changes in the system of urban taxation in Communist China. In the place of former commodity and business taxes, the turnover tax is applicable to the following 22 commodities: rolled tobacco, tobacco leaf, wine, wheat flour, furs and hides, cotton yarn, match, phonograph records, acid, salt, 651 chemical fertilizers, paper, newsprint, rubber tire, cork, cement, glass plates, metal and metal products, pig iron, coke and its products, and mineral oils and their products. After paying the turnover tax, producers and dealers in these commodities will be subject to no other commodity or business taxes so long as they circulate within the national boundaries of China. The exemption, however, does not apply to the custom duties if they are to be exported or to the income taxes to which such producers or dealers are liable. Nor would the payment of commodity tax on raw materials exempt a product manufactured of such material from commodity tax, if the product were itself a taxable commodity.

Instead of the payment of tax as a product leaves its factory or additional taxation as each business transaction occurs, as was the case of the old commodity tax, the collection procedure of the turnover tax varies according to the nature of the commodity subject to tax. In the case where the sales are to be handled by a government agent, the turnover tax is payable when the commodity is sold or transferred from its producers to such a sales agent. In the case where the sales are made by the manufacturer's own agent, the tax is payable at the first sale of the commodity at the wholesale level, or its transfer from producer to the sales agent. In the case where the sale of product is handled by neither a government

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agent nor that of its producer, but by the producer himself, the tax is payable at the time when the product leaves the hand of its producer. In the case where the taxable product is not for sale, but for further processing or use in some other departments of the producing factory, the turnover tax is payable when the commodity leaves the producing department. In the case of forestry products, the tax is paid by the purchasers at the time when the products are being shipped from their point of origin. In the case of an imported commodity, the turnover tax is collectible by the customs together with customs duties at the point of importation. In the case of an export commodity, the tax is collectible at the time of export.

Which of the above-mentioned procedure is to be applicable to a given commodity is to be decided by the government and not by the taxpayer himself.

Since the turnover tax is to displace both the commodity and business taxes, its rates are higher than those of either of these old taxes . The turnover tax rate on wheat flour has been raised to 10 per cent as against a rate of 3 per cent according to the old commodity tax. The new rate applicable to cotton yarn is 22 per cent as compared to 12 per cent charged in the old commodity tax. With the exception of the turnover tax on beer, which is a specific levy, the levy on all other commodities is collectible on an ad valorem basis.

651 Many changes other than those mentioned above were made in the business taxation following the institution of the turnover tax. Among such changes, the following changes are probably the most important.

Under the new regulation, all the commodities produced within the country and not subject to commodity or turnover tax as previously explained are liable to three business taxes -- one at the level of production, one at the wholesale level, and another at the retail level. All those subject to commodity or turnover tax are liable to two business taxes at the wholesale and retail levels. These regulations will be applied regardless of whether a commodity transaction is an inter-firm sale or merely an intra-firm transfer. As a result of these modifications, all the advantages of vertical combination, which were ample under the old system, are eliminated.

Before the tax reform in 1952, all the business taxes at manufacturing, wholesale, and retail levels were payable after the completion of business transaction. After 1952, the business tax became applicable only to the transactions of those commodities to which the new turnover tax does not apply. Instead of collecting the tax after the completion of transactions, producers of such commodities are required, in addition to their own tax liabilities, to advance the tax payable by wholesale dealers to whom the products are sold. Such advances

651 are later to be repaid by the wholesale dealers to the producers. Thus, under the new law the business tax on the wholesale dealer becomes collectible before rather than after the relevant business transactions are effected.[1]

In the case of the commodities subject to turnover taxation, all the business taxes on retailers, under similar arrangement, are to be advanced by wholesale dealers. The turnover tax and the changes in business tax not only result in speeding up the collection of business tax, but also, through the concentration of tax collection at production and wholesale levels, reduce substantially the cost of tax administration.

The stamp tax and all surtaxes attached to the business tax under the old system merged under the new regulation with the business tax. Under the new system, the rates of business tax fall into three categories. There are those applicable to industries, those for commercial undertakings, and those applicable to income derived from sales of personal services. For the cases where the old rates fell within the range of 1 to 3 per cent, a new rate of five per cent is used. For the cases where the old rates ranged from 4 to 6 per cent, an addi-

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1. Cheng Chu-yüan, Chung-kung Ts'ai-ching Cheng-ts'e Hsin Tung-hsiang [The New Tendencies of the Chinese Communists' Financial and Economic Policies], Hong Kong, 1953, pp. 73-77.

tional one per cent is added in the new rate schedule. For the cases where the old rates ranged from 8 to 10 per cent, an additional two per cent is added to form the new schedule. For the cases where the old rates ranged from 12 to 15 per cent, a new flat rate of fifteen per cent is used.

Besides the institution of the turnover tax and the changes in business tax mentioned above, there are also important modifications in the system of commodity tax. Among these are the following adjustments.

Twenty-two of the commodities formerly subject to commodity tax are under the new regulations subject to the turnover tax.

Fifteen new items are included in the modified system of commodity tax; among these new commodities, the most important item is foodstuffs. In the place of the old transaction tax, under the new system the foodstuffs are subject to commodity tax. This adjustment contributed substantially to widening the basis of the commodity tax.

Several silk textile products, which were formerly subject to commodity tax, are now exempted from the tax. In addition, several other minor adjustments in commodity classifications have also been made with a view to simplifying tax administration.

651 In the place of market price, commodity taxes under the new system are assessed on the basis of the relevant wholesale prices as quoted by government sales agents. For the commodities for which government quotations are not available, the market price is used as the basis of the tax assessment. Under the old system, the commodity tax was assessed by the means of the following formulas:

$$\frac{\text{Market price}}{1 - \text{Tax rate}} = \text{Price subject to tax}$$

The price subject to tax X Tax rate = The amount of tax.

The purpose of using these formulas was to avoid the inclusion of the tax in the price upon which the commodity tax rate is to be applied. Under the new system, the commodity tax rate is applicable directly to the price quoted by government enterprise, and the price includes the cost of tax. The commodity tax assessed on this basis is apparently higher than that which was derived from the old formula.

Other important changes in the system of urban taxation effected at the end of 1952 are as follows.

A part of stamp duties were transferred to be collected as turnover tax, commodity tax, or the tax on butchery.

651 The business taxes and stamp tax payable by butchers merged under the new system with the butchery tax.

The transaction tax on food stuffs are being collected in a new system of commodity tax. The transaction tax on cotton was combined under the new system with the turnover tax on textile products.

All the levies on real estate merged into one tax on real estate.

It is clear that one of the objectives for tax reform in 1952 was to transfer, wherever it was feasible, all the old taxes on gross business receipts, the commodity taxes, the transaction taxes, stamp duties, etc., into the newly instituted system of turnover tax. In the cases where such transfer are not practical, these levies are collected as much as possible under the system of commodity taxes. Only in the case where neither transfer is feasible do the old taxes on business or turnover continue to exist. Whenever the conditions permit, the regular tax and surtaxes imposed by local authorities are consolidated into one single tax. In the case of turnover tax, collections are made, as far as it is administratively feasible, at the wholesale level or at the time when the taxable commodity leaves the hands of its producer. The main purpose of effecting successful reforms is to reduce the cost of tax collection and to improve the efficiency of its administration.

There is little change in the system of income tax.

III. AGRICULTURAL TAXATION

During the last five years, four types of agricultural tax have been used in various parts of Communist China. They are the system used in Manchuria, that of North China, that applicable to the "newly liberated" areas where the land reform campaign has not yet been completed, and that for the areas where land reform has already been completed.[2]

In administering the agricultural tax in North China, the Communist government has encountered many problems, some of which are similar to those confronting other regions. The following are some of the main difficulties which are worthy of attention.

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[2] *Hua-tung Ch'ü Ts'ai-cheng Ching-chi Fa-ling Hui-pien* [*Compendium of Laws and Regulations Concerning Finance and Economy in East China*], Vol. I, pp. 291-306; *New China Monthly*, July 25, 1951, pp. 676-77; Cheng Chu-yüan, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-69.

651 1. The greatest difficulty involved in agricultural taxation in China is the lack of reliable statistical information concerning productivity, distribution of land, and rural population. This has been a constant problem of Chinese governments throughout Chinese history -- a problem which has never been satisfactorily solved, although land taxation has been one of the oldest and the most important levies. In this respect, the Communist government should be in a better position than its predecessors, since it has been carrying out a nationwide land reform which should have yielded many reliable facts not available to previous governments about China's land and agricultural systems.

Even with these possible improvements, the statistical basis for the tax administration remains inadequate. From reports now available it is clear that the assessment of agricultural taxes in Communist China has often been done on an arbitrary basis. The quota allocation system and the method of so-called "democratic assessment" have been commonly used. The former requires the fulfillment of a stipulated amount of tax revenue in a specified area. The regional quota is to be allocated among the prospective taxpayers in the area, with little or no regard for the amount of actually produced. The method of "democratic assessment" means to assess tax liability of a taxpayer by a specially organized committee; it is an assessment based on what the com-

65/ mittee thinks a particular taxpayer should pay. In many cases such a process of assessment has to be repeated each year, whereas in some areas a relatively permanent "norm" has been used. Before a comprehensive census of land and agricultural uproducation is taken, and more reliable statistical data are available, the administration's agricultural tax on an equitable basis will not be possible. This is a problem which the Communists themselves do not deny in their official reports.

2. The agricultural tax is applicable to crop yields but not to other sources of agricultural or rural income, which are ample in some parts of the country. The failure of the tax to cover these rural incomes is a concession probably dictated by administrative difficulties.

3. The reason for using proportional taxation in the "old liberated" areas is that, in these provinces where the land reform has been completed, landlords are no longer in existence and there should be little differentiation in the incomes of the farmers. Under these conditions, it is desirable to use the system of proportional taxation not only for the simplicity of administration, but also for its inducement for expansion in production. Later surveys indicated, however, that in villages in Hopei Province some farmers had incomes as much as sixty per cent higher than others in the same village. In the southern part of Chahar, where land reform was completed a few years ago, the average income of the new

"middle-income" farmers was about ninety per cent higher than the corresponding receipts of "low-income" farmers, whereas the income of "low-income" farmers was in turn 34 per cent higher than the average income of landowners.[3] These are only a few examples of income differentiation which continued to be common in many parts of the country long after the completion of the land reform campaign.

It is evident that to use the proportional agricultural taxation under such circumstances will preclude a fair distribution of tax burden among farmers. For this reason, there has been a clamor among Chinese economists for the adoption of some mild form of progressive taxation in North China, with a view to ensuring an equitable distribution to the tax burden without at the same time impairing the incentive for expansion in agricultural production.[4]

4. Another serious problem confronting the Communist regime is the question of collecting the agricultural tax-in-kind. To collect tax-in-kind had two advantages. It protects the government from losses in the real value of its tax receipts in the case of inflation. In

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[3] Wu Tan-ko, Chung-kuo Nung-yeh-shui Wen-ti [Problems of Chinese Agricultural Taxation], Shanghai, 1952, p. 43.

[4] Ibid.

651 addition, it ensures the government with the supply of staple foodstuffs which are necessary for the maintenance of its army and sometimes for the stabilization of food prices in the domestic market. But the collection-in-kind system has many serious disadvantages. First, there is the question of setting a standard for accepting the products for tax payments. The failure to set such a standard may result in encouraging taxpayers to meet their tax liabilities with products of inferior quality, and will mean a gross injustice to those who are too "honest" to take advantage of the government. Secondly, the collection-in-kind system often requires taxpayers to deliver their products at points specified by the government. This often means an extra burden for the taxpayer if the collection centers are located far away from his farm. Thirdly, there is the question of storing and distributing such agricultural products after they are collected. Their handling usually involves a great cost and additional administrative responsibilities for the government. The use of various commodities rather than a monetary unit as the basis of tax collection necessarily means a great complication in the system of tax accounting and surely provides fertile ground for graft and corruption.

Because of these disadvantages of the collection-in-kind system, many economists in China suggest that the government reconsider its position with reference to the collec-

651 tion system. With the containment of inflation in China, these economist contend, there is little need for the collection-in-kind system to protect the revenue of the government and to ensure food supplies in the domestic market.[5]

5. Another important defect of the agricultural tax is its failure to allow for costs involved in various kinds of agricultural production. Under the present system, exemptions and allowances have been given only to the labor employed in such production, but they are not applicable to other costs of production. There is, for instance, no allowance for equipment, horses, or cows used in land cultivation, for chemical fertilizers, or for special irrigation required for certain types of agriculture. Consequently, the use of modern methods to improve agricultural production receives no encouragement, and their use is actually discriminated against by the tax. If the agricultural tax were really to serve as a tax on income, as has been often claimed, the levy would have to be on the net income rather than the gross receipt.

IV. GOVERNMENT BONDS

652 Of 100 million *fen* (1 fen= US$0.75) of People's Victory Bonds issued in 1950, North China, consisting of five provinces and two

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[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 77-88.

652 municipalities, was allocated a total of 15 million fen.

The fact that, despite the importance of the industries and trade of the region, North China was allocated a quota of 15 million fen as against 45 million fen for East China and 30 million fen for Central-South China, may be interpreted as an indication of leniency in the government policy toward the northern provinces.

The distribution of the bond quota followed a pattern similar to that used in East China or Central-South China. A lion's share of the bonds was allocated to urban areas. Of the total quota of 15 million fen for the entire region, the municipalities of Tientsin and Peking, which are centers of economic and political activities, were responsible for 7.3 million fen and 17 million fen, respectively. That is to say, the contributions from these two municipalities accounted for 60 per cent of the quota for North China.

In these municipalities, the major part of the burden, as was the case in other regions, again fell upon private industrialists, traders, and, to a lesser extent, upon "rich" residents in urban areas. In mid-February 1950, about one month after the bond campaign began, the subscription in Tientsin had reached 7.5 million fen -- about 2 million more than the quota ori-

452 ginally allocated to the city.[6] Of this total subscription, 5.8 million _fen_ (or 77.3 per cent) were from private traders and industries, whereas about 1.0 million _fen_ (or 13.4 per cent) were from the "rich" residents in that urban area. While these percentages may not be as high as the corresponding percentages for Shanghai, the importance of the contribution of private trade, private industries, and "rich" residents toward the fulfillment of the city's quota is beyond dispute.

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[6] Economic Weekly, Jan. 26, 1950, p. 12; March 2, 1950, p. 20.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 3d,
Economic Background

BANKING AND CURRENCY[1]

I. THE ELIMINATION OF THE OLD BANKING STRUCTURE

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366 Before discussing the banking structure in North China, it is necessary to discuss briefly the shift of China's banking center from Shanghai to Peking/

In pre-Nationalist days there were two chief banking centers in China -- Peking and Shanghai. Peking was the location of the head offices of the Bank of China and of the Bank of Communications the two semi-government banks and a few important modern banks in addition to the native banks. The major foreign banks had special representatives in their Peking branches who were in charge of negotiations with the Peking government (not to be confused with the Peking regime of today). Shanghai was the headquarters for foreign banks as well as a number of modern Chinese banks and many native banks.

In 1928, as soon as the Nationalist Government was set up in Nanking, the head offices of the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications and of the major Chinese modern banks

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[1] Unless otherwise indicated, specific information in this chapter is based on private information from the author, Dr. K. N. Chang.

453 were transferred to Shanghai. Moreover, the
366 head office of the Central Bank of China, a government institution founded in 1928, was also located in Shanghai. Thus Shanghai became the sole banking center of China.

In October 1949, when the Communists had established their central government in Peking, they prepared to make Peking the center of major banking activities. The head office of the People's Bank of China was set up there, and the head offices of the Bank of China and of the Bank of Communications were ordered to return. When, toward the end of 1952 the old banking structure in Shanghai was completely eliminated, the Communists' goal was reached and Peking had become the financial center of China.

The fact that North China had neither been a stronghold of foreign banking in China nor a bulwark of Chinese commercial banking facilitated the Communists' task of eliminating the old banking structure in the area. Tientsin, for example had been an important North China banking center, comparable to Shanghai in East China, but the number resources, and volume of business of Tientsin banks had been much smaller than the comparable figures in Shanghai. For example, the amount of deposits in Chinese Commercial banks in pre-Communist days in Tientsin seldom exceeded one-tenth of that of the banks in Shanghai. In Hopei there had been a few branches of government and modern commercial banks only, and the local registered commercial

453 366 and native banks were of no consequence. Furthermore, severe restriction had been imposed on all foreign banks in Tientsin and Peking during the Japanese occupation, and operations there had hardly been resumed before the Communists overran North China.

Shansi Province had been under the control of a warlord until the Communists assumed control. It had been the warlord's policy to concentrate the main banking business in the hands of the Shansi Provincial Bank, and to keep outside banks from extending their activities in his province. As a result with the exception of one branch of each of the government banks, all in the provincial capital, there were virtually no modern commercial banks represented in Shansi.

As soon as the Communists occupied Peking, Tientsin, and other cities of Hopei Province, they closed down the branches of the Central Bank of China and of the Farmers Bank of China; branches of the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications were placed under government supervision, assisted by certain staff members who belonged to the Communist Party. In April 1949, regulations governning private banks were issued; these restricted the banks' operations and interest rates. The amount of reserves to be kept with the People's Bank and the forms of frequent periodical reports were so stringently stipulated that few of the banks could profitably operate. Immediately after the effective date

453 of the new regulations, the locally registered
366 commercial banks and more than half of the 85 native banks were forced to close because they were unable to increase their capital as required. The rest of the banks were strictly controlled by means of their periodic reports, and with the co-operation of the Communists on their staff.

The banks which survived the initial regulations were advised to form groups for the purpose of making joint loans. In Tientsin, for example, two groups were organized by commercial banks and one group by all the native banks as a result of this "advice." In so encouraging the formation of larger aggregates, the Communists aimed to force out the smaller banks and prepare for the final amalgamation of the larger ones, thus establishing the pattern to be followed in other areas.

In September 1950, all the native banks remaining in Peking were advised to discontinue their business and transfer their capital to the Peking Municipality Hsing Yeh Joint Stock Investment Corporation, a joint public-private organization. At the end of 1951 the surviving 29 native banks in Tientsin were directed to merge into one bank, in which government capital would participate. The commercial banks remaining in Peking and Tientsin at that time were mostly branches of banks with head offices in Shanghai; they were automatically converted into joint public-private organizations as their head offices underwent

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366 that transformation. A final merger of all branches into a single joint state-private bank occurred in December 1952.

Eliminating the old banking structure in Shansi Province was a much simpler and swifter process. The Communists took over the Shansi Provincial Bank and confiscated the few commercial banks, giving as reason that their capital was owned by "reactionaries." The native banks were forced out at about the same time by requiring them to increase their capital.

457 Foreign banks had operated in only two cities in North China, Tientsin and Peking. Early in the Communist regime, they had the illusion that they might be of service by providing export-financing facilities, thus greatly contributing to the attainment of the Communist goal of increased exports so essential to the economic life of North China. But these banks found themselves without functions as soon as foreign exchange operations were concentrated in the Bank of China. Foreign trade business gradually became a monopoly ofthe government trading organizations. Beginning late in 1951, the foreign banks separately applied for approval to withdraw from China. Though some of them had not received such approval as late as 1954, all foreign banks discontinued operations before the end of 1951.

453 Accordingly, the elimination of the old banking structure in North China was virtually com-

453 pleted only a little more than one year after the the Central People's Government was established in Peking.

426 The pawnshop, a minor monetary organization had been a useful credit mechanism serving needy people. It appeared to be more useful in North China than in the south, because the poverty of the people was more pronounced in the north. The poor were more than willing to obtain funds from the pawnshops by paying high interest, at the rate of 3-4 per cent monthly. The working capital of the pawnshops was mainly supplied by the native banks; in small towns even the banks themselves operated pawnshops. The Communists not only prevented the native banks from extending credit to the pawnshops, but also required the latter to increase their capital; as a result, the pawnshops were forced out of business even before the native banks.

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453 Development of the Communist monetary structure began with the birth of the People's Bank of China first established in Shihchiachuang, Hopei Province, on December 1, 1948. After the Communists assumed governmental function on October 1, 1949, the new banking system was set in motion. The People's Bank of China is now the supreme monetary agency, entrusted with the issuance of banknotes and having other undefined powers in monetary matters, including the control of private monetary organizations. Thus the Bank

652 453 of China, specializing in foreign exchange, and the Bank of Communications, in financing industry, were both placed under the direction of the People's Bank after they were reorganized during 1949-50. This was followed by the establishment of the Chinese People's Construction Bank and of the Agricultural Bank of China. The structure was rounded out by the addition of the Chinese People's Insurance Company an instrument for the accumulation of long-term funds, and the Credit Co-operative a banking mechanism reaching the basic level. Existence of the joint public-private bank seems to be a fleeting phase; it is doomed to extinction as soon as private enterprise dies out.

All the named institutions operate under the control of the People's Bank of China.

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II. THE PEOPLE'S BANK OF CHINA

No regional office of the People's Bank had ever been established in North China, as it has been in other areas. However, a special organ called the North China Business Administration Bureau was established for the purpose of controlling the branch offices of this area. The branch office in the capital of each province is the highest agency in charge of governing the subordinate offices within the province. The branch office of Hopei Province is in Paoting and that of Shansi Province in Taiyuan. The Peking and Tientsin offices, although located in Hopei

652 Province, are virtually under the direct control of the head office because of their special importance and their proximity to the head office.

The branch offices are entrusted with the following functions;[2] (a) to adjust the circulation of currency; (b) to act as agents for the state treasury; (c) to accept current accounts and promote savings; (d) to extend credits to industry and commerce, both public and private, either directly or through affiliated banks; (e) to handle clearings of bills and transfers of accounts, and facilitate remittances; (f) to extend rural credits either through their own agencies or through co-operatives; (g) to look after receipts and disbursements of foreign exchange handled by affiliated banks; and (h) to handle any other monetary matters within their jurisdiction.

Each branch office has departments controlling currency, rural credits, credits to public and private enterprises, and also departments promoting savings deposts and the extension of credit co-operatives. Controlling of foreign exchange transactions is only done by the Peking and Tientsin offices.

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[2] Kuo-min Ching-chi Shih-yung Tz'u-tien [Popular Dictionary of Practical Economics], Shanghai, Ch'un-ming Press, 1953, p. 8,013.

652 Under each branch office there are sub-branch offices in counties, cities, and thriving towns. Sub-branch offices located at key communication centers or points of political importance are designated as "central sub-branch offices"; they are entrusted with the duty of looking after a few sub-branch offices in their vicinity. The designation of central sub-branch office may be withdrawn whenever the special reasons for it cease to exist.

A layer of subordinate offices called agencies, sub-agencies, and stations is set up on main thoroughfares in big cities such as Peking and Tientsin, in villages, and within schools, factories, and on military posts. These offices handle deposits, remittances, and rural credits.

It is reported that in Hopei and Shansi provinces there are about 2,000 offices at all levels, including about 200 sub-branches and more than ten central sub-branches.

III. THE BANK OF CHINA

457 The Bank of China, established as a central bank in 1912, was reorganized in 1928 as a special institution for dealing with foreign trade. It had branches throughout the country, and 19 branches abroad. Its Tientsin branch office had developed into a strong organization, its standing and resources having surpassed other Chinese banks in North China. When on April 7, 1949, the Communist authority in Tientsin promulgated

457 foreign exchange regulations, the Tientsin branch of the Bank of China was appointed by the People's Bank as the authorized bank to handle foreign exchange in China and abroad. On December 22, 1949, the Communist government appointed directors representing the government share, which was one-half of the capital, and recognized the directors representing private shares. In order to "strengthen guidance and supervision, and promote business," the director-general of the People's Bank was made concurrently Chairman of the Board of the Bank of China, and the latter's general manager was appointed by the government. Thus, while the continuance of the Bank of China's old status was reaffirmed, it became virtually a subsidiary of the People's Bank. Its functions are as follows:[3] (a) the administration of the control of foreign exchange; (b) the handling of foreign exchange, securities, bills of exchange and other commercial documents payable or receivable in foreign exchange; (c) the extension of credits, and acceptance of deposits in connection with foreign trade; (d) the supervision of the accounts and clearings of foreign trade conducted by and through government organizations; and (e) the control of overseas remittances.

Branches of the Bank of China may engage in banking transactions other than foreign exchange

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[3] Ching-chi Chou-pao [Economic Weekly] , Shanghai, No. 31.

457 as directed by the People's Bank and may act for the latter's account.

The Bank of China formerly had a main branch in Tientsin, five sub-branches in Hopei and four in Shansi, and twelve city agencies in Tientsin and Peking. At present, the bank only has two offices in North China, the Peking head office and the Tientsin branch. The Peking office also manages an overseas Chinese banking-service station.

Of the 19 overseas branches of the Bank of China, 11 are located in countries which have recognized the Communist government, and these offices are now under the control of the Peking head office. They are the branches in Hong Kong London, Singapore, Penang, Kuala Lumpur, Calcutta, Bombay, Karachi, Chittagong, Rangoon, and Djakarta. These branches have not only surrendered a good amount of foreign currencies to the Communist regime, but have provided personnel experienced in handling foreign transactions.

How carefully the Communists had devised a financial plan, based on carefully documented information gathered before they took control, is eloquently demonstrated by their swift action in appointing the Tientsin branch of the Bank of China as a government agency to handle foreign exchange transactions.

IV. BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS

462 The Bank of Communications was formed in 1907 for the purpose of promoting the development of communications and was reorganized in 1928 as a special institution to develop industries and internal trade. Sixty per cent of the capital was owned by the government at that time. When the Communists entered Tientsin, the branch in that city (the main office in North China) and branches in other cities were put under government supervision. Not until 1950, when the Communist government announced the appointment of directors representing government shares, and the recognitions of directors representing private shares, did the bank receive official recognition that it would continue in its old status. At that time, as well, the Vice-Minister of Finance was made the chairman of the board of the bank and a government appointee was made general manager. The People's Bank exercised control over the operations of the Bank of Communications as it did the operations of the Bank of China.

In June 1951, the Bank of Communications recommenced operations; it was entrusted with the following functions:[4] (a) the handling of government appropriations set aside for basic construction of the state and the screening and approval of applications for such construction needs; (b)

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[4] Cheng Chu-yüan, Monetary Affairs of Communist China, Hong Kong, The Union Research Institute, 1954, p. 25.

652 the organization of long-term investment markets; (c) the control ofownership rights for public shares of enterprises operated by joint state-private interests; and the (d) handling of long-term credits.

652 454 The Communist authorities had hoped that the Bank of Communications could be instrumental in absorbing the idle funds of the people for the purpose of channeling them into industries to be developed by the state. At one time the government had enthusiastically promoted the organization, in a few large cities, of investment companies with the co-operation of the Bank of Communications, but these plans ignored general poverty and the minimal amount of private capital. The failure of the attempted sale to the public of investment debentures of the Tientsin Investment Company in mid-1952 foretold the difficulty of organizing long-term investment market. Furthermore, the function of handling the appropriations for basic construction was later transferred to the newly established Chinese People's Construction Bank. Now the Bank of Communications handles long-term credits to joint public-private enterprises, but the necessary funds are supplied by the People's Bank.

652 Because the Communications Bank is authorized to handle the appropriations for basic construction and the long-term credits granted to joint public-private industries, it established a number of new branches at industrial sites. Apart from the head office at Peking, the main branches in Hopei Province are located at Tien-

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tsin, Paoting, Tangshan, Chinwangtao, T'ungchou, Shihchiachuang, Kalgan, and Hsüan-hua; those in Shansi Province are loacted at Taiyuan, Ta-t'ung, Yü-tz'u, Ch'ang-chih, and P'u-ch'eng.

V. CHINESE PEOPLE'S CONSTRUCTION BANK

Since government appropriations for basic construction under the Five-Year Plan were increasing and better supervision and more efficient handling were necessary, the Chinese People's Construction Bank was created on October 5, 1954. Its head office is in Peking, and it is entrustd with the following specific functions:[5] (a) to look after the funds of basic construction projects, either as provided by appropriations from the budget or as raised by the projects themselves; (b) to supply short-term credits to the contracting organizations undertaking work for projects, according to the government's credit plan; (c) to settle accounts and make returns in connection with the government's appropriations for the projects; and (d) to supervise the use of funds appropriated or raised, the arrangement of payment between the projects and contracting organizations, and matters related to finance, cost accounting, and investment of the projects.

All these functions bear only an indirect relationship to ordinary banking business; the bank,

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[5] New China News Agency, Peking, Sept. 13, 1954.

652 accordingly, is little more than a department of the People's Bank of China. This fact was further evidenced by a statement to the effect that head office and branches had already been established, issued by the government on the day the Chinese People's Construction Bank was inaugurated. Indeed, branches were in existence at all places where there was state industry or basic construction. This overnight creation was made possible by using space in the Bank of Communications and the People's Bank of China as offices for the newly created bank and by transferring personnel from the Bank of Communications and the People's Bank to the Chinese People's Construction Bank.

VI. AGRICULTURAL BANK OF CHINA

In May 1951, during a conference on national rural finance called by the People's Bank of China, it was decided to create an agricultural co-operative bank of nationwide scope for the handling of rural finance. However, the project was shelved because the establishment of a new bank might interfere with the extension of branches of the People's Bank in rural areas. The Agricultural Bank of China was established on March 25, 1955, as part of an ambitious plan to expand the credit co-operatives. It was placed under the direction of the People's Bank and authorized to perform the following functions:[6] (a) the extension

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6. New China News Agency, Peking, March 25, 1954.

652 of long-term and short-term credits to jointly operated agricultural, stock-raising, fishery, mutual-aid, and co-operative organizations, as well as to individual producers; (b) the disposal of capital investments allocated in the state budget for agriculture, forestry, and water conservation; (c) the supervision of the people's credit co-operative organizations; and (d) the provision of savings deposit services for rural residents, producers, mutual-aid and co-operative organizations, collective farms, and state agriculture and water conservation agencies.

According to an official announcement, the function of handling capital investment appropriated in the state budget will be conducted by the People's Bank. The little news published concerning the installation of branches of the Agricultural Bank indicates that banking business in rural areas is still handled by the subordinate offices of the People's Bank, and that the new bank at present is engaged in the promotion of the extension of credit co-operatives and the supervision of rural credits.

VII. JOINT STATE-PRIVATE BANKS

453 There were 16 commercial banks in Tientsin
652 when the Communists took over Tientsin and Peking; 15 of these were branches of banks with head offices in Shanghai, and only one had its head office in Tientsin. These banks had sub-

652 branches or agencies in Peking. Toward the end
453 of 1951, ten banks were converted into joint public-private enterprises and the others were eliminated for various reasons. Thus all commercial banking in North China came under government control. In 1952, all banks in Shanghai were merged into one, and their branches in Tientsin and Peking were amalgamated. The newly formed branches became branches of the Joint State-Private Bank. This bank was not permitted to open any new offices in North China, and its head office was transferred from Shanghai to Peking in 1953. The bank is entrusted with the following functions: (a) the handling of accounts of private enterprises; (b) the extension of short-term credits to private enterprises, subject to the advice of the People's Bank; (c) the handling of overseas Chinese remittances through the branches of component banks still operating in Hong Kong for the account of the Bank of China; the handling of inland remittances; and (d) the acceptance of savings deposits for the account of the People's Bank.

The Communists' scornful opinion of the private banks was illustrated during the merger by the installation of a new board of directors and the appointment of representatives of the People's Bank to all key positions. The appointment of 103 directors to the board is far out of proportion to the limited scope of business of the bank and its fourteen branches. The offices of chairman

453 652 of the board and chief manager of the joint-management are occupied by the assistant managing director and by the manager of the Shanghai branch of the People's Bank, respectively; the representatives of the private banks are only assistant managers. The manager of the former Tientsin branch of the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank is the only northern banker among the seven assistant managers.

VIII. CREDIT CO-OPERATIVES

652 In North China the development of credit co-operatives began under the Communist regime. The conquest of the China Mainland progressed from the north through sections of Shansi Province where credit co-operatives are now used extensively. At the end of June 1953, the two provinces of North China had 2,303 credit co-operatives;[7] the five provinces of Central-South China had only 3,585 credit co-operatives. In absolute numbers, North China had 33.5 per cent and Central-South China 56.5 per cent of China's credit co-operatives. The number of credit co-operatives in Shansi Province far surpassed the number in Hopei Province. In terms of credit co-operatives Shansi Province holds a leading position in the race with Kiangsi Province in Central-South China, the stronghold of the Chinese Soviet during 1930 and 1934.

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[7] Ta-kung Pao [Ta-kung Daily] , Tientsin, January 22, 1954.

4652 Complementary to the functioning of the credit co-operatives were the credit departments in supply-marketing co-coperatives and credit mutual-aid teams. The supply-marketing co-operatives obtained funds for the extension of credit by allocation from the co-operatives concerned as well as from deposits. The credit mutual-aid teams obtained their funds by subscription from team members and loaned this money to their needy members.

In the early period of the Communist regime, credit co-coperatives were developed in order to extend credit to peasants so that they could increase production. Co-operatives were also used to assist in the purchase of agricultural products from government trading organizations and to popularize the circulation of People's Bank notes issued for such purchases. Upon the enforcement of "compulsory purchase" of grain, cotton, and oil-producing seeds in 1953, co-operatives were utilized to attract deposits from peasants who had sold their products in order to reduce the amount of money in circulation. Given these important functions, the number of credit co-operatives had to be increased. In the first quarter of 1955 twice as many co-operatives were in existence as were in operation at the end of 1953. Thus credit co-operatives have become the basic-level agencies of the People's Bank.

IX. CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSURANCE COMPANY

456 The Chinese Communist People's Insurance Company was formally inaugurated on Oct. 20, 1949,[8] and simultaneously the regime undertook the elimination of privately owned and foreign-operated insurance firms. Branches were established in all important cities, and branches of the People's Bank and other banks were appointed agencies of the insurance company.

The Chinese People's Insurance Company first began business by insuring the assets of state-operated organizations, enterprises, and co-operatives as well as persons traveling by train, steamer, and airplane. Later, coverage was exteneded to include "voluntary" collective insurance against fire, bodily injury, and accident. Since early 1950 the regime has offered in rural areas insurance on livestock and on some crops. The company, in co-operation with government veterinarians, has undertaken epidemic-prevention measures to protect livestock. But this type of insurance was suspended at the beginning of 1953 because of the dissatisfaction of the peasants, generated by the rough "sales tactics" of the Communist cadres who forced peasants to insure their livestock.[9] Later,

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8. Cheng Chu-yüan, op. cit., p. 116.

9. Chen Chung Hsiang, Keypoint Handling of Rural Livestock Insurance", Survey of China Mainland Press, Hong Kong, American Consulate General, August 23, 1955.

456 livestock insurance was revived, with the further development of producer co-operatives. However, because China's rural areas are so extensive, livestock insurance is only feasible in certain key districts. Crop insurance, for the moment, is only available for cotton.

Insurance business abroad is handled by the China Insurance Company, a subsidiary of the Bank of China. Its branches abroad are located wherever there is a Bank of China, but its operations within China have been discontinued.

X. BANKING OPERATIONS

652 The People's Bank of China and other banking and financial institutions operate as a single body. Business operations have been expanded as government control over monetary affairs increased in both the public and the private sectors of the National economy.

The People's Bank of China began operations by issuing banknotes to provide funds for government administration and public and private enterprises, the handling of foreign exchange, and the control of private banking and financial institutions. Control was next extended to include cash funds held by and credit granted to public organizations and enterprises, and the transfer of accounts and payments on their behalf. Operations were further expanded to include the supervision of capital construction investments, the promotion of economic accounting systems in both public and

652 private enterprises, and the attraction of surplus funds. Although the operations of these various financial institutions may vary, they have a single purpose: to draw all cash into the banks in order to assure centralized capital for the creation of a socialist economy.

XI. CASH CONTROL

Cash control measures were first applied to public organizations and enterprises and later extended to private enterprises and individuals. According to a directive issued in March 1950, all public-operated enterprises, co-operatives, and armed forces must deposit all but a small amount of their cash and drafts in the local offices of the People's Bank or its authorized agencies. No disbursements made by them, with the exception of salaries and wages and payments for native products in rural areas, may be in cash. After June 1951, all persons engaged in business must deposit daily proceeds in the bank; all shops must meet their purchase payments with checks and under no circumstances may cash be used. The checks received on goods sold must be deposited in the bank; under no circumstances may these checks be used to buy goods. All persons in possession of cash exceeding PB$2,000,000 (about US$80) must deposit their excess holdings in the bank.

Cash Control was further tightened in 1952 by making the use of checks compulsory in tran-

652 sactions exceeding PB$100,000 (about US$4).[10]

The People's Bank implemented control by introducing various kinds of checks and varied forms for the transfer of accounts in order to channel the transfer of accounts and payments through the bank and to facilitate remittance fees. The bank pays a lucrative rate of interest on current deposit accounts -- a higher rate to private enterprises than to public enterprises.

According to statistics from a Communist source, total deposits during 1954 in Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai, and Canton amounted to PB$5,300 billion (about US$212 million), the largest portion of which was in fixed deposits.[11]

In order to attract scattered funds, the People's Bank made a determined effort to promote savings deposits. For this purpose many agencies, sub-agencies, and stations were established in cities, towns, and villages and within factories, schools, and the armed forces. Bank officials and Party cadres in some districts went so far as to fix the quota for each village subscription to savings. In certain districts in Hopei Province, for example, the villagers were divided into five categories; in one village the quota for each male laborer was

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10. Monetary Affairs of Communist China, 1954.

11. Economic Bulletin, No. 49, Hong Kong, Nov. 29, 1954.

PB$20,000 (less than one U.S. dollar), and for each female laborer, PB$10,000[12] (less than fifty cents).

At the end of the third quarter of 1953, the amount of savings deposits in the Peking Branch of the People's Bank was approximately twelve times that of 1949, deposits in the Tientsin Branch[13] were 73 times larger than those of 1949, and total savings deposits[14] in the bank increased 131 times during the same period, to PB$1,320 billion (about US$52,800,000).

When the policy of "compulsory purchase" of grains and cotton from the peasants was enforced toward the end of 1953, so-called "special savings deposits for the sales proceeds of grains and cotton" were created by the People's Bank. An extraordinarily high interest rate was paid, ranging from 14.4 per cent annually for periods of one to three months to 18 per cent annually for periods of four to six months. But these efforts had little success: after the autumn harvest of 1954, only 10 per cent of the proceeds from sales were deposited in banks in Hopei Province.[15] ,

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[12] Ta-kung Daily, March 24, 1953.

[13] Economic Bulletin, No. 46, Hong Kong, Dec. 1, 1953.

[14] Ta-kung Daily, March 3, 1955.

[15] Ta-kung Daily, Jan. 3 1955.

652 and far less than this amount was deposited in Shansi Province. Later, as a result of a vigorous drive to increase the number of credit co-operatives, the peasants were forced to put additional money into savings accounts.

XII. CREDIT CONTROLS

652 452 Before 1953, all credits for public and joint state-private enterprises and co-operatives had to be approved by the head office of the People's Bank; applications for credits for private enterprises were submitted to affiliated banks, screened by the People's Bank regional office, and approved by the head office. It was an airtight, centralized means of credit control.

Early in 1953, a decentralization policy was adopted by which authority and responsibility was diverted to the branch offices. To obtain credit, enterprises were required to explain how they intended to increase production and how they would increase labor productivity and lower the cost of production; they also had to furnish a budget with an estimate of necessary credits. A sharp distinction was drawn between fixed capital and working capital and between working capital and any sums borrowed.

The extension and acceptance of credit between public enterprises and private firms were prohibited in order to eliminate commercial credit. Credit was further tightened by a resolution against credit arrangements between public industrial and trading enterprises approved at a conference[16] held by the People's Bank for all public enterprises in March 1955. Elimination of private banking and the prohibition of credit arrangements with public enterprises deprived firms of all other sources of credit supply and made them entirely dependent on government banks for their credit needs.

Rural credit is under the control of the government. The supply of credit comes from the People's Bank and from credit co-operatives which are under the control of the People's Bank. No "rich peasant" can afford to have surplus funds on loan nor dare he make such loans without incurring penalties. Credit was granted less to help peasants solve their financial difficulties than to encourage them to join the producer co-operatives or mutual-aid teams. The Communists report that in 1953, approximately 72 per cent of rural credits went to producer co-operatives and mutual-aid teams and only 28 per cent to individuals. The government announced in mid-1955 that more credits were to be given to the peasants in order to make it possible for them to join agricultural producer co-operatives. Shansi Province reported in 1954 more rural credits derived from credit co-operatives than from state banks. In 79 per cent of the villages in Shansi Province "usury has been basically eliminated."[17]

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16. Ta-kung Daily, May 7, 1955.

17. New China News Agency, Taiyuan, January 15, 1955.

652 452 In order to hasten the liquidation of the private merchant class and the transformation of private industries into joint public-private enterprises, exorbitant rates of interest were charged on loans to private commerce and industry (private commerce, 16.20 - 23.40 per cent annually against 8.28 per cent charged on loans to public commerce, and 10.80 - 19.80 per cent annually charged on loans to private industry compared with 5.58 per cent to public industry.).

XIII. CURRENCY SYSTEM

652 436 Jen-min-p'iao, (literally "People's Bank notes") were first issued by the People's Bank of China in Shihchiachuang, Hopei Province, on December 1, 1948. People's notes were to be regarded as the only legal tender in Communist China and were to supplant the Communist notes, which had been issued in various districts, as well as Nationalist notes. The People's Bank notes were first issued in denominations of 1, 5, 10, 20, 50 and 100 dollars. to which 200 dollar notes were added in Shanghai in July 1949 and 500 and 1,000 dollar notes in Shanghai and Tientsin in September 1949. Between February and April 1950, an additional issue of 5,000 and 10.000 dollar notes was made and in January 1954 the range of denominations was increased to include 20,000 and 50,000 dollar notes.

On March 1, 1955 new currency was put in circulation throughout China. A new one-yuan

652 436 note was exchanged for a 10,000-*yuan* banknote of the old currency. Other major note denominations are Y2, Y3 Y5, and Y10. The smaller denominations are 1 2 and 5 *fen* (100 *fen*=1 *yuan*) and 1, 2, and 5 *chiao* (10 *chiao*=1 *yuan*). Notes are printed in four languages: Chinese Tibetan, Mongolian, and Uighur. All the old banknotes in denominations of 5,000 or more were to be exchanged by the People's Bank of China before the end of April 1955 and denomination of 5,000 and less were to be exchanged not later than June 10, 1955.

The Communists first claimed that People's Bank notes were not backed by metallic or foreign currency reserves but by an abundant guarantee in goods; later they elaborated their monetary policy by saying that currency value was maintained by a balanced budget and balanced international payments. However, when introducing the recent issue of new currency, the Communists claimed that the stability of their currency was guaranteed by a huge and ever-increasing gold reserve as well as by ample material resources.[18] The Communists who realize the danger of arousing suspicion of bankruptcy, boast of their skill in the management of currency in order to dispel the popular distrust of currency revaluation.

652 The first official exchange rate quoted on April 7, 1949 by the Bank of China, Peking, was PB$56.25 for HK$1 (Hong Kong dollar), equivalent to PB$302 for US$1. Frequent revisions of the

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[18] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Hong Kong Mar. 10 1955.

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rate were made following the trend of the market. From May 1951 little changes were made and the rate became almost nominal. Before the issue of new currency the rate was PB$4.270 for HK$1, the equivalent of PB$26.321 for US$1. The rate for Hong Kong currency is PB$42.70 for HK$100. It is generally admitted that People's Bank notes are a domestic currency and the exchange rate does not reflect the foreign value.

XIV. CURRENCY CONTROL

At a meeting of the National People's Congress on July 6, 1955 the Minister of Finance reported that the issue of the new currency caused no loss to the people and did not affect commodity prices; he used these assertions to claim the stability of the new currency. This statement was supported by an announcement[19] of the State Statistical Bureau in Peking that, in eight major cities including Peking and Tientsin, the index figure of retail prices was 100.4 per cent that of 1953. It is evident that the revaluation of currency has been a most ruthless way of controlling the amount of currency in circulation. It prevented the conversion of cash into goods and forced hoarded cash into bank deposits. When such tactics are used, the price index is certain to remain stable.

In spite of its complete control of essential commodities and banking credit and its frequent

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[19] Current Background, No. 336, Hong Kong, American Consulate General June 14 1955.

652 use of extortion, the Communist regime was forc to adopt drastic measures to control Chinese currency. Newspaper reports[20] indicate that in Hopei and Shansi provinces those people who took old notes to the government banks to exchange for the new were required to fill in forms giving their name occupation and address. Others attempted to convert their old nots into goods although prices quoted in theold currency were higher than those in the new currency. This example will serve to suggest how desperately the Party cadres worked to gain control of private savings and how distrustfully the people looked upon the new currency.

454 652 Before taking this drastic step, the regime called upon the people to subscribe to government bonds and to make other contributions. Of 1950 Victory Bonds, amounting to US$70 million,[2 some 15 per cent was allocated to North China. In 1951, the people were expected to donate funds to buy weapons and ammunition for the troops in Korea. The North China Region was to contribute 13.60 per cent of a total equivalent to US$220 million.[22] In addition, contributions for the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Movement were demanded between November 1950 and January

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[20] Far Eastern Economic Review, No. 15, Oct. 13, 1955.

[21] Hsin Chung-kuo Ta-shih Chi-k'an [New China Events Quarterly] , No. 1 Peking 1950.

[22] Cheng Chu-yüan Chung-kung Ts'ai-cheng Chieh-p'ou [An Analysis of Finance in Communist China] , Hong Kong, Asia Press 1953.

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1952 -- a total of 13.28 per cent of US$ 8 million. No exact estimate of the fines collected in North China during the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns are available but it must have been a considerable amount. In Peking and Tientsin the equivalent of approximately US$300 million was collected.[24] The subscription of 1954 National Economic Construction Bonds allocated to North China was about 22 per cent of the total issue equivalent to US$250 million, of which Tientsin alone subscribed more than 30 per cent.[25] This was followed by a 1955 issue of a similar amount. North China was probably required to subscribe to the same percentage as in the previous issue.

North China lacks capital accumulation, Moreover, most of its meager capital fled to Shanghai before the Communists assumed control As the result of repeated demands made by the present regime, funds held by the people in this area must now be reduced to the minmum. Mindful of this straitened economy the government reduced the allocation to the private sector of joint enterprises and other residents of 1955 National Economic Construction Bonds from

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23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Far Eastern Economic Review, March 25 1954.

454 53 per cent to 45 per cent in January 1955.[26]
652 The currency measure instituted in March 1955 will have further reduced what little capital remains.

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[26] People's Daily, Peking. January 9, 1955.

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[Facing p. 799]


NORTH CHINA
POLITICAL AND TRANSPORTATION
Scale in Miles
0
50
100
International Boundary
Regional Boundary
Provincial Boundary
Highways
Old Railroads
Newly Constructed R. Rs.
Proposed Railroads
Established Waterways
MONGOLIA
Erhlien
Chi-ning
Pao-t'ou
Ta-t'ung
Kalgan
Sha-cheng
Ku-pei-kou
PEKING
Feng-t'ai
Tangshan
Shanhaikwan
Chinwangtao
Tientsin
Tangku
Ning-wu
Paoting
Yen-shan
Shihchiachuang
Taiyuan
Yang-ch'üan
Yü-tzu
Te-chou
Tsinan
Tsingtao
Han-tan
Ta-ming
Lin-fen
Ch'ang-chih
Feng-ling-tu
Chengchow
Kaifeng
Hsü-chou
Lien-yün-kang
SHANSI
HOPEI
112
116
120
40
36

Annex "A," Subparagraph 3e, Economic Background

TRANSPORTATION AND DOMESTIC TRADE

489 Both railway and ocean-shipping facilities in North China can be considered fairly adequate. The Communists have exerted a great deal of effort to hasten the rehabilitation and extension of the original railway network in this region of China. The reconstruction of the new harbor at Tangku has helped to improve the facilities for handling ocean shipping, highways in the vicinity of Peking and Tientsin have been rebuilt, and air transportation between Peking and other principal cities in China has been greatly expanded in recent years. As the result of this development of transporation facilities, domestic trade in North China has increased rapidly, especially in and around Peking where the supply of daily necessities to government employees and urban inhabitants is of prime importance to the smooth functioning of the present regime.

I. RAILWAY REHABILITATION AND CONSTRUCTION

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499 Immediately after World War II, the Nationalist Government began work on the rehabilitation of the railways in North China.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF12 North China AF12 CHINA AF12

499 When the Communists came to power, they
496 continued to develop the railways, and a number of double tracks were laid in order to increase the amount of traffic the roads could handle. The network in operation in North China in 1955 is shown in Table 1.

1: STANFORD U. S-4.5 1956 AF12 NORTH CHINA AF12

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[p. 860 (A)]

Table 1. Railways in North China 1955*

(Unit: Km. = kilometers.
Mi. = miles.)

Railway Systems	Terminals	Distance Covered
The Peking Railway Administration		
Trunk Lines		
Peking-Shanhaikuan (W)	Peking — Tientsin	141 Km. (88 Mi.)
Peking-Hankow (N)	Peking — Shihchiachuang	286 Km. (179 Mi.)
Peking-Paot'ou	Peking — Paot'ou	815 Km. (509 Mi.)
Peking-Kupeik'ou	Peking — Kupeik'ou	71 Km. (44 Mi.)
Fengt'ai-Shach'eng	Fengt'ai — Shach'eng	105 Km. (66 Mi.)
Branch Lines		
Peking-Ment'oukou	Peking — Ment'oukou	26 Km. (16 Mi.)
Peking-T'unghsien	Peking — T'unghsien	25 Km. (16 Mi.)
Lianghsiang-T'oli	Lianghsiang — T'oli	16 Km. (10 Mi.)
P'angchiapao-Hsüanhua	P'angchiapao — Hsüanhua	10 Km. (6 Mi.)
Liuliho-Chouchiatient	Liuliho — Chouchiatien	15 Km. (9 Mi.)
	Total	1,510 Km. (943 Mi.)
The Tientsin Railway Administration		
Trunk Lines		
Peking-Shanhaikuan (E)	Tientsin— Shanhaikuan	277 Km. (173 Mi.)
Peking-Hankow (M)	Shihchiachuang — Anyang	1,221 Km. (763 Mi.)
Shihchiachuang-Taiyuan (E)	Shihchiachuang — P'ingting	231 Km. (145 Mi.)
Tientsin-P'uk'ou (N)	Tientsin — Techou	238 Km. (150 Mi.)
Shihchbiachuang-Techou	Shihchiachuang — Techou	181 Km. (113 Mi.)

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Branch Lines

Tientsin-Tangku	Tientsin — Tangku	44 Km.	(27 Mi.)
Linch'eng-Tsaochuang	Linch'eng — Tsaochuang	31 Km.	(19 Mi.)
Hantan-Hots'un	Hantan — Hots'un	50 Km.	(31 Mi.)
Mat'ou-Hsitso	Mat'ou — Hsitso	21 Km.	(13 Mi.)
Huishui-Chinghsing	Huishui — Chinghsing	11 Km.	(7 Mi.)
Nanchangts'un-Fengshan	Nanchangts'un — Fengshan	7 Km.	(4 Mi.)
	Total	2,312 Km.	(1,445 Mi.)

[p. 800 (B)]

The Taiyuan Railway Administration

Trunk Lines

T'ung-P'u (N)	Taiyuan — Tat'ung	357 Km.	(223 Mi.)
T'ung-P'u (S)	Taiyuan — Fenglingtu	509 Km.	(316 Mi.)
Shihchiachuang-Taiyuan(W)	P'ingting — Taiyuan	231 Km.	(144 Mi.)

Branch Lines

Yüanp'ing-Tayingchen	Yüanp'ing — Tayingchen	120 Km.	(75 Mi.)
Hsinhsien-Chiatzuwan	Hsinhsien — Chiatzuwan	52 Km.	(33 Mi.)
Hsinch'eng-Paichiachuang	Hsinch'eng — Paichiachuang	24 Km.	(15 Mi.)
Yümenkou-Hsiming	Yumenkou — Hsiming	4 Km.	(3 Mi.)
Taiyuan-Lants'un	Taiyuan — Lants'un	16 Km.	(10 Mi.)
Taiyuan Round City	Taiyuan (S) — Taiyuan (N)	14 Km.	(9 Mi.)
Tungkuan-Luan	Tungkuan — Luan	175 Km.	(109 Mi.)
P'ingyao-Fenyang	Pingyao — Fenyang	34 Km.	(21 Mi.)
	Grand Total	5,358 Km.	(3,348 Mi.)

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* Hung-hsün Ling, Chung-kuo T'ieh-lu Kai-lun /General Survey of Chinese Railways/, Taipei, 1950, pp. 29-31.

Toshio Ito, Chukyo tetsudo no genjo /The Present Conditions of Chinese Communist Railways/, Tokyo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1954, pp. 47-49.; New China News Agency release, Peking, June 30, 1955.

499 Of all the railways listed in Table 1, 496 only the Feng-t'ai--Sha'ch'eng Railway, a section of the Peking-Pao-t'ou Railway, was built by the Communist regime. The original section (between Peking and K'ang-chuang) crosses very difficult terrain, particularly at Kuankou where the grade is as high as 3.33 per cent -- the steepest in the Chinese railway system.[1] To pass over this grade, two large locomotives, one to haul and one to push, are employed to handle a train with a maximum of 15 cars. The difficult grade was a serious hindrance to the routing of traffic on the line as a whole. The Feng-t'ai--Sha-ch'eng Railway was built in order to eliminate this section of the Peking--Pao-t'ou Railway. Construction of this 105-kilometer (65.6 mi.) line began in 1953 and was completed in June 1955, six months ahead of schedule. The railway starts from Feng-t'ai, an important junction of five railways, ends at Sha-ch'eng, northwest of K'ang-chuang and outside the Great Wall, and serves through-traffic from Peking to Moscow via the new Chi-ning--Erhlien--Outer Mongolia Railway. It is reported that after this short line was completed, the volume of traffic increased 333 per cent and speed speed was increased approximately 250 per cent.[2]

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[1] Hung-hsün Ling, op. cit., p. 102.

[2] China Daily News, New York, July 27, 1955.

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496 In the early part of 1955, the Communists also began to replace the light rails of the Shih-chia-chuang--Taiyuan Railway with heavier rails. The work of replacement is to be accomplished before the end of 1957, the last year of the Chinese Communists' first Five-Year Plan.[3] This railway serves as an outlet for coal produced in Shansi; the amount of freight traffic the railway can handle will be considerably increased upon the laying of sturdier rails.

A plan for the renovation of the T'ung-p'u Railway was implemented in early 1955. Some improvements were made in 1937 to the northern section of the line when the Japanese invaders converted it from narrow- to standard-guage in order to facilitate troop movements. Their work was convined to change of guage; bridges, roadbeds, and tunnels were neither enlarged nor strengthened.[4] The southern section of the railway remained a narrow-guage line. Its carrying capacity has been limited by steep gradients, sharp curves, and poor equipment; the railway has been unable to meet the increasing demands of agricultural and industrial producers in the

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[3] New China News Agency release, Taiyuan, April 1, 1955.

[4] Survey of China Mainland Press, Hong Kong, U. S. Consulate General, May 14-16, 1955, No. 1048, p. 56.

499 496 the area it was intended to serve. It is planned that the southern section will be converted to standard-gauge and gradients, curves, bridges, tunnels, and culverts will be smoothed and strengthened.[5] Certain sections of the railway will be double-tracked and principal stations will be enlarged and modernized.[6]

Other projects of a similar nature have been undertaken on the Peking-Mukden Railway and the Peking-Hankow Railway. Eight-hundred kilometers (500 mi.) of double tracks had been completed on the Peking-Mukden Railway in late 1955, according to a report from Peking.[7]

There are seven large railway plants in North China: (1) the Chang-hsin-tien Plant, near Peking; (2) the Nan-k'ou Plant in Hopei Province; (3) the Tientsin Plant at Tientsin; (4) the Tangshan Plant in Hopei Province; (5) the Shihchiachuang Plant in Hopei; (6) the Taiyuan Railway Plant in Shansi Province; and (7) the Feng-t'ai Railway Bridge Plant near Peking.[8] The Chang-hsin-tien, the Tientsin,

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[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] China Daily News, New York, Nov. 16, 1955.

[8] Chung-k'ung Wen-t'i [Chinese Communist Problems], Hong Kong, Tzu-yu ch'u-pan-she, 1954, Series No. 1, pp. 75-76.

499 the Tangshan, and the Taiyuan plants are best-equipped. The current practice in
496 Communist China is to overhaul each locomotive after it has been in service for 300,000 kilometers (187,500 mile); ordinary repairs are undertaken after 100,000 kilometers (65,500 mi.). Railway cars are overhauled after 16-18 years of service, depending upon the type of car; for ordinary repairs, the period of service is halved. Freight cars are overhauled after 6-8 years of service; ordinary repairs are made after the car has been in service for 3-4 years.[9]

Although the city of Feng-t'ai serves as a junction for the Peking-Hankow, the Peking-Mukden, the Peking-Tientsin, the Tientsin--Pu-k'ou, and the Peking--Pao-t'ou railways, the traffic is too heavy for existing facilities. The construction of a new train-dispatching yard, on 100,000 acres to the west of the present station, was begun in 1955. The plan provides for the construction of 141 kilometers (88 mi.) of special service lines, the installation of automatic signaling devices, and a new communications network.[10] The first stage of the project, increasing the

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9. Ibid., p. 76.

10. Wen-hui Pao [Wen-hui Daily], Hong Kong, Sept. 5, 1955.

499 efficiency of the railroad yard by some 30 per
cent, was to have been completed by the end
496 of 1955, according to a report from Hong Kong.[11]

II. RAILWAY THROUGH-TRAFFIC

496 Three international through-express trains were operating in Communist China in 1955: Peking-Moscow, Peking-Pyongyang, and Peking-Hanoi. The Peking-Moscow run (9,050 kilometers, 5,656 miles) was inaugurated on January 31, 1954; the journey takes nine days.[12] The Peking-Pyongyang run, inaugurated on June 3, 1954, takes 34.5 hours between Peking and the capital of North Korea.[13] The Peking-Hanoi run, inaugurated on August 1, 1955, takes about four days between Peking and the former capital of Indochina. In additional to these international through-express trains, there are five national through-express trains between Peking and other principal points in China: the Peking-Manchouli express; the Peking-Shenyang (Mukden) express; the Peking-Harbin express; the Peking-Hankow express; and the Peking-Shanghai express.

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[11] Ibid.

[12] China Daily News, New York, July 15, 1955.

[13] Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily], Peking, June 4, 1954.

III. RAILWAY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT

497 The "advanced experience" of Soviet Russia in the management of railways has proved useful in the organization of railroads in Communist China. "New measures," as they are introduced in China, are simply old practices which have proved successful in Russia.

The "Yang Mao-lin loading method," sometimes called the "matched-flag loading method," seeks to increase the amount of freight handled by conserving space and efficiently packing railway cars.[14] Freight is classified according to its nature and the method of packaging. Small flags designating contents are pinned to each piece of freight; large flags with similar markings are attached to the proper freight cars. In order to facilitate handling, workmen are provided with the most efficient loading order for each car, and workmen follow these lists or diagrams in packing the freight.

Cheng Hsi-k'un, an engine driver, is credited with devising the "overhaulage system" currently used in Communist China. He managed to increase by 60 tons the haulage capacity of his train by accelerating and sprayi sand on the rails as he approached an upgrade; to stop an over-loaded train, it was necessary to slow well in advance and twice apply the brakes.[15]

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[14] People's Daily, Peking, May 27, 1952.

Freight trains, under the new program, are expected to cover at least 500 kilometers every 24 hours. The present program shortens the time lost in car-switching, checking and assembling trains, and loading and unloading, and increases the speed at which trains run. The so-called "Li Hsi-kuei Train Switching Method" and the "Sun Feng-chi Simultaneous Checking and Repairing Method" have been established on all national railways.

The principle of "planned transport" is to make use of all available railways facilities and to reduce the transportation of empty cars. The promulgation in 1953 of "Tentative Regulations Concerning the Regional Balancing of Production and Marketing of Coal and its Reasonable Transport" incorporates this measure.[16] The country is divided into thirteen coal-producing areas, and there are 45 state-operated and joint state-private coal mines. The distribution, supply, sale, and

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15. Liberation Daily, Shanghai, July 6, 1952.

16. China Weekly, Hong Kong, Jan. 10, 1955, pp. 24-25.

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497 transport of coal are under government control. The direction of commodity flow and the regions in which commodities are to be marketed are fixed in order to avoid the waste of transportation facilities.[17] All of these measures have been enforced on the advice of Soviet technicians.

Railway freight has been re-classified into 30 categories; before the Communists assumed control, there were only five categories. Freight rates have been adjusted frequently, although in general rates are lower today. Those items of immediate value in industrial production are accorded comparatively low rates. Commodities intended for domestic consumption are charged at higher rates. Rates paid by state-controlled industrial enterprises are low; rates paid by private manufacturers are higher.[18] Lowest freight rates are charged on grain and other foodstuff. Freight rates on coal are often lower than the cost of transportation. Higher rates are charged for exceedingly long or exceedingly short hauls to discourage unnecessary use of railway facilities.[19] Passenger rates on national railways have been increased 20-30 per cent over those previously in force.

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[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid., Aug. 8, 1955, p. 13.

[19] Ibid., p. 14.

[Facing p. 809]

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Table 2. National Highways in the North China Region*

(Unit: Km. = kilometers. Mi. = miles.)

Highway	Terminals	Route	Total Length#
Basic No. 2.	Chiuchiang-P'angchiang	Tientsin, Peking and Changchiak'ou	5,385 Km. (3,366 Mi.)
Basic No. 4	Wanting-Ch'engte	Taiyuan, Shihchiachuang, Paoting, Peking, Kupeik'ou Ch'engte	4,615 Km. (2,884 Mi.)
Longitudinal No. 1	Haian-Shanhaikuan	Tientsin, Fengjun, Linyü	4,297 Km. (2,686 Mi.)
Longitudinal No. 3	Changte- P'angchiang	T'aiku, Taiyuan, Tat'ung	2,128 Km. (1,330 Mi.)
Lateral No. 5	Tsingtao-Ninghsia	Taming, Hantan, Ch'angchih, Fenyang	1,949 Km. (1,218 Mi.)
Lateral No. 6	Tolun-Shanpa	Changchiak'ou, Tat'ung	1,224 Km. (765 Mi.)
Total			19,598 Km. (12,249 Mi.)

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* Kuo-tao Wang [National Highway Network], Nanking, Bureau of Information, Executive Yuan, 1947, pp. 3-50.

# Covering the total length of each highway, not merely that section within the North China Region.

IV. HIGHWAY ROUTES

491 Exact distances of the network of highway in North China are difficult to determine because the statistics given in provincial reports do not agree with those given in nationa reports. No distinction is made between provincial roads and county roads, nor is there any consistency in the various records concerning the completion of new roads or when such roads are open or closed to traffic. This discussion must be confined to the principal national, provincial, and inter-provincial highways in the North China Region. (See Tables 2 and 3).

1: STANFORD U. S-4,5 1956 AF12 NORTH CHINA AF12)

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Table 3. Provincial and Inter-provincial Highways in North China
(Unit: km. = kilometers. Mi. = miles.)

Highway	Total Length
Peking-Linyü	332 km. (207 Mi.)
Peking-Kupeik'ou	132 km. (82 Mi.)
Peking-Ankuo	455 km. (284 Mi.)
Peking-Jench'iu	270 (169 Mi.)
Peking-Tangku	170 Km. (106 Mi.)
Peking-Tangshan	28 Km. (18 Mi.)
Peking-Nank'ou	145 km. (90 Mi.)
Peking-Shihchiachuang	283 Km. (177 Mi.)
Tientsin-Ihsien	199 Km. (124 Mi.)
Tientsin-Ts'anghsien	128 km. (80 Mi.)
Taiyuan-Shihchiachuang	230 Km. (144 Mi.)
Taiyuan-Tsehengk'ou	262 Km. (164 Mi.)
Taiyuan-Fenglingtu	674 Km. (421 Mi.)
Kupeik'ou Ch'engte	118 Km. (74 Mi.)
Taiyuan-Tat'ung	369 Km. (230 Mi.)
Paikueichen-Chinch'eng	348 Km. (219 Mi.)
P'ingting-Liaohsien	121 km. (76 Mi.)
Taiyuan-Shihchuntu	288 Km. (180 Mi.)
Hochin-Houmachen	104 Km. (65 Mi.)
Total	4,656 Km. (2,910 Mi.)

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* Chin Chia-feng, Chung-kuo Chiao-t'ung Chih Fa-chen Chi Ch'i Ch'ü-hsiang [Communications of China and the Trend of Development], Nanking, Cheng-chung Book Company, 1937, p. 177. Fei-ch'ü Ti kung-lu Chiao-t'ung [The Highway Transportation of Communist China] Taipei, Sixth Section, Central Committee, Nationalist Party, 1953, pp. 23-24.

[FACING P. 810]

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491 In addition to the national highways listed above, there are many provincial and inter-provincial highways in North China. Some of the most important are listed in Table 3.

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Table 4. The Inland Waterways of North China [*]
(Unit: km = kilometers. Mi = miles.)

Waterways	Routes	Distance	Grade [#]
Huit'ung River (North Canal)	Tientsin to Peking	143 km. (89 Mi.)	5
Tzuya River	Tientsin to Hsienhsien	160 km. (100 Mi.)	5
Hut'o River	Hsienhsien to Shihchiachuang	200 km. (125 Mi.)	5
Fuyang River	Hsienhsien to Hengshui	70 km. (44 Mi.)	5
Tach'ing River	Hengshui to Linch'ing	120 km. (75 Mi.)	5
	Tientsin to Paoting	250 km. (156 Mi.)	5
Linchi Canal	Linch'ing to Fanchiap'o	802 Km. (501 Mi.)	5
	Linch'ing to Tsinan	120 km. (75 Mi.)	5
Grand Canal	Tientsin, Linch'ing, to Wuchih	802 Km. (501 Mi.)	5
Luan River	Luanhok'ou to Ch'engte	300 Km. (188 Mi.)	5
North Grand Harbor Canal	Tientsin to North Grand Canal	177 km. (111 Mi.)	2
Hai River	Tientsin to Tangku New Harbor	45 km. (28 Mi.)	1
Chang River	Weihok'ou to Anyung	80 Km. (50 Mi.)	5.
Total		2,573 Km. (1,608 Mi.)	

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[*] Hang-tao Wang [Navigation-Route Network], Nanking, Bureau of Information, Executive Yuan, Nanking, 1947, pp. 16-17.

[#] See Table 5, following

[FACING P. 811]

491 Only the principal provincial and inter-provincial highways have been listed in Table 3. As of 1953, the total length of all highways in the North China Region was approximately 12,200 kilometers (7,625 mi.).[20]

V. INLAND WATER ROUTES

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502 North China, unlike the Central-South and the East China regions, has few large navigable rivers. Table 4 includes some of the more important navigable waterways in this region.

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[20] Economic Bulletin, Hong Kong, June 7, 1954, pp. 4-5.

Most of the rivers and canals listed
487 in Table 4 are classed as Grade 5 waterways
502 and are only navigable for boats up to 300
tons. Table 5 lists the appropriate tonnage
and depth of river in meters and feet for the
six classes of waterways in China.

Table 5. Grades and Navigability of Rivers in China*

Grade	Depth of Meters	River Feet	Navigable for Boats (Gross Tonnage)
1	5-8	16-26	10,000
2	3.8	12.5	2,000
3	3.2	10.5	1,000
4	2.8	9.2	600
5	2.5	8.2	300
6	1.5	4.9	60

* Hang-tao Wang [Navigation-Route Network
Nanking, Bureau of Information, Executive
Yuan, 1947, pp. 3-5.

Those waterways below Grade 5 accomodate 60-ton steamers or wooden junks.

(Table 6 faces p. 813.)

487

[FACING p. 813]

Table 6. The Coastal Shipping Routes of North China*

Route	Principal Ports	Distance (Miles)
Tientsin-Yingk'ou	Tientsin, Chinwangtao, Yingk'ou	285
Yingk'ou-Chefoo	Yingk'ou, Tientsin, Chefoo	219
Dairen-Chefoo	Dairen, Tientsin, Chefoo	89
Dairen-Tsingtao	Dairen, Tientsin, Tsingtao	272
Antung-Chefoo	Antung, Tientsin, Chefoo	215
Antung-Tsingtao	Antung, Tientsin, Tsingtao	350
Shanghai-Tientsin	Shanghai, Tsingtao, Tientsin	740
Shanghai-Dairen	Shanghai, Tientsin, Dairen	567
Shanghai-Yingk'ou	Shanghai, Tientsin, Yingk'ou	700
Tientsin-Tsingtao	Tientsin, Chefoo, Tsingtao	463
Tientsin-Dairen	Tientsin, Dairen	234

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* *Fei-ch'ü Ti Hang-yün Chiao-t'ung* [*Navigation in Communist China*], Taipei, 6th Section, Central Committee, Nationalist Party, 1953, Part II, pp. 1-2.

1:STANFORD U. 5-4.5 1956 AF12 NORTH CHINA AF12

VI. COASTAL SHIPPING

487 The city of Tientsin is the center of coastal shipping in North China; the city of Chinwangtao is second in importance as far as the total volume of coastal shipping traffic is concerned. Eleven principal shipping routes link North China harbors. (See Table 6.)

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504 North China's two principal harbors are Tangku New Harbor, about 45 kilometers (28 mi.) from Tientsin at a point where the Hai River meets the sea, and Chinwangtao Harbor. The construction of Tangku Harbor was begun by the Japanese during the Sino-Japanese War, continued by the Nationalist Government, and completed by the Communists in 1949. The harbor can accomodate ships up to 10,000 tons; prior to its completion, ships of more than 3,000 tons with cargo for Tientsin had to anchor 30 miles away, and freight was transferred to and from the docks by flat-bottomed boats. Today, the harbor is equipped with floating cranes, automatic coal-loaders, and other modern equipment, and there are shipyards, railway yards, and warehouses at hand. A single wharf can handle four 10,000-ton ships and five 3,000-tons vessels at one time.[21] Construction continues. The harbor at Chinwangtoa is the only year-round ice-free harbor in North China. Coal from the mines at Kailan are shipped from Chinwangtao to Tientsin and the East China ports.

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[21] People's China, Jan. 16, 1953, p. 32.

VII. SHIPPING TONNAGE AND TRANSPORTATION

505 Before World War II, China's shipping tonnage was 576,000 tons, including 124 ocean steamers (a total of 367,383 tons) and 3,333 river steamers (an estimated 208,617 tons). During the war, a number of Chinese ships with a combined weight of 495,320 tons were lost.[22] However, at the close of the war, 2,651 Japanese ships of various types (with a combined weight of 25,288 tons) were confiscated.

According to 1947 statistics of the Ministry of Communications, the total number of various types of ships under national, public, and private ownership in the North China Region was 162, with a total weight of 20,184 tons.[23] They are classified by service, size, and ownership in Table 7.

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[22] Hang-yün [Navigation], Nanking, Bureau of Information, Executive Yuan, 1947, p. 24.

[23] Ibid., p. 23.

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Table 7. Shipping Tonnage in North China, 1947*

Classification	Quantity	
	No. of Ships	Gross Tonnage
By Service:		
Ocean	151	19,279
River	11	905
Total	162	20,184
By Size:		
3,001-8,000 tons	1	3,222
60-3,000 tons	161	16,962
Total	162	20,184
By Ownership:		
National and Public	17	4,887
Private	145	15,297
Total	162	20,184

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* Hang-yün [Navigation], Nanking, Bureau of Information, Executive Yuan, 1947, pp. 25-28.

505 727 The Nationalist Government managed to save a large number of government-owned ships Communist confiscation by moving them to Formosa at the time of evacuation in 1949. It was reported that less than 20 per cent of the shipping tonnage of the government-owned China Merchant Steamship Company was left to the Communists.[24] But because of the Communists' vigorous efforts, building new ships as well as salvaging and repairing damaged ships, a substantial recovery was made between 1950 and 1954. The Tangku Dockyard near Tientsin is one of a dozen well-equipped dockyards in China. According to incomplete statistics released in October 1952, the Tangku Dockyard had repaired or rebuilt some 391 ships of various types since the Communist occupation of North China.[25] Salvaged ships from the sea off the coast of North China and from rivers in the vicinity of Tientsin are estimated to have been about 100 in number.[26]

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[24] Economic Weekly, Shanghai, Jan. 1950, Vol. X, No. 1, pp. 7-8.

[25] Navigation in Communist China, Taipei, 6th Section, Central Committee, the Nationalist Party, 1953, Part I, p. 17.

[26] Ibid.

505 No statistics are available upon the amount of inland water transport in North China. However, the volume of freight traffic has been increased by the adoption of the "single-file towing method" suggested by Soviet shipping experts. The total amount of freight shipped on North China waterways in 1951 showed an increase of 49 per cent over the amount shipped in the preceding year.[27]

Coastal shipping in the North China Region exceeded the planned freight target for 1954. Traffic was 14 per cent above that of 1953 and ton-kilometers increased by 6 per cent during the same period. Efficiency increased in loading and unloading; harbor turnover was shortened from 48 hours to 18 hours per ship, and some instances were reported in which cargo was unloaded and loaded in as short a time as 12 hours.[28] However, the number of accidents directly attributable to the Communist demand for acceleration of shipping was significantly higher in 1954 and thus may have canceled the advantages gained.[29]

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27. Ibid., Part II, p. 13.
28. Ibid., p. 20.
29. Current Background, Hong Kong, U.S. Consulate General, Sept. 29, 1955, p. 7.

VIII. AIR TRANSPORTATION

509 When the Nationalist withdrew to Formosa in 1949, the principal aircraft companies, the China National Aviation Corporation and the Central Aviation Transport Corporation, left few planes on the China Mainland. But in November 1949, following the defection of Liu Ching-i and Ch'en Cho-lin, who controlled the companies, over a dozen passenger planes were flown back to the Mainland from Hong Kong.[30]

During the first years of the Communist regime, there were few planes available for commercial transportation in China. Since 1954, Soviet Russia and local manufacturers have attempted to satisfy the most urgently required needs of the Party and government.[31] Although the Communists assert that airplanes are now produced in China, reports from Hong Kong indicate that Chinese companies are merely assembling parts imported from Soviet Russia.[32]

Four civil air routes serving Peking were in operation in 1955 : the Peking-Hankow-

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[30] Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, Dec. 1, 1949, Vol. VII, No. 22, p. 165.

[31] People's Daily, Peking, Sept. 29, 1954.

[32] (continued next page)

509 Chungking line, the Peking-Mukden-Harbin-Chita line, and the Peking-Lanchou-Tihua Line.[33] International air routes, which are in process of organization, include the China-Burma, the China-India, and the China-Vietminh lines. When they will be opened has not yet been announced. Communist China claims that its civil-aviation goals for the first half of 1955 have been overfulfilled. The number of passengers carried was 13 per cent above the goal set, and the amount of freight carried was 5.9 per cent above that of the same period in 1954. In the same period, the amount of mail carried increased by 76 per cent.[34]

IX. TRANSPORTATION OF KEY COMMODITIES

A. Grains

433 489 Before World War II, North China was a grain-deficient region, forced to depend upon a supply of millet, corn, and kaoliang from Manchuria and upon the import of wheat flour

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[32] China Weekly, Hong Kong, Jan. 10, 1955, p. 23.

[33] Ibid.

[34] New China News Agency release, Peking, July 30, 1955.

433 from abroad. Since 1952, the North China Region has been self-sufficient and sometimes can
489 report a grain surplus. Rice from Kiangsu and Chekiang and wheat from Shantung are shipped to North China for local consumption or to be processed by the large flour mills in and near Tientsin and Peking. Wheat is transported by rail from Shantung and Honan; rice dealers rely on coastal shipping.

B. Cotton

North China is a cotton-surplus region which produces, as a rule, about 40 per cent of the country's total output of cotton. Cotton grown in Hopei and Shansi is usually shipped by rail to Shantung and Kiangsu in East China; a certain amount of Shantung cotton is shipped by rail to textile mills in nearby Hopei. Part of the cotton processed in Hopei is sent through the port of Tientsin to Shanghai, Tsingtao, Chefoo, and other ports in Shantung Province.

C. Coal

North China usually produces a surplus of coal each year. After an amount is set aside for local consumption, the remainder is shipped to other regions. Coal mined in Hopei

433 and Shansi is shipped by rail to East China by
489 way of the Peking-Hankow, the Hankow-Canton, the Tientsin-Pukou, the Tsinan-Tsingtao, and the Shihchiachuang-Taiyuan railways. Coal from the mines at Kailan meant for East China coastal cities is usually loaded at Chinwangtao Harbor.[35]

XII. DOMESTIC TRADE

438 "State socialism" is the guiding principle for the economy of Communist China. The present stage of transition allows for state-owned, co-operative, state-capitalist, and individual trade and industry.

A. State-owned Trading Companies

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655 In 1950, six domestic trading companies were established with branches and sub-branches in nearly all of the major cities of North China. These are: the China Food Company, the China Textile Company, the China Salt Company, the China General Merchandise Company, the China Coal and Building Materials Company, and the China Native Products Company.[36] The

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[35] Economic Weekly, Shanghai, May 25, 1950, p. 9.

[36] Newspaper Reading Handbook, Hankow, Yangtze Daily, 1950, pp. 422-23.

438 655 China General Merchandise Company and the China Native Products Company have established branches even in rural areas.[37] The volume of trade of state-owned companies has increased since 1950 - nearly 300 per cent by 1952, although the total volume of trade throughout China may not have increased correspondingly. Regional trade of state-owned companies in North China probably increased at about the same rate.[38]

By the end of 1954, the number of state-owned trading companies in China as a whole had increased approximately 45 per cent over the number controlled by the state in the previous year.[39]

435 The general level of commodity prices was unchanged during 1954 as a result of the rationing of grain and other staples. In eight major cities, including Peking and

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37. Yuan-li Wu, An Economic Survey of Communist China, New York, Bookman Associates, 1956, p. 380.

38. People's China, Peking, Jan. 16, 1954, p. 5.

39. Current Background, Hong Kong, U.S. Consulate General, Sept. 29, 1955, p. 8.

435 Tientsin in North China, the index of both wholesale and retail prices of staples in 1954 was 100.4 per cent of the 1953 figures.[40] The total volume of trade in 1957 will be 133.2 per cent over that of 1952, according to the schedule for the first Five-Year Plan, as reported by Communist Vice Premier Li Fu-chun.[41]

B. The Co-operative Trading Companies

474 Supply and marketing co-operatives in Communist China are organizations formed by the peasants on a "voluntary basis," under the direction of the government. Capital is made up of shares held by the members. Co-operatives supply member-investors with farm implements, fertilizers, and a great number of other commodities both for production and consumption purposes, and the co-operatives market agricultural produce and the products of local industry. State trading companies often sign advance contracts with co-operatives and supply them certain commodities at fixed, low prices. According to the most

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[40] Ibid.

[41] Kung-shang Chieh [Industry and Commerc Peking, August 10, 1955.

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474 recently available report, there were over 30,000 supply and marketing co-operatives in China in August 1955, with a total membership of 156 million, including 1 million staff members, and some 200,000 retail purchasing agencies.[42] According to Cheng Tzü-hua, director of the National Supply and Marketing Co-operative, the retail sales of the co-operatives will increase to 34.1 per cent of the total retail trade under the Communist's first Five-Year Plan.[43] The exact number of supply and marketing co-operatives in North China is not available, but if we calculate on the basis of the ratio of regional population to the population of China as a whole, there were approximately 3,000 co-operatives in the rural districts of North China at the end of 1955.

C. "State Capitalism"

471 The principal type of "state capitalism" are three: (1) The state trading companies or the supply and marketing co-operatives may designate private commercial firms as distributors for their products on a commission basis. (2) Private merchants may purchase commodities from state trading companies at wholesale prices for sale to consumers at retail prices fixed by the state. (3) Joint state-private ownership may replace private

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[42] New China News Agency release, Aug. 3, 1955.

[43] *Ibid.*

471 ownership and the state invest capital in trading firms under joint management. In cities as large as Peking and Tientsin, approximately 70 per cent of the privately-owned commercial firms had undergone "socialist transformation" to one or another form of "state capitalism" by October 1954, according to a Communist report.[44]

D. Private Ownership

The government policy toward private trading corporations and dealers is to utilize their "positive" merits and to restrict their "negative" features by leading them, allegedly at their own insistence, on the road to state capitalism. In view of the monopolistic tendency of the state-owned trading companies, it is obvious that private wholesale and retail dealers will be automatically forced out of business or compelled to act as distributing agents for the state trading firms. Once the Communists had enforced their policy of planned purchase and planned marketing of grains, edible oils, and cotton cloth, the majority of retail dealers in Peking were forced to accept "socialist transformation"

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[44] Ta-kung Daily, Tientsin, Oct. 4, 1954.

471 to state capitalism. According to a report from Peking, in July 1955 some 40 mills were entirely devoted to state needs, 152 milling houses were engaged to mill and sell grain for the state, and 52 firms were selling grain only on behalf of state agencies.[45]

The majority of dealers engaged in the retailing of cotton cloth and silk in Peking suffered steadily growing losses until government directives forced their merger under a single management. Over thirty textile houses have merged, and others are preparing to follow the Communist-imposed pattern in order to maintain existence.[46]

XIII. FOOD RATIONING

434 Grain was first rationed in Communist China on November 19, 1953, in accordance with a government order for the enforcement of "planned purchase and planned supply of grain," designed to "stabilize foods required for livelihood and national construction,

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[45] Industry and Commerce, Peking, July 10, 1955, p. 30

[46] Ibid.

stabilize food prices, and eliminate food profiteering." All traders in grain and other essential foodstuffs were to submit to the control of the state, which would determine the ration for various classes of workers and fix official purchasing prices and retail selling prices.[47]

In order to facilitate the efficient rationing of grain in cities, industrial and mining districts, and in rural areas where grain was not produced or was produced only in insufficient quantities, "state grain markets" were established throughout China. According to a report from Hong Kong,[48] some 18,000 state grain markets had been established in the North China Region as of July 1954.

Because of the many floods and periods of drought during 1953 and 1954, grain production in these years was insufficient to meet local demands, in spite of Communist assertions that grain production had surpassed the figures for 1952. Rationing continues to cause discontent among urban and rural populations.

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47. Hsin Chien-she [New Construction], Peking, Sept. 3, 1955, p. 13.

48. China Weekly, Hong Kong, Jan. 10, 1955, p. 38.

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434 In the rural districts, following the implementation of the "san-ting" policy, which imposes fixed quotas for production, purchase, and marketing of grains, most of the farmers were not left with enough grain to increase production or to adequately feed themselves. In spite of the fact that the daily ration of grain since 1953 had been insufficient to provide minimum calorie requirements, the Communist regime proposed a tighter control of grain rationing in its "Temporary Measures Governing the Fixed Quantitative Supply of Grain in Urban Areas,"[49] promulgated in August 1955.

The individual's present or potential value to "socialist reconstruction" determines the size of the ration he receives. Amounts vary according to the age, type of work performed, and the eating habits of the local population. For example, North China is a region where wheat flour is of importance to the diet; monthly rations of wheat flour, as fixed by the Communists, are: (1) persons performing extraordinarily heavy work, 55

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[49] China Daily News, New York, Sept. 2, 1955.

434 catties (60.5 lbs.) of flour; (2) persons performing heavy physical work, 45 catties (49.5 lbs.); (3) ordinary workers, 35 catties (38.5 lbs.); (4) office clerks, teachers, and shop assistants, 31 catties (34.1 lbs.); (5) college and secondary school students, 35 catties (38.5 lbs.); and (6) residents in general, 26.5 catties (29.2 lbs.). Children under ten are classified according to age.[50]

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146 In order to determine whether the rations of wheat flour given above are adequate for minimum requirements, it is necessary to appraise the calorie content of each ration. It is estimated that one kilogram (2.2 lbs) of 4th grade wheat is equivalent to 3,430 calories.[51] Table 8, which follows, gives the daily calorie equivalents of wheat flour as rationed to the six groups listed above and offers, for purposes of comparison, the number of calories normally required by each group.

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[50] New China News Agency release, Peking, Aug. 25, 1955.

[51] Shih-wu Cheng-fen Piao [Tables of Composition of Foods], Shanghai, Chung-yang Wei-sheng Yen-chiu-yüan [The Central Health Research Institute], 1952, p. 5.

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Table 8. Wheat Flour Rations in North China*

	Quanity Rationed				
Class of Workers	Catties per Month	Pounds per Month	Calorie-equivalents per Day (I)	Normal Calorie-equivalents Per Day (II)	Percentage of Deficiency# $\left(\frac{II-I}{I}\right)$
Extra Hard Workers	55	60.5	3,110	4,800	55
Hard Workers	45	49.5	2,640	4,000	51
Ordinary Workers	35	38.5	2,000	3,200	60
Office Clerks	31	34.1	1,770	2,800	58
College or High School Students	35	38.5	2,000	3,200	60
Ordinary Residents and Children above 10 years of Age	26.5	29.2	1,520	2,400	58

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* Tables of Composition of Foods, Shanghai, The Central Health Research Institute, p. 5. T. H. Shen, Agricultural Resources of China, New York, 1951, p. 169.

# Wheat flour is the primary source of calories in the diet of the population of North China. Although some part of the deficiency may be made up by other foods consumed, the normal ration of other foods would not furnish 50-70 per cent of the daily calorie requirement.

434
146 Table 8 illustrates that the amounts of wheat flour rationed to various classes of workers are below normal dietary requirements as measured in terms of calories. Moreover, the people often cannot afford to buy their full ration at the prices fixed by the Communists, nor is there always an adequate amount of wheat flour on the market to provide even these minimum requirements.

XIV. COMMODITY FAIRS

543 In order to stimulate trade and facilitate the interflow of commodities between urban and rural areas, the Chinese Communists have held a series of "native products fairs" in some large cities in North China. Comparatively complete data on fairs held in the North China Region during 1952 are tabulated below.

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Table 9. Native Product Fairs in North China 1952*
(Unit = million. ¥ = yuan. $ = U.S. dollars)

Fairs	Place	Total Trading Volume
North China Commodity Fair	Tientsin	¥ 745,400 ($ 29.4)
North China Autumn Commodity Fair	Tientsin	¥5,628,500 ($225.1)
Peking Commodity Fair	Peking	¥ 850,000 ($34.0)
Changchiak'ou Commodity Fair	Changchiak'ou	¥ 130,000 ($ 5.2)
Taiyuan Commodity Fair	Taiyuan	¥ 107,800 ($4.3)

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Paoting Commodity Fair	Paoting	¥ 405,000 (c $16.2)
Shihchiachuang Commodity Fair	Shihchiachuang	¥ 872,300 ($34.9)
North China Native Products Fair	Tientsin	¥ 33,800 ($1.3)
Total		¥8,772,800 ($35.04)

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* Economic Weekly, Shanghai, May 28, 1953, p. 7.

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543 The total trade volume of the fairs listed above amounted to approximately US$350.4 million. The "native products fairs" held at Tientsin during the course of 1952 accounted for an estimated 72 per cent of the total trade volume. Tientsin is the industrial and trade center of North China and most of the commodities produced in this region are sent to Tientsin for sale and distribution.

XV. CONCLUSION

489 Commodity movements between the four regions of China are by rail and by coastal shipping, with railways handling the greater volume of freight traffic. Transportation facilities between the various regions of China are, for the most part, by rail. The recent completion of the section of the Peking-Paot'ou Railway between Feng-t'ai and Sha-ch'eng will facilitate transportation and will be of special value to through-traffic between Peking and Moscow by way of the Chi-ning--Erhlien--Outer Mongolia Railway. The building of the new section between Feng-t'ai and Sha-ch'eng is considered of great importance -- a triumph of the present regime. Passenger and freight traffic has tripled since the summer of 1955.

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1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF12 North China
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434 The stringent ration of wheat flour, as fixed by the Communists in North China, is evidently insufficient to maintain a normal diet. In spite of the claim that higher yields of wheat are produced each year, it seems obvious that either this claim is false or a shortage exists only because the Communists have found it necessary to export wheat flour in order to build up their foreign reserves. An inadequate food supply will cause serious unrest and ultimately lower agricultural and industrial production.

471 As the result of government monopolies in domestic and foreign trade, most privately owned commercial firms either have been forced out of business or have been forced to accept "socialist transformation." In Tientsin, Peking, Shihchiachuang, and Taiyuan, over 30 per cent of the private merchants were unemployed during 1955 and the remainder were forced to accept what work they found available or operate at a loss. The growing employment problem in the cities of the North China Region demands immediate action, and measures like the Back-to-the-Villages Campaign have not met with popular support. Disaffection in the rural areas and discontent in the cities may swell opposition to the ranks of anti-Communists.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 3f,
Economic Background

SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF PRIVATE COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY[1]

471 Industry in North China developed in three cities in Hopei Province -- Tientsin, Tangshan, and Peking. Before World War II, Tientsin was the second largest center of light industry in China. The Kailan mine, located in the vicinity of Tangshan and producing at one time at least one-quarter of the coal output of China (excluding Manchuria), fostered the growth of industry in this city. Peking, long famous for its handicrafts, became known as an industrial center after the Shih-ching-shan ironworks was established in its suburbs.

Nearly half of the industrial enterprises existing in Tientsin at the conclusion of World War II was expanded by the Japanese during their occupation of North China. Especially prominent were oil-refining companies, steel companies, and factories devoted to the manufacture of electrical products. The Shih-ching-shan ironworks was also completed by the Japanese before their defeat. After the victory, Japanese-built industries were confiscated by the Nationalist Govern-

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1. Unless otherwise indicated, specific information used in this chapter is based on private information known to Dr. K. N. Chang, the author.

471 ment and by the local governments; therefore, at the time the Communists assumed control of Tientsin, state-controlled industry accounted for approximately 40 per cent of the industrial output of this city.[2]

316
472 North China's coal mining industry was first developed in Shansi Province, which is considered to have the richest coal reserves in China. Small native iron smelters were scattered throughout the province. Two private coal mining Companies, Chin-pei in North Shansi and Pao-ch'ing in Central Shansi, were of greatest importance to the region's coal mining industry, but smaller companies were of only slightly lesser importance.

473 Before the Sino-Japanese war, the governor of Shansi organized a provincial enterprise called the Northwest Company as part of a program to encourage the general industrial development of the province and bolster the provincial economy. It was operated as a holding company and acquired interests in the two privately owned coal mining companies. The Northwest Company also erected two iron and steel works, one in Central Shansi (Yang-ch'üan) and the other in Taiyuan, the provincial capital, and began to operate several other light industries.

During the period of Japanese occupation, a number of new light industries were encouraged

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[2] Ta-kung Pao [Ta-kung Daily] , Hong Kong, July 15, 1955.

473 by the Japanese, who also assumed control of the interests of the Northwest Company and expanded its various holdings. After World War II, all the industries taken over or erected by the Japanese were surrendered to the provincial government. As a result, all the key industries and most of the light industries in Shansi Province were under the control of the provincial government before the area was overrun by the Communists.

471 In addition to assuming control of all the industries in North China owned by the provincial and local governments, the Communists gained control of those industries in which shares were held by so-called "bureaucratic capitalists and war criminals" and by those who had co-operated with the Japanese during the war. As elsewhere, the Communists attempted to eliminate foreign control of foreign-owned enterprises. The Communist authorities had so much to do in the early stages of occupation in determing the policies of a great number of industries that they could not afford to interfere in private industry. But they soon penetrated many industrial enterprises which had investments or credits from banks which were either wholly or partially controlled by the government. For instance, government influence could be exerted on the Pei-yang cotton textile mill, and the Yung-li chemical industries and the Chiu-ta Salt Refinery in Tientsin because the Chin-ch'eng Banking Corporation had interests in each of these industries, and the banking corporation was under the control of the Commu-

471 nist regime. Need for new credits, dependence on government trading organizations for the supply of raw materials and the granting of orders for repurchasing, processing, and finishing increased government influence in private industry.

Meanwhile, the Communists did not cease their plans for the "socialist transformation" of private industry. Little by little, privately owned firms were converted to joint state-private enterprises. To achieve this result, the Communists shrewdly arranged that the move from private to public industry should appear to be the "voluntary" suggestion of private ownership. A few prominent industrialists were chosen to "co-operate" with the government. They were praised as "progressive elements" of an otherwise backward economy and were induced to accept high positions in various government bureaus or in Communist-controlled political groups. Many industrialists, scarcely in a position to do otherwise, expressed their sympathy with the Communist cause. Some may have been under the illusion that tactics of this kind would enable them to obtain additional favors from the new regime; others, because they hoped thereby to protect their own interests, failing to realize that they were to be used as bait to induce fellow industrialists to enter a similar trap.

Li Chu-ch'en, manager of the Yung-li chemical industries and the Chiu-ta Salt Refinery in Tien-

471 tsin and Chou Shu-t'ao, general manager of the Ch'i-hsin Cement Works and the Hua-hsin Cotton Textile Mill in Tangshan, were appointed members of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in 1949. In 1950, Li was nominated as a member of the committee of the Central People's Government and Chou became a member of the Financial and Economic Committee of the Central People's Government as well as deputy-mayor of Tientsin municipality. Both were named in 1954 as members of the presidium of the national committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. Li was elected as a member of the National Congress standing committee and vice-chairman of the Tientsin municipal committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. Chou remains a deputy-mayor of Tientsin.

The Chiu-ta Salt Refinery and the Yung-li chemical industries which had been regarded as the most modern chemical industrial enterprises ever to be created in Tientsin, thus became spearheads of the "socialist transformation" of private industry in North China. The salt refinery was reorganized as a joint state-private concern in 1951, and the chemical industries were reorganized in 1952. Both concerns had had many difficulties during the early days of the regime because they were unable to elicit financial support from the banks. Upon their reorganization, they were able to obtain suffi-

471 cient credits from the People's Bank to expand operations and increase production and they began to pay dividends to their shareholders.

Some industrialists conceived the mistaken notion that the Communists were attempting to aid them in the revitalization of private enterprise This belief was instantly dispelled by a statement issued at the National Congress of Industry and Commerce in 1953. In effect, the Central People's Government planned to place on the road to "state capitalism" all those industries which would be of benefit to the national economy. The Communists asserted that the number of capitalists who understood the "fine points" of "state capitalism" had increased and that the capitalists in fact, were demanding that the government enforce its policy. Not long after the conference the Ch'i-hsin Cement Works and the Hua-hsin Cotton Textile Mill were "transformed" into joint state-private enterprises.

Some 23 joint enterprises in Tientsin were formed during 1953, and 55 private industries were transformed during 1954. These included all privately-owned cotton textile mills and a majority of important factories in otherfields.[3] By the fourth quarter of 1955 the total number of joint state-private industrial enterprises had reached 214, representing 28 per cent of the

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3. New China News Agency, Tientsin. Dec. 31 1954.

471 total value of local industrial production in some 29 different trades.[4]

In Peking, few large private industries remained. Most had been taken over by the government in 1949. When the Communists embarked on the transformation of private industry in 1954, the remaining enterprises including the 280-year old drugstore called T'ung-jen-t'ang, the famous candy shop Tao-hsiang-ts'un, and three renowned restaurants were among the approximately 290 enterprises which were transformed into joint state-private concerns. It can be inferred that the process of "socialist transformation" in Peking affected the smallest as well as the largest private enterprises.

Because all heavy industry and most light industry in Shansi Province had been taken over by the government, very few enterprises were left in the hands of private interests. In a report on Taiyuan made by the Communist regime, it was stated that state-owned enterprises accounted for 85.58 per cent of the annual revenue co-operatively owned enterprises accounted for 1.12 per cent, and joint public-private enterprises accounted for the balance of the gross industrial output.[5] In 1954, however some twenty enterprises were forced to accept trans-

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[4] New China News Agency, Peking, Sept. 20 1955.

[5] Shan-hsi Jih-pao [Shansi Daily], Taiyuan, Dec. 25 1954.

471 formation to joint state-private enterprises. They included six small iron works and two small coal mines.

After the establishment of government trading organizations in major cities to handle the sale of food, textiles, coal, salt, metal and miscellaneous goods supplemented by the establishment of supply-marketing co-operatives the greatest proportion of wholesale business and a slightly smaller proportion of retail business were taken away from the private merchants.

471 443 According to a Communist report[6] in August 1955, state and co-operative trade in Tientsin accounted for 91 per cent of the total wholesale trade. Retail trade by stores operating under various forms of "state capitalism" made up one-third of the total volume of retail trade. Most of Tientsin's 4 600 private wholesalers were forced to go through the process of socialist transformation. Some turned to industrial enterprises, and others have agreed to act as wholesale agents for state-controlled concerns. More than 7,000 employees were trained to work in state trading agencies. More than 60 per cent of the city's private retailers were brought within the sphere of "state capitalism". In Peking, in addition to 59 state department stores and 1,195 supply-marketing co-operat-

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6. New China News Agency, Tientsin August 10, 1955.

tives[7] already in existence in 1944, a large department store capable of catering to 20,000 customers was completed in 1955.

The Communist regime maintained almost complete control of all wholesale business by means of government trading organizations established in Shansi Province. Private retail business has been encroached upon by the supply-marketing co-operatives and by the great number of small state-owned department stores scattered throughout the province.

It can be said that private commerce in North China has been liquidated rather than transformed.

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[7] New China News Agency, Peking, Dec. 29, 1954.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 3g,
Economic Background

LABOR

I. THE EARLY STAGE OF LABOR ORGANIZATION

A. Organization of Trade Unions in Hopei and Shansi

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The Communists' organization of labor in the North China Region was more advanced than elsewhere in China proper. Hopei and Shansi were the first provinces outside the Northeast and Northwest regions to be dominated by Communist forces. Even before the formal inauguration of the People's Republic of China in October 1949, preparatory committees of various trade unions had been established in the larger cities of these provinces. Having gained experience in Northeast and Northwest China, the Communists smoothly developed their labor organization in Shansi and Hopei.

In Peking, 83 trade unions were organized and 125 preparatory committees established durin the first year of the regime. Among the 400,000 wage earners (one-fifth of the total population of Peking), 142,457 (35 per cent) were reported to have joined the trade unions. The Communists also claimed to have trained 19,007 trade union

467 cadres to tackle the problem of labor organization in Peking.[1]

Official policy in Communist China is to organize into unions all manual and non-manual wage earners whose earnings from work constitute their sole or chief means of livelihood. As early as 1949, doctors, nurses, staff members and janitors of the American-operated Peking Union Medical College (the famous P.U.M.C founded by the Rockefeller Foundation) formed a separate trade union. In 1949, Peking educational workers, i.e., people working in research institutes, universities, secondary and primary schools, had organized a trade union preparatory committee to represent 18,000 members.[2] The most numerous trade unions in Peking during this period, however, were in the handicraft industries

Tientsin, the largest industrial city in the North China Region, has a working population about as large as that in Peking. Eighty per cent of the Tientsin workers were employed in industry, and half of this group joined trade unions during 1949-50. The Tientsin General Trade Union opened its office on January 14, 1950. Among the first trade unions to be established in Tientsin were those made up of cotton mill workers, railway workers, and seamen. The Hopei

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[1] Kung-jen Jih-pao [Worker's Daily], Feb. 3, 1950; June 29, 1950, p. 1.

[2] Ibid., Dec. 8, 1949, p. 4.

467 Federation of Trade Unions was established on July 26, 1950.[3] It remains under the direct control of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions.

According to a report published in Nov. 1949, among the 500,000 workers in the public and private enterprises of Shansi Province, 140,000 (28 per cent) belonged to trade unions. In Shansi, 125 trade unions and 82 preparatory committees were established during the first year of the new regime. In the city of Taiyuan, 70 per cent of the workers in public and private enterprises had joined trade unions by October 1950.[4]

The rapid organization of trade unions in Communist China did not indicate the spontaneous enthusiasm of the working class, as the Communists claimed. Rather the swift pace of the movement resulted from government policy in sending thousands of trade union cadres into factories, mines and other enterprises to indoctrinate and organize the workers.

The functions of the trade union, as defined in the program of the Taiyuan General Trade Union in 1950, were: (1) to increase production; (2) to settle labor disputes: (3) to educate the

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[3] Ibid., Jan. 10, 15, 1950; Aug. 2, 1950.
[4] Ibid., Jan. 19, 1950, p. 4.

467 the workers; and (4) to improve the living standard of the masses.[5]

B. Labor Disputes and the Labor Bureau

468 The first step in settling labor disputes consists of consultation between the representatives of the workers (the trade unions) and the management, in the case of publicly-owned enterprises, and between the trade-unions and the owner, in the case of private enterprises. In 1949 and 1950 various kinds of consultation agencies were established in factories, mines, and other public and private enterprises in North China such as the Labor-Capital Consultative Council and the Factory Administration Committee. In 1950 in Peking, more than 70 private enterprises established labor-capital-consultative councils, and 28 public enterprises established factory administrative committees.[6] In Taiyuan, where there were then no large-scale industries, collective contracts were used to settle labor disputes.

If consultation fails, disputes are brought to the government labor bureau for mediation and arbitration. A labor bureau is established at every level of the government. According to a report made by the Peking government labor bureau, from June to October 1949, 190 labor

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[5] Ibid., Oct. 3, 1950, p. 4.

[6] Ibid., May 28, 1950; June 1, 1950.

468 disputes were submitted to the bureau for mediation. Some 77 per cent accepted the mediation or arbitration of the bureau.[7]

466 According to an analysis made by the labor bureau of Tangshan, an industrial district in North China, 73 per cent of the labor disputes in private enterprises in that area involved the dismissal of workers as a result of the economic slump which followed the Communist invasion of North China in 1948. In most cases, the labor bureau, with the help of trade unions, advised the workers to accept lower wages so that the discharged workers could be rehired and the enterprises concerned would be kept going. That "capital and labor should be united in the struggle for victory in the reconstruction of the Nation" was considered the basic principle for handling all disputes between workers and management. Workers were urged to recognize the close relationship between labor and management and to endeavor to help management. During March and May 1950, when the economic situation was at its worst, many workers "voluntarily" requested cuts in their wages and others agreed to rotation employment.[8]

C. The Apprentice System

Before the Communist regime, the apprentice system was used in handicraft industries,

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[7] Ibid., Dec. 29, 1949, p. 4.

[8] Cheng-fu Kung-tso Pao-kao Hui-pien [Compendium of Government Reports], Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1951, p. 269.

466 workshops, and, to some extent, in larger factories throughout China. When the Communists conquered North China in 1948, they could not afford to abolish this system as they had promised they would. Apprenticement was a means of training skilled labor needed in the industrialization of China. The Communists claim they have abolished the "feudalistic" nature of the apprentice system, which continues to exist in all regions of China.

Trade unions in Peking, Tientsin, and Taiyuan encouraged apprentices and masters in factories and workshops to sign "apprentice-master contracts," whereby the master promised to teach the apprentice certain skills and the apprentice promised to respect the master and work conscientiously. When the first "apprentice-master" contract was signed on Dec. 27, 1949, representatives of the Communist Party, the People's Government of Tientsin, and the trade unions witnessed the ceremony. It also was reported in some detail by the Worker's Daily.[9]

II. LABOR EMULATION AND LABOR PRODUCTIVITY

"Labor Emulation" is a technique used by the Communists to effect an increase in labor productivity without a corresponding increase in production costs.[10] In promoting "labor emulation," the following steps are taken: (1) workers are organized to discusss the production plans of the state; (2) the trade unions, acting on behalf of the workers, sign contracts with the respective administrations; (3) production meetings are called to discuss production problems; (4) workers are encouraged to work out and submit "rationalization proposals"[11] and to popularize "advanced methods of work."[12]

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[9] Worker's Daily, Jan. 11, 1950, p. 4.

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[10] People's China, Peking, May 16, 1954, pp. 6-8.

[11] In Communist China, the term "rationalization proposal" is used to mean proposals submitted by workers to management for increasing production through improved techniques, reducing costs of production, introducing methods to lengthen the life of machines, and using manpower more effectively. The submission of rationalization proposals emerged as a campaign in Northeast China in 1947 and spread throughout China in 1950. See Kuo-min Ching-chi Shih-yung Tz'u-tien [Popular Dictionary of Practical Economics], Shanghai, Ch'un-ming shu-tien, 1952, pp. 9016-17.

[12] "Popularization of the advanced methods of work" in Communist China is corresponding to Stahkanovism in Russia: a means to increase efficiency by utilizing methods introduced by model workers. See Ibid., p. 9057.

466 The "labor emulation drive" in Communist China was copied from practices current in Russia and used during the early 1940's in the Communist controlled Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region.[13] It had spread throughout China by 1950. Three years later, about 80 per cent of the working population in China had been forced to take part in this drive. According to a Communist report,[14] labor productivity increased as a result.

Labor emulation was begun in Tientsin. In early 1950, only 50 factories were participating, and most of them were state-owned. By January 1951 the great majority of factories in Tientsin, including over 60 private enterprises, were involved. The Communists alleged in 1955 that the smelters at the Tientsin Iron and Steel Works, as a result of the emulation drive, had increased their output thirteenfold during the past five years.[15]

The signing of collective contracts between labor and the administration was an important step in organizing "labor emulation." The proceedings, as reported by the Shih-ching-shan Electric Company, were as follows: The director of the plant reported to a general meeting of workers on the task assigned to the plant. The

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[13] Abundant Clothing, Sufficient Food, Shen-si-Kansu-Ninghsia-Border Region, May 1944.

[14] People's Daily, May 1, 1955, p. 2.

[15] People's China, Mayl, 1955, p. 19.

466 report was followed by discussions and suggestions at all union levels from the committee down to the smallest groups. A contract based on the results of these discussions and suggestions was drawn up by the vice-chairman of the trade union and the deputy director of the plant. The draft was then subjected to further discussion before approval. After the contract was signed, it became a program of action for the entire plant. Both administration and trade unions pledged to fulfill the production plan.[16]

From January to November 1953, the labor emulation drive drew from workers in factories and mines in Shansi Province a total of 18,115 "rationalization proposals." Of these, 12,571 were adopted at a reported saving to the state of 35,000 million yuan (old currency, about US$ 1.4 million.)[17]

The public acclaim given "model workers" who surpass their production quotas is one way the Communists have popularized "advanced methods of work" in an effort to increase labor productivity. Hopei and Shansi provinces and the municipalities of Peking and Tientsin sent 30 "model workers" to participate in the firstLabor Heroes' Conference held in Peking in 1950.[18]

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[16] Ibid., May 1, 1955, p. 19.

[17] People's China, May 1, 1955, p. 11.

[18] Worker's Daily, Sept. 28 - Oct. 3, 1950.

466 "Patriotic appeal" is another means used in Communist China to increase labor productivity. At the end of 1951, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions issued a note calling upon trade union organizations at all levels to launch the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Movement. In response to this call, workers in North China signed pacts, promising patriotically to increase production.

During the initial phases of a labor emulation drive, production generally increased in quantity, but accidents occurred more frequently. According to an announcement issued by the People's Control Committee on September 16, 1953,[19] trade unions in state-operated enterprises were guilty of increasing production at the cost of labor safety. In the Kailan Mining District in Hopei Province, the management and trade union officials at a brick factory encouraged the workers to pull bricks from blazing kilns in order to fulfill the production quota. Of the 43 workers involved in this incident, 41 sustained serious burns.[20]

At the state-operated Taiyuan Machinery Factory in Shansi Province, the management and union cadres extended working hours until a twelve-hour work-day was not unusual. The Communists admitted that a worker named Yang

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[19] People's Daily, Sept. 17, 1952, p. 1.

[20] Tsu-kuo Chou-k'an [China Weekly], January 19, 1953, pp. 7-8.

466 Chih-k'uei became exhausted on a sixteen-hour work-shift, grew careless, and caused his own death.

The Communists are aware of the dangers of strenuous labor emulation. Recently the regime has encouraged the observance of safety measures and adequate training of workers, and abnormal extension of working hours is discouraged.

III. WAGES AND PURCHASING POWER OF CHINESE WORKERS

465 In 1948 and 1949, the method of computing wages was in a state of confusion. At first, wages were calculated in terms of rice and millet. For example, in Peking in 1949, the privately-owned Yung-feng Chemical Works graded its workers according to their skills: in the first group each worker received 5.5 catties of rice (about 6 lbs) per day; in the second group, 5 catties (about 5.5 lbs); and in the third group, 4 catties (about 4.4 lbs). In Tientsin, at the end of 1949, each transportation worker earned almost 15 catties (about 16.5 lbs) of rice per day.[21]

In order to safeguard the workers' earnings against fluctuations of commodity prices, the Chinese Communists adopted a wage-unit system at the end of 1951. The wage-unit was based

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[21] Worker's Daily, Dec. 17, 1949, p. 4.

465 on the price of specified commodities. According to Chin-pu Jih-pao [Progress Daily], Tientsin, October 26, 1951, the monetary value of one wage-unit was equal to the sum of the retail values of the following commodities sold in the government stores:

Millet	0.48 catty
Flour	0.32 catty
Vegetable oil	0.05 catty
Coal	2.00 catties
Salt	0.02 catty
Cotton cloth	0.20 ch'ih

(One catty equals 1.10 lb; one ch'ih equals 1.09 feet.)

The monetary value of the wage-unit was announced daily by the local government. In North China it was first quoted at 2,323 yuan (old currency, about US$ 0.09).[22] In this region, the highest paid worker received about 300 units per month and the lowest paid worker about 60 units per month. The average earning per month was about 200 units, equivalent to 464,600 yuan (old currency, about US$ 18.00).[23]

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465 The Communists asserted that the earnings of Chinese workers were increasing with the

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[22] Progress Daily, Oct. 26, 1951, p. 2.

[23] Worker's Daily, Dec. 15, 1949; China Weekly, Feb. 14, 1955, pp. 13-21; Kung-fei Ti Min-chung Yün-tung [The Mass Movement in Communist China], Taipei, 1951, pp. 37-38.

434 advance in labor productivity. As monetary wages rose, the Communists claimed "this increase was

465 not an attempt to keep pace with a rising cost of living but a real increase in the workers' living standard."[24] The Communists insisted that a real increase in wages was reflected in the higher purchasing power of the Chinese people. In North China, purchasing power was reported to have advanced 30 per cent from 1950 to 1951 and another 16.3 per cent from 1951 to 1952. (The amount of pork consumed in Peking was claimed to be six times greater in 1954 than in 1949.)[25]

An examination of the prices of daily necessities in mid-1955 shows that in comparison to average earnings the cost of living for the Chinese worker was still very high.[26] In North China at that time, the cost of one pair of men's socks was 0.70 yuan (about US$ 0.28), one catty (1.10 lbs) of sugar 0.76 yuan (about US$ 0.30), one catty of beef 0.72 yuan (about US$ 0.28), and one dozen eggs 0.72 yuan. During the same period, the monetary value of one wage-unit was quoted at 0.2553 yuan and the average monthly wage was about 200 units, approximately 50 yuan (about US$ 20.00).[27]

In spite of the high cost of living, the income of the Chinese workers is subject to

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[24] People's China, May 1, 1955, pp. 3-5.

[25] Economic Bulletin, Hong Kong, Feb. 24, 1953, p. 10; Dec. 31, 1954, p. 22.

[26] Communist China adopted a new currency system on March 1, 1955. One new yuan equals 10,000 old yuan or US$ 0.40.

[27] Ta-kung Daily, Tientsin, June 28, 1955.

434 465 many "voluntary" contributions, to various campaigns as well as the all-but-compulsory purchase of government bonds. In 1950, the Communist government issued Victory Bonds, and North China was allocated 1,500,000 points.[28] The workers in Peking, Tientsin, and Taiyuan were pressed to buy the bonds by trade union officials and Party members.

VI. LABOR WELFARE

A. Labor Insurance and Health

466 743 Under the Labor Insurance Law, promulgated by the Ministry of Labor in March 1951 and revised in January 1953, there has been an increase in health facilities in factories and mines in North China. In June 1954, this area had more than 200 sanatoriums and rest homes with a total of more than 6,000 beds, and several similar institutions were under construction.[29] In 1949, Tientsin completed a workers' hospital with a staff of 82 to care for 200 patients daily. Tangshan industrial district in Hopei Province has a modern hospital with 330 beds.[30]

466 456 Old age pensions have been introduced in Communist China under the Labor Insurance Law. The aged workers of the famous T'ung-jen

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[28] Worker's Daily, Oct. 1952, p. 2; People's China, May 1, 1953, p. 15.

[29] People's China, June 1954, p. 39.

[30] Worker's Daily, Dec. 2, 1949, p. 4; Tsu-kuo Tsai Ch'ien-chin [China Forges Ahead], Vol. II, Peking San-lien shu-tien, p. 296.

456 t'ang Chinese drug store in Peking have received pensions under this law. The Communists assert 466 that one railway worker in Tientsin after 50 years of service receives 70 per cent of his former monthly wage as an old age pension.[31]

466 The Communists assert that under their regime housing conditions have improved throughout China. The regime claims to have spent more than 286 million yuan (new currency, about US$ 114.4 million) on housing in 1952 and to have allocated funds to construct some 130 million square feet of housing in 1953. In spite of these efforts, housing problems in Communist China have not been resolved. The People's Daily reported on November 25, 1954 that in Shih-ching-shan industrial district in the suburbs of Peking, about 80 per cent of the workers had to rent their living quarters from private owners, many of whom asked for large deposits and charged high rents. In a Shansi mining district, one worker with five children was unable to pay rent. He moved into one of the empty mining shacks, but was evicted and died of malnutrition.[32]

The Communists have paid some attention to the nutrition problem of the workers. A Tientsin Daily reporter paid a visit to the local textile machinery works in May 1955. He reporte that in the factory canteen, the workers were

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[31] Worker's Daily, oct. 1952, p. 2; People's China, May 1, 1953, p. 15.

[32] China Weekly, May 2, 1955, pp. 16-18.

466 offered seven or eight dishes to choose from, with prices ranging from 6 to 25 fen (US 2.4 to 9 cents). A doctor at the factory clinic told the reporter that each worker daily received 60 to 90 grams of protein, and a like amount of fat, and at least 4,000 calories, though needed no more than 3,000 to 3,500 calories. The cost of food to the worker was estimated at about one-sixth of his wages each month.[33]

It is possible that a part of the workers in some of the publicly-owned enterprises receive a proper diet subsidized by the state, but such subsidized feeding does not help the worker's family. The Communists admitted that in the industrial districts of the Peking suburbs in the spring of 1955 vegetables and other foods were scarce and that a wait in line of two or three hours was necessary in order to get daily supplies.[34]

B. Labor Safety and Industrial Accidents

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466 The Communists assert that from 1948 to 1953 the government has passed 119 decrees, rules and regulations concerning industrial safety and sanitation in factories, mines, and other enterprises. AT the end of 1949, the Communist regime instituted a nationwide investigation of

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[33] People's China, May 16, 1955, p. 33.

[34] Enlightenment Daily, April 23, 1955.

industrial safety and sanitation in all industries and mines. The trade unions mobilized workers throughout China for a check-up of machines, other tools, and working conditions. It was discovered that most factories and mines in North China had been neglecting safety measures; accidents were frequent, and deaths and injuries were on the increase. In Men-t'ou-kou coal mine near Peking in September-October 1949, there were 25 deaths and 191 injuries. In Shih-ching-shan Steel Works in Peking, the investigation committee discovered 2,794 violations of safety measures.[35]

Conditions were said to have been improved by the investigation, but the labor emulation drive in 1951 caused increased industrial accidents in Tientsin. In public and private factories in Tientsin in the first half of 1952, 1,589 persons were injured or killed in accidents.[36] Early in the Communist regime, the mayor of Tientsin, Huang Ching, remarked that the "improvement of workers' welfare must come after production has been developed."[37] This statement suggests that the policy of the Chinese Communists is to put production goals above safety measures.

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[35] Worker's Daily, Dec. 12, 23, 1949.

[36] Tientsin Daily, July 30, 1952.

[37] Compendium of Government Reports, pp. 260-62.

C. Labor Education and Recreation

464 The overwhelming majority of China's
212 workers are illiterate. One of the basic aims of the Communist regime has been to remedy this situation and raise the technical level among the masses to ensure the success of the reconstruction program. Workers have been encouraged to avail themselves of the training schools run by factories, mines, and other enterprises. In the first year of the Communist regime, 43 per cent of the workers in Peking were reported to be attending night classes. Over 172 night schools were in operation in Tientsin during the same period. Seventy-nine per cent of the workers in the Taiyuan Machinery Shop were illiterate in 1950, but this figure had been reduced to 11 per cent in 1955 after authorities adopted the "acclerated method" of learning Chinese characters.[38]

466 Peking was the first city to establish
461 "cultural centers" for the workers. Each "cultural center" has a library, a recreation hall, and many other recreational facilities. In 1952, workers took part for the first time in the national athletic meeting held in Peking. In 1950, eleven newspapers and periodicals were printed for workers, and most of the contributors were members of the working class.

Despite the efforts of the Communists to

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[38] People's Daily, May 1, 1955, p. 2; Worker's Daily, Oct. 5, 1953, p. 3.

466 establish night schools and "cultural centers" the workers were too busy to make use of them.
461 Their leisure time was occupied in political study, discussions, and self-criticism meetings as well as government campaigns, movements and drives. According to a Communist report, the workers and staff members in Tientsin factories spent 50 to 60 hours per month in political study and at meetings. The "activists" usually came to the factory at 6:00 a.m. and stayed until 10:00 p.m.[39]

D. Unemployment

464 Under Communist rule, everyone is said to be guaranteed the right to work. Unemployment, which has been a problem for the new regime, is considered by the Chinese Communists to be a legacy of capitalistic society which will disappear eventually.

The Communist policy of unemployment relief has been based upon the "substitution of work for relief," "self-help," and a series of "Back-to-the-Villages" campaigns. Thousands of unemployed workers have been recruited as forced labor and set to work building highways and railway lines or iworking on water conservation projects and state farms.[40]

In February 1950, the Peking General Trade Union promulgated regulations concerning un-

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[39] China Weekly, Jan. 26, 1953, p. 11.

[40] See chapter on Forced Labor in this handbook.

464 employment relief in Peking: (1) all of the workers in factories, mines, and shops employing more than ten persons shall contribute one per cent of their wages to a relief fund; (2) those who receive the benefit of the relief fund shall pay back one per cent of the total amount received after return to work; (3) unemployed workers who receive relief are obliged to work for the government and continue their political education. Under the last regulation, many unemployed workers in Peking had been drafted for municipal construction projects.[41]

V. THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN AND CHINESE LABOR

461 185 After the initiation of the First Five-year Plan in 1953, the Communists announced that all[42] manpower and material must be utilized to increase production in order to complete the industrialization of China, and that the improvement of the living standard must depend upon the development of production; therefore, the Chinese people, especially the industrial workers, must strive for this goal in a "spirit of bitter struggle."

According to the plan, China's total industrial output is scheduled to be increased by 98.3 per cent during the period of the first Five-year Plan, ending 1957. In April 1954, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions issued a directive calling for a renewal of the labor emulation drive,

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41. Worker's Daily, Feb. 17, 1950, p. 1.
42. People's China, May 1, 1953, p. 5.

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which was to be expanded from publicly-owned enterprises to all sections of the Communist economy.

For example, in Shih-ching-shan industrial district of the Peking suburbs in 1954, labor emulation was extended to include the families of workers. . Urban street offices in this area forced families to persuade their husbands and sons to forfeit their annual New Year's vacation and remain at work. In the Chien-ts'ao-p'ing industrial and mining district of Taiyuan, Shansi Province, urban street offices organized 777 family members to support those workers who had agreed to do additional factory work during 1954.[43] On the whole, the Communists have overlooked no opportunity to increase labor productivity since the announcement of the first Five-year Plan.

Upon reviewing the result of the first six months of the Five-year Plan, the Communists were alarmed to discover that production in the steel industry and in the mines was most unsatisfactory. Some 33 per cent of the enterprises had failed to fulfill production goals assigned to them. Light industry also lagged, with an estimated 26.5 per cent of the production goals fulfilled.[44]

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[43] People's Daily, April 9, 1955; Enlightenment Daily, April 24, 1955.

[44] Current Background, Hong Kong, U.S. Consulate General, March 20, 1953.

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The Communists attributed the crux of the failure to the lack of discipline among the workers and the failure of management to assume its share of responsibility. The regime reported that state and municipal enterprises in Peking had an average rate of absenteeism of 10 per cent. In the first quarter of 1953, the city's publicly owned enterprises reported a loss of 44,500 workdays, at least one-third of which were not due to illness or other legitimate reasons. In one coal mine in the western suburbs, the attendance in one month was down to 76 per cent.[45] The All-China Federation of Trade Unions issued a directive concerning labor discipline in July 1953, and the Government Administration Council promulgated "Regulations on the Conduct of Labor in State-operated Enterprises" in May 1954. The Ministry of Heavy Indsutry ordered factories and mines to institute a "responsibility system" in August 1953 to make certain that workers and management knew exactly what was required of them.

The Communists have not admitted that the cause of the incipient failure of the Five-year Plan is the lack of skilled labor in present-day China. According to an estimate made by Cheng Chu-yüan, the Communists will need 2,500,000 skilled workers to carry out the tasks proposed in the Five-year Plan, and at present possess

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[45] Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, August 6, 1953, pp. 162-63.

461/185 no more than 600,000 reasonably skilled workers.[46]

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[46] Cheng Chu-yüan, Chung-kung Wu-nien Chi-hua P"ou-hsi [Analysis of the Five-year Plan of the Chinese Communists], Hong Kong, 1955, pp. 317-38.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 3h,
Economic Background

FORCED LABOR

I. INTRODUCTION

697 466 The conscription of forced labor is practiced in North China as it is in other regions of the country and follows the same pattern as is found in the country as a whole. There are two categories of forced labor in the North. The first is prison labor -- those prisoners who were condemned as counterrevolutionaries and violators of landreform laws and others condemned during the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns. These prisoners are sentenced to manual labor during their prison terms. Some of them are kept in prisons or detention houses to perform their labor services, but most of them are organized into labor corps which may be assigned as needed to work individual sites. The second category is civilian labor recruited by government directives from among the surplus farmhands, the unemployed, and refugees from floods and droughts. They are employed in mass-labor projects, such as the harnessing of the Hwai River and the Ching River and the construction of the Chengtu-Chungking Railway and the Sikang-Tibet Highway. A study of the forced labor in North China must, of necessity, put

697 major emphasis on the first category, that is,
466 "Reform-through-labor."

II. REFORM-THROUGH-LABOR IN HOPEI PROVINCE

697 The nationwide drive for the suppression
695 of counterrevolutionaries started after Communist China entered the war in Korea at the end of 1950. Lo Jui-ch'ing, Minister of Public Security of the Communist Government, reported on October 1, 1951, that according to incomplete statistics submitted by eight administrative districts and four municipalities in Hopei Provinc during the first nine months of 1951, 3,900,000 people participated in 653 public trials.[1] The "public trial" is something new in Communist China. It is entirely different from the court procedure in a democratic country and akin to the trials which took place during the French Revolution. The procedure of the public trial is in the hands of the Public Security Office, which is in charge of inviting confessions or accusations from the public and of framing charges against the accused. The accused cannot defend himself because he is not allowed to speak, nor is he given the counsel of a lawyer. Public Security officers recommend punishment and the public passes final judgment. A sentence of imprisonment condemns the accused to "Reform-though-

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[1] Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Pekin Oct. 1, 1951, p. 3.

697 labor."

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The report made by Lo Jui-ch'ing does not mention either the number accused or the number of prisoners undergoing reform-through-labor. A report from Taiwan estimates that about 80,000 prisoners were sentenced to reform-through-labor in Peking in 1954.[2] Among these prisoners were a large number of women.[3]

III. CH'ING-HO FARM, A "REFORM-THROUGH-LABOR" PROJECT

A. History and Development of Ch'ing-ho Farm

697 Under the Communist regime, North China was one of the first regions to establish "Reform-through-labor" camps.[4] Ch'ing-ho Farm was created by the Public Security Bureau in March 1950, just five months after the establishment of the Central People's Government, on 90,000 mou (13,590 acres) of desolate land west of Ch'a-ting-chan along the railway from Peking to Shan-hai-kuan. In the first year, eight Hsin-jen-ts'un

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[2] Chung-kuo Lao-kung [Free China Labor] Taipei, Free China Labor League, No. 60, May 1, 1953, p. 46.

[3] Ya-chou Tien-hsün [Asia Foundation News Bulletin], San Francisco, Aug. 19, 1955.

[4] Reform-through-labor camps were first established in Northeast and Northwest China.

697[Rebirth Villages] were established, 2,500 room were constructed, 1,500,000 cubic meters (49,140,000 cubic feet) of earthwork were dug, and the prisoners erected electric pumping stations capable of irrigating 50,000 mou (7,550 acres) of land. Clinics and laboratories, as well as engineering and trasportation corps, were established. In keeping with the needs of the farm, brick kilns, rice mills, and a straw-bag factory were built. All of these were constructed by the prisoners in a little more than one year.

In 1950, 7,000 mou (1,055 acres) of land were reclaimed, and rice was planted on 5,000 mou (755 acres), which produced 2,600,000 catties (2,652,000 lbs) of rice. In 1951, another 33,000 mou (4,983 acres) of land were reclaimed and rice was planted on 23,500 mou (3,584 acres) which yielded 15,000,000 catties (15,300,000 lbs) of rice. The prisoners also raised chickens, ducks, cows, and pigs, and tended vegetable gardens and planted trees. Since 1952, Ch'ing-ho Farm has been producing surplus products which become the property of the Chinese People's Government.

Eight tractors are in use, power-driven pumps irrigate the rice fields, and airplanes are used to spread insecticides to kill locusts. In 1950, the average yield of rice per mou was 550 catties (605 lbs), increasing to 600 (673 lbs) in 1951. The average yield per mou in neighboring farms was 450 catties (495 lbs).[5]

B. The Prisoners

The prisoners condemned to "Reform-through-labor" include Kuomintang army officers, secret agents, bandits, "despots," habitual robbers and thieves, vagabonds, avaricious government officials, and members of reactionary secret societies who were called by the famous Communist playwright, Ts'ao Yü, "the dregs of society, the bloodsuckers of the people." The Communists consider the prisoners "enemies of the working class, men who oppressed the people, 'rode on the heads of the people,' and undermined society." They are put in prison not only to prevent them from continuing their "criminal activities," but to force them to "recognize their past crimes and reform into new men through labor." In the past, they had lived "on the exploitation of the working class;" after they had experienced reform-through-labor they were "able to live on their own labor."[6] In fact, most of these prisoners were imprisoned as a result of the drive to suppress counterrevolutionaries and offenders of land-reform laws and marriage laws, and included men sentenced at public trials during the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns. There were about 5,000 prisoners

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[5] Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily], Peking, Oct., 18, 1951, p. 1.

[6] Ts'ao Yü "Hsiu-mu Sheng-ch'u-le Lü-ya -- Wo So-chien-ti Ch'ing-ho Nung-ch'ang" [" Green Shoots Have Emerged From Rotten Wood -- The Ch'ing-ho Farm That I Saw"], People's

697 at the beginning of 1950 and the number increased to 30,000 in 1952 during the campaign for the suppression of counterrevolutionaries.[7]

Generally, the prisoners are organized into units according to the character of their offenses and the length of their sentences. A unit consisting of 600 prisoners occupies one Rebirth Village.[8] But there are exceptions, when prisoners live in mixed groups or are kept in individual cells. Women prisoners are housed in separate quarters.

C. Labor Production and Political Education

The basic policy of the Chinese Communists for the reform of prisoners is a combination of labor production and political education.[9] The Ch'ing-ho Farm has implemented this policy from the beginning. The manager of the farm recently said to a visitor, "The farm pays special attention to their education, so that they may understand the international situation of the day and the future of the state. They are induced

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Daily, Peking, July 3, 1955, p. 3.

[7] Cheng Chu-yüan, Chung-kung Ti Nu-kung Chih-tu [The Slavery System of the Chinese Communists], Hong Kong, 1952, p. 79.

[8] Enlightenment Daily, Oct. 18, 1951, p.1.

[9] See Article 7 of the Common Program; Mao Tse-tung, On People's Democratic Dictatorship; Constitution of the People's Republic of China.

697 to admit their past crimes and to obey the law."[10]

One official report[11] stated that, when the prisoners first came to the farm, "they had no habit for work, no production skill; some even openly resisted work, despised labor, and sabotaged production by deliberately falling down in carrying earth and lying on the ground for a long time; some stayed longer than they needed in the toilet to evade work. When the authorities of the farm explained the policy of Reform-through-labor contained in Mao Tse-tung's On People's Democratic Dictatorship, "... the criminals showed great resistance to the idea, some cried bitterly, many went on hunger strike, many wrote their last letters and planned suicide or escape." The farm authorities pointed out to the prisoners that Reform-through-labor was the most magnanimous policy of the Central People's Government toward the counterrevolutionaries, and that only through labor could they be changed into new men. By the Communists' own admission, when UN troops landed on Inchon in Sept. 1950, some prisoners expressed doubt that the Chinese Communists would be able to survive the assault. The farm authorities planned a three-month political-training program for the prisoners in the winter of 1950. According to

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[10] NCNA, Peking, April 13, 1955; quoted in Survey of China Mainland Press, Hong Kong, No. 1030, p. 45.

[11] Enlightenment Daily, Oct. 18, 1951, p.1.

697 Communist statistics, in the period from March 1950 to October 1951, 80 per cent of the prisoners changed their ideology and obeyed the regulations of the farm and 10 per cent became activists. Only 10 per cent were able to resist Communist persuasion.[12]

In discussing changes of ideology caused by the Reform-through-labor programs, the Communists cite two examples: "Criminal" Yang Ch'eng-jung flung himself upon a gap in a ditch through which water to irrigate a rice field was escaping and remained there until the damage was repaired. Miao Kan, who was released from the prison farm before the expiration of his term, asked to be allowed to stay there. He said, "[Although] I was once an employee of the Japanese consulate...[and] a former agent of the Kuomintang Army, I have no reason not to work honestly on the farm."[13]

According to the Communists, the productivity of the prisoners also increased as a result of their ideological education. When the digging of ditches began in 1950, each prisoner dug less than 1.5 cubic meters (about 48 cubic feet) per day, but several years later the average amount had been raised to 7 cubic meters (about 224 cubic feet).

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[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.

697 According to Liang Wen-ying, manager of Ch'ing-ho farm, two-thirds of the criminals had been changed into "new men" by July 1955 as a result of the policy of combining labor production and political education.

D. Living Conditions

In principle, the prisoners are expected to work nine to ten hours a day; in practice, they work a far greater length of time. The system of "fixed time, fixed quality, and fixed quantity" was adopted when the farm was organized. In the case of the digging of ditches, the system requires that each criminal dig a certain number of cubic meters of earth each day, but the officials in charge of the farm continues to raise the amount expected. Industry is encouraged by competition for the "red flag award," and there is a system of merits and demerits and placards announcing promotions and demotions. All of these methods have resulted in lengthening the working hours and making the working conditions of the prisoners still harsher. The farm manager's report stated that, when ditches were dug in the early spring of 1951, the temperature was below freezing and yet some of the prisoners worked barefoot on the ice, and many prisoners dug as much as 34 cubic meters per day. After extolling the prisoners, the report concluded that "miracles of this kind could not be achieved by force but only by implementation of the policy of Reform-through-labor."

The farm authorities, according to the

697 report, gave proper attention to the health and welfare of the prisoners. When the farm was established, there were only two clinics, but by 1955 a hospital had been built and there were clinics in all of the Rebirth Villages. The staff members of the hospital and the clinics were from the ranks of prisoners. The Communist report includes an example of the care alleged to be given to the prisoners. "Wang Kang-chi, a criminal, had an abnormal ulcer on his body, which in the past had never been properly cured. He thought he had not long to live. But after admission to the farm, he was cured of his ailment."[14]

The authorities, according to the Communist report, have taken charge of the cultural life of the prisoners and planned recreation for them. Many criminals who were illiterates in 1954, it is alleged, were able to read newspapers and write letters by 1955. A weekly paper, Kai-tsao Yüan-ti [Reform Garden], is published by the prisoners. The prisoners even write plays and stage them in the farm auditorium, which is large enough to accommodate an audience of 1,000. A dramatic club has been organized to give shows in nearby villages.

In theevenings, apart from the cultural classes and political study, the prisoners hold

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14. NCNA, Peking, April 13, 1955; quoted in Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1030, p. 45.

criticism meetings. In these meetings they are urged to confess their past crimes and admit how they have changed. They are also urged to criticize one another. The Communists believe that self-administered "criticism" is the only way to eliminate "reactionary thought" among the prisoners.

E. Awards, Punishment, and Release

A system of awards and punishment is enforced on the farm. The prisoners who work hard and make efforts to accept "ideological education" are given appropriate spiritual and material awards; for example, they may have their names published in an issue of the *Reform Garden*. Those who "sincerely repent" and show they have completed their change in ideology, and whose past "crimes" are not considered to have been too serious, are released before their sentences expire. According to Lo Jui-ch'ing, Minister of Public Security, in the four years of 1950-54, Ch'ing-ho Farm had released 5,384 persons on the expiration of their sentences.[15] In 1954-55 another 642 prisoners were released.[16]

Among the 5,384 prisoners said to have been released in the period 1950-54, as many as 1,455, or 27 per cent, were said to have "voluntarily" decided to remain at the farm. In 1955, among the 642 prisoners released, it is alleged that 453, or 72 per cent, asked to be allowed to re-

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[15] *People's Daily*, Sept. 7, 1954.

[16] *Ibid.*, July 3, 1955, p. 3.

697 main. Those who did remain continued to work on the farm or in its subsidiary factories. They were given better treatment than the prisoners and received wages as ordinary employees of the farm. Most of these people lived on the farm and their wives joined them in work there. Kao Anteng was made prisoner because he had commited a "counterrevolutionary crime", and, on his release, chose to remain in the livestock farming section of the farm. He has since then made his home there. His wife is now head of a production team in the straw-bags department of the farm. His elder son is an apprentice in the paper works of the farm."[17] The Communists insist that such cases are numerous.

In 1954, according to Communist sources, 180 of the released prisoners were employed at the mechanized paper works in the vicinity of Ch'ing-ho Farm. They were engaged in pulp-making, paper manufacturing, and machine tending, and in such clerical tasks as accounting and statistical work. With the exception of three counterrevolutionaries who were deprived of their political rights at the time, the released prisoners were said to have participated in the general elections of 1954, and members of the group were admitted into trade unions.

Since the punishment and reform of prisoners had been a part of farm discipline, there

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[17] NCNA, Peking, April 11, 1953; quoted in SCMP, No. 1030, p. 45.

697 was necessity for rigid control. Strict security measures were enforced along the boundaries of the farm. Those stubborn prisoners who openly resisted Reform-through-labor and carried on sabotage or tried to escape were segregated and organized into special labor groups. They were placed under strict control and given extended sentences. For example, Tu Hsi-chin, former chief of the first sub-office of Tangku-Taku Police Bureau, resisted control measures during the Reform-through-labor program and arranged the escape of six prisoners. He was arrested in Peking by the Public Security Service and brought back to the farm. After a public trial he was shot to death. Another prisoner, failing in a plan to escape, hanged himself on a tree.

IV. PEKING JAIL, A "REFORM-THROUGH-LABOR CENTER" IN PEKING

Besides Ch'ing-ho Farm, there are seven other Reform-through-labor camps in the vicinity of Peking. Peking Jail, an ordinary prison before the Communists enlarged it into a labor camp in 1949, is one of these. In appearance it looks like any ordinary factory. It includes hosiery works and shops for weaving, paper making, and printing. Two-thirds of the prisoners were once "counterrevolutionaries," and the other third were "common criminals." Among the counterrevolutionaries were "secret agents of the Kuomintang, habitual bandits, local despots, reactionary landlords, and leaders of the secret societies." Among the "common criminals" were those who

697 "ill-treated apprentices, capitalists who stole property belonging to the state and accepted bribes, violators of the marriage law, people who dealt in narcotics, and women who kept brothels."

According to an article by Chang Chung,[18] a reporter from the Communist New China News Agency who paid a visit to Peking Jail in March 1955, the inmates of the jail worked nine hours a day, six days a week. They spent two hours a day in the study of current affairs. The prisoners made their own bean curd and grew their own vegetables. In the prison compound there were six basketball courts, and the prisoners built two stages for the performance of plays and the showing of motion pictures. A co-operative in the jail sold all kinds of daily necessities; the criminals could obtain without restriction whatever they needed. Five doctors were employed to care for the prisoners. The inmates were urged to bathe once every two weeks.

The jail emphasized the education of the prisoners, according to the Communist report. Besides two hours of political study, illiterate prisoners were compelled to participate in the cultural classes. Many were said to have

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18. Chang Chung, "Reform of Criminals through Labor," People's Daily, April 1, 1955.

697 acquired a knowledge of about 1,500 Chinese characters within a short time. Take the case of criminal Yang Te-shun; in four generations no member of his family had attended school, but he was given a chance to study in jail. There was a reading room with more than 4,000 copies of magazines and many books. More than 500 fountain pens were sold in the jail co-operative during January-March 1955.

As for production, according to Communist sources, the prisoners in Peking Jail produced 8,568,000 pairs of stockings in 1953.[19] In 1954 they were able to produce each day 48,000 pairs of stockings, 300 pieces of cloth, and 200 reams of printed paper. Prisoners who had learned the skill during Reform-through-labor operated as many as 14 weaving machines per person. The reporter said that when he visited the jail he noticed that the prisoners had written on the wall of one room, "prevent accident, prevent inferior products, overfulfill production plans, and create new records." A list of names of model prisoners was also written on the wall. It is apparent that the same methods used to encourage efficiency and co-operation at Ch'ing-ho Farm are used in Peking Jail.

George Stafford Gale, a reporter for the Manchester Guardian, visited Red China in August 1954 with the British Labor Party. In his book about the trip,[20] he describes the prisoners in jail as follows: "Their work was not unduly heavy. But they made their stockings with de-

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[19] People's Daily, Sept. 7, 1954.

[20] No Flies in China, William Morrow & Co. New York, 1955, pp. 124-26.

697 dicated speed and concentration, performing repeated motions countless times a minute... mindless of any single thought or sensation save the particular primitive muscular function they were performing." As the British Labor Party delegation was about to leave, the deputy-governor of the jail assured the group that prison authorities had no trouble with the prisoners.

Other Reform-through-labor camps in Peking and Tientsin follow the patterns described above. The size and location of the camps are unknown.

V. REFORM-THROUGH-LABOR CORPS OF SHANSI PEOPLE'S COURT

A dispatch from the New China News Agency, dated November 21, 1951, reported that, according to statistics compiled in August 1951, 90 per cent of the prisoners in Shansi provincial prisons were organized into Reform-through-labor corps. The number of prisoners was estimated[21] at about 20,000 in 1952. Those who were allowed a certain measure of freedom were engaged in municipal construction and in coal mining; those who were under security control were employed in prison in the shoe factory or the blacksmith shop. The daily working period was set at nine hours, and the production stan-

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[21] Chin-jih Shih-chieh [The World Today], Hong Kong, No. 10, Aug. 1, 1955, p. 12.

697 dard was fixed according to the skill and physical strength of the prisoners.

The policy of co-ordinating compulsory labor with political education was followed by the Shansi People's Court in carrying out the Reform-through-labor policy. After a period of political indoctrination, the prisoners accepted the control measures and met the production standard. For instance, the prisoners who dug coal in Taiyuan suburban area steadily increased the quantity of coal they were able to dig. By September 1951, the average amount of coal dug by each prisoner each day was nearly three-tenth of a ton. As of 1951, the Communists allege, the labor corps in Shansi Province were self-sufficient and, since 1952, have produced "surplus value" for the Chinese People's Government.[22]

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212 The eradication of illiteracy has been a continuing process in Shansi provincial prisons, according to the Communists. As of March 1955, of the illiterate prisoners in the Shansi provincial jail, 71 per cent had acquired a knowledge of from 700 to 1,000 Chinese characters.[23]

VI. MASS LABOR PROJECTS IN THE NORTH

653 A. Water Conservation

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[22] Cheng Chu-yüan, The Slavery System of the Chinese Communists, Hong Kong, 1952, p. 79.

[23] NCNA, Peking, March 30, 1955; quoted in SCMP, No. 1020, p. 25.

653 The major water-conservation projects completed in North China by the Chinese Communists are Kuan-t'ing Reservoir on the Yung-ting River; the Ta-ch'ing River Diversion Channel; and the Fen River flood-control system.

Kuan-t'ing Reservoir. For many years, the Yung-ting River had been called "North China's Sorrow." Its flood manace is second only to that of the Yellow River ("China's Sorrow"). Seven major floods in a period of forty years had played havoc in Hopei Province. A plan for the control of the Yung-ting River, drafted by the Chihli River Commission before the Nationalist Party came into power, called for the building of a dam and reservoir at Kuan-t'ing Gorge where the Yung-ting River enters the Hopei Plain from the steep slope of the upper reaches; but nothing was done about it until October 1951.

A labor force of 50,000 peasants was mobilized to do the work.[24] The Kuan-t'ing Reservoir covers an area of 23,000 hectares (56,810 acres) and has a storage capacity of 2,370 million cubic meters (about 75,840 million cubic feet). The dam is 45 meters (147.6 feet) high and 290 meters (951 feet) long. The authorities built a small town on the construction site, fifty miles northewest of Peking, to accommodate the large body of labor. The peasants worked in shifts around the clock, in spite of the extremes of cold and heat typical of North China. In the period from October 1951 to July 1953, the Communists gave public recognition to 2,000 workers and elected them "labor models."[25] The entire project was completed in May 1954.

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[24] Kuan-t'ing Shui-k'u [Kuan-t'ing Reservoir], Shanghai, 1954, p. 17.

According to the Communists, the completion of the Kuan-t'ing Reservoir would result in an annual saving of 50,000 tons of grain to the government. Fu Tso-yi, Minister of Water Conservation, in a speech delivered at the celebration of the completion of the Kuan-t'ing Reservoir on July 13, 1954, said, "It is a project which has turned the river from a scourge into a benefit for the people."[26]

Ta-ch'ing River Diversion Channel. The Ta-ch'ing River runs across Hopei Province. The Communist plan was to build a diversion channel 48 kilometers (about 30 miles) long to relieve the pressure of flood waters during the rainy season. More than 70,000 peasants were mobilized to begin work in March 1951, and the project was completed in July 1953. Fu Tso-yi attributed its successful completion to the energies of a heroic people who contributed their strength to aid their motherland.

The Fen River Flood-Control System. The Fen River in Shansi is a tributary in the middle section of the Yellow River and helps to irrigate an area of 280,000 square kilometers (about 106,600 square miles). Since 1949, the Communists have mobilized 200,000 peasants in this region to prevent floods and to reforest the area. As of August 1955, the Communists report that the peasants had built seven artifical lakes and planted 30,000,000 trees. The area of irrigated land[27] increased from 3,400,000 *mou* (513,400 acres) in 1952 to 5,000,000 *mou* (755,000 acres) in 1955, the Communists allege.

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[25] *People's Daily*, July 2, 1953, p. 1.

[26] *Ibid.*, May 15, 1954, p. 1.

A fifty-year plan[28] to bring the Yellow River under control was announced in the second session of the National Congress of People's Representatives held in Peking in July 1955. If the Communists do carry out this project, mass labor on a vast scale will be needed for a long time to come.

B. Highway and Railway Construction

The new railways and new highways in Communist China have been constructed by forced labor to meet the needs of national defense. Apparently, their strategic value is at least as important as their economic significance. This is one of the reasons why almost all of the new railways and highways have been constructed in the Northwest and Southwest.

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[27] *Hua-ch'iao Jih-pao* [*China Daily News*], New York, August 3, 1955, p. 3.

[28] NCNA, Peking, July 11, 1955.

The only railway built in the North since the Communists seized power is the Feng-t'ai--Sha-ch'eng Line a re-routing project begun in 1952 and completed in June 1955. The line is only about 65 miles long but it is the most difficult job in railway construction ever undertaken by the Communists. The laborers had to cut across some lofty and dangerous mountain ranges and build eight bridges across the twisting Yung-ting River. The line includes 65 large tunnels and 270 culverts and bridges.[29]

The recruited civilians began work under the direction of the Engineering Corps of the "Liberation Army" at the end of 1952. The regions through which the projected line was to pass proved inhospitable, and so the builders constructed a supply line during the severe winter months in order to get building materials and food from outside.

At the beginning of 1953, the construction of the most difficult tunnels began. At first the workers had no drilling machines, and the road builders used handnpicks to do the work. When it was seen that the completion date could not be met because of the primitive methods of construction, the Communist authorities recruited

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[29] *Hsin-hua Yüeh-pao* [*New China Monthly*] Peking, Aug. 1955 pp 301 *passim*.

653 several hundred thousand civilians during 1953-54 to supplement the crew already at work. The recruits were requested to bring with them horses and wagons. Huai-lai hsien alone contributed 3,000 workers, and the farmers along the line were occasionally obliged to help. The line was opened to traffic in July 1955.

The Feng-t'ai -- Sha-ch'eng Line connects the Chi-ning -- Erh-lien and the Peking -- Pao-t'ou lines and facilitates transportation between Inner Mongolia and North China. It has strategic significance as well as economic importance.

VII. CONCLUSION

697 Although the Chinese Communists have publicized their policy of Reform-through-labor, there are few trustworthy statistics available to allow for a systematic study.

In the case of Ch'ing-ho Farm, all of the reports cited came through the New China News Agency, and there is no reason to believe these reports are reliable. Raja Hutheesing, an Indian visitor who traveled through Red China on behalf of the India-China Friendship Association[30] in September 1951 and had read a New China News Agency report on the ideal conditions at Ch'ing-ho Farm, asked to see the farm itself, but his

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[30] Raja Hutheesing, The Great Peace, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1953, pp. 184-95.

697 request was denied. It is reasonable to assume that glowing reports on Ch'ing-ho Farm are merely Communist propaganda. Even so, available information regarding forced labor, sabotage, and suicides within the labor camp gives an indication, in some measure, of what the actual conditions in the labor camp may be.

In the case of Peking Jail it is designed as the capital's showplace, a cynical choice by itself, to demonstrate the accomplishments of the Communist regime to visitors from foreign lands. But even the showplace is not be inspected too carefully. When George Stafford Gale visited the jail, he was warned neither to speak to the prisoners nor to ask for statistics.

The reports from Ch'ing-ho Farm and Peking Jail might have been designed for purposes of propaganda; still they indicate that in a Communist forced labor camp a human being does not exist as such. The value of an inmate to the camp is measured by the number of cubic feet of earth he digs or by the number of stockings he turns out. His strength is exploited to the utmost degree without regard to his fundamental human rights, and the harsh treatment he receives is justified in the name of the Communist regime,

Annex "A," Subparagraph 3i,
Economic Background

FOREIGN TRADE AND EXCHANGE

439 Geographical and Historical Background of the North China Ports

The only foreign trade ports of North China are Chinwangtao and Tientsin, both situated on the coast of Hopei Province on the Gulf of Chihli. Shansi, the only other province of the former North China Region, has no direct outlet to the sea and has never played any significant role in the foreign trade of China. Although there are now two principal customs establishments in North China -- Peking and Tientsin -- Peking is not a direct port of entry for foreign commerce.[1] The Tientsin customs office, on the other hand, has jurisdiction over two sub-offices located at Chinwangtao and Tangku the latter being the outer harbor of Tientsin itself. Of the two ports, Tientsin (or Tangku) is more important than Chinwangtao, which is primarily an outlet for coal shipments from Kailan and, economically, is more closely related to southern Manchuria than to North China. However, Chinwangtao harbor is open all year round and thus has an advantage over Tientsin, where the Hai River, leading from Tangku to the

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[1] Lun-hsien-hou Ti Ta-lu [Mainland under Occupation], Taipei, Chung-hua wen-hua ch'u-pan shih-yeh wei-yüan-hui, 1953, pp. 140-41.

439 city of Tientsin, is sometimes frozen during the winter months.

As one of the major treaty ports and manufacturing centers, Tientsin's relative importance in Chinese foreign trade is easily understandable. However, until the establishment of the Communist regime, foreign trade returns from Tientsin and Chinwangtao suggest a relative decline of these ports or, at best, stagnation. For instance, slightly over 9 per cent of Chinese imports,[2] excluding those of Manchuria were accounted for by Tientsin and Chinwangtao together in 1931; the total was 8 per cent in 1936 and only 3.4 per cent in 1946. In exports,[3] on the other hand, the relative share of Tientsin and Chinwangtao stood at 15.9 per cent in 1931, 17.6 per cent in 1936, and only 11.5 per cent in 1946. The decline of these two northern ports in China's import trade in relation to other areas before the war with Japan was unquestionably a reflection of the primary emphasis given by the Nationalist Government to the development of the economy south of the Yellow River, since political control in the northern cities was endangered by Japanese expansion. The even greater drop in the

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[2] Chinese Maritime Customs, Statistical Series, Trade of China 1936 and 1946, and Tsai Chien and Cheng Yu-kwei, Statistics of Foreign Trade of Different Chinese Ports with Various Countries (1919, 1927-1931), Shanghai, the Commercial Press, pp. 23, 47.

[3] Ibid.

439 relative position of these ports in both imports and exports after World War II was the direct result of the civil war and galloping inflation. Both developments resulted in a contraction of export supplies and the concentration of China's imports in Shanghai and and south China. As well, during this period Chinwangtao was a port for military supplies shipped to support Nationalist troops in Manchuria.

Increasing Importance of Tientsin

With the establishment of the Communist regime, the center of gravity of Chinese economic life has shifted northward. The importance of North China in foreign trade has accordingly been greatly enhanced. This development may be divided into two distinct periods, marked by the completion of the first phase of construction work on the new Tangku harbor in October 1952.[4]

Tientsin fell into the Communists' hands in November 1948, shortly after the Nationalist evacuation of Manchuria, Shanghai fell in May, 1949, and south China was occupied by the Communist army at the end of 1949. The North China ports were outside the network of the Nationalist blockade which for a time effectively prevented the Communists from using the

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[4] See Lin Li, Wo-men Ti T'ang-ku Hsin-kang [Our New Tangku Harbor] , Peking, 1954.

439 port of Shanghai. Accordingly, the volume of foreign trade through Tientsin became very important in Communist China's total foreign trade during the initial period of Communist rule. Although direct shipping from Hong Kong and foreign ports was subject to disruption by Nationalist warships patrolling the eastern and southeastern waters, some blockade runners nevertheless succeeded in reaching Tientsin. At the same time, ships from Hong Kong carrying cargo for Tientsin often took a roundabout route by sailing to Inchon in Korea where transshipments were made.[5] Thus, in the period between March and December, 1949, exports from Tientsin amounted to US$53.9 million and imports were estimated at US $ 51.4 million.[6] Since both imports and exports increased[7] month by month during 1949, the annual figures obtained by the inclusion of the figures for the first quarter would not be proportionately greater than the figures for the nine-month period. However, even on the basis of the nine-month date, Tientsin exports would be 28.7 per cent of China's total exports.[8]

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[5] Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, July 14, 1949, p. 34.

[6] Ching-chi Chou-pao [Economic Weekly] , Shanghai, Feb. 16, 1950, p. 13.

[7] Chin-pu Jih-pao [Progress Daily] , Tientsin, Jan. 15, 1950.

[8] Ching-chi Tao-pao [Economic Bulletin] , Hong Kong, July 24, 1951, pp. 2-3.

439 Significance of the New Tangku Harbor

439 504 The lifting of the Nationalist blockade, although incomplete, has removed an important cause contributing to the relative importance of Tientsin in China's foreign trade during the initial period of Communist rule. However, another factor has come into play and has more than compensated for the loss of the special advantage afforded by the port at Tientsin. This is the opening of the new Tangku harbor.

Work on the new harbor at Tangku was begun by the Japanese. Efforts were made by the Nationalists to continue construction at the close of World War II. Following the Communists' occupation of North China, construction work was resumed in August 1951. The original plan aimed at thecompletion of the first phase of construction by the end of 1952. According to a Communist report, the actual completion date was advanced to October 17, 1952.[9] The new harbor has a main navigation channel 15.2 kilometers (9.44 mi.) long, 60 meters (196.8 ft.) wide, and about 6.5 meters (21.32 ft.) in depth (10 meters at high tide). The Communist report says that 10,000-ton ocean-going ships can now be docked. Rail spurs at the harbor provide convenient connections with all the trunk lines in the Peking-Tientsin area, and connection with the five principal inland

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[9] Lin Li, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

439 waterways of the Hopei[10] plain is possible through
504 the Hai River.

439 The opening of the harbor at Tangku has resulted in a sharp drop in freight costs by eliminating the need for rail trans-shipment from Dairen, which, until 1953, served as a major port of entry for bulky industrial equipment destined for construction projects in North China. According to a Communist report,[11] total shipping volume in 1953 at Tientsin (including the old and new harbors at Tangku and the Tientsin harbor) reached 300 per cent of the corresponding volume in 1949; an additional increase of 50 per cent was recorded in the first nine months of 1954 in comparison with the corresponding period in 1953. Parallel to the increase in shipping in 1953, the value of both exports and imports at Tientsin has risen. Apparently the increase during 1953, the first year that the new harbor at Tangku was in actual use, was so rapid that, on a monthly basis, Tientsin was accounting for 60 per cent of the country's total imports and 40 per cent of its total exports.[12] This trend probably continued during the following year.

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[10] Ibid.
[11] Economic Bulletin, Dec. 31, 1954, p. 26.
[12] Lin Li, op. cit. pp. 14-15.

439 By 1954, it was reported that Tientsin's total exports for the year were 9-10 times the value reported in 1949.[13] The same report also noted a further significant increase in exports from Tientsin in the first five months of 1955.

Tangku as a port of Entry for Imports

Although the increase in exports through Tientsin has been noteworthy since the opening of the new Tangku harbor, a far greater increase in imports was reported. It is possible to assert that the new harbor planned to facilitate the flow of imports and that the expansion of exports from Tientsin was more or less incidental. That this development reflects the intensive industrial development of North and Northwest China, which are both served by the port of Tientsin, in the first Five Year Plan, appears to be indisputable.

Composition of Foreign Trade

According to one Communist report,[14] 32.1 per cent of Tientsin's imports in 1949 consisted of metals and metal products. Other major import categories included chemicals, 20.8 per cent; textiles, 14.3 per cent; oils, fats and wax, 6.8 per cent; and food, beverages, and tobacco, 2.3 per cent. Another report for 1949 mentioned large imports through Tientsin of rubber products, paper, and gunny sacks.[15] Although recent, detailed information is lacking on the percentages of different imports through Tientsin, it may be assumed that there has been a drastic reduction in the import of textile products, in the import of foods and beverages, and possibly also in the import of newsprint. Such a shift would enable the port to handle a greater amount of capital equipment and producers' goods.

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[13] China News Service, Tientsin, June 14, 1955.

[14] Yang P'o, "Hsin Chung-kuo Ti Hai-kuan Cheng-ts'e Yü Tui-wai Mou-i Cheng-ts'e," ["Customs and Foreign Trade Policy of the New China"] Ching-chi Chuan-k'an Lun-wen Hsüan [Selected Economic Essays], Peking 1951.

During 1949 the five most important exports from Tientsin were carpets, cotton piece goods, wool and woolen products, vegetable oils, and eggs and egg products.[16] Other traditional exports from Tientsin at this time consisted of straw braids and straw hats, salt, medicinal herbs, peppermint, hog bristles, kernels and nuts, intestines for sausage casings, vermicelli, etc. These commodities, which are for the most part derived from agricultural products and may have occasionally undergone some rudimentary manufacturing process, are often lumped together in Chinese parlance as "native and special products." During a foreign trade exhibition in

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15. Progress Daily, Jan. 15, 1955.
16. Ibid.

439 Tientsin in June 1955, it was officially asserted that there were over 400 such products on the export list.[17] At the same time it was stated that the export of industrial products from Tientsin in 1954 was approximately ten times the value exported in 1936.[18] While this ostensibly phenomenal increase must be discounted in view of the flexibility of the term "industrial products" and the small volume of those exports that could be regarded as falling within this category, it is nevertheless interesting to note that among the industrial exports from Tientsin were such items as glass, ephederine, sulphur black, copper sulphate, glycerine, and steel wire, in addition to the traditional cotton calico and woolen rugs. The initial result of industrial expansion in North China in recent years can be recognized. This expansion of industrial exports is all the more significant inasmuch as the export of such industrial raw materials as coal, an important export from North China in the past, may have to be drastically curtailed as a result of increasing domestic demand.

Foreign Trade Firms

As a result of trade expansion in North China during the initial period of the Communist regime, the number of foreign trade firms in Tientsin rose rapidly. According to one report, there

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17. China News Service, June 14, 1955.
18. Ibid.

439 were, in 1949, 556 independent foreign trade firms in Tientsin, including both Chinese and foreign concerns, as well as 165 branch establishments of firms whose head offices were in East China.[19] The total number of firms was twice that of the pre-Communist period. At this time, less than one-third of Tientsin's foreign trade was handled by government trading agencies.[20] However, with the expansion of state trading, the private trader has virtually disappeared.

Foreign Exchange Control

In the field of foreign exchange, government control was introduced early in the Communist period. The present system follows the general pattern of the national control. The same is true with respect to the control of gold and silver. Black-market transactions involving People's currency remittances to and from Hong Kong have not been reported for some time. However, this situation probably reflects the lack of overseas Chinese remittances to Tientsin and is not necessarily an indication of more effective control at Tientsin in comparison with other trade ports.

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19. Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, April 19, 1951 pp. 483-84.

20. Economic Bulletin, July 24, 1951, pp. 2-3.

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Annex "A"

APPENDIX A

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CONSTITUTION OF COMMUNIST CHINA

I. INTRODUCTION

The general character of the Chinese Communist Constitution -- and its relation to the 1936 Soviet Constitution -- may be indicated by an account of the way in which it was produced. In January 1953, a constitutional-drafting committee was formed, consisting of thirty-two members, of which a majority of seventeen were from the Communist Party. The drafting committee then sat idle for a year without a meeting. The Communist members made necessary revisions and decided on a draft without consulting the other members of the committee. According to a leading party theoretician, Liu Shao-ch'i,

> "While drafting the Constitution, the committee for drafting the Constitution referred to all the constitutions, past and present, of the Soviet Union as well as to the constitutions of the People's Democracies. It is obvious that the experience of the advanced socialist states, headed by the Soviet

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> Union, has been of great help to us. Our draft constitution embodies the experience of our own country and that of other countries. It is not only the product of the People's Revolutionary Movement in China, but also a product of the international socialist movement."[1]

This draft was presented as a finished product to the Constitutional Drafting Committee at its first meeting in March 1954. The Central Government announced that the Draft Constitution would be discussed by the Political Consultative Conference, the governments of the regions, the provinces, the municipalities, the democratic parties, the local branches of the People's organizations, and the military forces. This was little more than a gesture to enlist popular support. When the National People's Congress was convened, nineteen days were devoted to organizing the work of the congress, and then the Constitution was unanimously passed within one hour. The only changes made were minor changes in wording.

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1. Liu Shao-ch'i, Report on the Draft Constitution; see Current Background, No. 294, Hong Kong, American Consulate-General, Sept. 20, 1954, p. 8.

000 The Chinese Communist Constitution contains a few features which are reminiscent of the highly authoritarian and centralized imperial Chinese state and a number which are reminiscent of the structure of the Kuomintang after 1924. But in the present context the resemblance to Chinese precedent is of less significance than the resemblance to the Stalin Constitution of 1936. This is scarcely surprising in view of the manner in which the document was written. In analyzing either constitution, it is essential to remember that to the Communists a constitution is not a statement of abstract and enduring principles but one of many instruments forged to speed the struggle toward a socialist, and ultimately Communist, society. Therefore, every article must be examined in the context of what seem to be the ultimate goals of the international Communist movement.

The Chinese and Russian Constitutions are generally similar not only in basic principles, but also in wording and style, as the following juxtaposed passages will show:

USSR	COMMUNIST CHINA
Art. 1. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a	Art. 1. The People's Republic of China is a democratic state led by

socialist state of workers and peasants.	the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants.
Art. 2. The political foundation of the USSR is the Soviet of Working People's deputies which grew and became strong as a result of the overthrow of the power of the landlords and capitalists and the conquest of the dictatorship of the proletariat.	Art. 2. All power in the People's Republic of China belongs to the people. The organs through which the people exercise power are the National People's Congress and the local People's Congress. The preamble of the Chinese Constitution says: The Chinese people led by the Communist Party finally achieved their great victory in the People's revolution against imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucrat-capitalism.
Art. 4. The economic foundation of the USSR is the socialist system of economy and the socialist ownership of the instruments and means of production...	Art. 5. At present the following basic forms of ownership of means of production exist in the People's Republic of China: state ownership, that is, ownership by the whole people; co-operative ownerships, that is, collective ownership by

000 Art. 5. Socialist property in the USSR exists either in the form of state property (belonging to the whole people) or in the form of co-operative and collective farm property.	the working-masses; ownership by the individual working people; and capitalist ownership.
Art. 6. The land, its mineral wealth, waters, forests, mills, factories, mines, rail, water, and air transport, banks, communication... are state property, that is, belong to the whole people.[2]	Art. 6. Socialist Ownership: All mineral resources and water, as well as forest, undeveloped land, and other resources which are state-owned by law, are the property of the whole people.[3]

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[2] J. H. Meisel and E. S. Kozera, Material for the Study of the Soviet System, Ann Arbor, The George Wahr Publishing Company, 1950, p. 243.

[3] The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Peking, The Foreign Languages Press, 1954.

600 II. THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS AND THE SUPREME SOVIET

While the USSR and the Supreme Soviet is composed of two chambers, the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, the Chinese People's National Congress is a unicameral system. The Chinese State has been unitary for two millennia and the Communist Constitution contains no provision parallel to those concerning the Federal Republics of the Soviet Union.

USSR	COMMUNIST CHINA
Art. 30. The highest organ of state power in the USSR is the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.	Art. 21. The National People's Congress is the highest organ of state authority in the People's Republic of China.
Art. 32. The legislative power of the USSR is exercised by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.	Art. 22. The National People's Congress is the only legislative authority in the country.

As the power of a national congress in a unitary state is unlimited, it can make laws

600 on any subject. The drafters of the Chinese Communist Constitution failed to understand the distinction between the Soviet federal state and the Chinese unitary state and have quite unnecessarily specified the powers of their national congress as if China were a federal union.

The Chinese National People's Congress is indirectly elected. According to Article 23 of the Constitution: The National People's Congress is composed of deputies elected by the provinces, autonomous municipalities directly under central authority, the armed forces, and the Chinese residents abroad. There are several electoral levels within each province. The hsiang is the lowest unit of local government, and the congress of a hsiang is elected by the population. Above it, the county congress is composed of deputies elected by the hsiang congresses, and the provincial congress is then composed of deputies elected by the county congresses. Members of the National People's Congress are elected by the provincial congresses. Under this system of election, the intermediate layers -- the hsiang congress, the county congress, and the provincial congress -- make it difficult for the public to see the true relation between promises made by members of congresses and their fulfillment to their

000 ultimate constituencies. The Chinese Communist Party can easily manipulate the small number of deputies involved on each level.

After the military conquest of the Mainland, Communist prestige reached a new high. When the election of people's congresses was instituted, the Communists generally won a majority of at least 60 per cent on all levels of government. The Chinese Communist Party is confident of its powerful influence over the people and over all other political groups.

This one-party rule is somewhat obscured because other democratic groups are allowed to exist and to sit in the National People's Congress. Their leaders have been elected as deputy-chairmen under Liu Shao-ch'i. The preamble of the Constitution explicity states: "In the course of the great struggle to establish the People's Republic of China, the people of our country forged a broad people's democratic united front, composed of all democratic classes, democratic parties, and groups, and popular organizations, and led by the Communist Party of China."[4]

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[4] The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Peking, The Foreign Languages Press, 1954.

000 In reality, these non-Communist leaders have no power and are used by the Communists as a facade.

III. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE STATE COUNCIL

The position of Mao Tse-tung as the Chairman of the People's Republic of China is unique in the Communist world. This position is found neither in the Soviet government nor in the "People's democracies." Stalin said, "The USSR should not have an individual president elected by the entire population on an equal basis with the Supreme Soviet, who might essay to stand out against the Supreme Soviet."[5] It was explained by Soviet jurists that Stalin was referring to men like Napoleon and Hindenburg who rose above the state they were to serve. This consideration does not appear to have concerned the Chinese Communists. While the president of the Presidium of the USSR is a titular head, Mao Tse-tung represents the People's Republic in its relations with foreign states, commands the armed forces of the country, promulgates laws and decrees, and appoints or removes the Premier, Vice-Premier, and ministers. It is clear that Mao is an individual president, deviating from the collective presidency system

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[5] Julian Towster, Political Power in the USSR, Oxford Press, New York, 1948, p. 263.

000 of Soviet Russia, regardless of Liu Shao-ch'i's statement that "Ours is a collective head of state."[6]

Another divergence from the Soviet Constitutional pattern is the Chinese State Council. In the USSR the Council of Ministers, including its chairman or premier, is appointed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, but in China the premier is recommended first by the Chairman of the People's Republic and then accepted or rejected by the National People's Congress. Again, the ministers of the State Council are not, like the Council of Ministers in the USSR, appointed by the Presidium, but are recommended first by the premier and then accepted or rejected by the National People's Congress, or by the Standing Committee when the Congress is in recess. The Chinese Standing Committees' inability to appoint the premier means that it is less powerful than its counterpart, the Presidium of the USSR. The division of powers to appoint the premier and ministers in China may in part result from concern over the personal relations of the three top leaders.

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[6] Liu Shao-ch'i, op. cit., p. 15.

~~000~~ Mao Tse-tung, as Chairman of the Republic, may wish to have a share in the choice of Premier; Chou En-lai may be reluctant to have his premiership decided by Liu Shao-ch'i, who, as Chairman of the National Congress and the Standing Committee, would then appear superior to Chou.

In both China and the Soviet Union the ministers are directly subordinate to the State Council. In the Constitution of the Soviet Union, thirty all-union ministries are enumerated. Communist China has the following, similar list: Internal Affairs; Foreign Affairs; National Defense; Public Security; Justice; Control; State Planning; State Construction; Finance; Food; Commerce; Foreign Trade; First Ministry of Machine Building; Second Ministry of Machine Building; Fuel Industry; Geology; Building-Industry; Textile Industry; Local Industry; Railways; Communication; Post and Telecommunication; Agriculture; Forestry and Reclamation; Water Conservation; Labor; Cultural Affairs; Higher Education; Education; Public Health; Physical Education; Nationalities Affairs; and Overseas Chinese Affairs. Eight administrative offices attached to the State Council co-ordinate the elaborately subdivided work of the ministries.

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IV. THE STANDING COMMITTEE AND THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET

The functions of the Standing Committee in China are the same as those of the Presidium of the USSR, except that the Standing Committee's power of appointment is limited to vice-premiers and ministers.

USSR	COMMUNIST CHINA
Art. 49. The presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: (a) convenes the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; (b) issues decrees; (c) gives interpretations of the laws of the USSR in operation; (d) dissolves the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in conformity with Article 57 of the constitution of the USSR and	Art. 31. The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress exercises the following functions and powers: (1) to conduct the election of deputies to the National People's Congress; (2) to convene the National People's Congress; (3) to interpret the laws; (4) to adopt decrees; (5) to supervise the work of the State Council, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate; (6) to annul decisions and

orders new elections; (e) conducts nationwide polls (referendum) on its own initiative or on the demand of one of the Union Republics; (f) annuls decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and of the council of ministers of the Union Republics if they do not conform to law; (g) in the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, releases and appoints ministers of the USSR on the recommendation of the Chairman of the council of ministers of the USSR subject to

orders of the State Council which contravene the Constitution, laws, and decrees; (7) to revise or annul inappropriate decisions issued by the government authorities of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central authority; (8) to decide on the appointment or removal of any Vice-Premier, Minister, head of commission, or secretary-general of the State Council when the National People's Congress is not in session; (9) to appoint or remove the vice-presidents, judges, and other members of the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People's Court; (10) to appoint or remove the deputy chief procurators, procurators, and other members of the Procuratorial Committee of the Supreme People's

600 subsequent confirmation by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; (h) institutes decorations (orders and medals) and titles of honor of the USSR; (i) awards orders and medals and confers titles of honor of the USSR; (j) exercises the right of pardon; (k) institutes military titles, diplomatic ranks, and other special titles; (l) appoints and removes the high command of the Armed Forces of the USSR; (m) in the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, proclaims a state of war in the event of military attack on

Procuratorate; (11) to decide on the appointment or recall of plenipotentiary representatives to foreign state; (12) to decide on the ratification or abrogation of treaties concluded with foreign states; (13) to institute military, diplomatic and other special titles and ranks; (14) to institute and decide on the award of state orders, medals, and titles of honor; (15) to decide on the granting of pardons; (16) to decide when the National People's Congress is not in session, on the proclamation of a state of war in the event of armed attack on the country or in fulfillment of internation treaty obligations concerning common defense against aggression; (17) to decide on general or partial mobilization; (18) to

900 on the USSR or when necessary to fulfill international treaty obligations concerning mutual defense against aggression; (n) orders general or partial mobilization; (o) ratifies and denounces international treaties of the USSR; (p) appoints and recalls plenipotentiary representatives of the USSR to foreign states; (q) receives the letters of credence and recall of diplomatic representatives accreditied to it by foreign states; and (r) proclaims martial law in separate localities or throughout the USSR in the interest of the defense of the USSR or of the maintenance of public order and the security of the state.

Art. 48. The presidium of the

decide on the enforcement of martial law throughout the country or in certain areas; and (19) to exercise such other functions and powers as are vested in it by the National People's Congress.

Art. 33. The Standing Committee of the National

500 Supreme Soviet of the USSR is accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for all its activities.[7]

People's Congress is responsible to the National People's Congress and reports to it.[8]

V. THE JUDICIARY

Article 78 of the Chinese Communist Constitution states that in administering justice the People's Court is independent, subject only to the law. And, according to Article 85, "citizens of the People's Republic are equal before the law." However, the first article of the Constitution says that the People's Republic is based on the alliance of the workers and peasants. This wording clearly shows that capitalists and landlords are much less privileged than workers and peasants.

The president of a People's Court is not a judge appointed for life. He is elected by the People's Congress on the corresponding level. In addition to the judge, there are assessors, according to Article 25 of the organic law of People's Courts and People's Procuratorates. With the exception of those deprived of political rights, citizens who have reached the age of twenty-three, and have the right to elect, may be elected as assessors.

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[7] The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Peking, The Foreign Languages Press, 1954.

[8] Meisel and Kozera, op. cit., p. 236.

Cases of the first instance in the People's Courts are heard in full court composed of judges and People's assessors. The People's Court is responsible to the People's Congress on the corresponding level; it is not independent. The Six Codes instituted during the Kuomintang period have been declared null and void; the newly issued Communist laws and ordinances are instruments of Communist political policy.

The judicial systems of Soviet Russia and Communist China are similar in spirit and letter, as the following comparisons will show.

USSR	COMMUNIST CHINA
Art. 112. Judges are independent and subject only to the law.	Art. 78. In administering justice the people's courts are independent, subject only to the law.

ooo **Art. 103.** In all courts cases are tried with the participation of people's assessors, except in cases specially provided for by law.	**Art. 75.** The system of people's assessors applies, in accordance with law, to judicial proceeding in the People's Courts.
Art. 110. Judicial proceedings are conducted in the language of the Union Republic, autonomous republic, or autonomous region, persons not knowing this language being guaranteed the opportunity of fully acquainting themselves with the material of the case through an interpreter and, likewise, the right to use their own language in court.[9]	**Art. 77.** Citizens of all nationalities have the right to use their own spoken and written languages in court proceedings. The People's Court are to provide interpretations for any party unacquainted with the spoken and written languages commonly used in the locality.[10]

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[9] The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Peking, The Foreign Languages Press, 1954.

[10] Meisel and Kozera, op. cit., p. 236.

VI. LOCAL GOVERNMENT

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An examination of the powers of annulment in local government from the province down to the *hsiang* will show how the power of governing the localities is centralized according to an hierarchical principle. The fourth paragraph of Article 40 of the Constitution reads, "The People's Congresses at county level and above have power to revise or annul inappropriate decisions issued by People's Congresses at the lower level as well as inappropriate decisions issued by People's Councils at the next lower level."[11]

VII. CITIZENS RIGHTS

Communists believe that class determines the rights of the individual in society. They disavow the theory of natural rights, and argue that the rights of landlords and capitalists should be eliminated. When the proletarian dictatorship was established in Soviet Russia, the property of the landlords and the capitalists was confiscated. The same thing happened to Chinese landlords and capitalists throughout the country after 1949. Under the Chinese Communist Constitution, the right to property is not guaranteed.

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[11] *Ibid.*

600 With regard to other rights, the language of the Chinese Constitution is generous only on the surface. According to Article 87: "Citizens ... have freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom of procession, and freedom of demonstration. By providing the necessary material facilities, the state guarantees to citizens enjoyment of these freedoms." However, "freedom of association" in Communist China does not apply to groups which are deemed subversive, and anything which challenges orthodox Communist teaching is deemed subversive. The great majority of the newspapers are government-owned or Party-owned, and the news to be published is under the control of the New China News Agency; the newspapers of the other democratic groups can only publish or write as they are instructed.

Article 89 says that "freedom of the person of citizens . . . is inviolable." In reality, each person is a member of the urban street office, or urban inhabitants' committee, with the result that he is under the watch of Party members. Each must deposit his cash in a bank, which is situated at the corner of a street, and his bank account can be examined, so there is little freedom to dispose of one's own money. A Party member or a policeman may question anyone about his neighbors, and visitors must be reported.

000 The Russian Communists call the modern Western European and American views of civil rights "formal." By this, they insinuate that, while according to the letter of the Western European and American constitutions each citizen supposedly enjoys the same rights, in fact, however, a workman or a peasant never enjoys the same rights as a landlord or a capitalist. The Russians claim to reject this Western interpretation and to look at the question in the light of the common practice. Stalin says in his article, "The Principal Specific Features of the Draft Constitution,"

> "Bourgeois constitutions usually confine themselves to stating the formal rights of citizens, without bothering about the conditions for the exercise of these rights . . . . What distinguishes the draft of the new Constitution is the fact that it does not confine itself to stating the formal rights of citizens, but stresses the guarantees of these rights, the means by which these rights can be exercised. It does not merely proclaim equality of rights for citizens, but insures it by giving legislative embodiment to the fact that the regime of exploitation has been

abolished, to the fact that the citizens have been emancipated from all exploitation."[12]

VIII. CONCLUSION

Because the Chinese Communist Constitution is only a legal document, one must seek the reality behind it.

The Chinese Communist Party has always aimed at seizing and maintaining power; its war machine, its organizations, its propaganda, and its discipline are directed to this end.

In order to attain a monopoly of power, the Chinese Communists have worked to remove all obstacles. From Lenin, they have learned that civil rights are an obstacle, that separation of powers is an obstacle, that direct elections are an obstacle. Since there had been little knowledge of these democratic ideas among the people of China, their elimination has proved relatively easy. The Chinese Communists have been able to use new and effective techniques of control to consolidate a dictatorial power beyond the dreams of earlier Chinese autocrats.

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[12] Meisel and Kozera, op. cit., p. 236.

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[For details of Communist policies toward various sociological, political, and economic aspects of present-day China, see the entire text in category 116.]